What's left of the 'new limb' of Art 263(4) TFEU after Inuit and Telefonica? (C-274/12 P)

In its Judgment of 19 December in case C-274/12 P Telefonica v Commission, the CJEU has continued to define (and minimise) the scope of Article 263(4) TFEU and, particularly, the 'new' third limb introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon according to which 'Any natural or legal person may [...] institute proceedings against [...] a regulatory act which is of direct concern to them and does not entail implementing measures.'
 
The restrictive approach adopted in the interpretation of this provision is largely based on the (substitutive) potential reliance on requests for a preliminary ruling under Article 267 TFEU against the measures not susceptible of a direct challenge by 'non-qualified' applicants. Therefore, the CJEU has now (almost) completed the reinterpretation of the post-Lisbon mechanisms for judicial review, where it seems clear that Article 263(4) TFEU, and particularly its last limb, is bound to have (or continue having) a marginal role.
 
In Inuit, the CJEU made it clear that legislative measures are not covered by the concept of 'regulatory act'. However, that negative approach to the definition of 'regulatory act' left some questions unanswered (are those only legislative measures derived from the ordinary legislative procedure as the GC had found, or are there all legislative measures, independently from their ultimate legal basis?). It was also not considered what 'implenting measures' meant. This has now been addressed in Telefonica.
 
The arguments provided by the CJEU are worth reading carefully:
27 As the Advocate General has observed in points 40 and 41 of her Opinion, the concept of a ‘regulatory act which … does not entail implementing measures’, within the meaning of the final limb of the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU, is to be interpreted in the light of that provision’s objective, which, as is clear from its origin, consists in preventing an individual from being obliged to infringe the law in order to have access to a court. Where a regulatory act directly affects the legal situation of a natural or legal person without requiring implementing measures, that person could be denied effective judicial protection if he did not have a direct legal remedy before the European Union judicature for the purpose of challenging the legality of the regulatory act. In the absence of implementing measures, natural or legal persons, although directly concerned by the act in question, would be able to obtain a judicial review of that act only after having infringed its provisions, by pleading that those provisions are unlawful in proceedings initiated against them before the national courts.
28 It should be explained in this regard, first, that where a regulatory act entails implementing measures, judicial review of compliance with the European Union legal order is ensured irrespective of whether those measures are adopted by the European Union or the Member States. Natural or legal persons who are unable, because of the conditions governing admissibility laid down in the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU, to challenge a regulatory act of the European Union directly before the European Union judicature are protected against the application to them of such an act by the ability to challenge the implementing measures which the act entails.
29 Where responsibility for the implementation of such acts lies with the institutions, bodies, offices or agencies of the European Union, natural or legal persons are entitled to bring a direct action before the European Union judicature against the implementing acts under the conditions stated in the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU, and to plead in support of that action, pursuant to Article 277 TFEU, the illegality of the basic act at issue. Where that implementation is a matter for the Member States, those persons may plead the invalidity of the basic act at issue before the national courts and tribunals and cause the latter to request a preliminary ruling from the Court of Justice, pursuant to Article 267 TFEU (Case C-583/11 P Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and Others v Parliament and Council [2013] ECR I-0000, paragraph 93).
30 Second, as the Advocate General has observed in point 48 of her Opinion, the question whether a regulatory act entails implementing measures should be assessed by reference to the position of the person pleading the right to bring proceedings under the final limb of the fourth paragraph of Article 263 TFEU. It is therefore irrelevant whether the act in question entails implementing measures with regard to other persons.
31 Third, in order to determine whether the measure being challenged entails implementing measures, reference should be made exclusively to the subject-matter of the action and, where an applicant seeks only the partial annulment of an act, it is solely any implementing measures which that part of the act may entail that must, as the case may be, be taken into consideration (C-274/12 P at paras 27 to 31, emphasis added).
The Judgment could be criticised in view of the fact that it includes implementing measures to be adopted by the Member States within the definition of 'regulatory acts...' in Article 263(4) TFEU--which (under a more generous approach) could have been limited to acts that require implementing measures by the European Institutions, but not those that require implementation by the Member States. However, the logic of the Judgment is clear and the strong push to 'redirect' litigation towards Article 267 TFEU is clear and consistent.
 
It is also clear from the Inuit and Telefonica Judgments that the CJEU is keeping the 'Plaumann test' alive and kicking when it comes to the interpretation of 'direct and individual concern' under the second limb of Article 263(4) TFEU.
 
Finally, it is also cleat that the CJEU sees no violation of Articles 6 and 13 of the European Convention on Human Rights or Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU as a result of its restrictive interpretation of the locus standi criteria in Article 263(4) TFEU (see paras 56 to 61, where the CJEU stresses once again that 'Judicial review of compliance with the European Union legal order is ensured, as can be seen from Article 19(1) TEU, by the Court of Justice and the courts and tribunals of the Member States. To that end, the FEU Treaty has established, by Articles 263 TFEU and 277 TFEU, on the one hand, and Article 267 TFEU, on the other, a complete system of legal remedies and procedures designed to ensure judicial review of the legality of European Union acts, and has entrusted such review to the European Union judicature', at 57).
 
Bottom line, the CJEU is clearly stressing that domestic courts of the Member States are EU courts for all purposes. In my view, from the perspective of the design and manageability of the system, this is certainly the only sensible and viable strategy.

