What an amazing year 2015 has been. Thank you [and hiatus]

2015 has been an amazing for the blogger and open access enthusiast in me. Thank you all for your over 160,000 visits to the blog, over 4,000 SSRN downloads, all comments and engagements. Thanks also to Dr Pedro Telles for our 6-month long procurement tennis, which represented our first incursion into endurance blogging (more on that project in the new year, thanks to the support of the Society of Legal Scholars).

It has also been quite an intense year for the academic in me, including the move from Leicester to Bristol, as well as the appointment to the European Commission's Stakeholder Expert Group on Public Procurement

Quite frankly, after all this and the work required to cover all these fronts, I need a bit of a break. First, to relax. And later to catch up with some projects that need some attention. 

Thus, the blog is going on hiatus until February 2016. I hope you will have some excellent holidays and a happy new year in the meantime.


CJEU: companies cannot mislead consumers under their 'freedom of expression' (C-157/14)

In its Judgment of 17 December 2015 in Neptune Distribution, C-157/14, EU:C:2015:823, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) addressed whether companies making potentially misleading claims about their products could be protected under a right to 'freedom of expression and information'. In short, the CJEU assessed whether companies could issue commercial statements apt to mislead consumers and still be protected under that type of 'corporate human right'. 

This is a global issue, and the relevance of this problem has been picked by mainstream media, such as John Oliver's piece on an episode of HBO's Last Week Tonight in 2014. Interestingly, the CJEU ended up rejecting the idea of affording protection to companies that potentially mislead consumers in breach of EU foodstuffs law, but only after assessing their claims under a strict proportionality test. Its reasoning, which falls quite short from resolving the issue once and for all, deserves some analysis.

In Neptune Distribution, the contested claims concerned the presentation of carbonated water as low or very low in salt or in sodium in a manner contrary to Art 9(1), 9(2) and Annex III of Directive 2009/54 on the exploitation and marketing of natural mineral waters, when read together with the annex to Regulation No 1924/2006 on nutrition and health claims made on foods. The main issue was that, in the way they were advertised (eg per comparison to milk, or by establishing claims as to the different effects of sodium chloride and sodium bicarbonate), the mineral water products sold by Neptune could be perceived by consumers as '(very) low salt/sodium' despite actually (significantly) exceeding the the limits for the amounts of sodium or the equivalent value for salt laid down by the relevant EU legislation.

Remarkably, Neptune claimed that its marketing statements were protected by freedom of expression and information under Art 11 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU and corresponding rules under the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR, Art 10). The CJEU does not disagree with this general approach. The CJEU indeed recognises that there is significant scope for protection of corporate claims, including marketing claims, under their right to freedom of expression and information. As the CJEU stresses, the freedom of expression and information enshrined in Art 11 of the Charter 'applies, inter alia, as is clear from the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights, to the circulation by an entrepreneur of commercial information in particular in the form of an advertising slogan' (para 64). 

Therefore, Art 11 Charter protection can be claimed in relation to 'the use by a business, on packaging, labels and in advertising for natural mineral waters, of claims and indications referring to the sodium or salt content of such waters' (para 65). This results in the fact that '[t]he prohibition on the displaying on the packaging, labels and in the advertising for natural mineral waters of any claim or indication referring to the fact that such waters have a low sodium content which may mislead the consumer as to that content is an interference with the freedom of expression and information of the person carrying on that business and with his freedom to conduct that business' (para 67, emphasis added). 

Even if technically correct de lege data, I find this approach criticisable in itself because it recognises a type of strong 'corporate human right' to freedom of expression and information that seems unwarranted in view of the extremely weak (if not inexistent) link between the development of commercial activities and the exercise of (properly understood) civil and political liberties [see  the main arguments in A Sanchez-Graells and F Marcos, "'Human Rights' Protection for Corporate Antitrust Defendants: Are We Not Going Overboard?", in P Nihoul and T Skoczny (eds), Procedural Fairness in Competition Proceedings (Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2015) 84-107]. 

However, in a line of argument that clearly restricts the general approach outline above, the CJEU also recognises that such interference with corporate freedom of expression can be compatible with the applicable rules under the Charter and the ECHR if it serves a valid social purpose, not least because 'the freedom to conduct a business ... must be considered in relation to its social function' (para 66). In that regard, the CJEU considers that 'While those freedoms may nevertheless be limited, any limitation on their exercise must ... be provided for by law and respect the essence of those rights and freedoms. Furthermore ... subject to the principle of proportionality, limitations may be made only if they are necessary and genuinely meet objectives of general interest recognised by the European Union or the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others' (para 68).

In the assessment of the proportionality of the measure restricting Neptune's right to make any claims whatsoever about its products, the CJEU focusses on three aspects. First, that the restriction is created by law. Second, that 'the freedom of expression and information of the person carrying on the business is not affected by those provisions, since they merely make the information which may be communicated to the consumer regarding the sodium or salt content of natural mineral waters subject to certain conditions' (para 70). And, third, that 'far from prohibiting the production and marketing of natural mineral waters, the legislation at issue ... merely controls, in a very clearly defined area, the associated labelling and advertising. Thus, it does not affect in any way the actual content of the freedom to conduct a business' (para 71). This comes to establish that, provided that the restriction is not absolute and that it derives from a legal source, then a claim under Art 11 Charter is unlikely to prosper. However, this will not always be the case and, in particular for products other than foodstuffs, compliance with all these conditions may be difficult to achieve--particularly if the products are totally unregulated, which makes the first condition difficult to achieve unless general consumer protection or unfair competition rules fill that possible regulatory gap.

Further to these general considerations, the CJEU also assesses the purpose and proportionality of the restrictions. In that regard, it gives particular weight to several factors related to the fact that the 'limitations on the use of the claims and indications ... aim to ensure a high level of consumer protection, to guarantee adequate and transparent information for the consumer relating to the sodium content of drinking water, to ensure fair trading and to protect human health' (para 72), In particular,
75 ... the determination of the validity of the contested provisions must be carried out in accordance with the need to reconcile the requirements of the protection of those various fundamental rights protected by the EU legal order, and striking a fair balance between them ...
76 With regard to judicial review of the conditions of the implementation of the principle of proportionality, the EU legislature must be allowed a broad discretion in an area such as that involved in the present case, which entails political, economic and social choices on its part, and in which it is called upon to undertake complex assessments ...
77 ... even if a claim or indication referring to the sodium content of natural mineral waters associated with chloride ions can be regarded as being substantively correct, the fact remains that it is incomplete if it suggests that the waters are low in sodium whereas, in reality, their total sodium content exceeds the limits provided for by EU legislation ... 
78 In such a situation, the information displayed on the packaging, labels and in advertising containing that claim or indication may mislead the consumer as to the sodium content of the mineral waters ... (C-157/14, paras 75-78, references omitted).
There is a final step in the analysis concerning certain claims of Neptune that EU legislation was unnecessarily restrictive, which the CJEU sorts out by deferring to the EU legislator's action under the precautionary principle. Thus, overall, the CJEU has no qualms in restricting the previously recognised corporate right to freedom of expression and information on the basis of a pretty straightforward analysis of the labelling requirements coupled with a high degree of deference on the basis of the precautionary principle.

