One more #publicprocurement Judgment in the Evropaïki Dynamiki Saga (T-9/10)

The General Court's Judgment of 21 February 2013 in case T-9/10 Evropaïki Dynamiki v Commission (Microsoft SharePoint) is a new addition to this seemingly never-ending saga of cases where the Greek IT company challenges procurement award decision on the two-fold basis of failure to state reasons and presence of manifest errors of assessment.

This Judgment basically reiterates the position of the EU Courts on the duty to state reasons but, interestingly, includes an obiter paragraph that is not always expressly mentioned in the growing case law in this area of EU public procurement. 

In my opinion, paragraph 26 of this latest Evropaïki Dynamiki Judgment deserves emphasis, as the GC indicates that
It should also be borne in mind that the requirements to be satisfied by the statement of reasons depend on the circumstances of each case, in particular the content of the measure in question, the nature of the reasons given and the interest which the addressees of the measure, or other parties to whom it is of direct and individual concern, may have in obtaining explanations (see Case C‑367/95 P Commission v Sytraval and Brink’s France [1998] ECR I‑1719, paragraph 63 and case-law cited, and Case T‑465/04 Evropaïki Dynamiki v Commission, paragraph 49) (emphasis added).
This offers the basis for a far more restricted disclosure of information to unsuccessful candidates and disappointed bidders than usually provided by contracting authorities, and could (should) be used as the basis to rationalise this area of the law--where contracting authorities are indeed under significant pressure to provide excessive information during debriefing and bid protest procedures. 

In fact, in the case at hand,  
the Commission considers that it provided a statement of reasons exceeding that laid down in Article 100(2) of [the Financial Regulation] by informing the applicant of the reasons why its tender had been rejected as well as providing the scores obtained by the tenderers at the award stage, even though the applicant had not passed the selection phase (T-9/10 at para. 24, emphasis added). 
Situations such as this should be avoided, given the negative impacts that excessive transparency can generate in terms of potential collusion and access to confidential information and business secrets of competitors. Therefore, once again, it seems desirable to clarify and rationalise this area of EU public procurement law in the current process of revision of the EU Directives on public procurement.

The Future of European Legal Education -- Comment on Maduro's views

Prof. Miguel Poiares Maduro has published an interesting piece on The Future of European Legal Education, where he identifies some challenges derived from a tension between law as legal practice and law as science and highlights how those challenges can become an opportunity to reform legal education. 

In my view, his critical analysis is mostly accurate and supports his (relatively implicit) claim for a study of law in context, following the 'classic' proposals of Weiler (with whom Maduro has been working closely in related academic projects) and Snyder, who 23 years ago stressed that 
So far European Community law has been conceived mainly as 'black-letter law' [...] it is time to draw upon perspectives from other social sciences and to move in new directions. We must place European Community law in its social, economic and political context. Only in this way can we achieve the deeper and broader understanding—both practical and theoretical—of European Community law [F Snyder, New Directions in European Community Law (Law in Context) 30 (2nd edtn. 1990)].
Some of this certainly not-so-new worries go beyond Europe and are echoed by the work of the American Bar Association's Task Force on the Future of Legal Education, which is also concerned with the challenges that legal education faces as a result of the rapid and substantial changes in the legal profession, legal services, the national and global economy, and markets affecting legal education.

The issue is, therefore, of high currency and of global relevance, and deserves some good thought. In that regard, I think that it is remarkable that one of Maduro's main claims is that
These changes [derived from increased global economic and social integration] are bound to challenge not only the content of the law but also how it needs to be taught. This context of legal pluralism and legal miscegenation requires different hermeneutics and the interaction between legal cultures, which is triggered by the Europeanisation of the law, will confront each national legal culture with many of its unarticulated assumptions. Change in what you study is often the fastest way to break path-dependencies on how you study (p. 456).
While I agree that these global aspects need to be understood and mastered in order to become a well-rounded lawyer (be it in practice, be it in the academy, or anywhere in between), I remain skeptical that such a 'global' or 'delocalised' approach can be adopted from minute one in anyone's legal education.