CJEU follows AG Jääskinen in revisiting PreussenElektra and minimising Doux Elevages' requirements for State imputability of aid measures (C-262/12)


In its Judgment of 19 December 2013 in case C-262/12 Vent De Colère and Others, the Court of Justice of the EU has largely followed AG Jääskinen's Opinion (commented here) and confirmed that, under Article 107(1) TFEU, a mechanism for offsetting in full the additional costs imposed on undertakings because of an obligation to purchase wind-generated electricity at a price higher than the market price that is financed by all final consumers of electricity in the national territory constitutes an intervention through State resources and, consequently, is under the general prohibition of State aid.
 
This Judgment must be welcomed, particularly because the CJEU follows the submission made by the AG, who considered that consumer contributions amounted to the existence of 'State resources', due to 'the fact that these resources constantly remain under public control and, therefore, are available to the competent national authorities, [which] suffices to qualify them as State funds to finance the measure, which then falls within the scope of Article 107(1) TFEU' (para 34 of his Opinion, own translation from Spanish).
 
Indeed, the CJEU has reviewed the characteristics of the body administering the funds paid by consumers (a public body under effective State supervision) and has stressed that
33 […] the sums thus managed by the Caisse des dépôts et consignations must be regarded as remaining under public control.
34 All those factors taken together serve to distinguish the present case from that which gave rise to the judgment in PreussenElektra, in which the Court held that an obligation imposed on private electricity supply undertakings to purchase electricity produced from renewable sources at fixed minimum prices could not be regarded as an intervention through State resources where it does not lead to any direct or indirect transfer of State resources to the undertakings producing that type of electricity (see, to that effect, PreussenElektra, paragraph 59).
35 As the Court has already had occasion to point out – in paragraph 74 of the judgment in Essent Netwerk Noord and Others – in the case which gave rise to the judgment in PreussenElektra, the private undertakings had not been appointed by the Member State concerned to manage a State resource, but were bound by an obligation to purchase by means of their own financial resources.
36 Consequently, the funds at issue [in PreussenElektra] could not be considered a State resource since they were not at any time under public control and there was no mechanism, such as the one at issue in the main proceedings in the present case, established and regulated by the Member State, for offsetting the additional costs arising from that obligation to purchase and through which the State offered those private operators the certain prospect that the additional costs would be covered in full.
37 Accordingly, Article 107(1) TFEU must be interpreted as meaning that a mechanism for offsetting in full the additional costs imposed on undertakings because of an obligation to purchase wind-generated electricity at a price higher than the market price that is financed by all final consumers of electricity in the national territory, such as that resulting from Law No 2000-108, constitutes an intervention through State resources (C-262/12 at paras 33 to 37, emphasis added).
In my view, the Vent De Colère Judgment advances in the functional approach to State aid and consolidates a general criterion of State control that should reduce the uncertainty surrounding the imputability to the State of (indirect) support measures through consumer contributions. The distinction with PreussenElektra is also rather clear now.
 
The only hurdle that remains in the way of such truly functional approach is the issue of imputability as addressed in Doux Élevages particularly in relation with (pseudo)fiscal measures (something that AG Jääskinen had addressed in  paras 50-54 of his Opinion but the CJEU felt no need to discuss in Vent De Colère). Hopefully, the CJEU will also minimise Vent De Colère on that point some time soon.
 

CJEU: vertical effect of Directives goes both ways (C-425/12)


The Judgment of the CJEU of 12 December 2013 in case C-425/12 Portgás may appear to be of interest only for public procurement aficionados (and, even then, only for hardcore ones), as it deals with the potential applicability of the old 1993 utilities procurement Directive (no longer current) to a company entrusted with a gas distribution concession in Portugal. Hardly a topic bound to spur heated debates. Hence, it seems a case doomed to receive very little attention amongst EU lawyers...
 
However, it contains one of the very few potential (r)evolutions in the theory of Directives' direct effect since Mangold and Kücükdeveci by holding that their vertical direct effect goes both ways (i.e. both up and down). In my view, Portgás should become the new Foster and claim a main spot in general EU law (text)books.
 
I think that the Portgás Judgment indeed develops the existing law on Directives' vertical effect. Implicitly, that theory was always concerned with upwards vertical effect, in the sense of allowing particulars to claim EU law protection against the infringing Member State. The theory has clearly been conceptualised on the basis of an (implicit) bottom up claim.
 
However, it is not at all clear whether a downwards application of the theory is at all possible. In general terms, however, the canon (as an extension of the no-horizontal direct effect declared in Marshall) would dictate that such a vertical direct effect cannot go down because the infringing Member State cannot rely on the (non-transposed or deffectively transposed) Directive to affect the legal position of particulars (just as one particular cannot do it against another one).
 
The Foster line of extension of the "standard" upwards vertical direct effect of Directives started to tackle what we may now call 'mezzanine' situations, where a particular did not want to claim protection against the State itself, but against one of its 'emanations' (as a way to circumvent the harshness of the no-horizontal direct effect dogma). In that case, the CJEU was clear to stress that the upwards dimension of Directives' direct effect reaches such a mezzanine situation and declared, as is well known, that particulars can rely on EU law protection under certain circumstances.
 
In Portgás the situation is the opposite. The CJEU was asked to determine whether in a comparable 'mezzanine' situation, the State could claim downwards direct effect of a non-transposed Directive against one of its Foster-emanations. The first bet may be that the principle of legitimate expectations may prevent such an extension of the doctrine. However, such a position has now been rejected by the CJEU.
 
