Paper on centralisation of procurement and competition law

Ignacio Herrera Anchustegui, from BECCLE - University of Bergen, and I have just completed a working paper on the new rules on centralisation and occasional procurement under articles 37-39 of Directive 2014/24. The paper assesses the risks, rationale and justification for the rules on centralisation and aggregation of public procurement in Directive 2014/24. The paper is entitled "Impact of public procurement aggregation on competition. Risks, rationale and justification for the rules in Directive 2014/24" and is now part of the University of Leicester School of Law Research Paper Series.
 
The paper explores the justifications advanced for the aggregation of purchasing and the countervailing risks it generates. In both cases, it focusses in economic and administrative aspects. It then proceeds to a summary overview of the new rules for the aggregation of public procurement in Directive 2014/24, and emphasised how the Directive is expressly recognising possibilities that clearly exceed the more modest approach in Directive 2004/18. Moving on, it then focusses on the potential justification for certain activities now permitted by the 2014 rules, and engages in a critical assessment of their competitive impact. The paper briefly highlights the far-reaching and not necessarily positive implications that a maximisation of the centralisation and aggregation possibilities under Directive 2014/24 could have, and proposes that strict competition law enforcement will be necessary to avoid undesired consequences. Some suggestions for further research are provided by way of conclusions.
 
The full paper is available for download on SSRN. Its full citation is:

Sánchez Graells, Albert and Herrera Anchustegui, Ignacio, Impact of Public Procurement Aggregation on Competition. Risks, Rationale and Justification for the Rules in Directive 2014/24 (December 5, 2014). University of Leicester School of Law Research Paper No. 14-35. Available at SSRN:  
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2534496.
 
 

Competition lawyers, please, please, please be aware of public procurement rules: A comment on Bornico & Walden (2011)

I have just read L Bornico & I Walden, 'Ensuring Competition in the Clouds: The Role of Competition Law?' (2011) 12(2) ERA Forum 265-85 (part of the largest QMUL Cloud Legal Project) and have been, once more, surprised at the complete oversight of the public procurement rules that would have been relevant to the competition law analysis.

The paper engages in an exploratory analysis of the role of EU competition law could have in keeping the cloud computing industry competitive and, if possible at all, free from (potential) abuses of dominance by its main players. The paper has the good intuition to suggest that public procurement decisions by governments may play a key role in either the promotion of undistorted competition (if they opt for transparent standards based on interoperability) or, on the contrary, the creation of a very concentrated and potentially monopolistic market structure (if they unduly impose specific technological solutions). This is a very important point, and one that public procurement economists and commentators have been stressing for a long time.

However, when the paper moves on to suggest how to legally prevent and control those issues, it is completely oblivious to the existence of EU public procurement rules. Indeed, Bornico & Walden indicate that, where the contracting authority imposes a given (propietary) technological solution
... harmed competitors may challenge the choice of the public administration alleging that their specifications fit best the requirements ... or may challenge the behaviour of the firm whose specifications were chosen, but only if the firm can be considered dominant. More importantly competitors may challenge the choice of the public administration under Article 107 TFEU if the outcome of public procurement distorts competition.  The choice of formal specifications may soon be a source of disputes in the EU market, along the lines of the Google dispute in the US [by reference to  Google Inc. and Onix Networking Corporation v. The United States and Softchoice Corporation (United States Court of Federal Claims 2011)]; although it is too early to tell how technological choices made by public administrations will be dealt with by competition authorities in the EU. (p. 27, emphasis added).
There are three important points to stress here. Firstly, this is nothing new, but State aid litigation based on public procurement decisions is very limited, generally unsuccessful, and likely to be 'phagocytised' by 'pure' procurement litigation [for an extended discussion, see A Sanchez Graells, 'Enforcement of State Aid Rules for Services of General Economic Interest before Public Procurement Review Bodies and Courts' (2014) 10(1) Competition Law Review 3-34]. 

Secondly, aggrieved competitors would have a much better shot under the applicable rules on the design of technical specifications. Indeed, it has long been the position of the ECJ, now consolidated in the applicable Directives 2004/18 (and/or 2014/24, where transposed), that '[u]nless justified by the subject-matter of the contract, technical specifications shall not refer to a specific make or source, or a particular process, or to trade marks, patents, types or a specific origin or production with the effect of favouring or eliminating certain undertakings or certain products. Such reference shall be permitted on an exceptional basis, where a sufficiently precise and intelligible description of the subject-matter of the contract ... is not possible; such reference shall be accompanied by the words "or equivalent".' (emphasis added) [art 23(8) dir 2004/18, and now art 42(4) dir 2014/24; for discussion, see S Arrowsmith, The Law of Public and Utilities Procurement. Regulation in the EU and UK, 3rd edn, vol. 1 (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2014) 254-55 and 1068 ; and A Sanchez Graells, Public procurement and the EU competition rules (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2011) 271-72]. Consequently, specific technological choices that excluded equivalent solutions would immediately be in breach of EU public procurement rules.

Thirdly, a breach of those rules gives aggrieved bidders and other interested economic operators a ground to challenge the procurement procedure before domestic courts or procurement complaints boards, under the provisions of Directives 89/665 and 92/13 (as amended by dir 2007/66). This is a much clearer litigation path and one that would yield much better results to disappointed bidders and competing (technological) firms.

Consequently, in this specific area, competition law is not the best tool to achieve pro-competitive results in the public procurement setting. Public procurement law is. So, competition lawyers, please familiarise yourselves with public procurement rules. In the end, they are two sides of the same coin [C Munro, ‘Competition Law and Public Procurement: Two Sides of the Same Coin?’ (2006) 15 Public Procurement Law Review 352; and A Sanchez Graells, 'Competition Law Against Public Restraints in the Public Procurement Field: Importing Competition Considerations into the EU Public Procurement Directives' (2010)].

Neighbouring the Uber conflicts: AG Wahl's Opinion on London's bus/taxi lanes as State aid (C-518/13)

The attention raised by recent complaints and strikes against Uber's intended revolution of the local ground transportation system in big cities has put the taxi sector on the spotlight. This is a sector where competition rules have always been difficult to enforce due to the heavy regulation to which it is subjected. Some claim that it is a sector ripe for proper deregulation and liberalisation. Others claim the opposite [for recent discussion, see L Eskenazi, 'The French Taxi Case: Where Competition Meets—and Overrides—Regulation' (2014) Journal of European Competition Law & Practice].
 
In the middle of this turmoil, there is now a new dimension to consider: whether any of the rules concerned with the taxi activities amount to State aid. With this background in mind, it is interesting to consider AG Wahl's Opinion in Eventech, C-518/13, EU:C:2014:2239, where the CJEU has been asked by the UK's Court of Appeal (England and Wales)
whether a contested London bus lane policy adopted by Transport for London comes within the concept of ‘aid’ under Article 107(1) TFEU. Under that policy, only black cabs (that is to say, London taxis) are allowed, during certain periods of the day, to use the lane reserved for public buses on public roads, to the exclusion of private hire vehicles (PHVs).
Given that this is a very common rule in many large cities (in Europe, and elsewhere), depending on the answer, the case is bound to create a new wave of shock in the taxi sector. Indeed, as AG Wahl consciously stresses, 'taxis and PHVs are engaged in fierce competition with each other across Europe, and London is not the only city where conflicts have arisen'. In my view, there are several points of AG Wahl's Eventech Opinion worth stressing.
 
(1) Firstly, even if it is probably common knowledge, AG Wahl stresses the fact that black cabs hold a partial monopoly on the provision of taxi services in the UK, which creates an assymetrical access to the market between them and PHVs. Indeed, 'black cabs have a partial legal monopoly. They alone may ‘ply for hire’, that is to say, be picked up at a cab rank or be hailed from the street. However, both black cabs and PHVs may provide their services in respect of pre-booked journeys. As to the extent to which black cabs operate on the market for pre-bookings, according to evidence submitted to the High Court of Justice, a 2009 survey showed that 8 % of black cab journeys were pre-booked' (para 19).
 
However, it is unclear how this can be relevant for the assessment from a State aid perspective (given the fact that everyone accepts that the 'bus lane' policy has a distortive effect on competition, see para 18), if not to tilt it towards a finding against the existence of State aid on the basis of a lack of selectivity based on the different 'legal standing' of both types of taxi undertakings. In my view, this is an important logic trap in AG Wahl's Opinion.
 
(2) Secondly, AG Wahl engages in a rather counterintuitive approach to the issue of the transfer of State resources. The AG decides to assess the question from the perspective of the regulatory powers of the Member State and fundamentally concludes that in the exercise of those regulatory powers, there is no obligation to impose a charge for access to public infrastructure (paras 24-35). However, in my view, this is a faulty approach for two reasons.
 
(a) Specifically, because the 'economic' argument that AG Wahl develops is truly unfocussed. Indeed, he considers that
If, for the sake of argument, the State aid rules were interpreted as generally requiring Member States to charge for access to public infrastructure or State-controlled resources, this might deter States from creating or opening up areas to which there has previously been no, or only limited access (sic). Equally, it might deter undertakings from participating in that process. For example, in the matter under consideration, if black cabs were required to pay for access to bus lanes, that might deter certain of them from requesting access, which might result in access being given only to the economically most resourceful, thus defeating the purpose of the policy (para 30, emphasis added).
The argument is not fully developed or particularly clear, but it goes against a consideration of economic efficiency (why wouldn't we generally prefer economically resourceful over other competitors, provided there is no predation?). More importantly, it also avoids the obvious issue that, given the limited number of black cab licences and the difficulty in obtaining one (not least, due to cost issues), a benefit is implicitly being recognised in favour of black cabs over PHVs, which can be exactly advantaging the economically most resourceful (ie, those that manage to have a black cab licence) over others. Hence, on top of the argument being economically flawed, it is also myopic and internally inconsistent.
 
(b) More generally, and perhaps more importantly, the test being applied by AG Wahl in Eventech deviates from the general test applicable under art 102 TFEU to access to essential facilities under private property. In my view, the CJEU's Judgment in IMS Health, C-418/01, EU:C:2004:257 must be taken into consideration. Importantly, under that line of case law, one of the paramount issues when assessing the withholding of access to an essential facility that results in the reserve of an activity to the owner of the facility is to consider whether there is (potential or unsatisfied) consumer demand for a service that is not being provided (or not in sufficient amounts) [see for instance, Geradin's remarks].
 
Moreover, under similar regulatory conditions (ie where there is a partial reserve of certain services but an open market for others), the CJEU's Judgment in Höfner and Elser v Macrotron, C-41/90, EU:C:1991:161 is also relevant. Here, the CJEU determined that it is unjustified to reserve the provision of a given service in favour of an undertaking (or an emanation of the State) that is unable to meet demand for that service--or, in the words of the Court, where the beneficiary of the reserved activity is 'manifestly incapable of satisfying demand prevailing on the market for such activities.'
 
In my view, the combined rationale of these lines of case law should have been taken into account in the Eventech Opinion. Given that only 8% of pre-booked taxi services are carried out by black cabs, it is plain to see that a rule that can potentially reserve to them a larger tranche of the market is bound to create problems of sufficient provision and consumer satisfaction. Moreover, at least as a matter of principle, consistency in the rules applicable to publicly and privately owned essential facilities should be pursued.
 
(3) Finally, it is clear that the whole of AG Wahl's Opinion is drafted in a way that intends to make it hinge on an assessment of 'equality' or 'comparability' of legal position between black cabs and PHVs--which basically kills the issue and passes the hot potato back to the Court of Appeal. AG Wahl makes this clear in his interim conclusion by stressing that 'I propose that the Court should answer Question 1 to the effect that, on a proper construction of Article 107(1) TFEU, where State authorities make a bus lane on a public road available to black cabs but not to PHVs during the hours of operation of that bus lane, that does not involve a transfer of ‘State resources’, provided that all comparable undertakings are granted access on equal terms, which falls to be verified by the referring court' (para 46, emphasis added). He then, at points reluctantly, goes on to sketch the conditions for that assessment of 'comparability' between black cabs and PHVs (remember the logic trap).
 
In order to delineate the framework for analysis, AG Wahl interprets (rectius, rephrases) the questions referred by the Court of Appeal and considers that it 'in reality wishes to know whether selectivity is to be assessed solely on the basis of the market on which both black cabs and PHVs compete (that is to say, the market for pre-bookings), or whether it ought to include the ‘ply for hire’ market. This is arguably a decisive issue in the case under consideration' (para 53). That is, AG Wahl restricts the issue to the relevance of the assymetrical competition between black cabs and PHVs.
 
Even if he will timidly stress the need for any differences of treatment to be justified and proportionate (paras 72-73, ie  the bus lane policy 'does not amount to ‘favouring certain undertakings’, provided that those authorities show (i) that taxis and private hire vehicles are not legally and factually comparable, owing to objective considerations relating to the safety and efficiency of the transport system, and (ii) that such a measure is suitable for achieving that objective and does not go beyond what is necessary in order to achieve it', para 74), the AG very easily accepts that 'although I consider black cabs to be comparable to PHVs on the market for pre-bookings, they are not comparable in all respects. I can therefore accept, as a matter of principle, that, on the combined relevant markets, the objective consisting in the creation of a safe and efficient transport system may mean that black cabs are not comparable to PHVs' (para 70, emphasis in the original).
 