Overall, the outcome of the case must be welcome (and follows some other positive developments in EU food law). However, in my view, the trouble is in the process that the CJEU had to follow before upholding the restrictions on labelling of mineral waters for consumer protection health-related reasons. It would seem to me that these issues would be better reconducted under a standard case of judicial review of the administrative action and the underpinning legal rules imposing labelling requirements. In that regard, it seems quite clear that Neptune would not have had legal standing to challenge the European rules on mineral water labelling. However, it managed to trigger the same level of judicial review through a claim of corporate human rights (certainly artificially overblown). Is it time to reconsider, once and seriously, a change in the rules for judicial review of EU acts, or are we better off by indulging endlessly in this ridiculous discussion on corporate human rights?

AG Mengozzi on price comparisons: buying cars is not like buying tomatoes ... So what? (C-476/14)

In his Opinion of 16 December 2015 in Citroën Commerce, C-476/14, EU:C:2015:814 (not available in English), Advocate General Mengozzi assessed whether EU consumer law allows for Member State rules that systematically ban car advertisements that mention separately the price of the car and additional mandatory transportation expenses that the consumers need to cover in order to buy the advertised car. Or, in other words, whether harmonised EU consumer law prevents Member States from retaining domestic rules that require car ads to indicate in a transparent and unmistakable manner the global, full and final price of the advertised vehicle. 

In his Opinion, AG Mengozzi concludes that EU law does not systematically prohibit this type of ads, but rather requires a case-by-case analysis of the content and circumstances of the advertisement. Thus, in his view, a domestic rule that imposes a blanket restriction on the way price and information on other (mandatory) expenses is provided--ie, which requires explicit disclosure of the global cost of acquisition of the car--runs contrary to EU law. This is a counter-intuitive Opinion on consumer protection and, in my view, deserves some closer analysis.

The dispute in Citroën Commerce concerns a German rule whereby the offeror of goods to final consumers must indicate prices including value added tax and any other integral parts of the final price to be paid. In the specific case of car ads, it is settled German law that 
in principle, what should be indicated in ads is the final price of the vehicle, ie the price including transportation expenses, because the public does not perceive these incidental expenses as additional, but rather as an integral part of the price. It is only possible to indicate separately the price if the consumer can choose between two options, namely, collecting the vehicle at the manufacturer's plant or ordering the vehicle to be transferred to the dealership where the sale took place; or when it is not possible to calculate in advance the amount of such expenses (Opinion in C-476/17, para 26, own translation from Spanish).
AG Mengozzi assesses the German rule and its interpretation by reference to EU rules on labelling of products (Directive 98/6) and on unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices (Directive 2005/29). 

Assessment under Directive 98/6
From the outset, AG Mengozzi doubts the applicability of Dir 98/6 to the case. In his view, '[p]erhaps the advertisement ... constitutes an offer of products in the broad and common sense. However ... the concept of "products offered by traders to consumers" ​​in Article 1 of Directive 98/6 must be interpreted within the limits inherent to its scope' (Opinion in C-476/17, para 38, own translation from Spanish).

AG Mengozzi considers that Dir 98/6 on consumer protection in the indication of the prices of products offered to consumers, does not apply in the case of cars. In his view, '[a]lthough this obligation [to provide transparent prices for the purposes of comparison by consumers] is ... prima facie formulated regarding all "products offered", the analysis of the lexical scope of Directive 98/6 leads me to conclude that it was, however, essentially conceived for regular consumption products, it being understood that it may be both food and non-food products(Opinion in C-476/17, para 42, own translation from Spanish). 

The AG expands on the reasons for his assessment:
45 ... although Article 1 of the [then] proposed directive was drafted in the sense that the indication of the selling price and the price per unit of measure of "products offered by traders to final consumers" should be provided, the Commission added that this should be done where such dual pricing information was relevant. It thus acknowledged that "there [were] a number of situations where the comparison does not give the consumer determinant information, particularly when the products have very different characteristics or meet different needs of consumers. This is, for example, customized products, articles of clothing, automobiles, furniture and all products where indication of measurement [...] does not provide useful information to compare prices."
46. ​​Thus, given their own varied individual characteristics, vehicles are not products for which a price comparison through the labelling regulated by Directive 98/6 proves immediately relevant to the consumer. To be clear, just as Directive 98/6 is destined to facilitate comparison, for the consumer, of the price of a kilogram of tomatoes--because tomatoes are an easily comparable product and, in any case, are completely equivalent to tomatoes sold in another store--for products such as automobiles, the labelling of prices in the conditions prescribed by Directive 98/6 cannot serve this objective, given the degree of specificity of each vehicle (Opinion in C-476/17, paras 45-46, own translation from Spanish, emphasis added).
AG Mengozzi also stresses that AG Cruz Villalón and the CJEU indicated that 'the purpose of Directive 98/6 is not to protect consumers in relation to the indication of prices, in general or with regard to the economic reality of announcements of price reductions, but specifically in relation to the indication of the prices of products by reference to different units of quantity' (Commission v Belgium, C-421/12, EU:C:2014:2064, para 59; as referred to in Opinion in C-476/17, para 47, emphasis added).

All those arguments lead AG Mengozzi to conclude that 'Directive 98/6 does not constitute the European Union law benchmark for the indication of prices in general for all product offerings. Nor is it intended to regulate in general terms the conditions under which prices must appear in ads' (Opinion in C-476/17, para 49, own translation from Spanish, emphasis added).

In my view, the reasoning of AG Mengozzi is problematic for two reasons. Firstly, because it conflates whether dual pricing (ie including both the selling and the unit price) is necessary for consumers to assess the cost of a car [which it is not, as cars are bought by units; see Art 5(1) Dir 98/6] and whether transparent price comparisons are useful for consumers looking to buy cars (which they definitely are). I am particularly troubled by his "tomato-analogy" because it does not reflect the basic economic insight that consumers can benefit from competition in two dimensions: inter-brand and intra-brand competition.

Of course, inter-brand competition only benefits consumers willing to compare the price and characteristics of different (makes and models of) cars and, in that regard, pure price comparisons may not be (solely/primarily?) relevant. However, intra-brand competition benefits consumers willing to buy one specific make and model of car and looking for the best price available. This second type of consumer benefit derived from competition necessarily relies on transparent price comparisons. Thus, the exclusion from cars altogether from the scope of application of Dir 98/6 'because buying  cars is not like buying tomatoes' is simply ridiculous [by the way, buying tomatoes can be a less than straightforward exercise as well ... but let's leave the paradox of choice aside].