In the passages that deserve more attention in the Portgás Judgment, the CJEU analyses the possibility for the Portuguese government to claim financial recovery of amounts paid to Portgás to finance the acquisition of equipment (gas meters) due to the fact that the undertaking did not tender the contract in accordance with the requirements of the 1993 utilities procurement Directive. However, at the time of the purchase of the equipment, Portugal had not implemented the Directive. Consequently, Portgás raised the defence that Portugal cannot require compliance with a set of rules it had not itself transposed. The CJEU, however, takes a different approach based on the effet utile of EU law and argues that:
33 [...] although the Court has held that unconditional and sufficiently precise provisions of a directive may be relied on by individuals against a body which has been given responsibility, under the control of the State, for a public-interest service and which has, for that purpose, special powers (see, to that effect, Foster and Others, paragraphs 18 and 20, and Dominguez, paragraphs 38 and 39 and the case-law cited), the case in the main proceedings has arisen in a context different from the context of that case-law.
34 In the context of the present case, it should be recalled that, according to the case-law of the Court, the obligation on a Member State to take all the measures necessary to achieve the result prescribed by a directive is a binding obligation imposed by the third paragraph of Article 288 TFEU and by the directive itself. That duty to take all appropriate measures, whether general or particular, is binding on all the authorities of the Member States (see Case C‑129/96 Inter-Environnement Wallonie [1997] ECR I‑7411, paragraph 40 and the case-law cited) as well as on bodies which, under the control of those authorities, have been given responsibility for a public-interest service and which have, for that purpose, special powers. It follows that the authorities of the Member States must be in a position to ensure that such bodies comply with the provisions of Directive 93/38.
35 It would be contradictory to rule that State authorities and bodies satisfying the conditions set out in paragraph 24 of the present judgment [Foster conditions] are required to apply Directive 93/38, while denying those authorities the possibility to ensure compliance, if necessary before national courts, with the provisions of that directive by a body satisfying those conditions when that body must itself also comply with Directive 93/38.
36 Furthermore, the Member States would be able to take advantage of their own failure to comply with European Union law in failing correctly to transpose a directive into national law if compliance with the provisions of Directive 93/38 by such bodies could not be ensured on the initiative of a State authority.
37 Lastly, that approach would make it possible for a private competitor to rely on the provisions of Directive 93/38 against a contracting entity which satisfies the criteria set out in paragraph 24 of the present judgment [Foster conditions], whereas State authorities could not rely on the obligations flowing from that directive against such an entity. Consequently, whether or not such a contracting entity would be required to comply with the provisions of Directive 93/38 would depend on the nature of the persons or bodies relying on Directive 93/38. In those circumstances, Directive 93/38 would no longer be applied in a uniform manner in the domestic legal system of the Member State concerned.
38 It follows that a private undertaking, which has been given responsibility, pursuant to a measure adopted by the State, for providing, under the control of the State, a public-interest service and which has, for that purpose, special powers going beyond those which result from the normal rules applicable in relations between individuals, is obliged to comply with the provisions of Directive 93/38 and the authorities of a Member State may therefore rely on those provisions against it (C-425/12 at paras 33-38, emphasis added).
I think that it is plain to see that Portgás is somehow the mirror image of Foster. Its practical implications may seem small in that the number of Foster-emanations that Member States hold is probably relatively small. However, in the area of public procurement and, more generally, of EU economic law, it is not hard to imagine a relatively important number of potential 'Portgás' entities that can see their rights and (financial) interests compromised as a result of the 'sandwich' situation that this latest CJEU Judgment creates. And this may be a situation that triggers litigation on the basis of the protection of legitimate expectations, rights to property or other fundamental rights by those companies (which stresses the relevance of rethinking the current trends of granting of 'corporate human rights'--see some discussion here).
 
What may be more controversial is to claim, as I would, that this is the last frontier before the full recognition of Directives' direct effect. All in all, as the law currently stands, there is a very limited field where Directives are not directly effective (after their period of transposition) and that, by itself, may justify a simplification (repeal?) of the no-horizontal direct effect dogma. It remains to be seen if the CJEU will ever be willing to cross that bridge.

CJEU rubber stamps Italian minimum tariffs for certification in public procurement, subject to proportionality (C-327/12)


In its Judgment of 12 December 2013 in case C-327/12 Soa Nazionale Costruttori, the Court of Justice of the EU has followed rather closely AG Cruz Villalon's Opinion (commented here) and declared that a scheme of compulsory minimum tariffs for certification services supplied to undertakings seeking to participate in procedures for the award of public contracts is not per se contrary to EU competition and free movement rules, always provided that it is not disproportionate (which determination it referred back to the domestic courts).
 
One of the remarkable features of the Judgment is the level of detail in which the CJEU has summarised its State action doctrine. In this useful reminder, the CJEU has stressed that
37 [...] although it is true that Articles 101 TFEU and 102 TFEU are concerned solely with the conduct of undertakings and not with laws or regulations emanating from Member States, those articles, read in conjunction with Article 4(3) TEU, which lays down a duty of cooperation between the European Union and the Member States, none the less require the latter not to introduce or maintain in force measures, even of a legislative or regulatory nature, which may render ineffective the competition rules applicable to undertakings (see Joined Cases C‑94/04 and C‑202/94 Cipolla and Others [2006] ECR I‑11421, paragraph 46, and Case C‑393/08 Sbarigia [2010] ECR I‑6337, paragraph 31).