However, in my view, this derives from a logically flawed argument that derives from the weight given to the pre-existing regulation of the taxi market. Indeed, it is worth stressing that AG Wahl accepts the lack of comparability in principle on the basis of the following:
61. [...] taxis provide a service which supplements the existing methods of public transportation and which, in some ways, can arguably be assimilated to a universal public service. At a time when methods of communication were less developed, being able to hail a taxi from the street or to pick one up from a cab rank was an essential alternative to the other methods of transportation available. This is the reason why black cabs traditionally have a monopoly on ‘ply for hire’ journeys, and the same reason why taxis in many cities across Europe enjoy similar privileges, including the right to use bus lanes.
62. Moreover [...] a mere 8 % of black cab journeys are pre-booked. Accordingly, I am not persuaded that the pre-booked market is the only significant market on which black cabs operate. In this connection, although it does not appear self-evident to me, it has not escaped my attention that the High Court in its judgment found that ‘[i]t would clearly not be possible to legislate that … black cabs could not use the bus lane when carrying a pre-booked passenger’. With that in mind, there appears to be no justification for limiting the assessment to the market for pre-bookings alone. (footnotes omitted and emphasis added).
What I think has escaped the AG's attention is that the relevant setting is not to determine where do black cabs operate, but where do they compete. If that is kept in mind, but for the anachronic and currently unjustified exclusive right to carry out 'ply for hire' journeys that black cabs retain, either all journeys would become pre-booked (if their right was simply erased and no taxi could be hailed on the streets, which is not plausible) or both black cabs and PHVs would compete for all services, which would erase the issue of comparability and assymetrical competition. Hence, making the whole analysis rely on the existence of a currently unjustified regulatory restriction makes the argument very weak and difficult to justify, particularly if a measure that distorts competition in the only market where PHVs can be present is being analysed, as is the case in Eventech.
 
(4) Consequently, for all the above, I would have preferred it if AG Wahl would have avoided the logic trap and more clearly emphasised that there is no good reason to provide discriminatory access to a public essential facility to black cabs over PHVs, which is plainly the conclusion that I think would derive from any other competition law assessment under a more general framework.
 
Implicitly, AG Wahl has been very deferential towards a sector that, as has been clear, is currently fighting to keep a monopoly that is increasingly difficult to justify (if possible at all). This is hardly a progressive Opinion. Consequently, I would like to see the CJEU deviate from his advice in Eventech and to finally rule that the State aid rules apply in this case and that the implicit extension of the reserved activities for black cabs that the bus lane rules create is contrary to the rules on State aid. I will most likely be disappointed, though.

GC pushes for overcompliance with EU public procurement rules in the provision of public services (T-309/12)

In its Judgment in Zweckverband Tierkörperbeseitigung v Commission, T-309/12, EU:T:2014:676, the GC has assessed the compatibility with EU State aid rules of a system of financial support to the maintenance of reserve animal disposal capacity in the case of epizootic. It is a very long and complicated Judgment and its reading is not easy, as the only available versions are in French and German. However, it is a case that should not go unnoticed. In my view, it raises two very fundamental questions where the position of the GC (and the Commission) is at least highly contentious and it will be good to see if a further appeal to the CJEU opens a door to some clarification in this area of EU economic law.
 
The first contentious issue is the economic or non-economic character of the activity at stake. In para 86 of the Judgment [and relying by analogy on the reasoning in FENIN, C-205/03, EU:C:2006:453 at para 26 and in Mitteldeutsche Flughafen and Flughafen Leipzig-Halle v Commission, C-288/11 P, EU:C:2012:821 at para 44 (but quoting its own argument in T-443/08 at para 95, which the CJEU later endorsed)] the GC concludes that "even if it is true that the applicant was required to maintain a reserve capacity in the event of an epidemic (rectius, epizootic), it does not mean that the implementation of this obligation by the applicant was related to the exercise of the prerogatives of public power" (emphasis added). In my view, and for reasons that I still need to articulate fully, this does not make good sense. However, this is a point I would like to reserve for the near future.
 
The second contentious issue is that, in the overall assessment of the GC, the fact that the arrangement between the affected German lander (and a multiplicity of regional and local authorities) and the public undertaking providing the reserve animal disposal capacity in the case of epizootic was covered by exceptions to the EU public procurement rules (either under the Teckal in-house exception or the Hamburg public-public cooperation exception, which is not entirely clear in the case) did not have any effect on the application of the Altmark criteria to the case. I know that this is an issue riddled with nuances and jargon stemming from public procurement rules, but I will try to disentangle it in a way that shows the difficulty created by the GC finding, as I see it.
 
Under the Altmark criteria (4th condition), compliance with applicable public procurement rules is a requirement for State aid granted to the provider of services of economic interest (acknowledgely, an issue related with the first point) to be compatible with Articles 107(1) and 106(2) SGEI (rectius, for State aid not to exist due to the lack of economic advantage) [for discussion, see A Sánchez Graells (2013), "The Commission’s Modernization Agenda for Procurement and SGEI" in E  Szyszczak & J van de Gronden (eds.), Financing SGEIs: State Aid Reform and Modernisation, Series Legal Issues of Services of General Interest (TMC Asser Press/Springer) 161-181]. In the absence of procurement procedures for the selection of the provider, the level of economic support needs to be "determined on the basis of an analysis of the costs which a typical undertaking, well run and adequately provided with [material means] so as to be able to meet the necessary public service requirements, would have incurred in discharging those obligations, taking into account the relevant receipts and a reasonable profit for discharging the obligations". This is a fiendish exercise and, generally speaking, procurement is a much easier road. Hence, structurally, there is a clear pressure on public authorities to resort to procurement procedures in order to be on the safe side re compliance with State aid rules.
 
At the same time, however, it should be highlighted that public authorities have no obligation to resort to the market in order to discharge their (public service) missions and they are fundamentally free to either cooperate with other public authorities (Hamburg) or entrust the execution of those activities in-house (Teckal). This is an area where the clash between EU Institutions and Member States has been evident and the recently approved Directive 2014/24 tries to provide a compromise solution in Art 12 by recognising that in those cases a public procurement procedure is not required (and allowing for the instrumental entities used to even carry out market activities up to a 20% of their average total turnover). 
 
In my view, the fact that public procurement rules allow for the avoidance of public tenders in the award of public contracts [including those for the provision of public services (broadly defined)] to public undertakings or other contracting authorities, creates a difficulty from a State aid/procurement interaction perspective. The basic difficulty derives from the fact that a perfectly legal decision to keep certain activities within the public sector creates very significant difficulties for the funding of that activity as soon as there is any (potential) interaction with the market--which, at least under the new rules in Art 12 of Dir 2014/24, is also a perfectly legal situation. This is a structural problem of coordination of both sets of rules that comes to put pressure on the viability of keeping the Altmark criteria untouched.
 
Indeed, following the general reasoning of the GC in Zweckverband Tierkörperbeseitigung, the absence of a procurement procedure (despite the fact that it was not required) excludes the possibility to benefit from the presumption set out in the 4th Altmark condition and creates a significant risk of breach of EU State aid rules. From the perspective of the consistency of the procurement system and the effectiveness of the general consensus that the procurement rules "should [not] deal with the liberalisation of services of general economic interest, reserved to public or private entities, or with the privatisation of public entities providing services" [Rec (6) Dir 2014/24] , this is problematic. The increased risks of infringement of State aid rules brings a very important limitation on the contracting authorities' actual freedom to resort to schemes covered by Art 12 of Directive 2014/24 and creates a clear incentive for overcompliance with public procurement rules.
 
Regardless of the benefits that more compliance with procurement rules and public tenders could bring about, the clear limits that EU constitutional rules (and the principle of neutrality of ownership in Art 345 TFEU in particular) create need to be respected and duly acknowldeged. Hence the difficulty in coordinating all these sets of provisions in a manner that is respectful with both the split of competences between Member States and the EU, and the effectiveness of EU State aid rules.
 
In my view, the CJEU should use the opportunity to clarify these complicated issues in case the GC's Zweckverband Tierkörperbeseitigung Judgment is further appealed. In the meantime, there are lots of issues that require further thought and, in particular, how to exactly reach the adequate balance in the coordination of both sets of rules.

... and Cut! Lights Out for the €274mn Spanish "Ciudad de la Luz" Film Studios (T-319/12)

In its Judgment of 3 July 2014 in Spain v Commission (Ciudad de la Luz), joined cases T-319/12 and T-321/12, EU:T:2014:604 (not available in English), the General Court (GC) reviewed Commission's Decision (2012) 3025 final and assessed the compatibility of a Spanish support scheme for the development of the Ciudad de la Luz film studios (a project initially promoted by the late Luis Garcia Berlanga) with the rules on State aid in Articles 107-109 TFEU.
The GC found the aid to be incompatible with the internal market and confirmed the obligation of the Valencia Regional Government to divest its €274mn stake in the film studios, where it originally invested in 2000. The Judgment raises some interesting points on the application of the market investor test to the development of this sort of culture-related facilities.
 
Firstly, at paras 38 to 45, the GC rejects any obligation of the European Commission to take into consideration average returns in a given sector, particularly where they are affected by a lack of data or there are concerns about their reliability. The GC clarifies, following the Judgment in Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Commission [joined cases T-228/99 and T-233/99, EU:T:2003:57] that the average return is one amongst many factors that the Commission may take into account when assessing the likelihood that a private investor would undertake a given publicly-sponsored project. 
 
Nonetheless, the Commission is not bound to use it and, in any case, its assessments could not be limited to such an average return analysis. Indeed, the "utilization of the average rate of return in the sector concerned does not relieve the Commission of the obligation to make a complete analysis of all relevant elements of the transaction and its context, including the situation of the company and the market, in trying to check whether the recipient undertaking has benefitted from an economic advantage which it would not have obtained under normal market conditions" (para 45, own translation from Spanish).
 
Secondly, at paras 48 to 50, the GC grants very low probative value to the existence of independent consulting studies and viability plans commissioned by the public authority prior to its investment. The GC acknowledges that the existence of independent reports may serve as an indication of the public investment having been made in comparable terms to those of a private transaction.

However, the GC also clarifies that the "jurisprudence does not in any way support that the existence of such reports is in itself sufficient to consider that the beneficiary of that measure has not benefited from an economic advantage within the meaning of Article 107, paragraph 1 (...) the Member State concerned can not rely on the findings of reports of independent consultancy firms without offering itself an adequate response to the issues that a prudent investor would have considered in the context of the case" (para 50, own translation from Spanish, emphasis added).
 
Thirdly, the GC clearly upholds the method followed by the European Commission to estimate the cost of capital and the expected internal rate of return. Strikingly, although maybe not suprising for a country and a region that undertook too many loss-making infrastructure projects in the last decade (shamefully, for instance, the Castellon Airport), the Commission rightly found that "the net present value was negative for any cost of capital of between 5% and 6%. For all costs of capital higher than 10%, the net present value was sharply negative and relatively stable. In view of the results [and the information available to the public authority], according to which the cost of capital was of 16.66% in 2000 and 14.9% in 2004, it could have effectively concluded with a high degree of certainty that the project was not profitable" (para 61, own translation from Spanish).
 
Fourthly and  in a rather colourful way, in paras 87 to 95, the GC engages in an assessment of the economic data included in the works of a Spanish university professor [not named by the GC, but the works are those of P Fernandez, and mainly its paper: The Equity Premium in 150 Textbooks (Date posted: September 14, 2009; Last revised: November 26, 2013)]. In my view, the detailed discussion that the GC entertains about the use of those equity premium estimates is an example of the degree of financial sofistication that the Court can reach--but, equally, of the possible excess in the detail of the review, if compared with the literal tenor of Art 263(2) TFEU.
 
Fifthly, the GC also engages in a largely useless exercise concerned with the incorporation or not of additional sources of revenue in the Commission's assessments. In its Decision, the Commission had only taken into account the revenue from film making activities. Spanish authorities wanted to add the expected revenue from hotel and commercial exploitation of the premises. The GC, in paras 125 to 139, sorts out the issue in a Solomonic way. First, it finds that the Commission should have incorporated the additional revenue in its assessment. However, it then rejects the arguments of the appellants on the basis that, even with those additional revenues, the project would not have been viable.
 
In my view, the important factual point to stress is that the public call for developers launched by the Spanish region in 2005 was deserted and the developments never took place (para 135). If listening to the market is of any value, it seems that the Commission made the right call by not including the expected additional revenue.

Anyway, the case law is now more open to the inclusion of alternative sources of revenue in the public investment in complex infrastructure projects as a result of the Ciudad de la Luz Judgment.
 
Finally, in paras 152 to 159, the GC assesses the requirements applicable to private investments and their continuity in order to make the infrastructure project that receives public finance susceptible of a declaration of compatibility under the applicable block exemption regulations. In short, the GC takes a pragmatic approach and clearly determines that an initial investment of 25% of the equity that, due to subsequent increases in capital in which the private investor does not participate, is reduced to around 1.6% in under a year falls short from the requirement of substantial private investment in the project (paras 155-156). In my view, this is a strong point in the Judgment and definitely one oriented to prevent circumvention strategies such as the one clearly seen in the Ciudad de la Luz case.
 
All in all, the case is interesting (or depressing...) if one reads it from the perspective of the massive legal and financial arguments that can be created to cover a simple and worrying truth: that certain infrastructure projects are anti-economical and a brutal waste of public resources, probably only driven by politicans' interests. In that regard, the insights of the study by Flyvbjerg, Garbuio and Lovallo "Delusion and Deception in Large Infrastructure Projects: Two Models for Explaining and Preventing Executive Disaster" (2009) California Management Review 51(2): 170-193 will be worth re-reading (over and over). Now, in the short-term, the difficulty will be in trying to find a private buyer for such inviable film studios...

State aid and (university) software licensing: who's interested? (T-488/11)

In its Judgment of 12 June 2014 in case Sarc v Commission, T-488/11, EU:T:2014:441, the General Court of the EU (GC) has assessed an interesting case concerned with the licensing of software developed at a Dutch university from a State aid perspective.
 
In the case at hand, staff of the Delft University had developed source code usable in the development of software for ship design and ship loading (a highly commercial application). Those members of staff then left university and created a start-up company 'Delftship' that entered into a licensing agreement with the Delft University. According to competitor Scheepsbouwkundig Advies- en Rekencentrum BV ('Sarc'), the terms of the licensing agreement where too advantageous and implied State aid. Crucially, Sarc claimed that the royalty payable by Delftship to the University was lower than the market price, which allowed it to offer software at a low rate.
 
However, after a preliminary examination under Article 108(2) TFEU, the Commission decided that the licence agreement for the use of the software source code did not constitute State aid, as the level of the royalties payable to the University had been negotiated intensely and ended up reflecting market prices--so that the licensing agreement did not grant Delftship an advantage within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU. Sarc appealed the decision before the GC.
 