Not to sound parochial, but I think that law is and will always be a jurisdiction-specific phenomenon (in our case, EU+Member State-specific) and I doubt that you can understand the very complex issues of the global legal reality if you have not first been (solely and thoroughly) trained in the law of one specific jurisdiction. 

This does not mean that legal studies throughout the EU need not be more 'Europeanised' (as, indeed, restricting EU law to a self-standing module is no longer a sensible option), but I think that it raises the issue that before you can engage in highly sophisticated comparative and contextualised legal analysis, you need to have a deep knowledge of a (self-contained) domestic system. As the saying goes, you must learn to walk before you can run.

Therefore, I would agree with Maduro's diagnosis and recommendations for the development of better postgraduate legal education programs, but I think that extending them to initial or basic legal studies may overshoot the mark. Maduro himself hints at this by the end of his contribution (p. 461), which maybe would have required some clearer disclosure in his general criticism to the development of legal theory.


Why is #competition law so special? Or how #leniency will kill private #damages actions (AG C-536/11)

In his Opinion of 7 February 2013 in case C-536/11 Donau Chemie and Others, Advocate General Jääskinen has developed a line of reasoning that goes well beyond the issue at hand (whether access to judicial documents should be granted to a potential claimant for damages derived from anticompetitive behaviour) and encapsulates the growing risk that an excessive level of protection of leniency applicants will kill (all) potentially significant developments in damages litigation. 

Indeed, as clearly emphasised by AG Jääskinen,
36. In my opinion it is inarguable that such proceedings [ie damages actions based on infringement of EU competition law] are comparable to either ordinary civil or criminal procedures, given that neither is concerned with the protection of leniency programmes or other specific features of public law proceedings in the context of enforcing competition policy (emphasis added).
For such strong claims, the AG's reasoning remains rather sparse and implicit, and seems to oversee the fact that in certain criminal procedures a similar scheme of plea-bargain can exist in some Member States and that, in any case, the current trend in competition law enforcement seems to search for a more balanced approach between public and private enforcement, or even for a boost of private enforcement (as is the case in the UK).

Moreover, if his argument was carried to the extreme, there would be no difficulty for Member States to create a 'damages-proof' system that completely excluded damages actions when they risked the effectiveness of the public enforcement of competition law (and, notably, of leniency programmes). 

But surely this cannot be in line with the (declared) policy of the European Commission--or with the functional and pro-effective stance taken by the CJEU in Courage and in Manfredi--despite the very clear Opinion of AG Jääskinen, who expressly states that 'the Courage and Crehan/Manfredi right of private parties to seek damages from economic operators that have breached EU competition law should not, in my opinion, be developed to a point that would imperil the efficacy of public law enforcement mechanisms, whether they be European or national' (para 62). In my opinion, this is a seriously troubling position, as it clearly sets a glass ceiling on the development of private enforcement of competition law in the EU and, ultimately, may be the final thrust against its true development.

I think that the criticism against the bluntness of the AG's Opinion is not dispelled by his effort to square the circle by making compatible the 'damages proofness' of leniency applications with a right of effective access to justice for antitrust litigants. In my opinion, there are two frontally contradicting arguments in the AG's Opinion.

On the one hand, and on the basis of the general requirements of the principle of effectiveness (effet utile) of EU law, the AG claims that

51. […] subjecting access to public law competition judicial files to the consent of the infringer of the competition rules amounts to a significant deterrent of the exercise to a right to claim civil damages for breach of EU competition law. The Court has ruled that if an individual has been deterred from bringing legal proceedings in good time by the wrong-doer, the latter will not be entitled to rely on national procedural rules concerning time limits for bringing proceedings. I can see no reason for confining the application of this principle to limitation periods, and would advocate its extension to onerous rules of evidence that have an analogous deterrent effect. I would further query the compliance of remedies that deter enforcement of EU law rights with Article 19(1) TEU (footnotes omitted, emphasis added).
On the other hand, however, the AG carves out a truly significant exception for leniency applications:
55. Article 47 [of the Charter of Fundamental Rights] is also relevant to the case to hand because it guarantees the fairness of hearings, which serves to protect the interests of the undertakings that have participated in the cartel. In my opinion, access by third parties to voluntary self-incriminating statements made by a leniency applicant should not in principle be granted. The privilege against self-incrimination is long established in EU law, and it is directly opposable to national competition authorities that are implementing EU rules.
56. It is true that leniency programmes do not guarantee protection against claims for damages and that the privilege against self-incrimination does not apply in private law contexts. Despite this, both public policy reasons and fairness towards the party having given incriminating declarations within the context of a leniency programme weigh heavily against giving access to the court files of public law competition proceedings where the party benefiting from them has acted as a witness for the prosecuting competition authority (footnotes omitted, emphasis added). 
In my view, both positions are logically irreconcilable in that leniency applicants would have (by definition) prevented by their own unilateral will, access by third parties to the parts of the file that could be used to claim damages against them (something the AG rightly criticises at para. 51 of his Opinion).