38 Articles 101 TFEU or 102 TFEU, read in conjunction with Article 4(3) TEU, are infringed where a Member State requires or encourages the adoption of agreements, decisions or concerted practices contrary to Article 101 TFEU or reinforces their effects, or where it divests its own rules of the character of legislation by delegating to private economic operators responsibility for taking decisions affecting the economic sphere, or requires or encourages abuses of a dominant position (see, to that effect, Cipolla and Others, paragraph 47) [C-327/12 at paras 37-38, emphasis added].
Further than this, and after dismissing the applicability of the State action doctrine on the basis of a lack of evidence of the existence of such effects--which is at least questionable where we are in presence of a de facto agreement on minimum prices between certification entities--the CJEU rejects the application of Art 106 TFEU on the basis that the authorisation given by the Italian State to the certification entities is not an exclusive or special right because there is no numerus clausus of authorisations. On this point, the CJEU must be praised for sticking to its stated case law in Ambulanz Glockner and not accepting the rather counterintuitive remarks made by the AG in his Opinion (criticised here).
 
Finally, and looking at the compatibility with freedom of establishment rules (art 49 TFEU), in the Soa Nazionale Construttori Judgment, the CJEU has followed very closely the Opinion of the Advocate General and accepted some premises for the existence of mandatory public procurement certification schemes subject to (non-disproportionate) minimum tariffs that I find objectionable. In particular, I think that the CJEU should have avoided declaring such a system adequate to protect a public interest in the following terms:
59 A restriction on the freedom of establishment may be justified where it serves overriding requirements relating to the public interest, is suitable for securing the attainment of the objective which it pursues and does not go beyond what is necessary in order to attain it (see DKV Belgium, paragraph 38).
60 Unionsoa and the Italian Government consider that the national legislation at issue in the main proceedings seeks to ensure the independence of SOAs and the quality of the certification services which they supply. Competition between SOAs at the level of tariffs negotiated with their customers and the possibility of fixing those tariffs at a very low level would risk compromising their independence with respect to those customers and having a negative impact on the quality of the certification services.
61 In that regard, it must be observed that the public interest in the protection of recipients of services can justify a restriction on the freedom of establishment (see Case C‑451/03 Servizi Ausiliari Dottori Commercialisti [2006] ECR I‑2941, paragraph 38).
62 In this case, first, SOAs are entrusted with certification of undertakings, receipt of an appropriate certificate being a necessary condition in order for the undertakings concerned to participate in public works contracts. In that context, the Italian legislation seeks to ensure the lack of any commercial or financial interest such as to result in unimpartial or discriminatory behaviour on the part of SOAs with regard to those undertakings.
63 Secondly, as is apparent from the order for reference, SOAs may only carry out certification activities. Moreover, they are required, in accordance with national legislation, to have resources and procedures suitable for ensuring that their services are carried out effectively and in good faith.
64 It is with a view to protecting the recipients of the services that the independence of SOAs vis-à-vis the specific interests of their customers is particularly important. A certain restriction of the possibility to negotiate the prices of services with those customers is likely to strengthen their independence.
65 In those circumstances, it must be held, as the Advocate General essentially stated in point 58 of his Opinion, that the setting of minimum tariffs for the supply of such services is intended, in principle, to ensure the quality of those services and it is suitable for attaining the objective of protecting the recipients of those services [C-327/12 at paras 59-65, emphasis added].
In my view, the CJEU's position is exceedingly lenient. Particularly if one takes into consideration that the ultimate "beneficiaries" of the certification services (i.e.the Italian contracting authorities) cannot impose the provision of those certificates to all entities willing to participate in their tenders for public contracts. Under Art 52(5) of Directive 2004/18 (the same provision that allows for the creation of certification entities such as the Italian SOAs) it is clearly stated that 'economic operators from other Member States may not be obliged to undergo such registration or certification in order to participate in a public contract. The contracting authorities shall recognise equivalent certificates from bodies established in other Member States. They shall also accept other equivalent means of proof' (emphasis added). So, even if only in relation to non-national undertakings, it is clear that contracting authorities need to retain independent capacity to assess alternative methods of proof of suitability of tenderers. Moreover, under Art 52(4), contracting authorities can challenge the certifications (or the information derived therefrom) as long as they have a sufficient reason to distrust it. Therefore, their reliance on the certificates (of domestic) tenderers is not intended to be acritical or necessarily automatic if there are reasons that justify a request for further information.
 
Consequently, the creation of systems of mandatory certification seem to protect a weak public interest inasmuch as they are simply a mechanism of administrative simplification (or red tape reduction). If this is borne in mind, the reasoning based on the independence of the certifying entities and the need to set minimum prices in order to preserve it so that contracting authorities' interests are sufficiently protected seems to fade away rather quickly.
 
Moreover, the CJEU's lukewarm approach to the proportionality of the Italian minimum certification tariffs (which is limited to indicate that 'It is for the referring court to determine whether, in the light of, inter alia, the method of calculating the minimum tariffs, particularly in the light of the number of categories of work for which the certificate is drawn up, that national legislation goes beyond what is necessary to attain that objective', para 69) does not establish a sufficiently clear indication of the lack of proportionality of a system that, effectively, forces (!) certification entities to charge larger sums for exactly the same amount of work depending on the number of contracts the certified undertaking wants to tender for. In this regard, the Opinon of Advocate General Cruz Villalon is much more detailed and convincing.
 
All in all, in my view, this is a formally correct and substantially very deficient Judgment of the CJEU, and one that keeps a very formal approach to restrictions on free movement (as the CJEU has only looked at restrictions on the freedom of establishment, forgetting completely about the implications of the system on the free movement of goods and free provision of services subjected to the EU public procurement rules). A more holistic and funcional approach would have been preferable.

Is the CJEU engaging in 'Judicial Abstinence'? Or, where do we go from here?