The appeal has been opposed by both the University and the Dutch state on several grounds. Remarkably, the active standing of Sarc to bring proceedings has been challenged. In its analysis of the applicant’s standing to bring proceedings, the GC focussed on the competitive position of the applicant--following the settled case-law under art 263(4) TFEU that an applicant can only challenge a (State aid) Decision addressed to another party if it is of direct and individual concern, which requires proof that its market position is significantly affected, see paras 31-35 [for discussion, see F Pastor Merchante, "On the Rules of Standing to Challenge State Aid Decisions Adopted at the End of the Preliminary Phase" (2012) European State Aid Law Quarterly 3: 601-610].
 
These considerations are extremely important, as they indicate a very restrictive test and impose a substantial burden of proof on any challengers of State aid decisions not addressed to them. In my view, it is worth stressing that the GC and has found that
43 [...] it should be noted, first, that the applicant has not provided the Court with the main information relating to the structure of the relevant market establishing its competitive position in that market. In particular, the applicant has not provided information about the relevant geographic market, its share of that market and the share of its competitors and any shift in market shares since the measure at issue was granted.

44 It should be pointed out, secondly, that the applicant has not provided the Court with any evidence which could lead to the conclusion that the grant of the measure at issue had significantly affected its competitive position given, in particular, the specific nature of that measure, the length of the period for which it was granted and any circumstances making it impossible to circumvent the adverse effects of that measure.

45 In those circumstances, it is to be found that the applicant has not established that its competitive position was significantly affected within the meaning of the case-law set out in paragraph 33 above.

46 The six arguments which the applicant raises in that regard cannot invalidate the finding set out in paragraph 45 above
.
The GC then goes on to discard each of the arguments, which were concerned with: 1) the lack of need to define the relevant market and the sufficiency to focus on competitive constraints, 2) the existence of a very close competitive relationship, given that the beneficiary of the aid and the claimant sell the same products/services to the same clients, 3)the fact that the applicant held 80% of the market share in the Netherlands (and, consequently, was bound to be affected by the entry of a new competitor that could undercut prices), 4) the fact that the value of the measure at issue was between 6 and 12 times above the de minimis threshold, 5) the specific loss of customers to the beneficiary of the aid, which was argued as proof of loss of market share, and 6) a price comparison that showed that the beneficiary was able to offer very low prices due to it not being required to recoup the costs of software development (which had been financed by the University prior to entering into the licensing agreement). 
 
In my view, most of the arguments and information supplied by the applicant and, if nothing else, taking them all into global consideration, should have led the GC to conclude that its competitive position was bound to be significantly affected by the measure at issue. However, adopting such a strict approach and imposing such a high (almost impossible to discharge) burden of proof of significant alteration of its competitive position, the GC only recognises the applicant's standing to protect its procedural rights, which fundamentally limits the possibility for competitors to challenge State aid decisions unless they were involved in the procedure leading to the Commission's Decision.
 
Hence, this is a decision bound to disincetivise competitors from challenging State aid decisions, unless they were involved in the procedure from the beginning--and always conditional upon any of their procedural rights having been breached. In my view, not a positive interpretation of the rules on active standing under Art 263(4) TFEU and one that is definitely difficult to square with the over-enthusiastic approach of the CJEU to the effectiveness of EU competition law rules in other areas (such as cartels...).

CJEU further pushes for a universal application of the 'market economy private investor test' (C-224/12)


In its Judgment of 3 April 2014 in case C-224/12 Commission v Netherlands and ING Groep, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has followed its antiformalistic approach to the application of the 'market economy private investor test' (see comment to its precedent in C-124/10 EDF here) and has basically consolidated its role as a universal test in the application of Article 107(1) TFEU [for discussion, see A Sanchez Graells, “Bringing the ‘Market Economy Agent’ Principle to Full Power” (2012) 33 European Competition Law Review 35-39].

In its ING Groep Judgment, the CJEU determined that the Commission could not evade its obligation to assess the economic rationality of an amendment to the repayment terms of the aid granted by the Dutch State to ING in the light of the private investor test solely on the ground that the capital injection subject to repayment itself already constituted State aid--since only after such an assessment would the Commission be in a position to conclude whether an additional advantage within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU had been granted.
 
In my view, this general approach insisting on the application of the 'market economy private investor test' regardless of the prior existence of State aid in itself must be praised, and the very rotund terms in which the CJEU has stressed its importance deserve some emphasis.
 
Indeed, the CJEU has built up on the arguments already indicated in C-124/10 EDF and, following the advice of AG Sharpston, has made it clear that:
30 [...] in view of the objectives pursued by Article [107(1) TFEU] and the private investor test, an economic advantage must, even where it has been granted through fiscal means, be assessed in the light of the private investor test if, on conclusion of an overall assessment, it appears that, notwithstanding the fact that the means used were instruments of State power, the Member State concerned has conferred that advantage in its capacity as shareholder of the undertaking belonging to it.
31 It follows that the applicability of the private investor test to a public intervention depends, not on the way in which the advantage was conferred, but on the classification of the intervention as a decision adopted by a shareholder of the undertaking in question.
32 Furthermore, that test is one of the factors which the Commission is required to take into account for the purposes of establishing the existence of aid and is therefore not an exception that applies only if a Member State so requests, where the constituent elements of State aid incompatible with the common market referred to in Article [107(1) TFEU] have been found to be present (see Commission v EDF, paragraph 103).
33 Consequently, where it appears that the private investor test may be applicable, the Commission is under a duty to ask the Member State concerned to provide it with all relevant information enabling it to determine whether the conditions governing the applicability and the application of that test are met (see Commission v EDF, paragraph 104).
34 The application of that case-law cannot be compromised merely because, in this case, what is at issue is the applicability of the private investor test to an amendment to the conditions for the redemption of securities acquired in return for State aid.
35 Indeed, as the Advocate General has stated [...] any holder of securities, in whatever amount and of whatever nature, may wish or agree to renegotiate the conditions of their redemption. It is, consequently, meaningful to compare the behaviour of the State in that regard with that of a hypothetical private investor in a comparable position (C-224/12 at paras 30-35, emphasis added).
In my view, this Judgment must be welcome as a good addition and (further) clarification to C-124/10 EDF in terms of the universal applicability of the  'market economy private investor test' and, as I already indicated, it would be interesting to see this criterion extended to other areas of EU Economic Law and, particularly, public procurement, where the control the (disguised) granting of State aid is crying for further developments of the 'market economy private [buyer] test' [as I stressed in "Public Procurement and State Aid: Reopening the Debate?"(2012) 21(6) Public Procurement Law Review 205-212].

Recent CJEU and GC views on the "economic advantage" element in State aid cases (C-559/12 and T-150/12)

In two recent cases, the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) and the General Court (GC) have reassessed the element of "economic advantage" required in the prohibition of State aid in Art 107(1) TFEU in connection with State guarantees in France and Greece. The element of advantage has ranked rather high in the list of issues recently submitted to public consultation by the European Commission as part of the forthcoming new Notice on the concept of State aid. Hence, it seems interesting to have a look at these cases.


Firstly, in its Judgment of 3 April 2014 in case
C-559/12 France v Commission (La Poste), the CJEU assessed the Commission's previous findings regarding the existence of an unlimited guarantee granted by the French State to its postal operator (La Poste) as part of its status as an establishment of an industrial and commercial character (établissement public à caractère industriel et commercial, ‘EPIC’)--which entails a number of legal consequences, including the inapplicability of insolvency and bankruptcy procedures under ordinary law--and which ultimately constituted State aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU. The Commission's assessment had been endorsed by the GC (see comment here). The CJEU concurs with the substantive assessment of both the Commission and the GC in an interesting reasoning (and after having addressed a number of issues concerning the burden of proof that, in the end, remain largely marginal in view of the consolidation of a presumption of advantage in the case of unlimited State guarantees):
94 [...] it must be borne in mind that the concept of aid embraces [...] measures which, in various forms, mitigate the charges which are normally included in the budget of an undertaking and which, therefore, without being subsidies in the strict sense of the word, are similar in character and have the same effect [...] Also, State measures which, whatever their form, are likely directly or indirectly to favour certain undertakings or are to be regarded as an economic advantage which the recipient undertaking would not have obtained under normal market conditions, are regarded as aid [...].
95 Since State measures take diverse forms and must be analysed in terms of their effects, it cannot be ruled out that advantages given in the form of a State guarantee can entail an additional burden on the State
[...]
.
96 As the Court has already held, a borrower who has subscribed to a loan guaranteed by the public authorities of a Member State normally obtains an advantage inasmuch as the financial cost that it bears is less than that which it would have borne if it had had to obtain that same financing and that same guarantee at market prices
[...]
.
97 From that point of view, moreover, the Commission Notice on the application of Articles 
[107 and 108 TFEU] to State aid in the form of guarantees specifically provides[...]
that an unlimited State guarantee in favour of an undertaking whose legal form rules out bankruptcy or other insolvency procedures grants an immediate advantage to that undertaking and constitutes State aid, in that it is granted without the recipient thereof paying the appropriate fee for taking the risk supported by the State and also allows better financial terms for a loan to be obtained than those normally available on the financial markets.
98 It is apparent,
[...]
a simple presumption exists that the grant of an implied and unlimited State guarantee in favour of an undertaking which is not subject to the ordinary compulsory administration and winding-up procedures results in an improvement in its financial position through a reduction of charges which would normally encumber its budget.
99 Consequently, in the context of the procedure relating to existing schemes of aid, to prove the advantage obtained by such a guarantee to the recipient undertaking,
it is sufficient for the Commission to establish the mere existence of that guarantee, without having to show the actual effects produced by it from the time that it is granted (C-559/12 at paras 94 to 99, emphasis added).
 
Secondly, in its Judgment of 9 April 2014 in case T-150/12 Greece v Commission (aid to cereal production), the GC has also assessed a Greek guarantee scheme to cereal producers and has upheld the Commission's view whereby the conditions attached to such guarantee--i.e. initially, the acceptance of crops as collateral (although the existence of the guarantee rights and the conditions for their execution were not automatic) and later the potential charge of a 2% premium (again, which charge was not automatic)--did not dissipate the existence of an economic advantage for the beneficiaries of the guarantee scheme. The reasoning of the GC (in French) in paras 82 to 97 is interesting to grasp the unconditionality required of any measures intended to eliminate the (presumed) advantage that State guarantee schemes provide.
In my view, both Judgments are in line with the content of the Commission's Draft Notice on the concept of State aid (and, in particular, paras 111 to 117) and it seems now clear that unlimited State guarantees or State guarantees without actual (automatic) conditions (such as collateral and premia to be paid by the beneficiaries) will be ruled as being against Art 107(1) TFEU as a result of the iuris et de iure presumption of their conferral of an advantage.

"National brands" and State aid: AG Whatelet on investing in "State branding" (C-533 & 536/12)

In his Opinion of 15 January 2014 in joined cases C-533/12 P and C-536/12 P SNCM v Corsica Ferries France, Advocate General Whatelet has addressed an interesting (and creative) argument concerning the protection of a "national brand" as a justification for the granting of public support that would otherwise constitute illegal State aid under Article 107 TFEU.

In the case at hand, and as part of a privatisation process, the French Republic had allegedly agreed to assume the costs of payment of excessive compensations for termination of employment and retirement of certain employees of a public undertaking. Regardless of the fact that the existence of such excessive compensations was also challenged, the French Republic claimed the protection of the national brand (ie, the reputation of French business conglomerates) as a justification for such public support to the privatised undertaking (or, rectius, its new owners). France considered that any social unrest derived from severance and pension payments within the context of the privatisation process would trigger significant strikes that would, in turn, create the image that the French State and its industrial conglomerates are not a reliable trading partner. As the argument goes, the protection of future business by French companies (or companies more closely linked to the French State) would justify such a (reputational) investment under the private investor test and, consequently, would exclude the existence of illegal State aid under Article 107 TFEU. More specifically, the French arguments were as follows:
72 . Furthermore, the French Republic considers that the payment of additional compensations is necessary to protect the brand image of the state. In support of his thesis, it refers to the risk that sympathy strikes would spread throughout the public sector and would have the effect of paralyzing the economic activity of enterprises in this sector.
73 . In this context, the French Republic claims that an epidemic of strikes would generate serious economic losses to the state. It refers to the abrupt disruption of contractual relationships between the companies at strike and their suppliers and customers, as well as to payment and supply difficulties that would force non-professional clients of public companies to switch to competing private companies.
74 . The French Republic therefore claims to have considered the avoidance of these dire economic consequences as the indirect material benefit that the state wished to obtain from the payment of additional compensations (Opinion in C-533 & 536/12 P, own translation from Spanish).
AG Whatelet disagrees with this argument very clearly and presents a set of very interesting remarks in paragraphs 76 to 96 of his Opinion. In short summary, I think that the most remarkable points of AG Whatelet's wrap-up of the (limited) existing case law concerned with the existence and protection (through investment) of a "national brand" are the following: 
  1. In the absence of specific circumstances and a specially compelling motivation, protecting the brand image of the state as a global investor in the economy cannot be a sufficient justification to demonstrate the long-term economic rationality of the assumption of additional costs such as additional employment and retirement-related compensation (para 78).
  2. As AG Jacobs and CJEU made clear in joined cases C-278/92, C-279/92 and C-280/92 Spain v Commission, it is difficult to accept that a state holding would worry so much about the damage that its global image would suffer as a result of the failure of one of its companies (or as a result of social unrest related to its winding up or bankruptcy) so as to offer, just for that reason, huge sums as an incentive for a private company to take charge of it (paras 83-86).
  3. The same position was held by the GC in joined cases T-129/95 Neue Maxhütte Stahlwerke and Lech-Stahlwerke v Commission, where it also considered that "It is not credible that Bavaria have been obligated to pay a sum of money to a private company [...] to entice it to restructure [the company in question] in order to prevent that the bankruptcy of the latter could harm severely the reputation of the Land" (paras 87-90).
Hence, AG Whatelet concludes that, in the case at hand,
the General Court did not commit any error of law in concluding that "in the absence of special circumstances and without a particularly compelling motivation, the protection of the brand image of a Member State as a global investor in a market economy cannot constitute sufficient justification to demonstrate the long-term economic rationality of the assumption of additional costs such as additional severance pay" (Opinion in C-533 & 536/12 P, at para 91, own translation from Spanish).
And, as a matter of general principle, clearly indicates that 
I find it highly unlikely that the considerations made so far by the States on their brand image as global investors in a market economy can eventually circumvent the qualification of their decisions as State aid in light of the private investor test [...] the concerns raised by the Member States in relation to their brand image as global investors in a market economy, however noble they may be for other reasons, are far from those of a private investor, whether they relate to 'political costs' (in addition to the economic and social costs) of closing a business, "trade union or political pressure", the location of the failing firm in "in an area in social crisis" or, as in this case, the risk of sympathy strikes that would spread throughout the public sector. These considerations are absent of any prospect of profitability, even in the long term (Opinion in C-533 & 536/12 P, at paras 92 and 94, footnotes omitted and own translation from Spanish).
Ultimately, the rationale for this line of thought is that State aid rules' effectiveness would be significantly impaired if Member States can justify their public support decisions on the basis of the construction of their own "national brand". In my view, this is a very interesting Opinion and it is to be hoped that the CJEU will follow it and consolidate a very restrictive approach towards this type of justifications in the field of EU State aid law.

