Bid rigging, self-cleaning, leniency and claims for damages: A beautiful procurement mess? (C-124/17)

silence_cc_albertoortiz.jpg

In his Opinion of 16 May 2018 in Vossloh Laeis, C-124/17, EU:C:2018:316 (not available in English), Advocate General Campos Sánchez-Bordona has offered an interesting view on the interpretation of the grounds for discretionary exclusion of economic operators engaged in bid rigging. In particular, his proposed interpretation concerns the limitations of the contracting authority's ability to demand full and unrestricted cooperation from undertakings seeking to reassure them that they have self-cleaned after participating in collusive practices in public markets. This Opinion and the forthcoming CJEU Judgment in Vossloh Laeis will be relevant for the interpretation of Article 57 of Directive 2014/24/EU, as well as Article 80 of Directive 2014/25/EU, on which the case rests. In my view, the Vossloh Laeis Opinion raises difficult questions about the coordination of enforcement of mechanisms to prevent bid rigging in the fields of public procurement and competition law. It also creates some functional tensions with recent cases such as Generali-Providencia Biztosító, C-470/13, EU:C:2014:2469; and Impresa di Costruzioni Ing. E. Mantovani and RTI Mantovani e Guerrato, C-178/16, EU:C:2017:1000. Thus, it deserves some close analysis.

Vossloh Laeis - Background

This case concerns the aftermath of an investigation into bid rigging practices by the German competition authority (Bundeskartellamt), which established that '[d]uring the period from 2001 to 2011 Vossloh Laeis concluded agreements with other companies on the supply of rails and switches to the detriment of local public transport companies, private, regional and industrial railway companies and construction companies. The aim of the agreements was to divide up tenders and projects among the members of the cartel'. This resulted in the imposition of a fine of just under 3.5 million euros on the company Vossloh Laeis in 2016 by the Bundeskartellamt.

In the case that triggered the reference to the CJEU, a contracting entity whose procurement is covered by Directive 2014/25/EU (Stadwerke München) sought to exclude Vossloh Laeis from its qualification system on the basis that it had been fined for its participation in the cartel. It is important to stress that the relevance of the cartel for Stadwerke München was not simply remote or theoretical, but concerned it rather closely because this entity had been a victim of the anticompetitive practices carried out by Vossloh Laeis. This led Stadwerke München to seek damages compensation from Vossloh Laeis in civil litigation, as well as to exclude it from its list of approved contractors.

Vossloh Laeis sought to resist its exclusion from Stadwerke München's qualification system on the basis that it had taken self-cleaning measures and should thus be reinstated in the list of approved contractors on the basis of Article 57(6) of Directive 2014/24, to which the applicable Article 80 of Directive 2014/25 refers. In particular, Vossloh Laeis sought to persuade the contracting entity that it had taken organizational and personnel measures to clarify the facts and prevent their future repetition. It also indicated that it would compensate the damage caused by its illicit behavior. 

Stadwerke München rejected the claims of self-cleaning on the basis that (i) despite the uncovering of the cartel in 2011, Vossloh Laeis had not addressed the contracting entity or undertaken any initiative to clarify the facts as a whole; (ii) only in 2016 had Vossloh Laeis ceased to deny, in front of Stadwerke München, its participation in the relevant collusive practices, and even then it stressed that it had challenged the decision imposing the fine. Most importantly, Stadwerke München took issue with Vossloh Laeis' behaviour because (iii) it had not agreed to furnish a copy of the Bundeskartellamt's decision imposing the fine, so that Stadwerke München could examine it. Neither did Vossloh Laeis agree to cooperate with Stadwerke München in clarifying the infringement committed, since it understood that his cooperation with the competition authority was sufficient.