The CJEU has released the ebook of the May 2013 conference that celebrated 50 years of its Van Gend en Loos Judgment. The book contains many interesting contributions and, in my view, one of the most thought-provoking is Prof Catherine Barnard's 'Van Gend en Loos to(t) the future'.
 
Prof Barnard reflects about the future role of the CJEU in a changed and changing EU and identifies a trend of 'Judicial Abstinence' that 'leaves the uncomfortable impression that the Court is reneging on its key function, first articulated in Van Gend en Loos, that EU law must be effective' (p. 122).
 
Her analysis is relevant and expands well beyond the area of labour law, where she focusses. In my view, recent Judgments in other (even more fundamental?) areas such as the legal position and effectiveness of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU also show the judicial abstinence the CJEU is (selectively) engaging in (for instance, in case C-313/12). And that leaves us with the difficult question of why is the CJEU (suddenly) so averse to (continuying to) act as constitutional court at EU level?
 
Pessimists could say that we are witnessing a deflation of the EU law supremacy balloon, and that the 'golden age' of the CJEU lasted 50 years and is already over. However, Prof Barnard offers a positive outlook as long as the CJEU departs from 'hardcore' judicial abstinence and opts for a medium-ground strategy (which she terms 'Old-Rules Lite'). As she stresses,
The EU of 2013 is infinitely more complex and any solutions will have to reflect that. There will be no Van Gend en Loos II. However, this does not mean the end of the Court of Justice and its influence. Quite the contrary. It means a repositioning of the Court from standard bearer of EU integration to ensuring that the EU is able to function in its new, more fragmented reality. This paves the way for the Court to develop a new kind of doctrine of effectiveness, one that might mean endorsing the devolution of more decision-making power to the Member States or other actors (p. 122, emphasis added).
The next few years will show if the CJEU is up to the task.

CJEU strengthens Commission's enforcement monopoly in State aid (C-111/10) and jeopardises its consistent enforcement with other EU policies (C-272/12)

In two recent Judgments of 4 December 2013 (C-111/10, Commission v Council) and 10 December 2013 (C-272/12, Commission v Ireland and Others), the CJEU has ruled on the distribution of powers between the Council and the Commission in the area of State aid enforcement. In one of the cases (C-111/10), the CJEU made a substantive finding and upheld the Council authorisation of State aid for agricultural support in Lithuania. In the other case (C-272/12) the CJEU refused to engage in an analysis of the distribution of competences between the institutions due to a procedural flaw (the GC had raised the issue of its own motion, in breach of art 21 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union), but stressed the same underlying principles.
 
It is worth highlighting that, in both Judgments, the CJEU clearly stressed the exceptional powers that the Council holds in the area of State aid enforcement--which, in my view, comes to further strengthen, consolidate and perpetuate the monopoly of State aid enforcement held by the Commission.
 
This is particularly clear in certain passages of the reasoning followed by the CJEU, which:
39 [...] held, after recalling the central role which the FEU Treaty reserves for the Commission in determining whether aid is incompatible with the internal market, that the third subparagraph of Article 108(2) TFEU covers an exceptional and specific case, meaning that the power conferred upon the Council by that provision is clearly exceptional in character (see, to that effect, Case C‑110/02 Commission v Council [2004] ECR I‑6333, paragraphs 29 to 31) and, accordingly, that the third subparagraph of Article 108(2) TFEU must necessarily be interpreted strictly (see, by analogy, Case C‑510/08 Mattner [2010] ECR I‑3553, paragraph 32, and Case C‑419/11 Česká spořitelna [2013] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 26)
72 [...] the power granted to the Council under the third subparagraph of Article 108(2) TFEU applies only within the limits indicated by that provision, namely where exceptional circumstances exist (see, to that effect, Case C‑122/94 Commission v Council [1996] ECR I‑881, paragraph 13) [C-111/10 at paras 39 and 72, emphasis added].
And further stressed that:
48 As the Court held in paragraphs 29 to 31 of Case C‑110/02 Commission v Council [2004] ECR I‑6333, the intention of the EC Treaty, in providing through Article 88 EC for aid to be kept under constant review and monitored by the Commission, is that the finding that aid may be incompatible with the common market is to be arrived at, subject to review by the General Court and the Court of Justice, by means of an appropriate procedure which it is the Commission’s responsibility to set in motion. Articles 87 EC and 88 EC thus reserve a central role for the Commission in determining whether aid is incompatible. The power conferred upon the Council in the area of State aid by the third subparagraph of Article 88(2) EC is exceptional in character, which means that it must necessarily be interpreted strictly (see also, to that effect, the judgment of 4 December 2013 in Case C‑111/10 Commission v Council [2013] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 39) [C-272/12 at para 48, emphasis added].
This renewed emphasis on the (almost) exclusive powers of the European Commission in the area of State aid policy and enforcement is probably a necessity in terms of ensuring institutional balance and the proper working of the EU institutions (as the CJUE stresses in para 47 of C-111/10: 'That interpretation seeks to maintain the coherence and effectiveness of European Union action'), but it can also create difficulties when it comes to ensure the proper integration of State aid enforcement with policy in other areas of EU economic law where the balance of powers between EU Institutions, or between the EU and Member States, is different.
 