Moreover, I find unjustified the final statement whereby AG tries to balance them exclusively on the basis of the peculiarities of leniency programmes:
64. [...] from the point of view of proportionality, in my opinion a legislative rule would be more appropriate that provided absolute protection for the participants in a leniency programme, but which required the interests of other participants to a restrictive practice to be balanced against the interests of the alleged victims. [...] Furthermore, in my view and except for undertakings benefiting from leniency (sic!), participation in and of itself in an unlawful restriction on competition does not constitute a business secret that merits protection by EU law (emphasis added).
* * *
But, beyond the specifics of the reasoning, I think that the Opinion in Donau Chemie is troublesome because it indicates a very strong resistance against effective private actions and, in my view, excessive deference towards leniency applicants--and, what is more important, low priority to granting effective economic compensation to the victims of cartels. 

Maybe this is just an indication that a 'public enforcement only' model is better suited to EU competition law and its institutional architecture. But then, if such is the case, maybe it is better to accelerate the process and not wait for leniency protection to (slowly) kill private actions. Let's just bury them and avoid unnecessary litigation. Or, if we want them in the EU competition toolbox, let's abandon the 'pro-public' approach expressed in the AG Opinion. Otherwise, competition law evolution will continue running in circles... to everyone's loss.

Las tasas judiciales como límite a la efectividad del Derecho UE: Una razón (más) para su supresión

El debate en torno a la imposición de nuevas tasas judiciales parece estar perdiendo algo de fuerza, pese a las recientes decisiones del Tribunal Constitucional sobre las tasas judiciales catalanas y la decisión de la Audiencia Nacional de no suspender su efectividad. 

Dada la desproporcionada limitación al derecho a la tutela judicial efectiva previsto en el artículo 24 de nuestra Constitución, creo que este importante asunto merece mucha más atención.

Para contribuir a (re)avivar el debate, creo que hay que añadir la perspectiva del Derecho comunitario, que da argumentos adicionales para la supresión de las tasas, al menos allí donde limitan la efectividad de la normativa de la UE y, en especial, en cuanto limita los derechos de los ciudadanos comunitarios, cuya última base es el artículo 20 TFUE. Habida cuenta de que estamos celebrando el 50º Aniversario de la Sentencia Van Gend en Loos, que dio inicio a la importante doctrina de la supremacía y efecto directo del Derecho de la UE, creo que estos argumentos deben tenerse en especial consideración.

Pongamos un ejemplo concreto. Creo que es ilustrativo el caso de las indemnizaciones por retrasos y cancelaciones de vuelos conforme al Reglamento (CE) n° 261/2004 del Parlamento Europeo y del Consejo, de 11 de febrero de 2004, por el que se establecen normas comunes sobre compensación y asistencia a los pasajeros aéreos en caso de denegación de embarque y de cancelación o gran retraso de los vuelos. Conforme al Reglamento 261/2004, los pasajeros que sufran retrasos significativos o cancelaciones tienen derecho a reclamar una compensación de entre 250 y 600 Euros por trayecto (art 7 Rgto 261/2004). 

Hay que tener en cuenta que el TJUE ha interpretado de manera claramente expansiva el ámbito de protección de los pasajeros afectados por cancelaciones y retrasos (basta ver la muy reciente STJUE de 31 de enero de 2013 contra Ryanair en el caso del cierre del espacio aéreo de gran parte de la UE en 2010 por la actividad del volcán islandés Eyjafjallajökull), de modo que el grado de protección de los ciudadanos comunitarios que utilizan el transporte aéreo (o de extranjeros que viajan por la UE) sea suficiente y efectivo.