CJEU follows AG Jääskinen in revisiting PreussenElektra and minimising Doux Elevages' requirements for State imputability of aid measures (C-262/12)


In its Judgment of 19 December 2013 in case C-262/12 Vent De Colère and Others, the Court of Justice of the EU has largely followed AG Jääskinen's Opinion (commented here) and confirmed that, under Article 107(1) TFEU, a mechanism for offsetting in full the additional costs imposed on undertakings because of an obligation to purchase wind-generated electricity at a price higher than the market price that is financed by all final consumers of electricity in the national territory constitutes an intervention through State resources and, consequently, is under the general prohibition of State aid.
 
This Judgment must be welcomed, particularly because the CJEU follows the submission made by the AG, who considered that consumer contributions amounted to the existence of 'State resources', due to 'the fact that these resources constantly remain under public control and, therefore, are available to the competent national authorities, [which] suffices to qualify them as State funds to finance the measure, which then falls within the scope of Article 107(1) TFEU' (para 34 of his Opinion, own translation from Spanish).
 
Indeed, the CJEU has reviewed the characteristics of the body administering the funds paid by consumers (a public body under effective State supervision) and has stressed that
33 […] the sums thus managed by the Caisse des dépôts et consignations must be regarded as remaining under public control.
34 All those factors taken together serve to distinguish the present case from that which gave rise to the judgment in PreussenElektra, in which the Court held that an obligation imposed on private electricity supply undertakings to purchase electricity produced from renewable sources at fixed minimum prices could not be regarded as an intervention through State resources where it does not lead to any direct or indirect transfer of State resources to the undertakings producing that type of electricity (see, to that effect, PreussenElektra, paragraph 59).
35 As the Court has already had occasion to point out – in paragraph 74 of the judgment in Essent Netwerk Noord and Others – in the case which gave rise to the judgment in PreussenElektra, the private undertakings had not been appointed by the Member State concerned to manage a State resource, but were bound by an obligation to purchase by means of their own financial resources.
36 Consequently, the funds at issue [in PreussenElektra] could not be considered a State resource since they were not at any time under public control and there was no mechanism, such as the one at issue in the main proceedings in the present case, established and regulated by the Member State, for offsetting the additional costs arising from that obligation to purchase and through which the State offered those private operators the certain prospect that the additional costs would be covered in full.
37 Accordingly, Article 107(1) TFEU must be interpreted as meaning that a mechanism for offsetting in full the additional costs imposed on undertakings because of an obligation to purchase wind-generated electricity at a price higher than the market price that is financed by all final consumers of electricity in the national territory, such as that resulting from Law No 2000-108, constitutes an intervention through State resources (C-262/12 at paras 33 to 37, emphasis added).
In my view, the Vent De Colère Judgment advances in the functional approach to State aid and consolidates a general criterion of State control that should reduce the uncertainty surrounding the imputability to the State of (indirect) support measures through consumer contributions. The distinction with PreussenElektra is also rather clear now.
 
The only hurdle that remains in the way of such truly functional approach is the issue of imputability as addressed in Doux Élevages particularly in relation with (pseudo)fiscal measures (something that AG Jääskinen had addressed in  paras 50-54 of his Opinion but the CJEU felt no need to discuss in Vent De Colère). Hopefully, the CJEU will also minimise Vent De Colère on that point some time soon.
 

CJEU strengthens Commission's enforcement monopoly in State aid (C-111/10) and jeopardises its consistent enforcement with other EU policies (C-272/12)

In two recent Judgments of 4 December 2013 (C-111/10, Commission v Council) and 10 December 2013 (C-272/12, Commission v Ireland and Others), the CJEU has ruled on the distribution of powers between the Council and the Commission in the area of State aid enforcement. In one of the cases (C-111/10), the CJEU made a substantive finding and upheld the Council authorisation of State aid for agricultural support in Lithuania. In the other case (C-272/12) the CJEU refused to engage in an analysis of the distribution of competences between the institutions due to a procedural flaw (the GC had raised the issue of its own motion, in breach of art 21 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union), but stressed the same underlying principles.
 
It is worth highlighting that, in both Judgments, the CJEU clearly stressed the exceptional powers that the Council holds in the area of State aid enforcement--which, in my view, comes to further strengthen, consolidate and perpetuate the monopoly of State aid enforcement held by the Commission.
 
This is particularly clear in certain passages of the reasoning followed by the CJEU, which:
39 [...] held, after recalling the central role which the FEU Treaty reserves for the Commission in determining whether aid is incompatible with the internal market, that the third subparagraph of Article 108(2) TFEU covers an exceptional and specific case, meaning that the power conferred upon the Council by that provision is clearly exceptional in character (see, to that effect, Case C‑110/02 Commission v Council [2004] ECR I‑6333, paragraphs 29 to 31) and, accordingly, that the third subparagraph of Article 108(2) TFEU must necessarily be interpreted strictly (see, by analogy, Case C‑510/08 Mattner [2010] ECR I‑3553, paragraph 32, and Case C‑419/11 Česká spořitelna [2013] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 26)
72 [...] the power granted to the Council under the third subparagraph of Article 108(2) TFEU applies only within the limits indicated by that provision, namely where exceptional circumstances exist (see, to that effect, Case C‑122/94 Commission v Council [1996] ECR I‑881, paragraph 13) [C-111/10 at paras 39 and 72, emphasis added].
And further stressed that:
48 As the Court held in paragraphs 29 to 31 of Case C‑110/02 Commission v Council [2004] ECR I‑6333, the intention of the EC Treaty, in providing through Article 88 EC for aid to be kept under constant review and monitored by the Commission, is that the finding that aid may be incompatible with the common market is to be arrived at, subject to review by the General Court and the Court of Justice, by means of an appropriate procedure which it is the Commission’s responsibility to set in motion. Articles 87 EC and 88 EC thus reserve a central role for the Commission in determining whether aid is incompatible. The power conferred upon the Council in the area of State aid by the third subparagraph of Article 88(2) EC is exceptional in character, which means that it must necessarily be interpreted strictly (see also, to that effect, the judgment of 4 December 2013 in Case C‑111/10 Commission v Council [2013] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 39) [C-272/12 at para 48, emphasis added].
This renewed emphasis on the (almost) exclusive powers of the European Commission in the area of State aid policy and enforcement is probably a necessity in terms of ensuring institutional balance and the proper working of the EU institutions (as the CJUE stresses in para 47 of C-111/10: 'That interpretation seeks to maintain the coherence and effectiveness of European Union action'), but it can also create difficulties when it comes to ensure the proper integration of State aid enforcement with policy in other areas of EU economic law where the balance of powers between EU Institutions, or between the EU and Member States, is different.
 
This is something that case C-272/12 clearly brings to light. In that case, there was a tension between the Decisions adopted by the Council in the area of national fiscal legislation and the Commission's powers in State aid enforcement. The tension derived from the circumstance that the Council could authorise Member States to provide tax exemptions from the excise duty for mineral oils used for the production of alumina. Such exemptions could (at least theoretically, although this was challenged in C-272/12 but the CJEU declined to provide an answer on the basis of the ultra petita argument mentioned before) constitute State aid. In order to try to sort out that potential conflict, recital 5 of the relevant instrument (Council Decision 2001/224) indicated that
that decision was without prejudice ‘to the outcome of any procedures relating to distortions of the operation of the single market that may be undertaken, in particular under Articles [107 TFEU] and [108 TFEU]’, and that it did not override ‘the requirement for Member States to notify instances of potential State aid to the Commission under Article [108 TFEU]’.
Such 'coordination' provision was bound to create difficulties, despite the fact that the European Commission was involved in the assessment of the Member States' requests for authorisation to provide exemptions. The GC had sought to create a functional balance that could overcome the difficulties of subjecting the Council authorisation (and, consequently, the Member States' exemptions) to a second analysis by the European Commission under the State aid rules (despite the wording in recital 5 of Decision 2001/224). Indeed,
the General Court held, first, that, in the light of the fact that the rules governing the harmonisation of national fiscal legislation and the rules on State aid have a shared objective, namely to promote the proper functioning of the internal market, by combating, inter alia, distortions of competition, the concept of distortion of competition had to be regarded as having the same scope and the same meaning in both those areas, in order to ensure the consistent implementation of those rules. The General Court stated, in that regard, that Article 8(4) and (5) of Directive 92/81 confers in particular on the Commission, which submits a proposal, and the Council, which enacts a measure, the responsibility for assessing whether there is any distortion of competition, in order to decide whether or not to authorise a Member State to apply or continue to apply an exemption from the harmonised excise duty and that, if the assessments differ, the Commission has the option of bringing an action for annulment of the Council’s decision [C-272/12 at para 39, emphasis added].
The implications of this reasoning would be, rather clearly, that the European Commission should not have a second bite of the cherry under the State aid rules because it would have already expressed its views on the (absence of a) distortion of competition derived from the excise duty exemption within the fiscal harmonisation mechanism. However, the CJEU had none of this and declared that
46 It must be borne in mind that Directive 92/81 was adopted on the basis of Article 99 of the EEC Treaty (which became Article 99 of the EC Treaty, which itself became Article 93 EC [and is now art 113 TFEU]) which conferred on the Council the power to adopt provisions for the harmonisation of legislation concerning turnover taxes, excise duties and other forms of indirect taxation to the extent that that harmonisation was necessary to ensure the establishment and functioning of the internal market.

47 The authorisation decisions were adopted pursuant to Article 8(4) of Directive 92/81, which granted to the Council, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission, the power to authorise any Member State to introduce exemptions or reductions other than those laid down by that directive ‘for specific policy considerations’. The purpose and the scope of the procedure laid down in that article differ from those of the rules established in Article 88 EC.

48 As the Court held in paragraphs 29 to 31 of Case C‑110/02 Commission v Council [2004] ECR I‑6333, the intention of the EC Treaty, in providing through Article 88 EC for aid to be kept under constant review and monitored by the Commission, is that the finding that aid may be incompatible with the common market is to be arrived at, subject to review by the General Court and the Court of Justice, by means of an appropriate procedure which it is the Commission’s responsibility to set in motion. Articles 87 EC and 88 EC thus reserve a central role for the Commission in determining whether aid is incompatible. The power conferred upon the Council in the area of State aid by the third subparagraph of Article 88(2) EC is exceptional in character, which means that it must necessarily be interpreted strictly (see also, to that effect, the judgment of 4 December 2013 in Case C‑111/10 Commission v Council [2013] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 39).

49 Consequently, a Council decision authorising a Member State, in accordance with Article 8(4) of Directive 92/81, to introduce an exemption of excise duties could not have the effect of preventing the Commission from exercising the powers conferred on it by the Treaty and, consequently, setting in motion the procedure laid down in Article 88 EC in order to review whether that exemption constituted State aid and on the conclusion of that procedure, if appropriate, to adopt a decision such as the contested decision
[C-272/12 at paras 46 to 49, emphasis added].
Moreover, the CJEU went as far as to expressly exclude any estoppel-like argument by stressing that
53 [...] the concept of State aid corresponds to an objective situation and cannot depend on the conduct or statements of the institutions (Commission v Ireland and Others, paragraph 72). Consequently, the fact that the authorisation decisions were adopted on a proposal from the Commission could not preclude those exemptions being classified as State aid, within the meaning of Article 87(1) EC, if the conditions governing the existence of State aid were met. That fact however had to be taken into consideration in relation to the obligation to recover the incompatible aid, in the light of the principles of protection of legitimate expectations and legal certainty, as was done by the Commission in the contested decision when it declined to order the recovery of aid granted before the date of publication in the Official Journal of the European Communities of the decisions to initiate the procedure laid down in Article 88(2) EC [C-272/12 at para 53, emphasis added].
In my view, the final caveat clearly indicates that the problems derived from the extreme protection of Commission's powers in which the CJEU has engaged are intractable. The requirements of the principles of protection of legitimate expectations and legal certainty will almost always deactivate any legal effects of the Commission's second analysis of the situation under the State aid rules--so one can wonder if it would not be preferable to create a framework where the powers of the Commission under State aid rules could be restricted in order to promote a better integration of different EU/Member States economic policies and different areas of EU economic law.
 
Otherwise, the 'dominance' of State aid enforcement could significantly diminish the effectiveness of other policies and, as long as those policies are designed and implemented with due regard for the competitive distortions they can create (as was clearly the case in C-272/12, where the Commission was itself entrusted with that analysis), that would be a superior working framework. This is not to say that State aid (or competition) should rank as a secondary consideration. To the contrary, this advocates for an integration of competition concerns at the phase of policy design and implementation, rather than as an ex post (re)analysis of the situation that can create significant disruptive effects--eventually (luckily) barred by the principles of protection of legitimate expectations and legal certainty.
 