This is something that case C-272/12 clearly brings to light. In that case, there was a tension between the Decisions adopted by the Council in the area of national fiscal legislation and the Commission's powers in State aid enforcement. The tension derived from the circumstance that the Council could authorise Member States to provide tax exemptions from the excise duty for mineral oils used for the production of alumina. Such exemptions could (at least theoretically, although this was challenged in C-272/12 but the CJEU declined to provide an answer on the basis of the ultra petita argument mentioned before) constitute State aid. In order to try to sort out that potential conflict, recital 5 of the relevant instrument (Council Decision 2001/224) indicated that
that decision was without prejudice ‘to the outcome of any procedures relating to distortions of the operation of the single market that may be undertaken, in particular under Articles [107 TFEU] and [108 TFEU]’, and that it did not override ‘the requirement for Member States to notify instances of potential State aid to the Commission under Article [108 TFEU]’.
Such 'coordination' provision was bound to create difficulties, despite the fact that the European Commission was involved in the assessment of the Member States' requests for authorisation to provide exemptions. The GC had sought to create a functional balance that could overcome the difficulties of subjecting the Council authorisation (and, consequently, the Member States' exemptions) to a second analysis by the European Commission under the State aid rules (despite the wording in recital 5 of Decision 2001/224). Indeed,
the General Court held, first, that, in the light of the fact that the rules governing the harmonisation of national fiscal legislation and the rules on State aid have a shared objective, namely to promote the proper functioning of the internal market, by combating, inter alia, distortions of competition, the concept of distortion of competition had to be regarded as having the same scope and the same meaning in both those areas, in order to ensure the consistent implementation of those rules. The General Court stated, in that regard, that Article 8(4) and (5) of Directive 92/81 confers in particular on the Commission, which submits a proposal, and the Council, which enacts a measure, the responsibility for assessing whether there is any distortion of competition, in order to decide whether or not to authorise a Member State to apply or continue to apply an exemption from the harmonised excise duty and that, if the assessments differ, the Commission has the option of bringing an action for annulment of the Council’s decision [C-272/12 at para 39, emphasis added].
The implications of this reasoning would be, rather clearly, that the European Commission should not have a second bite of the cherry under the State aid rules because it would have already expressed its views on the (absence of a) distortion of competition derived from the excise duty exemption within the fiscal harmonisation mechanism. However, the CJEU had none of this and declared that
46 It must be borne in mind that Directive 92/81 was adopted on the basis of Article 99 of the EEC Treaty (which became Article 99 of the EC Treaty, which itself became Article 93 EC [and is now art 113 TFEU]) which conferred on the Council the power to adopt provisions for the harmonisation of legislation concerning turnover taxes, excise duties and other forms of indirect taxation to the extent that that harmonisation was necessary to ensure the establishment and functioning of the internal market.

47 The authorisation decisions were adopted pursuant to Article 8(4) of Directive 92/81, which granted to the Council, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission, the power to authorise any Member State to introduce exemptions or reductions other than those laid down by that directive ‘for specific policy considerations’. The purpose and the scope of the procedure laid down in that article differ from those of the rules established in Article 88 EC.

48 As the Court held in paragraphs 29 to 31 of Case C‑110/02 Commission v Council [2004] ECR I‑6333, the intention of the EC Treaty, in providing through Article 88 EC for aid to be kept under constant review and monitored by the Commission, is that the finding that aid may be incompatible with the common market is to be arrived at, subject to review by the General Court and the Court of Justice, by means of an appropriate procedure which it is the Commission’s responsibility to set in motion. Articles 87 EC and 88 EC thus reserve a central role for the Commission in determining whether aid is incompatible. The power conferred upon the Council in the area of State aid by the third subparagraph of Article 88(2) EC is exceptional in character, which means that it must necessarily be interpreted strictly (see also, to that effect, the judgment of 4 December 2013 in Case C‑111/10 Commission v Council [2013] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 39).

49 Consequently, a Council decision authorising a Member State, in accordance with Article 8(4) of Directive 92/81, to introduce an exemption of excise duties could not have the effect of preventing the Commission from exercising the powers conferred on it by the Treaty and, consequently, setting in motion the procedure laid down in Article 88 EC in order to review whether that exemption constituted State aid and on the conclusion of that procedure, if appropriate, to adopt a decision such as the contested decision [C-272/12 at paras 46 to 49, emphasis added].
Moreover, the CJEU went as far as to expressly exclude any estoppel-like argument by stressing that
53 [...] the concept of State aid corresponds to an objective situation and cannot depend on the conduct or statements of the institutions (Commission v Ireland and Others, paragraph 72). Consequently, the fact that the authorisation decisions were adopted on a proposal from the Commission could not preclude those exemptions being classified as State aid, within the meaning of Article 87(1) EC, if the conditions governing the existence of State aid were met. That fact however had to be taken into consideration in relation to the obligation to recover the incompatible aid, in the light of the principles of protection of legitimate expectations and legal certainty, as was done by the Commission in the contested decision when it declined to order the recovery of aid granted before the date of publication in the Official Journal of the European Communities of the decisions to initiate the procedure laid down in Article 88(2) EC [C-272/12 at para 53, emphasis added].
In my view, the final caveat clearly indicates that the problems derived from the extreme protection of Commission's powers in which the CJEU has engaged are intractable. The requirements of the principles of protection of legitimate expectations and legal certainty will almost always deactivate any legal effects of the Commission's second analysis of the situation under the State aid rules--so one can wonder if it would not be preferable to create a framework where the powers of the Commission under State aid rules could be restricted in order to promote a better integration of different EU/Member States economic policies and different areas of EU economic law.
 
Otherwise, the 'dominance' of State aid enforcement could significantly diminish the effectiveness of other policies and, as long as those policies are designed and implemented with due regard for the competitive distortions they can create (as was clearly the case in C-272/12, where the Commission was itself entrusted with that analysis), that would be a superior working framework. This is not to say that State aid (or competition) should rank as a secondary consideration. To the contrary, this advocates for an integration of competition concerns at the phase of policy design and implementation, rather than as an ex post (re)analysis of the situation that can create significant disruptive effects--eventually (luckily) barred by the principles of protection of legitimate expectations and legal certainty.
 