The Vossloh Laeis Opinion states that '[t]he referring court does not dispute (as it was stated in the sanctioning decision itself) that Vossloh Laeis had collaborated continuously and without restrictions with the German competition authority during the infringement procedure procedure' (para 17, own translation from Spanish). This creates a situation that may seem difficult to understand. Why would an undertaking that has already cooperated unreservedly with the competition authority not take the same approach to cooperation with the contracting entity? Is it a matter of opposition to red tape and duplication of effort? Or is there any secret that the economic operator is seeking to protect? Equally, on the side of the contracting entity, why is it so interested in the nitty-gritty details of the decision imposing the fine? Could it not just accept that the economic operator was sanctioned and is now trying to move on?

The importance of leniency programmes in this context

Even if the Opinion of AG Campos does not mention this at all, the dispute about access to the Bundeskartellamt's decision and Vossloh Laeis' refusal to cooperate with Stadwerke München in a parallel clarification of the facts needs to be placed in the context of the applicable leniency programme run by the Bundeskartellamt, and the civil litigation around the action for damages against Vossloh Laeis. This is important to understand the position of the parties, as well as the shadows that loom over the approach taken by AG Campos (discussed below).

As part of a leniency programme (not only Bundeskartellamt's, but those run by the contracting authorities of other Member States and the European Commission itself), economic operators that have participated in bid rigging offences can seek an exemption or reduction of the fines that would otherwise be applicable if they uncover the cartel and/or cooperate with the competition authority in its investigation (the degree of cooperation and the relevance of the information provided determining the level of 'discount' on the otherwise applicable fine).

In return for their cooperation, cartellists not only benefit from exemption or reduction of the fines, but also from some protection against claims for damages by the victims of their collusive behaviour. Indeed, competition authorities will take measures to ensure that leniency statements are not disclosed to the public, will include minimal parts of them in their final decisions imposing fines, and will redact relevant material from the public version of those decisions. This makes it virtually impossible for 'outsiders' to learn about the detailed ways in which the cartel functioned on the basis of public information resulting from the infringement procedure. Moreover, leniency programmes are specially protected by the Directive on competition damages (2014/104/EU), which requires Member States to ensure that 'for the purpose of actions for damages, national courts cannot at any time order a party or a third party to disclose ... leniency statements' (Art 6(6)(a)) (see also the position of the CJEU here).

This creates significant difficulties in the context of follow-on damages actions, where the previous investigation by the competition authority is of no avail to victims seeking redress. This would explain why Stadwerke München insisted in having access to the confidential version of the decision imposing a fine, and why Vossloh Laeis resisted such disclosure. It also clarifies how, in this specific context, cooperation with the competition authority is of no use to contracting entities and authorities seeking to understand the behaviour of the economic operator, as the opacity surrounding leniency programmes prevents them from benefiting from the investigation and findings of the competition authority. 

The Vossloh Laeis Opinion in its own terms

In own terms, the Opinion of AG Campos seems to be solely based on the conceptual premise that the dispute between Stadwerke München and Vossloh Laeis resulted not from the background discussed above, but rather from the peculiarity of the German rules that transposed Article 57(6) of Directive 2014/24/EU, which required that, for the purposes of self-cleaning, economic operators must demonstrate that they have 'fully clarified the facts and circumstances by actively collaborating with the investigating authorities and the contracting authority' (Art 125(1)(2) Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen, as reported in para 10 of the Opinion). This deviates from the literal wording of Article 57(6) of Directive 2014/24/EU, which foresees that 'the economic operator shall prove that it has ... clarified the facts and circumstances in a comprehensive manner by actively collaborating with the investigating authorities'. The analysis in the Opinion, thus, largely rests on the interpretation of the concept of 'investigating authorities' in Article 57(6) with the purpose of establishing whether it covers the contracting authority or entity itself (see para 2). The Opinion offers a good synthesis of the competing arguments in paras 26-36.

In that regard, the Opinion provides some relevant positions. First, that the requirements explicitly listed in Article 57(6) of Directive 2014/24/EU are mandatory and, consequently, contracting authorities and entities cannot accept claims of self-cleaning that do not meet them all (paras 40-41). Therefore, establishing the scope of the duty of collaboration in the clarification of the facts becomes paramount because its breach determines the impossibility of benefiting from any other self-cleaning measures adopted.