All these considerations are clearly relevant in the area of integration of State aid and public procurement rules, particularly in the financing of Services of General Economic Interest (SGEI), where the Almunia package creates a dual relationship between procurement and State aid rules by stressing that only certain procurement procedures will be acceptable under State aid rules and, at the same time, stressing that State aid exemptions do not alter the obligations created by public procurement rules themselves in the first place. If no clear criterion is established to prefer State aid analysis over procurement enforcement, or otherwise, the enforcement landscape looks rather complicated [for further discussion, see my "The Commission’s Modernization Agenda for Procurement and SGEI"].

CJEU toys with the one stop shop approach and muddies the waters of State Aid analysis (C-284/12)


In its Judgment of 21 November 2013 in case C-284/12 Deutsche Lufthansa, the Court of Justice of the EU has further defined the role of domestic courts hearing State aid cases and has clarified the legal effects that result from an Article 108(2) TFEU Decision whereby the European Commission decides to open a formal investigation and expresses a preliminary opinion on the incompatibility of certain State aid measures with Article 107(1) TFEU.
 
In the case at hand, Lufthansa intended to avail itself of a Commission's Article 108(2) TFEU Decision that opened an in-depth investigation on certain types of aid received by Ryanair for its activities at Frankfurt Hahn Civil Airport (operated by FFH). Prior to the Commission's investigation, Lufthansa initiated private litigation and sought an order for the recovery of certain payments made to Ryanair and an additional order that there be no future aid for the benefit of Ryanair. The initial dismissal of Lufthansa's action was under appeal when the Commission formally decided to investigate the case.
 
After learning that the Commission had opened an in-depth investigation, Lufthansa contended that the domestic courts were barred from conducting their separate assessment under Articles 107 and 108 TFEU and were bound to follow the preliminary assessment of the Commission--which indicated that 'each of the measures in question was selective and constituted State aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU, unless it satisfied the private investor principle. As regards that principle, the Commission noted that, on the basis of the information available to it at the time of the adoption of the [Decision], the airport fees paid by Ryanair were not enough to cover the costs incurred by FFH'.
 
The German courts were not satisfied and asked the Commission for its opinion under the relevant provisions in the Notice on the enforcement of State aid law by national courts. Unsurprisingly,  the Commission supported Lufthansa and replied that the domestic court itself was not required to assess whether the measures in question could or could not be classified as State aid as it could take the Commission's Decision as a basis for drawing all the necessary inferences from the infringement of Article 108(3) TFEU. The German court was still not persuaded and made a preliminary reference.
 
In its Lufthansa Judgment, the CJEU has ruled that:
37 While the assessments carried out in the decision to initiate the formal examination procedure are indeed preliminary in nature, that does not mean that the decision lacks legal effects.

38 It must be pointed out in that regard that, if national courts were able to hold that a measure does not constitute aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU and, therefore, not to suspend its implementation, even though the Commission had just stated in its decision to initiate the formal examination procedure that that measure was capable of presenting aid elements, the effectiveness of Article 108(3) TFEU would be frustrated.

39 On the one hand, if the preliminary assessment in the decision to initiate the formal examination procedure is that the measure at issue constitutes aid and that assessment is subsequently confirmed in the final decision of the Commission, the national courts would have failed to observe their obligation under Article 108(3) TFEU 
[...]
to suspend the implementation of any aid proposal until the adoption of the Commission’s decision on the compatibility of that proposal with the internal market.

40 On the other hand, even if in its final decision the Commission were to conclude that there were no aid elements, the preventive aim of the State aid control system established by the TFEU 
[...]
requires that, following the doubt raised in the decision to initiate the formal examination procedure as to the aid character of that measure and its compatibility with the internal market, its implementation should be deferred until that doubt is resolved by the Commission’s final decision.

41 It is also important to note that the application of the European Union rules on State aid is based on an obligation of sincere cooperation between the national courts, on the one hand, and the Commission and the Courts of the European Union, on the other, in the context of which each acts on the basis of the role assigned to it by the Treaty. In the context of that cooperation, national courts must take all the necessary measures, whether general or specific, to ensure fulfilment of the obligations under European Union law and refrain from those which may jeopardise the attainment of the objectives of the Treaty, as follows from Article 4(3) TEU. Therefore, national courts must, in particular, refrain from taking decisions which conflict with a decision of the Commission, even if it is provisional.

42 Consequently, where the Commission has initiated the formal examination procedure with regard to a measure which is being implemented, national courts are required to adopt all the necessary measures with a view to drawing the appropriate conclusions from an infringement of the obligation to suspend the implementation of that measure
(C-284/12, paras 37-42, emphasis added).
So far, the solution is clear cut and seems to impose a very clear preference for Commission (preliminary) assessment over any other assessment independently carried out by domestic courts. This would strengthen the one stop shop approach derived from the Commission's monopoly over the enforcement of Article 107 and 108 [except for the direct effect of 108(3) TFEU] and would strengthen the current centralised enforcement system.
 
However, in the two followning paragraphs, the CJEU muddies the waters by further ellaborating and indicating that:
43 To that end [ie to draw the appropriate conclusions from an infringement of the obligation to suspend the implementation of that measure] national courts may decide to suspend the implementation of the measure in question and order the recovery of payments already made. They may also decide to order provisional measures in order to safeguard both the interests of the parties concerned and the effectiveness of the Commission’s decision to initiate the formal examination procedure.

44 Where they entertain doubts as to whether the measure at issue constitutes State aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU or as to the validity or interpretation of the decision to initiate the formal examination procedure, national courts may seek clarification from the Commission and, in accordance with the second and third paragraphs of Article 267 TFEU, as interpreted by the Court, they may or must refer a question to the Court for a preliminary ruling (see, to that effect, as regards requests for preliminary rulings on the validity of State aid, Case C-222/04 Cassa di Risparmio di Firenze and Others [2006] ECR I-289, paragraphs 72 to 74)
(C-284/12, paras 43-44, emphasis added).
In my view, this reopens the question and destroys the one stop shop approach (or, in more clear terms, the approach in para 44 basically deactivates all the reasoning in paras 39-40 and introduces a level of uncertainty and procedural complication that seems unnecessary). And I wonder where are the concerns about the effectiveness of Article 108(3) TFEU that had previously been alluded to in para 38, particularly if the preliminary reference is made before any interim measures are adopted (and what would be the use for it otherwise?). 
 
As I already indicated when I criticised the Advocate General's Opinion in this case (here), this can create significant complications by way of parallel procedures (before the Commission, the national courts and the CJEU) in one and the same case. Such duplication of procedures can only result in a waste of resources and, most likely, in legal uncertainty and potentially contradictory outcomes.
 
Leaving the door open for a reference for a preliminary ruling (of validity) against a provisional assessment of the European Commission is excessively deferential towards domestic courts and can have significant undesirable effects. This is not satisfactory and it starts to be evident that there is a need for the adoption of a more streamlined procedural system where (in the absence of a decentralised enforcement system for State aid, which may well be superior), national courts would have to suspend their powers of interpretation of the concept of aid and limit their role to the adoption of effective interim measures when the Commission is still completing its investigation on a given measure.

In my view, this could be easily achieved by simply applying Article 4(3) of the Treaty on European Union, since the need for sincere cooperation in this type of matters seems out of the question (an argument the CJEU has used differently in Lufthansa). Nonetheless, it is now clear that the CJEU is not willing to go very far in striking a more sustainable balance between the sphere of jurisdiction/competence of domestic courts and ensuring a manageable procedural system in State aid law. In my view, domestic courts should resort to the possibilities outlined in para 44 of the Lufthansa Judgment only in very extreme cases (if ever).

GC rules on two-part State aid measures and selectivity under Art 107(1) TFEU (T-499/10)

In its Judgment of 12 November 2013 in case T-499/10 MOL v Commission, the General Court has found that an authorisation agreement that froze the mining fees payable for the explotaition of hydrocarbon reserves and that exempted the beneficiary from complying with a posterior law that increased the applicable mining fees does not constitute State aid incompatible with the internal market. In my view, the Judgment is interesting for the guidance it provides regarding the analysis of two-part or complex State aid measures.
 
In the case, MOL and the Hungarian State entered into an authorisation agreement in 2005 whereby the mining rights assigned to MOL were extended and the mining fees payable in return were determined on a non-revisable basis for the period 2005-2020. Later, a 2008 law reform significantly increased the mining fees that would have been payable for the exploitation of those same fields. However, in view of the 2005 agreement, MOL was exempted from topping up the mining fees it was liable to pay. Competitiors and potential new entrants were subject to the revised (higher) fees.
 
The Commission took the view that, given the way the 2005 agreement and the provisions of the 2008 amendment had been designed, they should be regarded as part of the same measure and it concluded that their combined effect conferred an unfair advantage to MOL.
 
According to the Commission, even if the 2005 agreement was concluded in accordance with the Mining Act then in force and even if it was up to the Member State to set the mining fees, the effects produced were not necessarily compatible with the State aid rules of the Treaty, although, taken in isolation, neither the 2005 agreement nor the 2008 amendment was contrary to these rules.
 
It is important to stress that MOL was the only operator in the hydrocarbons sector to have obtained an extension of its mining rights, since other extension agreements concerned undertakings extracting solid minerals, for which mining fees were not amended.  The Commission considered that the measure fulfilled the criteria enshrined in Article 107(1) TFEU and should be considered as State aid, and that there was nothing to indicate that it could be compatible with the internal market.
 
The Hungarian authorities challenged the Commission's position arguing that the measure did not constitute State aid, since the 2005 agreement conferred MOL no advantage and was not selective, as the company received no preferential treatment resulting from that agreement. Hungary further stressed that undertakings making large investments in mining projects require long‑term certainty in respect of the applicable mining fees and charges and that, consequently, mining fees subject to agreement should be fixed and stable for the entire duration of the respective agreement.
  
 
The GC has reviewed the Commission's decision and, mainly on the basis of the 'selectivity' requirement under Article 107(1) TFEU, has found that:
46 [...] although the Commission considered that the contested measure had, in those two constituent elements, favoured the applicant, it drew attention to the fact that the extension agreement was, by itself, selective, on account of the manner in which it had been negotiated and concluded [...]. In stating that the 2005 agreement and the 2008 amendment had resulted in the applicant’s benefiting from lower mining fees than those of the other operators until 2020, the Commission drew attention to the selective nature of the 2005 agreement vis-à-vis the applicant only [...], since the benefit of such mining fees stems solely from the agreement, which sets the rate of the increased mining fee for each of the fifteen years of duration of the agreement, and which provides that the rates thus set will be determined solely in accordance with its provisions and that those rates will stay unchanged [...]. Moreover, by concluding that the applicant was subject to a specific regime shielding it from any increase in mining fees [...], the Commission necessarily took the view that the criterion of selectivity of the contested measure had been met, on the ground that, in the light of its characteristics mentioned above, the 2005 agreement was selective. [...]

54 With respect to the selective nature of the aid measure, it must also be observed that Article 107(1) TFEU does not distinguish between measures of State intervention by reference to their causes or their aims but defines them in relation to their effects (Case C‑409/00 Spain v Commission [2003] ECR I‑1487, paragraph 46). It follows that the application of that provision only requires it to be determined whether under a particular statutory scheme a State measure is such as to favour ‘certain undertakings or the production of certain goods’ over others which are in a legal and factual situation that is comparable in the light of the objective pursued by the measure in question (see Spain v Commission, paragraph 47 and the case-law cited). If so, the aid measure satisfies the condition of selectivity which defines State aid as laid down by that provision. [...]

62 As a preliminary point, it should be recalled that the contested measure consists of two elements, namely the 2005 agreement, which sets mining fee rates for all the applicant’s fields, whether in production or the subject of extension, for each of the fifteen years of duration thereof, and the 2008 amendment, which increases mining fee rates for all hydrocarbon fields under authorisation, but does not contain any provisions relating to fields that have already been the subject of an extension agreement.

63 In that regard, it should be noted at the outset that the Commission was right to state
[...] that the 2005 agreement is not contrary to the State aid rules. Since the fees stipulated by the 2005 agreement, which were applicable to both fields already in production and fields concerned by extension of authorisation, were higher than the statutory fees applicable at the time of its conclusion, that agreement did not involve any State aid element for the purposes of Article 107 TFEU.

64 Next, the Court considers that, where a Member State concludes with an economic operator an agreement which does not involve any State aid element for the purposes of Article 107 TFEU, the fact that, subsequently, conditions external to such an agreement change in such a way that the operator in question is in an advantageous position vis‑à‑vis other operators that have not concluded a similar agreement is not a sufficient basis on which to conclude that, together, the agreement and the subsequent modification of the conditions external to that agreement can be regarded as constituting State aid.

65 In the absence of such a principle, any agreement that an economic operator might conclude with a State which does not involve any State aid element for the purposes of Article 107 TFEU would always be open to challenge, where the situation on the market on which the operator party to the agreement is active evolves in such a way that an advantage is conferred on it
[...] or where the State exercises its regulatory power in an objectively justified manner following a market evolution whilst observing the rights and obligations resulting from such an agreement.

66 However, a combination of elements such as that observed by the Commission in the contested decision may be categorised as State aid where the terms of the agreement concluded were proposed selectively by the State to one or more operators rather than on the basis of objective criteria laid down by a text of general application that are applicable to any operator. In that regard, it must be pointed out that the fact that only one operator has concluded an agreement of that type is not sufficient to establish the selective nature of the agreement, since that may result inter alia from an absence of interest by any other operator.