A functional understanding of the goal of Dir 98/6 should make it obvious that it aims at enabling easy and reliable price comparisons by consumers, or 'to stipulate indication of the selling price and the price per unit ... in order to improve consumer information and to facilitate comparison of prices' (Art 1, emphasis added)--ultimately because 'transparent operation of the market and correct information is of benefit to consumer protection and healthy competition between enterprises and products' [rec (1) Dir 98/6].

Therefore, it seems quite straightforward that Dir 98/6 aims to facilitate price comparisons and, in that regard, the rest of its provisions are relevant also for the offer of cars. Art 2(a) Dir 98/6 clearly establishes that 'selling price shall mean the final price for a unit of the product ... including VAT and all other taxes'. Therefore, the analysis of the Citroën Commerce case should have rested on whether offering a price and separately indicating that there are additional mandatory transportation expenses for the acquisition of a car meets this requirement. In that regard, even if it was considered that the indication of these two elements of the final prices in the same ad was not prohibited by the EU rule, it should be taken into account that Art 10 Dir 98/6 allows for Member States to adopt or maintain provisions which are more favourable as regards consumer information and comparison of prices, without prejudice to their obligations under the Treaty. Therefore, unless there was an infringement of the other obligations under EU law, the German rule should stand (see analysis re Dir 2005/29 below).

AG Mengozzi disagrees with such an approach and considers that 'transportation expenses ... are entirely outside the scope of Directive 98/6 for various reasons(Opinion in C-476/17, para 55, own translation from Spanish). His main reasons relate to the travaux preparatoires of the Directive and his argument that it solely applies to regular consumption products offered immediately by retailers to consumers (ie where no transportation costs are usually applicable). In my view, such approach goes against the objective of the Directive and seeks to create a restriction that can well render the requirements of the Directive completely moot. It should be clear that the Directive aimed to provide consumers a global, final price for the products they are offered (thus, the obligation to include applicable taxes). Any interpretation that allows for the exclusion of price components from the 'legal' concept of final price makes no functional sense.

In any case, what is clear is that, either on the basis of Art 10 Dir 98/6 or not, the last hurdle for the German rule to overcome is the regulation of unfair commercial practices under Dir 2005/29, which establishes maximum harmonisation measures and, consequently, does not allow Member States to provide a level of protection beyond the EU law standard.

Assessment under Directive 2005/29
Ultimately, then, the assessment of  compatibility of an interpretation of Dir 98/6 with Dir 2005/29 and the maximum harmonisation it imposes requires to determine whether a reading of Art 2(a) (and 10) Dir 98/6 as requiring the disclosure of a single final price that includes all mandatory costs and expenses payable for the acquisition of the car, is compatible with Art 7(1), 7(4)(c)  and 7(5) Dir 2005/29 as a standard of maximum harmonisation [Art 3(5)].

Art 7(1) Dir 2005/29 determines that a 'commercial practice shall be regarded as misleading if, in its factual context, taking account of all its features and circumstances and the limitations of the communication medium, it omits material information that the average consumer needs, according to the context, to take an informed transactional decision and thereby causes or is likely to cause the average consumer to take a transactional decision that he would not have taken otherwise'. Art 7(4)(c) Dir 2005/29 clarifies that '[i]n the case of an invitation to purchase, the following information shall be regarded as material, if not already apparent from the context: ... (c) the price inclusive of taxes ... as well as, where appropriate, all additional freight, delivery or postal charges ...'. Finally, Art 7(5) Dir 2005/29 determines that EU law requirements on pricing are to be considered material as well, which include Art 3(4) Dir 98/6 (not relevant for our purposes).

AG Mengozzi reasons as follows:
73 ... Article 7, paragraph 4, letter c) of Directive 2005/29 is not limited to mentioning the price, including taxes, but also refers to "... where appropriate, all additional freight, delivery or postal charges." From the structure of this provision, it is clear that it covers price with all of its components and that the text of Article 7, paragraph 4, letter c) of Directive 2005/29, read in its entirety, clearly seems to address differently the price or the manner in which it is determined, on the one hand, and the other price components such as transport costs, on the other. In any case, nothing indicates, in view of the interpretation of Article 7, paragraph 4, letter c), that the price must include transport costs and be subject to a global definitive indication
74 ... it must also be stated that the omission of material information, such as price as defined in Article 7, paragraph 4, letter c) of Directive 2005/29 is not, in any case and of itself, an unfair trade practice, since the impact of this omission on consumer behavior and the adoption of its decision on a transaction will always have to be analysed case-by-case. The terms of Directive 2005/29 show that this analysis should also take into account the context of the commercial practice in question, of all its features and circumstances and the limitations of the communication medium.
76 ... a national rule interpreted as systematically prohibiting invitations to buy that indicate separately the price of products and mandatory transportation costs would go beyond the level of protection afforded by Directive 2005/29 because that provision would have the effect of generally punishing the omission of material information--namely the price, including compulsory expenses--whereas the Directive requires a case-by-case analysis to appreciate the practical consequences of such a failure in the commercial behavior of such a consumer before it can qualify the commercial practice as "unfair" (Opinion in C-476/17, paras 73-74 and 76, own translation from Spanish, emphasis added).
In this instance, the reasoning of AG Mengozzi seems accurate. Indeed, it seems clear that Art 7(4)(c) Dir 2005/29 requires disclosure of all costs applicable to the purchase, but not necessarily the disclosure of a global, final price as a single figure. It also seems clear that Art 7 Dir 2005/29 excludes the use of presumptions of unfairness by Member States by requiring a case-by-case analysis [which may not be desirable from a broader perspective, particularly in terms of legal enforcement costs, but that is an issue intrinsic to Dir 2005/29 and its maximum harmonisation]. 

In the circumstances of the case Citroën Commerce, given that the mandatory transportation costs were disclosed (albeit in a different, smaller font...) it is hard to see a possibility to declare the practice "unfair" for the purposes of Dir 2005/29.

As a final point, it may be worth stressing that it also seems clear that Dir 2005/29 has (implicitly) severely limited, if not completely excluded, the possibility for Member States to adopt 'more stringent measures' under Art 10 Dir 98/6. If this implication is correct, it would be desirable for the CJEU to declare it as such in its final Judgment in Citroën Commerce.