Sin embargo, esta importante normativa y jurisprudencia comunitaria pueden quedar sin efecto para los ciudadanos españoles o para quienes opten por reclamar en España frente a aerolíneas españolas por la necesidad de pagar tasas judiciales para ejercitar su reclamación. Y esto no será infrecuente en el futuro inmediato, por ejemplo, debido a la inminente huelga de los trabajadores de Iberia de estos meses de febrero y marzo--que seguramente generarán numerosas situaciones de retraso o cancelación de vuelos.

Efectivamente, en España, una vez agotada la vía amistosa de reclamación directa frente a la aerolínea, que tiende claramente a negar la responsabilidad de compensar (al menos en mi experiencia personal), sólo queda la posibilidad de interponer una demanda de proceso verbal para tratar de obtener la compensación por parte de la aerolínea. Y resulta que, para la interposición de una reclamación de 250 Euros, la tasa aplicable es de 150 Euros (es decir, del 60% del valor de la reclamación, o un poco menos si la autoliquidación se presenta electrónicamente). Para el caso de la mayor reclamación, de 600 Euros, la tasa aplicable es de 180 Euros (el 30% del valor de la reclamación). La barrera al acceso a una tutela judicial efectiva no podría ser más palmario.

No deberá sorprender a nadie que, a salvo de casos excepcionales en que se acumulen reclamaciones de mucho mayor cantidad o se ejerciten acciones colectivas (con todas las dificultades que acarrean), lo racional para los viajeros que hayan sufrido retrasos o cancelaciones es olvidarse de la reclamación y simplemente elegir otra aerolínea en el futuro. La restricción a la efectividad del Derecho comunitario en la materia no podría ser, tampoco, más clara.

En definitiva, creo que este ejemplo (que puede multiplicarse casi hasta el infinito en relación con todas las normas de tutela de consumidores y usuarios, entre otras) debería bastar para entender que no sólo hay argumentos muy contundentes de Derecho constitucional interno, sino también de Derecho comunitario, para la supresión de las tasas judiciales (o, cuanto menos, para una revisión en profundidad que garantice que no generan un efecto disuasorio para la tutela efectiva de los derechos de los ciudadanos).

CJEU prevents competitors from taking the law into their hands (C-68/12)

In its Judgment of 7 February 2013 in case Slovenská sporiteľňa, the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) has clarified that the fact that an agreement between competitors is concluded in order to prevent a situation of allegedly illegal competition by a third party is irrelevant for its analysis under Article 101 TFEU.

In the very clear terms of the Slovenská sporiteľňa Judgment,

18 Article 101 TFEU is intended to protect not only the interests of competitors or consumers but also the structure of the market and thus competition as such (Joined Cases C501/06 P, C513/06 P, C515/06 P and C519/06 P GlaxoSmithKline Services and Others v Commission and Others [2009] ECR I9291, paragraph 63).
19 In that regard, it is apparent from the order for reference that the agreement entered into by the banks concerned specifically had as its object the restriction of competition and that none of the banks had challenged the legality of Akcenta’s business before they were investigated in the case giving rise to the main proceedings. The alleged illegality of Akcenta’s situation is therefore irrelevant for the purpose of determining whether the conditions for an infringement of the competition rules are met.
20 Moreover, it is for public authorities and not private undertakings or associations of undertakings to ensure compliance with statutory requirements. The Czech Government’s description of Akcenta’s situation is evidence enough of the fact that the application of statutory provisions may call for complex assessments which are not within the area of responsibility of those private undertakings or associations of undertakings.
21 It follows from those considerations that the answer to the first and second questions is that Article 101 TFEU must be interpreted as meaning that the fact that an undertaking that is adversely affected by an agreement whose object is the restriction of competition was allegedly operating illegally on the relevant market at the time when the agreement was concluded is of no relevance to the question whether the agreement constitutes an infringement of that provision (C-68/12 at paras. 18 to 21, emphasis added).
In my view, the general principle reinforced by the CJEU is sensible and prevents undertakings from taking the law into their own hands--and, even further, from trying to disguise anticompetitive agreements behind an appearance of law-reinforcing behaviour. It clearly establishes a positive obligation for undertakings (either unilaterally or through a sectoral association?) to report instances of potential illegal competition to the competent authorities. Also, although not mentioned by the CJEU, undertakings may be able to file judicial claims (including requests for interim measures) on the basis of unfair competition rules under the relevant domestic legislation [which offers yet one more instance of potential (dis)coordination between unfair competition and antitrust rules in the EU; see Ulrich's reflective piece Anti-Unfair Competition Law and Anti-Trust Law - A Continental Conundrum?].