67 Moreover, it should be recalled that, for the purposes of Article 107(1) TFEU, a single aid measure may consist of combined elements on condition that, having regard to their chronology, their purpose and the circumstances of the undertaking at the time of their intervention, they are so closely linked to each other that they are inseparable from one another (see, to that effect, Joined Cases C‑399/10 P and C‑401/10 P Bouygues and Bouygues Télécom v Commission and Others and Commission v France and Others [2013] ECR I‑0000, paragraphs 103 and 104). In that context, a combination of elements such as that relied upon by the Commission in the contested decision may be categorised as State aid where the State acts in such a way as to protect one or more operators already present on the market, by concluding with them an agreement granting them fee rates guaranteed for the entire duration thereof, whilst having the intention at that time of subsequently exercising its regulatory power, by increasing the fee rate so that other market operators are placed at a disadvantage, be they operators already present on the market on the date on which the agreement was concluded or new operators.

68 It is in the light of those considerations that it is necessary to examine whether, in the present case, the Commission was entitled to consider that the contested measure was selective, on the ground that, in so far as the 2005 agreement sets the rate of the increased mining fee for each of the fifteen years of its duration and provides that the rates thus set would remain unchanged, it was selective
(T-499/10 at paras 46-68, emphasis added).
On the basis of the very specific circumstances of the case, the GC finds that the 2005 agreement was not selective that its combination with the 2008 amendment does not alter this finding and, consequently, annuls the Commission's incompatibility Decision.
 
Beyond the specific circumstances of the case, I think that the analytical framework sketched by the GC includes some useful guidance [such as the stress on the close chronological requirement, or the selectivity element (implicitly) required in all the components of a two-stage or complex State aid measure] but also some troubling hints at a less than objective assessment.
 
In that respect, regardless of the emphasis put on the standard legal position that 'Article 107(1) TFEU does not distinguish between measures of State intervention by reference to their causes or their aims but defines them in relation to their effects' (para 54), the GC goes on to stress that 'a combination of elements such as that relied upon by the Commission in the contested decision may be categorised as State aid where the State acts in such a way as to protect one or more operators already present on the market, by concluding with them an agreement granting them fee rates guaranteed for the entire duration thereof, whilst having the intention at that time of subsequently exercising its regulatory power, by increasing the fee rate so that other market operators are placed at a disadvantage' (para 67). Therefore, the GC does build in an element of (reverse) causality or, probably more accurately, of volition or intention that seems extraneous to the State aid control system.
 
If Article 107(1) TFEU is meant to avoid distortions of competition in the internal market, when confronted with sequential, two-part or complex aid measures, the fact that they all formed part of a 'master plan' from the outset or are the 'random or supervening' result of discrete interventions should be irrelevant. Otherwise, the burden of proving 'distortive intent' from the outset may simply make it impossible to pursue these cases. However, it may well be that the remarks made by the GC in para 67 of MOL v Commission will remain a 'mere' obiter dictum and that the assessment of two-part or complex measures will remain much more objective in the future (as indeed, is the case with the rest of the Judgment).

Missed opportunity for the CJEU to confirm 'non bis in idem' in State aid enforcement (C-560/12 P and C-587/12 P)

In contrast to its very recent Judgment in case C-77/12 P Deutsche Post, where the CJEU clearly barred the European Commission from adopting an indefinite number of 'follow up' decisions concerned with a single State aid investigation (in what I read as an incipient 'ne bis in idem principle' in State aid enforcement); in its  twin Judgments of 7 November 2013 in case C-560/12 P Wam Industriale v Commission and in case C-587/12  P Italy v Commission (only available in French and Italian), the CJEU has brushed aside a similar argument on the basis of its insufficient development by the appellant (C-560/12 P) and (implicitly) on the basis of the lack of independent legal effects of the fresh assessment carried out by the European Commission of the evidence on file after the initial decision had been quashed at judicial review (C-587/12 P). In my view, the Deutsche Post and (the set of) Wam Judgments are difficult to reconcile
 
In Wam, the European Commission had adopted a 2004 decision declaring the unlawfulness of State aid granted by the Italian State to support market expansion projects in Japan, Korea and China. After the quashing of the Commission's 2004 Decision by the GC in 2006 (T-304/04 and T-316/04) and the confirmation of that decision in 2009 by the CJEU (C-494/06), the Commission adopted a new incompatibility Decision in 2010.
 
In its challenge against the Commission's 2010 Decision (C-560/12 P), Wam argued that
the contested [2010] decision is not [merely] vitiated either by a 'procedural irregularity' or a 'formal defect', since the failure to state reasons does not constitute such a defect, but it rather lacks an "essential element", which effectively determines its nullity. In this case, therefore, there is a subjective claim preclusion between the parties [res iudicata] and, accordingly, the Commission, being under the obligation to give effect to the judgments of the Court in Italy and Wam v Commission [T-304/04 and T-316/04] and Commission v Italy and Wam [C-494/06]could not "in any way have adopted a new decision on the matter". The Court should therefore "for this [reason] only", have annulled the contested decision (C-560/12 P, para 6, own translation from Italian).
The argument sounds very similar to the one raised by Deutsche Post (although in that case the 'follow up' decision was not concerned with a full reassessment of the same measures, but with a fresh assessment of measures not expressly considered in the initial Decision eventually quashed), which the CJEU analysed in detail and actually backed in C-77/12 P.

However, in Wam the CJEU does not show the same appetite for the development of a strong limit on the Commission's ability to reopen a case after losing it on appeal (a sort of procedural estoppel or ne bis in idem), and dismisses the argument on the (very formal basis) that
15 By the first part of the first plea, it should be noted that the applicant merely submits that, for the mere fact [of the existence of] the judgments of the Court in Italy and Wam v Commission and Commission v Italy and Wam, the Commission would have been in any case precluded from adopting a new decision.
16 In that regard it should be noted that the argument concerning that matte is limited to a dozen lines on pages 26 and 27 of the appeal, the substance of which is taken up in paragraph 7
[sic, 6] of this judgment.
17 However, such an argument, marred by a lack of precision, clearly does not fulfill the conditions laid down in Article 169, paragraph 2, of the Rules of Procedure of the Court. Consequently, it must be rejected as inadmissible
(C-560/12 P, paras 15-17, own translation from Italian).
In my view, in adopting this approach, the CJEU has been too keen to take an easy way out and has missed an opportunity to reaffirm and give further guidance on the limits applicable to the reopening of State aid investigations by the European Commission. However, the CJEU does look into more detail to a similar submission made by Italy in the other Judgment concerned with the same State aid measures, of the same date (C-587/12 P).
According to the Italian Republic,
7 [ ...] the Court erred in holding that the Commission did not have an obligation to open a new contradictory investigation procedure with the national authorities. Contrary to what the Court found, the point would not have been to establish, in general and in theory if, after a judgment of annulment for failure to state reasons, the Commission could or could not take up the procedure from the adoption of the [annulled] act.
8 The Italian Republic considers that, given that the Commission has "renew[ed] completely" the examination of all matters in the contested decision, introducing new facts, it has hence recognized that the "defects criticized", despite being considered as defects of the duty to state reasons, actually had substantial implications that made ​​it necessary to "redo from scratch" the 2004 decision.
9 The Italian Republic considers that the
[...] factual elements consisting of the alleged "relative strengthening" of Wam and the alleged "freeing up of resources" could never have been deducted from the [initial] investigation procedure. Consequently, them being decisive elements for the demonstration of the existence of aid, the Commission should have opened a new adversarial procedure with the parties concerned [...]
10 The Commission claims that the first part of the first plea is unfounded. It points out that the annulment of the 2004 decision was based on a lack of motivation because [...] that decision did not explain in what way the aid in question could affect competition and trade between Member States. On the contrary, the Court failed to criticize the inquiry into the matter as carried out during the administrative procedure, nor did it identify any deficiency in this regard (C-587/12 P, paras 7-10, own translation from Italian).
The CJEU sides with the European Commission in the following terms:
11 It should be remembered that in the judgment of the Court in Italy and Wam v Commission as well as in the judgment in Commission v Italy and Wam, the investigation conducted by the Commission on the aid in question was not at all criticized.
12 
[...] the General Court correctly pointed out that, according to settled case-law, the procedure for replacing an unlawful act that has been cancelled can be resumed at the point at which the illegality occurred, that the cancellation of a Union act does not necessarily affect the preparatory acts and, furthermore, that the annulment of an act that puts an end to an administrative proceeding which comprises several stages does not necessarily entail the annulment of the entire procedure prior to the adoption of  the contested measure for whatever reason, procedural or substantive, taken into account in the judgment of annulment.
13
 [...] the Court also correctly pointed out that if, despite of the investigations that enable a comprehensive analysis of the compatibility of the aid, the Commission's analysis is found to be incomplete, and it involves the illegality of the decision, the procedure for replacing such a decision may be resumed at that point making a new analysis of the investigatory measures.
14 As regards the present case
[...] the Court stated that the illegality of the 2004 decision [...] concerned the inadequate statement of reasons thereof. [...] the Court has, in fact, merely stated that this decision did not contain sufficient arguments that would allow the conclusion that they met all the conditions for the application of Article 107, paragraph 1, TFEU which was confirmed by the Court in its judgment in Commission v Italy and Wam. The illegality of the 2004 decision did not affect the proceedings before it. No argument leads to the conclusion that that procedure was, in itself, vitiated by any illegality.
15 As to the argument put forward by the applicant's claim that the Court failed to take account of the fact that the Commission has completely revisited the examination of all the evidence in the file and introduced new elements, it should be noted that this argument is not supported by anything which could demonstrate a misrepresentation of the facts relating to it by the Court.
16 As regards the applicant's claim that the Court, in the remainder of its reasoning, ignored any arguments to refute the conclusion set out in paragraph 50 of the judgment under appeal, the Court notes that, in paragraph 57 of that judgment, the Court stated that the circumstances relating to the strengthening of Wam's position and the release of resources were correctly assessed in the contested decision. The Court added in such a point that, in any case, it was not new factual circumstances, but considerations arising from the analysis of the Commission, based on elements with respect to which nothing allowed it to believe that they were not known at the time when the decision was taken in 2004.
[...]
19 In these conditions [...] the General Court correctly concluded that the execution of the judgment of the Court in Italy and Wam v Commission and the judgment in Commission v Italy and Wam did not require the Commission to take on again the whole process provided for in Article 108 TFEU and that the Commission had erred, as a result of the same judgment, by not initiating a new formal investigation procedure.
20 The first part of the first plea is therefore unfounded
(C-587/12 P, paras 11-20, own translation from Italian, emphasis added).
In my view, this is contradictory with Deutsche Post. There, the CJEU basically prevented the Commission from conducting a fresh (additional) assessment of the facts already contained in the file because, even if they were present from the beginning and known by the parties, because the initial decision adopted had exhausted the procedure and closed the investigation completely. Following the same line of reasoning, the Judgment in Wam should have been pointing in that direction by preventing the Commission from adopting a fresh 'theory of harm' on the basis of the facts already on file, as that would equally alter the legal position of the parties and would disregard the fact that the Commission had completely closed the investigation when adopting the initial (now quashed) incompatibility decision.
 
Effectively, Deutsche Post denied the Commission a second bite of the cherry, whereas Wam basically (potentially) allows for multiple bites. I find this inconsistency insatisfactory and, as I said already I would advocate for an approach where once a measure has been analysed and the Commission reaches a final decision, then the same measure should not be subjected to additional enquiries and no new findings of incompatibility should be acceptable.
 
In maybe more blunt terms, the Commission should have one shot (and only one) at each controversial State aid measure, in order to protect legal certainty and as an (implicit) requirement of the principle of good administration.
 
Overall, I would consider such a general principle a positive development in EU State aid law. It remains to be seen, however, whether there is true CJEU appetite for such a development.

"Ne bis in idem" in State aid control? CJEU quashes Deutsche Post decision (C-77/12 P)

In its Judgment of 24 October 2013 in case C-77/12 P Deutsche Post v Commission, the Court of Justice of the EU quashed a Judgment of the General Court (T-421/07) and (indirectly) questioned a decision taken by the European Commission concerning the State aid granted by Germany to Deutsche Post in the 1990s. The Commission had adopted an initial negative decision in 2002 (ultimately quashed by the CJEU in C-399/08 P) and, following a request by the initial complainants to look into the matter in more detail, it decided to extend the scope of the original investigation in a 'follow-up' enquiry carried out in 2007 (while the GC was still considering the legality of the original negative decision).
 
Germany challenged the decision of the European Commission on the general basis that, contrary to its allegations, this 'follow-up' enquiry would alter the legal effects of the initial decision (now annulled) and that such an enforcement strategy would be against the most fundamental principles of due process and good administration.
 
The GC (T-421/07) took no issue with the opening of the 'follow-up' investigation, as it considered that such a decision did not alter the legal standing of the State aid measures under investigation, since they had already been flagged as potentially illegal in the initial decision to open an investigation that the Commission adopted in 1999 (and regardless of the fact that they were not included in the original negative decision of 2002). In even more controversial terms, the GC brushed aside the argument that the annulment of the 2002 negative decision should also be taken into consideration in order to bar any 'follow-up' investigation that ultimately had the same origin. As the CJEU summarises,
In addition, the [General] Court observed in paragraphs 77 and 79 of the contested judgment, that this conclusion is not undermined by the judgment in Deutsche Post / Commission [...]. Indeed, this decision did not rule on the question whether the formal investigation procedure initiated in 1999 in respect of the disputed measures has been closed. The Court further considersed that this decision had the effect of retroactively eliminating the 2002 negative decision, so that "this decision can in no way affect the conclusion that the 2002 [negative] decision had no impact on the existence of any independent legal effects generated by [the contested decision] (C-77/12 P at para 37, own translation from French).
On the basis of those considerations, the GC considered that the 2007 decision to carry out a 'follow-up enquiry' was not open to an annulment action under Article 263(4) TFEU and, consequently, dismissed Deutsche Post's challenge. The CJEU has taken a different view.
 