Early Career Researcher Public Procurement Conference Announced (March 4th, 2016, London)

Showing his clear entrepreneurial approach to public procurement (and everything else), my colleague Dr Pedro Telles is pushing for a very interesting new project: the Early Career Researcher Public Procurement Conference (March 4th, London). I am honoured to be involved and certain that it will be a great opportunity to hear new ideas and bring new blood into public procurement research. I am reposting here his blog announcement. Please get involved!
We will be holding a one day conference for Early Career Researcher Public Procurement Conference at the Centre for Transnational Legal Studies in London on March 4th. 10 Early Career Researchers will have the opportunity to present their research on a non-threatening environment, benefiting from presenting at a leading international conference early in their career and getting expert commentary on their research. We are looking for promising researchers passionate about public procurement irrespective of disciplinae and interested in engaging with a non-specialist audience.
In addition, the conference will include a ‘speed-dating’ mentoring session in the afternoon, allowing for the beneficiaries to expand their personal networks and helping the development of their career plans. Participants are also invited to take part in the dinner that evening.
Thanks to the British Academy Rising Star Engagement award and the kind facilities offer by the Centre for Transnational Legal Studies it is be possible to reimburse travel costs (up to a maximum of £350), offer one night accommodation and also the dinner on the night of March 4th.
The call for proposals is open at the Public Procurement Podcast website until January 10th.
We already have some confirmed appearances. In addition to myself [Dr Pedro Telles], Dr. Albert Sanchez-Graells, Dr. Ama Eyo and Professor Roberto Caranta will also be taking part. [Pedro] will be confirming further names in the next few weeks.
In case you are not an Early Career Researcher and would like to attend the conference, drop us a line as we will have limited spaces available.

Lost in translation or games of semantics? CJEU deepens diverging protection for registered and reputed trade marks against translated 'identical' signs (C-603/14)

In its Judgment of 10 December 2015 in El Corte Inglés v OHIM, C-603/14 P, EU:C:2015:807, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) decided on a trademark case involving the Spanish commercial retailer El Corte Inglés (ECI) and its opposition to the registration of the trademark 'The English Cut'--which is the literal Spanish-to-English translation of ECI's trademark 'El Corte Inglés'.

ECI had opposed the registration of the trademark 'The English Cut' on the basis that it infringed Art 8(1)(b) of the Community Trademark Regulation (CTR), according to which a proprietor of an earlier trade mark can successfully oppose the registration of a new trademark 'if, because of its identity with, or similarity to, the earlier trade mark and the identity or similarity of the goods or services covered by the trade marks there exists a likelihood of confusion on the part of the public in the territory in which the earlier trade mark is protected; the likelihood of confusion includes the likelihood of association with the earlier trade mark' (emphasis added). 

ECI also opposed the registration on the basis of Art 8(5) CTR, according to which 'the trade mark applied for shall not be registered where it is identical with, or similar to, the earlier trade mark and is to be registered for goods or services which are not similar to those for which the earlier trade mark is registered, where, in the case of an earlier Community trade mark, the trade mark has a reputation in the Community and, in the case of an earlier national trade mark, the trade mark has a reputation in the Member State concerned and where the use without due cause of the trade mark applied for would take unfair advantage of, or be detrimental to, the distinctive character or the repute of the earlier trade mark' (emphasis added).

It is important to stress that both grounds for opposition are based on the identity or similarity of the previous trade mark and the new trade mark applied for. Whether these two opposition grounds rely on the same or different tests of similarity has been heavily litigated and constituted the nub of the legal dispute in the El Corte Inglés v OHIM case. 

As immediate precedents, in Intra-Presse v Golden Balls (C-581/13 P, EU:C:2014:2387, discussed here) and, previously, in Ferrero v OHMI (C-552/09 P, EU:C:2011:177), it was stressed that
72 The Court has consistently held that the degree of similarity required under Article 8(1)(b) ..., on the one hand, and Article 8(5) ..., on the other, is different. Whereas the implementation of the protection provided for under Article 8(1)(b) ... is conditional upon a finding of a degree of similarity between the marks at issue so that there exists a likelihood of confusion between them on the part of the relevant section of the public, the existence of such a likelihood is not necessary for the protection conferred by Article 8(5) ... Accordingly, the types of injury referred to in Article 8(5) ... may be the consequence of a lesser degree of similarity between the earlier and the later marks, provided that it is sufficient for the relevant section of the public to make a connection between those marks, that is to say, to establish a link between them ...
73 According to the same case-law, Article 8(5) ..., like Article 8(1)(b), is manifestly inapplicable where the General Court rules out any similarity between the marks at issue. It is only if there is some similarity, even faint, between the marks at issue that the General Court must carry out an overall assessment in order to ascertain whether, notwithstanding the low degree of similarity between them, there is, on account of the presence of other relevant factors such as the reputation or recognition enjoyed by the earlier mark, a likelihood of confusion or a link made between those marks by the relevant public (C-581/13, paras 72-73, emphasis added, references omitted and emphasis added).
This seemed to point out to a single test for the existence or not of similarity. A negative answer to the test would exclude the analysis of whether the degree of similarity sufficed to engage either Art 8(1)(b) or Art 8(5) CTR protection. On the contrary, a positive answer to the test would require an assessment under both tests. The CJEU has now elaborated on this position and further clarified that
39 Given that it is not apparent either from the wording of paragraphs 1(b) and 5 of Article 8 ... or from the case-law of the Court of Justice that the concept of similarity has a different meaning in each of those paragraphs, it follows, inter alia, that, if, in examining the conditions for the application of Article 8(1)(b) of that regulation, the General Court concludes that there is no similarity between the signs at issue, paragraph 5 of Article 8 also necessarily does not apply to the case in point. Conversely, if the General Court takes the view, in the context of that same examination, that there is some similarity between the signs at issue, such a finding is equally valid with regard to the application of both Article 8(1)(b) and Article 8(5) ...
40 However, in a situation in which the degree of similarity in question does not prove to be sufficient to result in the application of Article 8(1)(b) ... it cannot be deduced from that that the application of paragraph 5 of that article is necessarily precluded.
41 The degree of similarity between the signs at issue required by each of the paragraphs of that provision is different. Whereas the application of Article 8(1)(b) ... is conditional on a finding of a degree of similarity between those signs which is capable of giving rise to a likelihood of confusion between them on the part of the relevant public, the existence of such a likelihood of confusion is not, by contrast, necessary as a condition for the application of paragraph 5 of that article.
42 Since Article 8(5) ... merely requires the similarity which exists to be capable of leading the relevant public to make a connection between the signs at issue, that is to say, to establish a link between them, but does not require that similarity to be capable of leading that public to confuse those signs, it must be held that the protection which that provision lays down in favour of marks with a reputation may apply even if there is a lower degree of similarity between the signs at issue (C-603/14, paras 39-42, emphasis added).
The general framework seems conceptually clear, and there is an internal logic that excludes protection under either Art 8(1)(b) or Art 8(5) CTR where the existing and the new trade marks are not similar. The problems and difficulties come in the application of this framework. 