Moreover, in the view of the CJEU, the existence of such avenues for legal reaction / opposition exclude the possibility to apply the exemption of Article 101(3) TFEU:
35 Even if [the first] condition were met [regarding the protection of conditions for healthy competition and, in the broader sense, thus seeked to promote economic progress], the agreement at issue in the main proceedings does not appear to meet the other three conditions – more particularly, the third condition, whereby an agreement must not impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions which are not indispensable to the attainment of the objectives referred to in the first condition laid down in Article 101(3) TFEU. Even if, as stated by the parties to that agreement, the purpose was to force Akcenta to comply with Slovak law, it was for those parties [...] to lodge a complaint with the competent authorities in that respect and not to take it upon themselves to eliminate the competing undertaking from the market(C-68/12 at para. 35, emphasis added).
Again, the general position of the CJEU seems highly appropriate. However, a feeling remains that the CJEU's Slovenská sporiteľňa Judgment may be too blunt and that the assessment of fulfillment of the conditions could be refined by leaving a door open for a justification in view of Article 101(3) TFEU in some (extreme) cases where lack of reaction on the part of the established industry could result in irreversible changes to market structure, or where other (superior) conflicting interests may be affected. Indeed, a reading of paragraph 35 of the Judgment seems to disqualify the standard position that it is possible to exempt any agreements prohibited under Article 101(1) TFEU if the four conditions of Article 101(3) TFUE are fully met (as indicated by the CJEU only in para. 31).


In any case, as a matter of principle, it must be welcome that the CJEU has excluded the "an eye for an eye" principle and strongly pushed for undertakings to resort to the established regulatory and judicial avenues in order to try to prevent instances of illegal competition in their markets. At the same time, it seems to generate some (positive) pressure on sectoral regulators and the courts to integrate competition law analysis (or competition implications) when deciding on the existence of potential illegal competition or intrusion in a given market.


US GAO report on interagency contracting: A mirror for centralised purchasing strategies in the EU?

The US Government Accountability Office (GAO) has just published an interesting report and recommendations for executive action regarding interagency contracting.

In the US, interagency contracting refers to a strategy whereby 'one agency either places an order directly against another agency's contract or uses the contracting services of another agency to obtain supplies or services'. The EU rough equivalent is the use of centralised purchasing strategies and, in particular, the carrying out of cooperative procurement--most often through dedicated central purchasing bodies. 

In view of the importance given to these 'smart procurement' strategies in the revision of the current EU rules (see October 2012 compromise text for a 'state of play' on centralised procurement strategies), learning from the lessons offered by the experience in the US looks like a promising opportunity.

In my view, the relevance of the GAO interagency contracting report relies on its realism and practical approach. Indeed, GAO 'designated the management of interagency contracting as a high risk area in 2005, in part because of the need for stronger internal controls and clear definitions of agency roles and responsibilities'. 