I find it interesting to stress that the CJEU has argued that:
52 As regards, in particular, the binding legal effects of a decision to initiate the procedure provided for in Article [108], paragraph 2 [TFEU] with respect to a measure running and qualified as new aid, such a decision necessarily changes the legal status of the measure, as well as the legal position of the beneficiaries, particularly in regard to its implementation. After the adoption of such a decision, there is at least a significant doubt about the legality of this measure, which must lead the Member State to suspend the payment, since the opening of the procedure laid down in Article [108], paragraph 2 [TFEU] excludes an immediate decision on the compatibility with the common market that would allow for the regular execution of the measure. Such a decision could be invoked before a national court called upon to draw all the consequences of the violation of Article [108], paragraph 3, last sentence, [TFEU]. Finally, it is likely to lead beneficiaries of the measure to refuse in any event new payments or to provision the necessary funds for any subsequent repayments. The beneficiaries will also be affected in their relations with other agents, which will take into consideration the weakened legal and financial situation of the former (see judgment of 9 October 2001, Italy / Commission, C-400/99, Rec . P. I- 7303, paragraph 59).
53 It should be added that […] such a decision to open an investigation with respect to a measure that the Commission describes as new aid is not simply a preparatory step in that it has independent legal effects, particularly with regard to the suspension of the measure under consideration.
54 In this case, it should be noted that […] in the contested decision, the Commission qualified as new aid the transfer payments made by DB-Telekom and the system of public guarantees. Furthermore, as regards the public pension fund, this institution has expressed its doubts about the extent to which this funding granted an economic advantage to [Deutsche Post]. The Commission also pointed out […] that Germany was under the obligation to suspend the measures challenged by the decision.
55 It follows that the 2007 opening decision is an act that is likely to affect the interests of [Deutsche Post] by altering its legal status and, therefore, it meets all the elements of an act within the meaning of Article [263 TFEU].
56 Contrary to what the Court considered […] that finding is not challenged by the existence of the decision to open an investigation in 1999, by which the Commission opened the procedure laid down in Article [108], paragraph 2 [TFEU] in respect of a series of measures being implemented.
57 Indeed, it is clear that, in any event, the Commission, by its negative decision of 2002, closed the formal investigation procedure in 1999.
58 In this regard, it should be noted that the Commission dealt in its negative decision of 2002, of all the measures challenged by the opening 1999 decision, as argued rightly [Deutsche Post] (C-77/12 P at paras 52-58, own translation from French, emphasis added).

Even if this may not be the end of the story in this particular case, which has been sent back to the GC, I think that the principle established by the CJEU could be read as a sort of 'ne bis in idem' in the area of State aid enforcement. Once a measure has been analysed and the Commission reaches a final decision, then the same measure should not be subjected to additional enquiries and no new findings of incompatibility should be acceptable.
 
In maybe more blunt terms, the Commission has one shot (and only one) at each controversial State aid measure, in order to protect legal certainty and as an (implicit) requirement of the principle of good administration.
 
Overall, I would consider such a general principle a positive development in EU State aid law. It remains to be seen, however, whether this reasoning is only case-specific or the CJEU is willing to flesh out such a general principle in even clearer terms, should the opportunity arise in the future.

Maybe not such a global appraisal of State aid after all: CJEU backtracks from a truly economic approach (C-124/10)

In an interesting recent paper, Pablo Ibáñez Colomo conducts a very detailed statistical overview of State Aid Litigation before EU Courts (2004–2012) [Journal of European Competition Law & Practice doi: 10.1093/jeclap/lpt057]. One of his relevant findings is that the 'private investor test' and its application by the European Commission was one of the most litigated areas of EU State Aid law in that period and that '[a]nnulments were more likely where the ‘private investor test’ was raised as a ground'.
 
In its Judgment of 24 October 2013 in Joined Cases C-214/12 P, C-215/12 P and C-223/12 P Land Burgenland v Commission, the Court of Justice of the EU has been confronted again with the test--this time in the mirror image of the ‘private vendor test'--and, on this occasion, has upheld the approach taken by the European Commission. In my opinion, there are several passages of the Judgment that bear stressing, particularly because the CJEU is backtracking from a much more economically oriented assessment of State aid that was (at least) suggested in Commission v EDF (C-124/10 P).
 
The case involved the existence of State aid in the privatisation of HYPO Bank Burgenland AG, where the relevant Austrian authorities decided to sell the bank to GRAWE despite the fact that the price it offered (EUR 100.3 million) was significantly lower than the price offered by a competing Austro-Ukrainian consortium (EUR 155 million). As the CJEU explains:
The decision was based, in particular, on a [...] recommendation by HSBC  [which] essentially states that, although on the basis of the proposed purchase price the decision should be made in favour of the Consortium, it was recommended that BB be sold to GRAWE, in view of the other selection criteria, namely the reliability of the purchase price payment, the continued operation of BB while avoiding the use of Ausfallhaftung [ie the Austrian performance guarantee system for public credit institutions], capital increases and transaction security (C-214/12 P at para 9).
Not surprisngly, the Consortium challenged the decision claiming that the Republic of Austria had infringed State aid rules during the privatisation of BB and stressing that, amongst other irregularities, the tender procedure had been unfair, untransparent and discriminatory towards it--which resulted in the sale of BB not to the highest bidder, namely the Consortium, but to GRAWE.

The European Commission found that Austria had indeed granted illegal State aid to GRAWE in the privatisation Bank Burgenland because it failed to meet the requirements of the 'private investor test'. In the Commission's view, a private seller would only reject the highest bid in two circumstances: either where it is obvious that the sale to the highest bidder is not realisable, or where consideration of factors other than the price is justified, subject to the proviso that only those factors which would have been taken into consideration by a private vendor are taken into account.

The key aspect then becomes whether the (likely) avoidance of the use of the Ausfallhaftung that would follow the sale to GRAWE rather than to the Consortium was a valid justification under the second scenario (ie whether it was a risk which avoidance justified the transaction). The Commission clearly considered that according the private investor test excludes risks stemming from potential liability to make payment under a guarantee which has to be classified as State aid, such as Ausfallhaftung. The reasoning was similar to the one followed (or, at least, the one I identified) in Commission v EDF, where the CJEU rejected a similarly formalistic approach followed by the Commission.
 
In that case, the CJEU found that
in view of the objectives underlying [Article 107(1) TFEU] and the private investor test, an economic advantage must – even where it has been granted through fiscal means – be assessed inter alia in the light of the private investor test, if, on conclusion of the global assessment that may be required, it appears that, notwithstanding the fact that the means used were instruments of State power, the Member State concerned conferred that advantage in its capacity as shareholder of the undertaking belonging to it (C-124/10 P, para 92, emphasis added).
 
In essence, this supported the approach followed by the General Court, which had ruled that
the purpose of the private investor test is to establish whether, despite the fact that the State has at its disposal means which are not available to the private investor, the private investor would, in the same circumstances, have taken a comparable investment decision. It follows that neither the nature of the claim, nor the fact that a private investor cannot hold a tax claim, is of any relevance (C-124/10 P, at para. 37, emphasis added).

In that regard, it would seem that in the Burgenland case, the GC and the CJEU should also reject the Commission's argument and, consequently, allow the selling authorities to integrate the total potential costs of the use of the Ausfallhaftung as a valid reduction of the nominal price offered by the Consortium and, dependeing on the result of such an assessment, potentially award the contract to GRAWE, as they effectively did. It would have been expected, as the Austrian authorities claimed, that the nature and origin of potential liabilities would be considered irrelevant and that a gloabl (economic) appraisal of the offers received for the Burgenland Bank would have been considered in line with EU law.
 
However, the CJEU reexamines the interpretation of the 'private investor (rectius, vendor) test' to take into account this issue and rules in the following terms:
46 In their first argument, the Province of Burgenland, the Republic of Austria and GRAWE claim, in essence, that the General Court failed to appreciate, in the light of Ausfallhaftung’s characteristics, both the role of the Province of Burgenland as owner and shareholder of BB and, therefore, the private investor test, such as it emerges from Spain v Commission and Germany v Commission. […]

48 the General Court found, in line with that case-law that, when applying the private investor test, it must be determined whether the measures in question are those which such an investor, who counts on making a profit in the short or long term, could have granted.

49 Finally,
[…] the General Court found, in its assessment of the facts which cannot be appealed, that Ausfallhaftung was not entered into on normal market conditions, given its characteristics.

50 In those circumstances, the General Court rightly concluded
[…] that Ausfallhaftung could not be taken into account when assessing the conduct of the Austrian authorities in the light of the private vendor test (sic) and that, consequently, the Commission could not be criticised for having rejected Ausfallhaftung’s relevance when evaluating the offers submitted by the Consortium and by GRAWE.

51 Further, as regards the impact of Commission v EDF, it must be pointed out that that judgment was principally concerned with whether the private investor test was applicable in the circumstances of that case, which was rejected by the Commission in the decision at issue in that case, and not how that test was applied in the particular case (see Commission v EDF judgment, paragraph 75). However, in the present cases, it is undisputed that the Commission applied the private vendor test and the Province of Burgenland, the Republic of Austria and GRAWE are in actual fact challenging the General Court’s approval of the manner in which the Commission applied that test.

52 As regards the application of that test, Commission v EDF confirmed the case-law which emerges, in particular, from Spain v Commission and Germany v Commission, according to which, in order to assess whether the same measure would have been adopted in normal market conditions by a private vendor in a situation as close as possible to that of the State, only the benefits and obligations linked to the situation of the State as shareholder – to the exclusion of those linked to its situation as a public authority – are to be taken into account (see, to that effect, Commission v EDF, paragraph 79).

53 In Commission v EDF judgment, the Court further made it clear that, when carrying out that assessment, the manner in which the advantage is provided and the nature of the manner by which the State intervenes are irrelevant where the Member State concerned conferred that advantage in its capacity as shareholder of the undertaking concerned (see Commission v EDF, paragraphs 91 and 92).

54
[…] The General Court examined whether Ausfallhaftung had to be taken into account when implementing the private vendor test and found that a private vendor would not have entered into such a guarantee (sic).

55 The Province of Burgenland, the Republic of Austria and GRAWE do not put forward any argument liable to put that finding into doubt, but claim themselves that Ausfallhaftung is a State aid, as the Commission had moreover found in Decision C(2003) 1329 final.

56 In those circumstances, and since, by granting aid, a Member State pursues, by definition, objectives other than that of making a profit from the resources granted to an undertaking belonging to it, it must be held that those resources are, in principle, granted by the State exercising its prerogatives as a public authority.

57 In so far as the Province of Burgenland, the Republic of Austria claim that, through Ausfallhaftung, the Province of Burgenland was none the less seeking to make profit or, at the very least, attempting to do so in addition to its other objectives, it must be recalled that, if a Member State relies on a test such as the private vendor test, it must, where there is doubt, establish unequivocally and on the basis of objective and verifiable evidence that the measure implemented is to be ascribed to the State acting as shareholder (see, to that effect, Commission v EDF, paragraph 82).

58 That evidence must show clearly that, before or at the same time as conferring the economic advantage, the Member State concerned took the decision to make an investment, by means of the measure actually implemented, in the public undertaking (Commission v EDF, paragraph 84).

59 In that regard, it may be necessary to produce evidence showing that the decision is based on economic evaluations comparable to those which, in the circumstances, a rational private vendor in a situation as close as possible to that of the Member State would have had carried out, before making the investment, in order to determine its future profitability (see, to that effect, Commission v EDF, paragraph 84).

60 It is only in cases where the Member State concerned provides the Commission with the necessary evidence that the onus is on the Commission to carry out a global assessment, taking into account – in addition to the evidence provided by that Member State – all other relevant evidence enabling it to determine whether the Member State took the measure in question in its capacity as shareholder or as a public authority (see, to that effect, Commission v EDF, paragraph 86).

61 However, neither during the administrative procedure nor before the General Court did the Province of Burgenland, the Republic of Austria or GRAWE put forward any evidence showing that the introduction or retention of Ausfallhaftung was based on economic evaluations carried out by the Province of Burgenland for the purposes of establishing its profitability. It follows that the Commission was not required to undertake such a global assessment as regards Ausfallhaftung and that the Burgenland and GRAWE judgments were not vitiated by any errors in that regard
(C-214/12 P at paras 46-61, emphasis added).
 
 
I am puzzled by the findings of the CJEU. If it rightly held in Commission v EDF that the fiscal nature of the credit converted into capital was irrelevant for the assessment of the transaction as a whole, why is it now relevant that the potential liability incurred in the use of the Ausfallhaftung by the disappointed Consortium derives from a public law system? Surely, if it was not questioned that 'the General Court [rightly] rejected the Commission’s argument that the private investor test could not be applied to the conversion into capital of a tax claim, since a private investor could never hold a tax claim against an undertaking, but only a civil or commercial claim' (C-124/10 P, at paras 37 and 95), it should not be now relevant that a private investor could have not entered into a guarantee scheme such as the Ausfallhaftung (C-214/12 P at para 54).
 
Moreover, an economic assessment should be carried out regardless of the subjective intentions of the State authority (cfr. C-214/12 P at para 59) and, in any case, it was cristal clear in the Burgenland case that an (independent) economic evaluation was carried out by (HSBC), which clearly indicated that, all factors considered, the rational decision was to enter into the transaction with the lowest bidder. Why is the CJEU now not willing to assess the economic transaction as a whole is something I cannot come to grips with.
 
I guess that this will be an area that, as Ibáñez Colomo's study shows, will continue to occupy a significant amount of cases and, possibly, remain one of the obscure areas of State aid litigation for quite some time.

Interesting EFTA case on 'expert evaluations' and 'bidding procedures' and State aid (E-9/12)

In its Judgment of 22 July 2013 in case E-9/12 - Iceland v EFTA Surveillance Authority**, the EFTA Court analysed two interesting issues concernig the use of 'bidding procedures' and 'expert evaluations' for State aid purposes--and, more specifically, concerning the sale of public real estate (for general discussion and a review of CJEU case law, see Nicolaides' piece here).
 
Firstly, the EFTA Court analysed whether on-line property listings can be cosidered well-publicised bidding procedures comparable to auctions. This is relevant in light of Decision No 275/99/COL of 17 November 1999 (equivalent to the 1997 Communication on State aid elements in sales of land and buildings by public authorities), whereby
A sale of land … following a sufficiently well-publicised, open and unconditional bidding procedure, comparable to an auction, accepting the best or only bid is by definition at market value and consequently does not contain State aid (para 2.1).
Secondly, the EFTA Court assessed if, where the on-line listings were not sufficiently publicised, a tax evaluation of the properties to be sold constitutes an adequate benchmark (ie an independent expert evaluation) to determine the 'State aid-free' price of transfer of the real estate. That was relevant because the EFTA authority based the existence of State aid in the discrepancies between tax evaluation and price paid for the real estate concerned.
 