In the case at hand, the core of the question relied on the General Court's (GC) assessment of the existence of any similarity between 'El Corte Inglés' and 'The English Cut'. One of the compounded difficulties in the assessment is that the GC's Judgment is only available in French and Spanish, which complicates matters. In the CJEU's (English) account,
45 ... it must be pointed out that, when it examined the conditions for the application of Article 8(1)(b) ..., the General Court held, in paragraph 29 of the judgment under appeal, that there was a low degree of conceptual similarity between the signs at issue. However, in paragraph 33 of that judgment, it took the view that, in the light of the absence of any visual and phonetic similarity, it had been rightly found in the contested decision that those signs were different overall. Consequently, the General Court held that, as one of the cumulative conditions for the application of Article 8(1)(b) was not satisfied, there was no need to carry out a global assessment of the likelihood of confusion.
46 However, as regards the assessment of the conditions for the application of Article 8(5) ..., the General Court stated, in paragraph 39 of the judgment under appeal, that it was apparent from the comparison of the signs at issue, which was carried out in the context of paragraph 1(b) of that article, that those signs were not similar and therefore that the conditions for the application of paragraph 5 of that article were not satisfied.
47 In ruling to that effect, the General Court erred in law (sic). That Court could not disregard its own finding, in paragraph 29 of the judgment under appeal, that there was a conceptual similarity between the signs at issue.
48 In those circumstances, the General Court should have examined whether that degree of similarity, albeit low, was not sufficient, on account of the presence of other relevant factors such as the renown or reputation of the earlier mark, for the relevant public to establish a link between those signs, for the purpose of Article 8(5) (C-603/14, paras 45-48, emphasis added).
Frankly, upon reading these passages, I have the feeling that the CJEU is screaming 'gotcha' in the background. Firstly, it seems clear to me that the GC could not have erred in law by failing to take into account its own factual findings. When the GC stressed in para 39 that 'those signs were not similar', it was clearly making a (factual) reference to a previous factual assessment. Thus, if anything, the GC could have erred in fact. But, even then, it is hard to see why the CJEU engages in such a tricky reconstruction of the facts as found by the GC and their interpretation. It seems clear to me that, in paragraphs 29 and 33, the GC carried out the assessment of whether similarity existed for the purposes of Art 8(1)(b) protection. On this point, the GC could only reach two conclusions. Either there was similarity and an assessment of the likelihood of confusion was engaged. Or, conversely, there was no similarity and thus there was no need to proceed to such assessment. 

At this stage, it is important to go back to the original GC Judgment rather than relying on the stylized summary that the CJEU provides. Quite clearly, in para 29 of its Judgment, the GC indicated that 'the signs at issue have a weak conceptual similarity requiring proper prior translation, not a strong conceptual identity' (own translation from Spanish and French). And in para 33, it indicated that 'there is a slight conceptual similarity, but no visual and phonetic similarity between the conflicting signs. It follows that the Board of Appeal correctly concluded that the signs were different overall(own translation from Spanish and French). 

Now, it must be acknowledged that the GC could have been clearer. Its (corteous?/naive?) deference to the point that, upon proper prior translation, there was a weak conceptual similarity between the signs, but that the signs were different overall is open to (re)interpretation. Was there some similarity or not? However, the natural and systematic interpretation of what paragraph 33 means needs to be found in the GC's Judgment itself. 

In para 39, it is clearly stated that 'it nevertheless follows from the comparison between the conflicting signs, that they are not similar(own translation from Spanish and French, emphasis added). By ignoring this statement and the weight it must be given as authetic interpretation of what the GC meant in the same Judgment, only some 10 or 6 paragraphs earlier, the CJEU engages in an exercise of semantics that certainly does not contribute to conceptual clarity. More importantly, the CJEU also fails to recognise the difficulty of carrying simultaneously a conceptual and linguistic comparison, given that concept and language are, if not impossible, certainly hard to disentangle [or is it only when humour is concerned; see G Ritchie, The Linguistic Analysis of Jokes, vol. 2 Routledge Studies in Linguistics (London, Routledge, 2004) 28 and ff]. Are we doomed to remain lost in translation?

AG Wathelet proposes creation of excessive presumption of liability for third party infringement of Art 101 TFEU (C-542/14)

In his Opinion of 3 December 2015 in case VM Remonts and Others, C-542/14, EU:C:2015:797 (not yet available in English), Advocate General Wathelet advised the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) on issues concerning the subjective elements (ie mens rea-like requirements) of the prohibition of anticompetitive behaviour in Art 101(1) TFEU. 

In particular, the case addresses issues concerning the imputability of anticompetitive practices in which a third party services provider is engaged to the 'client' undertaking that hired those services (ie how to make the 'client' undertaking liable for the anticompetitive behaviour of one of its services providers). In my view, AG Wathelet's proposal is clearly excessive (see critical assessment below) and deserves closer inspection. 

The case is quite convoluted because it concerns the imputability of a bid rigging offence to a supplying company that engaged a consultant to help it formulate a bid in a tender for a public contract. After the fact, it became apparent that the consultancy engaged in collusion with other tenderers in the same bid. The question was, thus, to what extent the bidder should be liable for the collusion that resulted from the allegedly independent activity of the consultancy (third party services supplier) and, in any case, what level of proof of anticompetitive intent would be necessary to impose liability on the 'client' undertaking.

In AG Wathelet's Opinion, it is not necessary to prove a personal behavior of any corporate officer of the 'client' undertaking, or his knowledge or consent to the behavior of the external services provider that also acted on behalf of other participants in a possibly prohibited agreement. AG Wathelet proposes to create a presumption of (vicarious?) liability, so that it is incumbent upon the 'client' undertaking to adduce sufficiently convincing evidence to rebut that presumption and escape liability. 

In particular, AG Wathelet considers that the necessary proof concerns (i) evidence relating to the fact that the third party (services provider) has acted outside the scope of the functions that had been entrusted to it, (ii) evidence regarding the precautionary measures taken by the 'client' undertaking at the time of designation of the third party and during the monitoring of the implementation of the functions in question, and (iii) evidence regarding the 'client' undertaking's conduct upon becoming aware of prohibited behavior.

AG Wathelet's VM Remonts Opinion follows the expansive/strict interpretation of the subjective elements in the prohibition of Art 101(1) TFEU in recent cases such as AC-Treuhand v Commission (C-194/14 P, EU:C:2015:717, re liability of a cartel facilitator, see an interesting comment here); Schenker and Others (C-681/11, EU:C:2013:404, re reliance on third party advice, see comments here); or Kone (C-557/12, EU:C:2014:917, re extension of 'umbrella' liability for damages to third parties to a cartel, see comments here). 

This is a very relevant opinion, with potentially very significant effects commensurate to those of the presumption of liability of the parent company, which has shaken competition law enforcement in the EU for the last 5 years or so.  