Following a first assessment in 2010 and the implementation of important policy reforms aimed at strengthening the governance and oversight of interagency contracting, GAO now issues a series of additional recommendations that, basically, boil down to giving effect to the 2011 Policy developed by the Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP) and to strengthening the collection and analysis of data on interagency contracting. Some of the most interesting extracts are, in my opinion, the following:
OFPP issued guidance in September 2011 that requires agencies to develop business cases for creating new governmentwide acquisition contracts and multi-agency contracts. The business cases must address three key elements: (1) the scope of the contract vehicle and potential duplication with existing contracts; (2) the value of the new contract vehicle, including expected benefits and costs of establishing a new contract; and (3) the administration and expected interagency use of the contract vehicle.
The guidance also requires senior agency officials to approve the business cases and post them on an OMB website to provide interested federal stakeholders an opportunity to review and provide feedback. Feedback is addressed through various channels, including posting written comments through the website and sending letters or memos to stakeholders. According to OFPP, it also conducts follow-up with sponsoring agencies when significant questions are raised during the interagency vetting process, including questions related to potential value or duplication.
OFPP and GSA have taken a number of steps to address the need for better data on interagency contract vehicles. We previously have reported that a lack of reliable information on interagency contracts hampers agencies’ ability to do market research as well as efforts to manage and leverage them effectively. To promote better and easier access to data on existing interagency contracts, OFPP has worked to improve the Interagency Contract Directory, a searchable online database of indefinite delivery vehicles for interagency use created in 2003. [...] Short-term improvements include enhancing the search function and simplifying the presentation of search results, which should aid market research. Potential long-term enhancements include the ability to access vendor past performance information and upload contract documents, such as statements of work, to the system. OFPP officials also noted that this information will be helpful in providing data on the use of interagency contract vehicles, as the database provides information on the amount of obligations against the contracts, and eventually may provide other information such as a notification when contracts not designated for interagency use are being used in that manner.
In my view, the practical recommendations and the policy objectives set out by the OFPP and now strongly endorsed / recommended by GAO make sense and should be carried to the regulation of centralised procurement bodies/strategies in the forthcoming EU rules, with a particular focus on data collection and analysis (which has been significantly reduced with the proposed suppression of article 84 of the 2011 Commission's proposal and, particularly, of its paragraph 3(1) that mandated special public oversight of central purchasing bodies). 

I think that the more general transatlantic message to carry home in the revision of the current of the EU rules is that, as procurement strategies become more complicated, more planning and more oversight / analysis are required. Maybe not an easy lesson to square with the aim of procurement simplification, but definitely an operative need if we want to avoid creating (or nurturing) a 'regulatory beast' we may be unable to tame.

Latest GC on contract modification in #publicprocurement: Practical difficulties and the need for new rules in the 2013 Directive

In its Judgment of 31 January 2013 in case T-235/11 Spain v Commission (AVE), the General Court has set a very rigid position against the permissibility of contract modifications under EU public procurement rules. 

In a nutshell, and further developing the previous case law in Succhi di Frutta and Pressetext Nachrichtenagentur, the GC has declared that (non-insignificant) contract modifications amount to direct award of (complementary) public contracts and that, consequently, failure to do so in accordance with the rules of the Directives implies a breach of EU law by the contracting authority or entity.

Indeed, the GC has declared that:

69 [...] nor can the argument of the Kingdom of Spain that despite the alteration of certain of the characterizing elements of the services contracted, by keeping the contract initially concluded, the modification of the original contract cannot be considered substantial. As is clear from the case law, in order to ensure transparency of procedures and equal treatment of tenderers, amendments to the provisions of a public contract during its validity constitute a new award of the contract when they have characteristics substantially different from those of the original contract and therefore highlight the willingness of the parties to renegotiate the essential aspects of the contract (see, to that effect, the judgment of the Court of 5 October 2000, Commission / France, C-337/98, ECR p. I-8377, paragraphs 44 and 46, see, by analogy, Pressetext Nachrichtenagentur, paragraph 60 above, paragraph 34).
70 The modification of a contract in force may be considered material when it introduces conditions that, had they been included in the initial award procedure, would have allowed the participation of tenderers other than those initially admitted, or would have allowed the selection of a tender other than the initially selected. Also, a modification of an initial contract can be considered substantial when the contract extends largely to works not originally foreseen. An amendment can also be considered substantial when it changes the economic balance of the contract in favor of the contractor in a way that was not foreseen in the terms of the original contract (see, by analogy, Case Pressetext Nachrichtenagentur [C‑454/06, Rec. p. I‑4401] paragraphs 35 to 37).
71 In the present case, the technical specifications that were modified cannot be considered ancillary, but of a greater importance, as they relate, in particular, to the implementation of important works (such as the execution false tunnels, a viaduct, deepening of foundations, strengthening of technical armor blocks, extension of drainage works, etc..). Therefore, the Kingdom of Spain cannot claim that the work to be executed remains the one initially designed, ie, the high-speed train line, not that the object of the initial contract remained essentially unaltered. (T-231/11 at paras. 69-71, own translation from Spanish; emphasis added).
This position generates practical difficulties, particularly in technically complicated projects, where the use of non-modifiable fixed-price contracts could deter bidders from participating or could generate an increase of total procurement costs due to the need of contractors to create a 'financial cushion' in their offers to cover any unexpected needs for amendments in the scope of works.