In relation to the first issue, ie whether on-line listings can be assimilated to auctions, according to the EFTA Court
67 Pursuant to subparagraph (a) of point 2.1 of the Land Sale Guidelines, an offer is regarded as sufficiently well-publicised when it is repeatedly advertised over two months or more in the national press, estate gazettes or other appropriate publications and through real estate agents addressing a broad range of potential buyers, so that it can come to the notice of all potential buyers.
68 The criterion of an offer being well-publicised must be interpreted such that where two or more properties are offered on sale together, but not necessarily only as one single unit, specific advertisements must be made for the individual properties. A general call for interest cannot suffice, as such a method cannot reasonably be expected to reach all potential buyers of specific properties.
69 As regards the publication format, the wording of the Land Sale Guidelines does not in principle exclude adequate publication on the internet. However, advertisements must be placed in a publication, be it printed or digital, which is appropriate for reaching all potential buyers. The seller’s own website can only exceptionally be regarded as such a publication.
70 In the present case, four of the five buildings in question were specifically advertised solely on KADECO’s website. There is nothing to suggest that this website was appropriate for reaching all potential buyers. It must therefore be held that ESA did not err in finding itself unable to conclude that a sufficiently well-publicised bidding procedure, or a procedure comparable to that, was followed
(E-9/12, paras 67-70, emphasis added).  
In my view, the EFTA Court is correct in that mere calls for interest are too far away from auction procedures to be considered sufficient for the purposes of excluding the existence of an economic advantage for the purposes of State aid control. However, the EFTA Court could have ellaborated on the minimum requirements that on-line listings should meet for them to be considered susceptible of reaching 'all potential buyers'. Nonetheless, the restraint of the Court is fully understandable and this basically opens the door for a revision / upgrade of the 1997 guidance to include on-line advertising and bidding methods (both at EFTA and EU level).
 
In relation to the second issue, the EFTA Court found that an evaluation conducted for tax purposes may serve as the adequate criterion to determine the 'State aid-free' price of the real estate, as long as it was deemed to reflect market value. Indeed,
90 Iceland has a system established by law to evaluate the market price of properties. Pursuant to Article 1 of Act No 6/2001, all real property in the country shall be registered in the Real Property Register, operated by Registers Iceland. According to Article 27 of Act No 6/2001, Registers Iceland is obliged to evaluate and register the market price of properties in Iceland.
91 The applicant argues, first, that the purpose of the valuation carried out by Registers Iceland is to determine the likely value of a property for tax purposes, and that the private investor test cannot rely solely on that valuation.
92 It is true that valuation in the context of a tax audit does not necessarily show the market value of land (see, for comparison, Case C-290/07 P Commission v Scott [2010] ECR I-7763, paragraph 97). However, in an email of 13 May 2012, the Icelandic authorities themselves confirmed that, as a matter of Icelandic practice, the valuation for taxation purposes is generally understood to reflect the market rate
(E-9/12, paras 90-92, emphasis added).
In my view, this finding is potentially problematic, particularly in countries where the evaluations carried out for registration and/or tax purposes tend to be well below market value and seldomly updated. Therefore, the finding of the EFTA Court needs to be taken with a pinch of salt and read in the very circumstance-specific Icelandic background. This too seems to be an area for development / upgrade of the existing guidance on State aid in the sale of land and property.
 
** I am thankful to Kristjan Birgisson for bringing this case to my attention.

CJEU 'warns' against tax breaks based on employment goals: State aid rules (may) oppose them (C-6/12)

In its Judgment of 18 July 2013 in case C-6/12 P Oy, the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) assessed the compatibility with EU State aid rules of the Finnish regime of deduction of tax losses by undertakings subjected to corporate control changes (see a Finnish comment here). 

In my view, the most interesting part of the CJEU Judgment in the case lies not with the "boilerplate" analysis of the Finnish tax law provisions but, remarkably, with the not so concealed warning it has sent out to Member States that may be tempted to create 'too soft' tax regimes for companies which activities may have a "particular impact on employment".

Basically, Finnish tax rules allow companies to carry their losses forward up to 10 years after incurring them for the purposes of compensating their benefits and diminishing their tax burden. However, in order to prevent strategic acquisitions of 'bags of losses' within the shields of inactive companies, the Finnish tax code establishes a special regime in case of changes of corporate control. According to the relevant provisions, "losses sustained by a company are not deductible if, during the year in which they arise or thereafter, more than half of the company’s shares have changed ownership otherwise than by way of inheritance or will, or more than half of its members are replaced." However, "the competent tax office may, for special reasons, where it is necessary for the continuation of the activities of the company, authorise the deduction of losses when such an application is made" (emphasis added). 

By way of a guidance letter, the Finnish Tax Directorate interpreted the concept of "special reasons" and considered that, inter alia, could include the fact that the company requesting permission to carry fiscal losses forward despite a change of corporate control had "particular impact on employment". Indirectly, this raised the issue whether the granting of such an authorisation based on (non-strictly) tax reasons would meet the selectivity requirement of Article 107(1) TFEU and, consequently, could be challenged under the EU State aid rules.

In a very clear manner (despite the non-binding general tone of the Judgment, where the CJEU claims not to have sufficient information to reach a final position), the CJEU has indicated that:
26 […] the application of an authorisation system which enables losses to be carried forward to later tax years, such as that in question in the present case, cannot, in principle, be considered to be selective if the competent authorities have, when deciding on an application for authorisation, only a degree of latitude limited by objective criteria which are not unrelated to the tax system established by the legislation in question, such as the objective of avoiding trade in losses.
27 On the other hand, if the competent authorities have a broad discretion to determine the beneficiaries or the conditions under which the financial assistance is provided on the basis of criteria unrelated to the tax system, such as maintaining employment, the exercise of that discretion must then be regarded as favouring ‘certain undertakings or the production of certain goods’ in comparison with others which, in the light of the objective pursued, are in a comparable factual and legal situation (see, to that effect, C‑107/09 P Commission and Spain v Government of Gibraltar and United Kingdom [2011] ECR I‑0000,  paragraph 75). […]
30 […] if the competent authorities were to be able to determine the beneficiaries of the deduction of losses on the basis of criteria unrelated to the tax system, such as maintaining employment, such an exercise of that power should then be regarded as favouring ‘certain undertakings or the production of certain goods’ in comparison with others which, in the light of the objective pursued, are in a comparable factual and legal situation (C-6/12 at paras 26 to 30, emphasis added).
In my view, the CJEU has gone out of its way in this case (where it could have simply declined to provide an answer on the basis of the lack of information submitted by the referring court) with the aim of sending out a clear message to the governments of all Member States: if they intend to use (selective) tax measures to prevent negative impacts on employment, they need to obtain approval by the European Commission first.

This is not a revolution and may even have a second order of importance but, in my view, the CJEU has clearly backed the European Commission's efforts to control Member States' measures to (continue trying to) react to the economic crisis and has clearly indicated that corporate taxation cannot be used as a tool for these purposes. We shall see if the message reaches the intended ears...

AG Jääskinen revisits PreussenElektra and minimises implications of Doux Elevages (C-262/12)

As a continuation of the Judgment of the Court of Justice of the EU of 30 May 2013 in case C-677/11 Doux Élevages and Coopérative agricole UKL-AREE, where the CJEU (re)analysed the concept of 'State aid' and stressed that aid cannot exist if the economic advantage under analysis is not funded by 'State resources' and there is no 'imputability to the State' (commented here); in his Opinion of 11 July 2013 in case C-262/12 Vent De Colère and Others, Advocate General Jääskinen has assessed a French scheme of support to electric distribution companies and revisited the well-known PreussenElektra criteria.

In his analysis, AG Jääskinen uses the two main criteria of 'imputability' and existence of 'State resources' in order to determine whether some contributions paid by final customers of electricity--which are then used to compensate for the costs of the mandatory purchase of wind energy by electricity distributors at above the market prices--amount to State aid.

Very briefly, under the controverted scheme, producers of wind energy benefit from an obligation of mandatory purchase of their electricity by energy distributors at prices above the market. Distribution companies can then claim full compensation for those additional costs (which are classed as costs derived from public service obligations) from CDC (Caisse des Dépôts group, which is a "public group serving general interest and economic development"). CDC's compensation is ultimately financed by the final consumers of electricity, who pay that compensation as part of their electricity bill.

According to AG Jääskinen, the scheme constitutes State aid because there is both State imputability and the measure is financed by State resources. As to the first element, the AG considers that the fact the contribution to be paid by consumers is directly determined in a law implies that the adoption of such a measure is imputable to the public powers of the French State (para 32 of hi Opinion). 

It is interesting to stress that the AG distinguishes this case from the very recent Doux Elevages Judgment by stressing that the intervention of the State in this case was not of a 'merely instrumental' nature, but that the French State took full ownership of the compensation scheme for producers of wind electricity (para 40).

As to the more controversial issue of the consumer contributions amounting to the existence of 'State resources', the AG stresses that 'the fact that these resources constantly remain under public control and, therefore, are available to the competent national authorities, suffices to qualify them as State funds to finance the measure, which then falls within the scope of Article 107(1) TFEU' (para 34, own translation from Spanish). AG Jääskinen confirms this positive finding in view of the control that the French State exercises over CDC, the status of CDC as the organism that intervenes in the transmission of the funds between consumers and distributors of energy, and the nature of the controverted funds.

In my view, it is worth noting that AG Jääskinen advocates for a rather streamlined test of 'origin/absorption' of private funds once they are managed by a public entity by clearly submitting that he does 'not agree with the general statement that the public nature of an organism does not entail that the resources available to it  are to be regarded as State funds' (para 46, own translation from Spanish). I think that this is an appropriate approach that would overcome a formalistic assessment of the avenues that financial support follows and, in the end, would broaden the definition of State aid under a more functional approach.

Also, and once more, AG Jääskinen distinguishes this case from the Doux Elevages Judgment by stressing the fact that all consumers are indiscriminately affected by the compensation scheme (regardless of their use of wind energy or not) and, consequently, the scheme is of a (quasi)fiscal nature (at least, this is my understading of his considerations in paras 50-54 of his Opinion). I think that this should also be welcome, as such an approach would contribute to limit the possibilities for States to effectively create (disguised) aid schemes by means of (pseudo)fiscal interventions.

In general, in my opinion, AG Jääskinen's Opinion in Vent de Colere should be welcome, not least because of his clear and well-thought proposals to distinguish (and restrict) the implications of the Doux Elevages Judgment. 

Let's hope that the CJEU follows him and also adopts a clear position towards limiting the potentially far-fetched implications of Doux Elevages.

AG (dangerously) stresses possibility to indirectly challenge State Aid decisions via Art 267 TFEU

In his Opinion of 27 June 2013 in case C-284/12 Deutsche Lufthansa, Advocate General Mengozzi stressed that (provisional) Decisions of the European Commission in State Aid cases are open to (indirect) challenges via a reference for a preliminary ruling on their validity under Article 267 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. 

In the case at hand, the complainant before the Commission seeked interim measures against the beneficiary of a measure that the Commission qualified as State aid in its decision to open a formal investigation. The domestic court competent in the matter remained unconvinced by the Commission's preliminary assessment and seeked ways not to adopt interim measures on the basis of such an assessment. It referred the following question to the CJEU:
Does the uncontested decision of the Commission to initiate the formal investigation procedure under Article 108 paragraph 3, second sentence, result in the national court seised of a procedure which aims to recover payments already made and the prohibition of future payments being bound by the legal assessment expressed by the Commission in that decision on the state aid character of the measure in question?
In paragraph 42 of his Opinion, AG Mengozzi indicates that:
under the combined effect of Article 108 paragraph 3, last sentence, and the qualification as a new aid of the controverted measure [in the provisional decision of the Commission], the opening of the formal investigation procedure generates the obligation of the Member State concerned to suspend its execution from the date of adoption of the decision to open the investigation and until a final decision is reached, regardless of the objective nature of the controverted measure [...]. National courts will therefore be obliged to take all necessary measures to ensure compliance with this requirement and to eliminate the consequences of any breach thereof, regardless of any previous assessment of the measure under Article 107, paragraph 1. In case national courts harbour doubts about whether the requirements to qualify the measure as aid are met in the given case, which justify the initiation of the formal investigation procedure, national courts may refer a question of validity under Article 267 TFEU, first paragraph, letter b) (Opinion in C-284/12 at para 42, own translation from Spanish).
This comes to stress the (procedural) difficulties derived from the joint competence of domestic courts and the Commission to interpret and apply the notion of aid under Article 107(1) TFEU--as stressed in paragraph 10 of the Commission Notice on the enforcement of State Aid law by national courts, which also metions the possibility for a preliminary reference in paragraph 90, but (impliedly) in a context where no concurrent Commission investigation is in place--and can create significant complications by way of parallel procedures (before the Commission, the national courts and the CJEU) in one and the same case. Such duplication of procedures can only result in a waste of resources and, most likely, in legal uncertainty and potentially contradictory outcomes.

In my view, leaving the door open for a reference for a preliminary ruling (of validity) against a provisional assessment of the European Commission is excessively deferential towards domestic courts and can have significant undesirable effects. This is not satisfactory and would justify the adoption of a more streamlined procedural system whereby national courts would have to suspend their powers of interpretation of the concept of aid and limit their role to the adoption of effective interim measures when the Commission is still completing its investigation on a given measure. 

In my view, this could be easily achieved by simply applying Article 4(3) of the Treaty on European Union, since the need for sincere cooperation in this type of matters seems out of the question. It will be interesting to see how far the CJEU is willing to go in the balance between the sphere of jurisdiction/competence of domestic courts and ensuring a mangeable procedural system in State aid law.