Therefore, it is interesting to look at AG Wathelet's reasoning in some more detail:
60. In my view, two extreme positions must be rejected. On the one hand, the automatic imputation of responsibility to the undertaking for the actions of a third party, regardless of the degree of involvement of the undertaking, which would go against fundamental principles governing the imposition of competition law sanctions (in particular the principles of personal responsibility and legal certainty), and, on the other hand, the obligation of the competent competition authority to demonstrate convincingly that the undertaking receiving the services from the third party was aware of the criminal acts committed by the latter or had consented to them, which would create a risk of seriously undermining the effectiveness of competition law.
61. Indeed, "... the prohibition on participating in anti-competitive practices and agreements and the penalties which infringers may incur are well known, it is normal that the activities which those practices and agreements involve take place in a clandestine fashion, for meetings to be held in secret, frequently in a non-member country, and for the associated documentation to be reduced to a minimum. " Therefore, it would be too easy to "hide" behind a third party in order to go unpunished under competition law.
62. Moreover, the importance of keeping free competition allows for companies that entrust third parties with functions such as those at issue in the present case [ie public procurement consultancy services] to be required to take all possible precautions to prevent such third parties from infringing competition law, avoiding, in particular, any negligence or recklessness in the definition or in the monitoring of these functions.
63. In line with this, the solution I propose for cases such as that in the main proceedings is to establish a rebuttable (iuris tantum) presumption of liability of the undertakings for acts contrary to competition law committed by a third party whose services it has engaged and which cannot be considered its subsidiary or ancillary body. Such a presumption can maintain the balance between, on the one hand, the objective of effectively suppressing behavior contrary to the competition rules, in particular to Article 101 TFEU, and to prevent their recurrence bearing in mind that respect for these rules requires an active corporate behavior at all times and, on the other hand, the requirements arising from the fundamental rights regarding the imposition of sanctions. Such a presumption would apply even if the acts performed by the third party were different from the functions entrusted to it, and even when it was not possible to demonstrate that the undertaking that used the services was aware of the acts of the provider or consented to them.
64. This presumption should apply to an undertaking from the moment the authority responsible for the enforcement of competition rules proves the existence of an act contrary to competition law committed by a person working for (or providing services to) the undertaking but which does not, directly or indirectly, form part of its organisational chart.
 65. In order to respect the balance to which I referred in point 63 of this Opinion, the undertaking may rebut the presumption of liability by submitting all elements supporting its claim that it was unaware of the illegal behavior  in which the third party service provider engaged, and by demonstrating that it took all necessary measures to prevent such a breach of competition law precautions, and this in three stages.
66. The first is when his appointment or hiring occurs. It refers in particular to the choice of supplier, the definition of the functions and the monitoring of its implementation, the conditions (or exclusion) of recourse to subcontracting, obligations to ensure respect for the law, in particular, competition, and the sanctions for breach of contract, as well as whether authorization was required for  any act not provided for in the contract.
67. The second stage includes the period of execution of the functions entrusted to the third party, ensuring that the latter strictly sticks to its functions as defined in the contract.
68. The third stage is when the third party commits a breach of competition law, even if committed at the back of the undertaking. The undertaking cannot simply ignore that behaviour, it should distance itself publicly from the forbidden act, prevent its repetition or report it to the administrative authorities. Indeed, as stated by the Court: "... passive modes of participation in the infringement, such as the presence of an undertaking in meetings at which anti-competitive agreements were concluded, without that undertaking clearly opposing them, are indicative of collusion capable of rendering the undertaking liable under Article [101(1) TFEU], since a party which tacitly approves of an unlawful initiative, without publicly distancing itself from its content or reporting it to the administrative authorities, encourages the continuation of the infringement and compromises its discovery" (C-542/14, paras 60-69, references omitted, own translation from Spanish, emphasis added).
In my own opinion, the creation of the presumption proposed by AG Wathelet goes way too far. In simple conceptual terms, it excessively erodes the principle of personal responsibility and falls short of meeting the desirable balance that the AG presents himself. The 'client' undertaking and the third party service provider are, in these cases, completely independent undertakings and the creation of the presumption would go beyond the acceptable limits of expansion of the concept of (functional) single economic entity. 

Plainly, it is excessive to impose this type of burden of proof (probatio diabolica) on undertakings that simply lack the knowledge and manpower required to monitor the execution of the activities contracted out to the third party to the standard created by AG Wathelet. This applies at least in stages one (design of the contract) and two (monitoring of execution), where the 'client' undertaking will in many cases be affected by significant asymmetries of information and gaps in human capital. Otherwise, what would be the economic rationale for contracting out something the undertaking could carry out on its own?

I would thus prefer the CJEU to deviate from the proposal of AG Wathelet in this case and to reject the creation of such rebuttable presumption of liability for the anticompetitive behaviour of third parties to which a 'client' undertaking has outsourced certain types of functions. The competent competition authority should always be obliged to demonstrate, at least at the level of sufficient indicia (balance of probabilities, but for?), that the recourse to the third party aimed to circumvent the prohibition of Art 101(1) TFEU--ie, that there was an anticompetitive agreement (by object) between the 'client' undertaking and the third party services provider because the outsourcing had the object of creating further restrictions of competition (on the issue of prohibitions by object, see here). Thus, if the contracting out arrangement was not genuine or if there are indications that the outsourcing aimed at a restriction of competition, then the burden of proof could be reversed. But to create a presumption of liability in the way that AG Wathelet proposes is excessive.

Evaluation of tenders after the expiry of their validity does not annul tender for EU public contracts (T-553/13)

In its Judgment of 2 December 2015 in European Dynamics Luxembourg and Evropaïki Dynamiki v Joint undertaking Fusion for Energy, T-553/13, EU:T:2015:918, the General Court (GC) of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has assessed one more case of procurement litigation concerning a cascade-based framework agreement for the provision of IT services (for previous cases, see here and here). This is proving to be quite a highly litigated design for framework agreements, so it is worth looking in detail at the scope of the dispute to determine whether the design of this type of arrangement makes them more exposed to litigation. The analysis will show that it does not because the claims made against the conclusion of the framework agreement are purely procedural.

In the case at hand, the Joint undertaking Fusion for Energy (F4E) issued a tender for a framework agreement for the provision of IT Services and requested that offers remained valid for a minimum of 130 days from the deadline for the receipt of tenders. The successful tenderers were also required to maintain the validity of their tenders for a further 60 days from the notification of the award of the contract. Given the high volume of tenders received, F4E took longer than 130 days in evaluating them, and the evaluation was concluded after the minimum validity period of the tenders had expired.

European Dynamics (ED) was once more a disappointed tenderer. Its offer was not included in the cascade mechanism of the framework agreement, which F4E intended to conclude with three alternative suppliers. Additionally to its standard arguments on failure to meet the duty to provide reasons (which, this time, do not constitute the core of the dispute), ED challenged the process claiming that by evaluating the tenders after their validity period had come to an end, F4E infringed the applicable rules [which require that [t]he invitation to tender ... shall at least … specify the period during which a tender will remain valid and may not be varied in any respect’] and treated ED in a discriminatory manner compared with other tenderers. The key argument submitted by ED is that
the principles of sound administration, transparency and equal treatment of tenderers require that no contract be awarded or signed in the event that one or more tenders are no longer valid in the course of the evaluation, unless the contracting authority officially requests and obtains an extension of the validity period of the tenders... Accordingly, it is a prerequisite for the validity of the evaluation of tenders and the award procedure that tenders be valid throughout the entire evaluation process, in order to ensure that the evaluator’s examination is impartial (T-553/13, para 18).
The GC rejects the argument on several points. Firstly, the GC stresses that the requirement to indicate a minimum tender validity does not impose 
an obligation on the contracting authority to complete the evaluation of a tender within the validity period of that tender. Whilst it is certainly in the interest of the contracting authority to complete its assessment before the expiry of the tenders’ validity period, exceeding that time-limit cannot render the procedure unlawful, nor can it constitute a ground for cancellation of the evaluation of the tenders (T-553/13, para 22).
The GC clarifies that 'the purpose of the validity period of tenders is to ensure that a tenderer does not vary his tender during the evaluation stage and that compliance with that period is not a condition sine qua non for the signature of contracts at the end of the award procedure' (T-553/13, para 24). 