This seems now recognized in the current version of the Compromise Text for the reform of current EU public procurement Directives, which includes a (more flexible) rule on contract modification that reduces the risk of (illegal) direct award of public contracts where modifications are justified and necessary.
Article 72 Modification of contracts during their term
1. A substantial modification of the provisions of a public contract or a framework agreement during its term shall be considered as a new award for the purposes of this Directive and shall require a new procurement procedure in accordance with this Directive. In the cases referred to in paragraphs 3, 4 or 5, modifications shall not be considered as substantial.
2. A modification of a contract or a framework agreement during its term shall be considered substantial within the meaning of paragraph 1, where it renders the contract or the framework agreement materially different in character from the one initially concluded. In any case, without prejudice to paragraphs 3, 4 or 5, a modification shall be considered substantial where one of the following conditions is met:
(a) the modification introduces conditions which, had they been part of the initial procurement procedure, would have allowed for the admission of other candidates than those initially selected or for the acceptance of an offer other than that originally accepted or would have attracted additional participants in the procurement procedure;
(b) the modification changes the economic balance of the contract or the framework agreement in favour of the contractor in a manner which was not provided for in the initial contract or framework agreement;
(c) the modification extends the scope of the contract or framework agreement considerably to encompass supplies, services or works not initially covered.
3. Modifications shall not be considered substantial within the meaning of paragraph 1 where they have been provided for in the initial procurement documents in clear, precise and unequivocal review clauses or options. Such clauses shall state the scope and nature of possible modifications or options as well as the conditions under which they may be used. They shall not provide for modifications or options that would alter the overall nature of the contract or the framework agreement.
4. Where the value of a modification can be expressed in monetary terms, the modification shall not be considered to be substantial within the meaning of paragraph 1, where its value does not exceed the thresholds set out in Article 4 and where it is below 10% of the initial contract value, provided that the modification does not alter the overall nature of the contract or framework agreement. Where several successive modifications are made, the value shall be assessed on the basis of the net cumulative value of the successive modifications.
5. A modification shall not be considered to be substantial within the meaning of paragraph 1, where the following cumulative conditions are fulfilled:
(a) the need for modification has been brought about by circumstances which a diligent contracting authority could not foresee;
(b) the modification does not alter the overall nature of the contract;
(c) any increase in price is not higher than 50% of the value of the original contract or framework agreement.
Contracting authorities shall publish in the Official Journal of the European Union a notice on such modifications. Such notices shall contain the information set out in Annex VI part G and be published in accordance with Article 49. 
6. Without prejudice to paragraph 3, the substitution of a new contractor for the one to which the contracting authority had initially awarded the contract shall be considered a substantial modification within the meaning of paragraph 1. However, the first subparagraph shall not apply in the event of universal or partial succession into the position of the initial contractor, following corporate restructuring, including takeover, merger, […] acquisition or insolvency, of another economic operator that fulfils the criteria for qualitative selection initially established provided that this does not entail other substantial modifications to the contract and is not aimed at circumventing the application of this Directive.
As can be seen, the current proposal incorporates the (formalistic) criteria used by the GC in Spain v Commission (AVE), but also creates some flexibility both in terms of setting a value threshold that excludes the need to run a new procurement procedure to increase contract value of up to 10% (as long as the addition remains below EU thresholds, which does not seem to be a necessary or practical requirement), and recognizing that there are sets of circumstances where contract modifications are simply needed and, consequently, legitimate.

In my view, the adoption of new Article 72 in the 2013 EU public procurement Directive is much needed from a practical perspective, although the final wording could still be improved to enhance the effectiveness of its paragraph 4.