All these considerations are clearly relevant in the area of integration of State aid and public procurement rules, particularly in the financing of Services of General Economic Interest (SGEI), where the Almunia package creates a dual relationship between procurement and State aid rules by stressing that only certain procurement procedures will be acceptable under State aid rules and, at the same time, stressing that State aid exemptions do not alter the obligations created by public procurement rules themselves in the first place. If no clear criterion is established to prefer State aid analysis over procurement enforcement, or otherwise, the enforcement landscape looks rather complicated [for further discussion, see my "The Commission’s Modernization Agenda for Procurement and SGEI"].

CJEU on renegotiation of mandatory technical conditions in negotiated procedures: A good case? (C-561/12)

In its Judgment of 5 December 2013 in case C-561/12 Nordecon and Ramboll Eesti, the CJEU has ruled on the interpretation of Article 30(2) of Directive 2004/18 as regards the negotiation of technical elements between a contracting authority and the tenderers participating in a negotiated procedure.
 
The case is complicated by the fact that a more general issue concerning the (potential) obligation to exclude technically non-compliant tenders in a negotiated procedure is entangled with the limits of the negotiation authorisation provided for in Article 30(2) Directive 2004/18. In my view, by not clearly distinguishing both issues, the CJEU may have provided unnecessarily limiting guidance on the proper interpretation of Article 30(2) Directive 2004/18.
 
In the case at hand, the contracting authority launched a negotiated procedure for the construction of a new road. The road had to have certain technical characteristics (including, amongst others, specific width in different parts of the road) and the technical specifications did not allow for the submission of variants, which (implicitly) means that  all technical requirements were mandatory (art 24 dir 2004/18) and, consequently, tenders that failed to meet the technical specifications (in full) should had to be rejected by the contracting authority.
 
However, the contracting authority engaged in negotiations with all tenderers, including one that had submitted a tender that did not meet the technical description of the road (it was narrower in some points). Even if, eventually, that tenderer was not awarded the contract, there were several challenges against the award decision and the case ended up before the CJEU on grounds of a potential infringement of Art 30(2) Directive 2004/18. The Court addressed it as follows:
33 [...] the referring court asks whether Article 30(2) of Directive 2004/18 allows the contracting authority to negotiate with tenderers tenders that do not comply with the mandatory requirements laid down in the technical specifications of the contract.

34 In that regard, it must be recalled that, in certain cases, Article 30(2) of Directive 2004/18 allows the negotiated procedure to be used in order to adapt the tenders submitted by the tenderers to the requirements set in the contract notice, the specifications and additional documents, if any, and to seek out the best tender.

35 According to Article 2 of Directive 2004/18, contracting authorities are to treat economic operators equally and in a non-discriminatory manner and are to act in a transparent way.

36 The Court has stated that the obligation of transparency is essentially intended to preclude any risk of favouritism or arbitrariness on the part of the contracting authority (Case C‑599/10 SAG ELV Slovensko and Others [2012] ECR I‑0000, paragraph 25).

37 Accordingly, even though the contracting authority has the power to negotiate in the context of a negotiated procedure, it is still bound to see to it that those requirements of the contract that it has made mandatory are complied with. Were that not the case, the principle that contracting authorities are to act transparently would be breached and the aim mentioned in paragraph 36 above could not be attained.

38 Moreover, allowing a tender that does not comply with the mandatory requirements to be admissible with a view to negotiations would entail the fixing of mandatory conditions in the call for tenders being deprived of useful effect and would not allow the contracting authority to negotiate with the tenderers on a basis, made up of those conditions, common to those tenderers and would not, therefore, allow it to treat them equally.

39 In the light of the foregoing considerations, the answer to the first question is that Article 30(2) of Directive 2004/18 does not allow the contracting authority to negotiate with tenderers tenders that do not comply with the mandatory requirements laid down in the technical specifications of the contract (C-561/12 at paras 33-39, emphasis added).
In my view, this is a problematic interpretation, as Article 30(2) Directive 2004/18 covers a range of cases and, at least in some of them, the interpretation provided by the CJEU nullifies Art 30(1) Directive. To be more specific, under Art 30(1)(a) Directive 2004/18, contracting authorities are allowed to resort to negotiated procedures "in the event of irregular tenders or the submission of tenders which are unacceptable [...] in response to an open or restricted procedure or a competitive dialogue insofar as the original terms of the contract are not substantially altered".
 
The interpretation provided by the CJEU would imply that the lack of compliance or the reason that made the tenders unacceptable could not have been of a technical nature (or, at least, could not affect a mandatory technical specification) because, in that case, even if the procedure would be formally available under Art 30(1)(a), the contracting authority could not engage in any meaningful negotiation oriented towards adapting the tenders to the requirements set in the (technical)  specifications--which is precisely the purpose of Art 30(2) dir 2004/18, or one of them at least. Moreover, risks of excessive deviation from the original conditions are controllable by the last caveat in Art 30(1)(a), where it is expressly required that the original (technical?) terms of the contract are not substantially altered.
 
The interpretation provided by the CJEU could work when Article 30(2) is triggered by other grounds for resorting to the negotiated procedure under Art 30(1), but not for Art 30(1)(a). In my view, this derives from an excessive reliance on the principle of non-discrimination and a too rigid understanding of the need and purpose for a negotiated procedure triggered by a fundamental flaw of the initial competitive procedure (be it due to a fundamental technical flaw, excessive requirements, or any other reasons).
 