The formulation of the second part of this clarification could lead to uncertainty, as it could be understood that a tender which validity period did not meet the minimum, or that was modified during that term, could still lead to award of the contract. That is not what the GC intends to indicate. In fact, the GC makes reference to the previous case Evropaïki Dynamiki v Commission, T-236/09, EU:T:2012:127, where that clarification was made in a different context. In that case, the GC ruled that
As regards the ... argument that the principles of transparency, good administration and equal treatment among tenderers preclude a contract being signed when one or more tenders are no longer valid, suffice it to say that the purpose of the period of validity of tenders is to ensure that a tenderer does not vary his tender during the evaluation stage ... it is not a condition sine qua non for the signature of contracts at the end of the award procedure. In the present case, the decisions to award the contracts were taken ... within the period of validity of the tenders. Moreover, the applicant merely states that signing the contract when one or more tenders are no longer valid is a breach of the principles of transparency, good administration and equal treatment, but does not explain in what way that constitutes a breach (T-236/09, para 40, emphasis added).
Therefore, the combined reading of para 24 of ED v E4F (T-553/13) and para 40 of ED v Commission (T-236/09) leads to the interpretation that the signature of the contract is not prevented by the fact that one or more tenders are no longer valid at that time. However, it also raises the issue of whether the tender chosen for the award of the contract must remain valid at the time of that decision (as T-236/09, para 40 suggests). The rest of the ED v E4F case discusses this in more detail. As the GC explains
25 ... the applicants may not regard evaluation of the tenders during their validity period as a condition of the validity of the tender procedure ...[the] claim that the principles of transparency, sound administration and equal treatment between tenderers preclude a contract from being concluded when one or more tenders is no longer valid must be rejected (see, to that effect, [T-236/09] paragraph 40).
26 Moreover, in so far as the applicants claim that F4E should have officially requested [ED] to extend the validity of its tender when it realised that the period in question was not long enough to complete the evaluation phase, it should be stressed that, whilst it is true that the contracting authority is entitled to request an extension of the validity period of tenders, it is not required to do so under any of the applicable provisions.
27 As F4E correctly notes, the only consequence that may arise from that provision for the contracting authority is that it cannot oblige a tenderer whose tender has expired to sign and perform a contract based on the conditions set out in that tender.
28 In addition, equal treatment between tenderers is ensured by evaluating all the tenders using the same evaluation criteria and comparing them with one another. If the validity period of the tenders is not one of the evaluation criteria, it could only lead to discrimination in respect of their evaluation if it were proved that a tender was not taken into account on the ground that it had expired ...
29 The file shows that the tenders of all tenderers were evaluated, including [ED]’s tender, and that that evaluation took place while the tenders were valid ...
30 In such circumstances, the mere fact that the final decision was adopted after that validity period had ended cannot render the award decision unlawful (T-553/13, paras 25-29, emphasis added).
In my view, the GC fails to take into account all possible scenarios of discrimination that could arise in such circumstances. It is true that not taking into account a tender for the purposes of evaluation on the ground that it had expired would constitute discriminatory treatment. However, it would also be discriminatory to allow undertakings that set a specific period of validity for their tender to waive it upon hearing that their tender was chosen for award. 

Thus, the argument that the contracting authority must ensure that all tenders remain valid throughout the period carries weight if one considers the strategic games that could ensue when tenderers whose offer has expired are allowed to extend them, particularly if that implicitly creates financial impacts that will (possibly) require modifications of the contract down the line (even if those modifications 'simply' result in the trigger of price revision clauses earlier than would have otherwise been expected).

In my view, the GC also fails to make proper use of the right to good administration. If a diligent contracting authority fails to evaluate the tenders it receives in good time to make sure that all of them remain valid when it aims to enter into the framework agreement or contract, it should (or, I would say, shall) actually request them to extend the validity of their offers. There is no reason to allow the contracting authority not to do so on the basis that "the only consequence ... is that it cannot oblige a tenderer whose tender has expired to sign and perform a contract based on the conditions set out in that tender". That would constitute very poor administration and would severely limit the ability of the contracting authority (and society at large, indirectly) to benefit from competitive outcomes leading to value for money due to its poor time and workload management. Thus, this does not seem to be a proper analysis under the principle of good administration.

On a related note, I think that the GC also got the wrong end of the stick when assessing instances where the contracting authority actually decides to request such extensions of the validity of offers when it realises that it cannot complete the evaluation and award the contract in time. In the previous ED v Commission case, the GC considered that "the fact that the [contracting authority] stated that it did not intend to cancel the tendering procedure in the event of a tenderer refusing to extend the validity of its tender does not mean that the [tenderer who was approach for an extension] was under pressure to agree to the request for extension" (T-236/09, para 39). From a business perspective, this simply makes no sense. Commercial pressure to extend offers should also be subjected to a high standard of assessment under the principle of good administration and the contracting authority should have very powerful reasons not to cancel the tender. The same reasoning that prevents contracting authorities to resort to urgency-based procedures due to situations they should have avoided applies here [see A Sanchez Graells, Public procurement and the EU competition rules, 2nd edn, (Oxford, Hart, 2015) 435-436].

Overall, it seems to me that the GC is generally failing to incorporate commercial reality arguments into its judicial decision-making when it comes to this tricky issue of expiry of time-limited tenders during the evaluation process, or before award of the contract. I would thus support a change of tack in future cases, so that there is really no space for strategic games at that stage, and so that contracting authorities do not engage in business-like negotiations that they could (and should) have prevented by reacting earlier on during the evaluation period.

Joint Bidding and Subcontracting under EU Competition Law: Some critical comments on Thomas (2015)

Christopher Thomas has recently published the paper "Two Bids or not to Bid? An Exploration of the Legality of Joint Bidding and Subcontracting Under EU Competition Law" (2015) 6(9) Journal of European Competition Law & Practice 629-638. It is interesting to read the paper, particularly while we await the decision of the CJEU in a pending matter where issues of public restrictions to subcontracting and their impact on competition for the public contract need to be addressed--Wrocław - Miasto na prawach powiatu, C-406/14 (for discussion of the Opinion of AG Sharpston, see here). 