In my view, the CJEU could have found two alternative routes to sort out the case. Well, possibly three.
 
The first one, by accepting the criticisms raised as to the inadequacy of Art 30(2) Dir 2004/18 to solve this specific case--which should have led it to declare the question inadmissible and leave it at that.
 
The second one, to consider that the case was actually concerned with an illicit acceptance of technical variants and, consequently, a breach of Art 24 Directive 2004/18--hence sending out the clear message that, in negotiated procedures, contracting authorities still need to indicate that variants are acceptable if they want to engage in technical dialogue [except in the case of art 30(1)(a) where the tenders are inadmissible or unacceptable on technical grounds].
 
There would be a potential third option, ie to set out a differential interpretation of Art 30(2) depending on the ground in Art 30(1) which triggers the availability of the negotiated procedure--something that we can only do speculatively now by stressing the factual conditions that surrounded the cases [although it is not explained why the contracting authority resorted to a negotiated procedure and why it was acceptable under art 30(1) dir 2004/18, which seems duboius in the circumstances].
 
As a conclusion, I think that the Nordecon Judgment would actually create a very significant problem if technical negotiations were completely excluded in all cases and under all circumstances in negotiated procedures--and, particularly, where negotiations are triggered by the technical unsuitability of all the tenders received. However, this is something that may be avoided under the new Directives if an uncritical reading of Art 30(2) as interpreted in Nordecon is not carried forward to future Art 27 of the new Directive on the (rebranded) competitive procedure with negotiation.

Some comments on Robinson (2013) "Social Public Procurement: Corporate Responsibility Without Regulation"

In a recent paper entitled "Social Public Procurement: Corporate Responsibility Without Regulation",  John Robinson Jr., a student at the University of Utah College of Law, 'explores the EU’s framework for achieving [...] social goals and suggests that the US should undertake many of the same policies. In the US, public procurement accounts for over 10% of GDP. Therefore, using the marketplace rather than regulation to achieve positive change offers a powerful tool: the upside of social good without the downside of increased regulatory burden' (emphasis added). 
 
Even more specifically, the paper claims that 'EU’s position on CSR, specifically that expenditure of public funds provides a powerful mechanism with which to drive corporate responsibility. Essentially, this reflects a collective EU decision (sic) that market forces are superior (eg., more efficient) to regulation in terms of promoting socially responsible business practice' (emphasis added). However, the superiority or efficiency of the mechanism is not an issue that can simply be agreed upon or opted for, but an empirical question. And, difficult as it may be to measure, economic theory does not support the premise that exercising buyer power is a more efficient mechanism than (adequate) regulation when it comes to the pursuit of social (or any other) regulatory goals.

In my view, the whole argument in the paper and the final policy recommendation (as, more generally, the use of public procurement to pursue secondary considerations) is problematic because it does not duly take into account the short-term, static competitive distortions and the (implicit) higher costs of procurement based on non-economic considerations, nor the undesirable dynamic distortions that can be created by the public buyer. Readers may be bored already with my argument, but I cannot help stressing that using public buyer power to achieve regulatory goals is an inefficient strategy [for further discussion, see my Distortions of Competition Generated by the Public (Power) Buyer].
 
Nonetheless, Robinson completely ignores the fact that imposing regulatory requirements through the backdoor of public procurement decisions significantly muddles the working of the market. Such ommission is clear in the argument that 'Using their already-existent presence in the market, governments may encourage corporate social responsibility through favoring those corporations, goods, and services that produce better social outcomes. The EU terms this as socially responsible public procurement, and has actively engaged in SRPP for some time'. In passing, it is worth stressing that the CJEU has created some important limitations as to what can be done in terms of pursuing CSR objectives through procurement (see case C-368/10 and my comment, in Spanish, though).

In my view, the foundations of the logic behind the proposals to 'use' the market (ie buyer power) to achieve regulatory objectives (which Robinson borrows from McCrudden's 'Buying Social Justice') are essentially flawed. Remarkably, it can hardly be supported that 'Although not perfect, markets constitute the best method yet found for “optimizing the use and distribution of scarce resources.” Traditionally, society placed social justice and equality outside of the market, but within the sphere of government influence. However, the movement towards [socially responsible public procurement], particularly within Europe, signals a recombination of the two—integration of social justice into the marketplace'. In my view, such a recombination is simply not possible, as the preference for social (or other) regulatory requirements distorts the market mechanism and, consequently, there can be no guarantee that it can still optimize the use and distribution of scarce resources.
 
Contracting authorities are clearly in a position to decide what to buy and to require that the products or services they purchase or hire meet certain technical specifications that include environmental or social requirements. They will be able to do so as long as there is a market for such products or services. Equally, they are free to decide to what social or environmental projects they give preference and where the money should be spent. And, once they do that, they should aim to take full advantage of the undistorted market mechanism to maximise the value of their expenditure or investment to achieve those goals. However, they are in a very bad position to attempt to regulate the market through purchasing decisions, and they should refrain from doing so. Otherwise, they may see how their own efforts are in vain as a result of their unforeseen impact in the market.
 
The boundaries of what can and what cannot be done in terms of promoting social and environmental goals through procurement still require some further clarification (particularly in light of the novelties in the new public procurement directives), but it should come with some sound understanding of the economics underpinning procurement mechanisms. Bottom line: public procurement needs to take place in properly functioning markets and any (pseudo-regulatory) strategies that distort the market will be inefficient, however appealing it may seem to exploit buying power in the short term.