Thomas' paper attempts to apply to the public procurement setting the general criteria used in competition law to assess joint bidding and subcontracting arrangements [something that I address in Public Procurement and the EU Competition Rules, 2nd edn (Oxford, Hart, 2015) 336-340 and 353-355]. The arguments are grouped around two issues: (1) the subjection or not of joint bidding and subcontracting agreements to the prohibition of Art 101(1) TFEU, and (2) the possible exemptions to the prohibition under Art 101(3) TFEU.

(1) Applicability of Art 101(1) TFEU prohibition to joint bidding agreements
After providing some background on the international competition law approaches to joint bidding and subcontracting in procurement, Thomas tries to establish a test to assess whether those arrangements run contrary to EU competition law, and Art 101(1) TFEU more specifically, or not.

Thomas critically considers the general guidance offered by the European Commission regarding horizontal commercial cooperation agreements that are excluded from the application of Art 101(1) TFEU, whereby "consortia arrangements that allow the companies involved to participate in projects that they would not be able to undertake individually. As the parties to the consortia arrangement are therefore not potential competitors for implementing the project, there is no restriction of competition " (emphasis added). I interpret this guidance to mean that undertakings concluding joint bidding and teaming agreements should be able to prove that they can only submit a compliant tender if they participate together. Thomas takes the mirroring position.

He argues that the Commission's guidance is quite limited in practical terms because it "is simplest to apply in the situation of undertakings with expertise only in different products, all of which are required in order to bid for the contract in question. Clearly, such undertakings are not competitors, and their joint bid cannot raise competition concerns." However, he stresses that this is not the usual situation. 

Remarkably, he submits that the Commission's position "would ignore the possibility that each undertaking might nonetheless be able to submit an independent bid, by bringing in specialist resources from outside. If it were in fact feasible for each undertaking to submit a tender in this way, then surely it cannot be excluded that a joint bid would restrict competition. The real question is rather whether, in the absence of the joint bid, there could in fact have been two or more independent bids" (emphasis added). And, more specifically, he clarifies that "One possible approach to this issue would be to ask whether, in the ordinary course of business, each undertaking would normally bring in such resources from outside. Alternatively, and more precisely, are such resources demonstrably available on reasonable terms and in time to prepare and submit the tender, from an undertaking that is not a competitor in the procurement procedure?"

I find this line of argument exceedingly restrictive. Conceptually, because it relies on an assessment of whether the parties of the teaming/joint bidding agreement could have cooperated with other undertakings or complemented their capacities in a different way, which fundamentally and in itself proves the point that they were unable to submit bids individually or with a total independence from third parties. Once this is clear, I see no good reason for the assessment to rely on whether there were alternative potential partners, not least because this would require an excessive amount of second-guessing by procurement and competition authorities, who may not be the best placed to ex post query business decisions.

Discussing this issue further, Thomas emphasises that "it should be noted that the test is whether an independent bid is objectively possible, and demonstrating this does not require proof that it is easy, or even achievable without substantial sacrifices (such as giving up other projects to which relevant capacity is currently dedicated). Second, it is arguably sufficient in principle for the competition authority to demonstrate that the contract is of the general type carried out by the undertaking in the ordinary course of its activities" (emphasis added).

In my view, once again, his analysis of the type of joint bidding agreements not covered by Art 101(1) TFEU is too narrow and restrictive. It would be clearly excessive to consider undertakings 'objectively' able to submit an independent bid if, for instance, they need to give up alternative projects. Thus, generally, I disagree with his interpretation of the European Commission's guidance and the implicit requirements for a team/joint bidding arrangement not to be covered by Art 101(1) TFEU. 

I also disagree with his assessment of whether the joint bidding agreement needs to be analysed as either a restriction by object or by effect, particularly under the Cartes bancaires test. Given that the boundaries of that test are unclear and that it would only carry issues of burden of proof of anticompetitive effects (which need to be addressed anyway in view of the potential exemption of Art 101(3) TFEU, as discussed below), the discussion seems very superficial and practically unhelpful to me (for assessment of the by object/by effect division, see here). In any case, particularly under his approach, most cases will depend on the assessment of the applicability of the exemption of Art 101(3) TFEU to agreements caught by the prohibition of Art 101(1) TFEU.

(2) Applicability of Art 101(3) TFEU exemption to joint bidding agreements
As Thomas stresses, "Once the analysis has reached this stage, an approach needs to be found to balance the loss of competition with the objective benefits deriving from cooperation between the undertakings concerned." In my view, the test needs to be whether the joint bidders could actually submit a bid (ie there is an expansion of the pool of competitors for the given contract), or whether the terms of the joint tender are substantially better for the public buyer than those they could offer independently—ie, that there are specific and measurable efficiencies derived from the teaming or joint bidding strategy and that they are passed on to the public buyer. He generally agrees by stressing that "Where the joint bid offers no tangible performance benefit for the customer, when compared with the provision of the relevant products by one of the bidders acting alone, then the cooperating undertakings should be put to the full burden of proof."

Going beyond this, he engages in an interesting assessment of whether "the consent of the customer is either a necessary or a sufficient indicator of legality. After all, if the assessment is designed to balance the objective benefits of the cooperation with the loss of competition, who is better placed than the customer to make that judgement? It is submitted that the consent of the customer, while relevant, is neither necessary nor sufficient in itself". This is an interesting issue. However, Thomas' analysis is almost impossible to bring to practice under the applicable EU public procurement rules.

Thomas gives the following example:
It is therefore inappropriate for legality to depend on the discretion of the customer. Indeed, were this to be the case, then the customer might threaten to withhold its consent as a means of imposing commercial pressure precisely in the form of exposure to investigation by a competition authority. Thus customer consent should not be, in itself, a prerequisite for exemption under Article 101(3). On the other hand, if, before actually coordinating their intentions and exchanging any confidential information, two potential bidders approach the customer, explain the benefits that might be achieved from combining their efforts, and offer the customer the choice between a joint bid and two independent bids, and if the customer considers those alternatives and indicates that its preference is for a joint bid, then this is surely very relevant evidence for the purposes of Article 101(3). Indeed, in such circumstances, a court or competition authority would need to be very confident indeed if it envisaged forming a different view of the balance between the benefits from cooperation and the loss of competition (emphasis added).
This would simply infringe such a large number of EU public procurement that it is not worth engaging in the detail. In my view, this is one of the main risks of uncritically trying to extrapolate competition principles and criteria developed in a scenario of free bargaining inter privatos to settings of regulated tendering for public contracts. Therefore, most of what Thomas submits in his paper is actually of little or no relevance to public procurement practitioners, which should avoid engaging in too complex competition-related issues that, in reality, bear no relevance in the regulated setting. Generally, this shows a continued need for more procurement-specific guidance, and competition practitioners would be well advised to double check their arguments within the constraints created by the EU and domestic public procurement rules.