Second, on the specific issue of the entities included in the concept of 'investigating authorities', AG Campos takes the view that, despite the fact that Article 57 of Directive 2014/24/EU grants contracting authorities and entities some investigative powers, 'the exercise of these functions does not make the contracting authority one of the "investigating authorities" referred to in Article 57 (6), second paragraph of Directive 2014/24' (para 47, own translation from Spanish). In addition to other functional reasons on the way contracting authorities carry out their limited investigation for the purposes  of establishing the existence of an exclusion ground (paras 48-50), AG Campos concludes that, in general terms, 'the "investigating authorities" referred to in Article 57, paragraph 6, second paragraph, of Directive 2014/24 will not coincide with the contracting authorities. In front of the latter, the tenderer (or the company that aspires to be part of a classification system, as in this case) must prove that it has actively and thoroughly collaborated with the investigating authorities to clarify the facts. But this collaboration must be, by force, with an institution other than the contracting authority itself: otherwise, [the collaboration] would be, for the latter, a notorious fact that does not require any proof' (para 51, own translation from Spanish).

Finally, AG Campos also rejects the possibility for Member States to go beyond the scope of the collaboration foreseen in Article 57(6) of Directive 2014/24/EU in demanding that the economic operator seeking to benefit from its self-cleaning efforts not only collaborates with the 'investigating authorities' but also with the contracting authority or entity (paras 55-61). Interestingly, AG Campos stresses two main issues against this possibility: (i) that it would create a duplication of obligations required against those who, like the investigating authorities and the contracting authorities, perform different functions and (ii) that it 'could place the economic operator in a situation close to defenselessness when, in circumstances such as those in this case, the contracting authority claims to have suffered damages, because of the infringing conduct that led to the exclusion of [the economic operator], for which it requests compensation' (para 60, own translation from Spanish).

It is worth stressing that the case also concerns issues surrounding the maximum period of exclusion of economic operators that cannot benefit from self-cleaning (paras 62-86). However this post concentrates solely on the interpretation of Article 57(6) of Directive 2014/24/EU.

In my view, the Opinion of AG Campos advances a plausible interpretation of Article 57(6) of Directive 2014/24/EU. However, I would disagree with two issues. First, the fact that Member States cannot go beyond the minimum mandatory self-cleaning requirements established in the Directive on the grounds that this would result in a duplication of effort for economic operators does not make sense to me, in particular after the recent CJEU Judgment in Impresa di Costruzioni Ing. E. Mantovani and RTI Mantovani e Guerrato, C-178/16, EU:C:2017:1000 (see comment here), which AG Campos acknowledges but sets aside in his Opinion (para 57). Second, and more importantly, I think that the Opinion of AG in Vossloh Laeis does not work in the context of infringements of competition law covered by leniency programmes, which triggers the second of the arguments against an expansive functional interpretation of Article 57(6) on the grounds of the undertaking's procedural rights.

The Vossloh Laeis Opinion in the broader context of leniency programmes

Indeed, the main difficulty I have with the AG Opinion in Vossloh Laeis is functional. It is worth stressing that the implication of this Opinion is that a contracting entity or authority that knows that it has been the victim of a cartel offence cannot oppose self-cleaning of the competition law violator on the basis of its lack of cooperation, despite being in litigation with that undertaking over damages compensation. From the perspective of the infringer, this also means that participation in a leniency programme not only provides a shield from administrative fines and some protection from actions for damages, but also some protection from exclusion from procurement procedures. These are two negative results from the perspective of ensuring the effectiveness of competition law in public procurement markets and, in my view, runs against the thrust of previous decisions such as Generali-Providencia Biztosító, C-470/13, EU:C:2014:2469 (see comment here).

I also think that the way in which the Vossloh Laeis Opinion frames the issue of defenselessness is artificial. An economic operator that has infringed competition law and received a reduced fine as a result of its leniency application has already obtained a relevant practical advantage. Therefore, I see no problem in making it face a simple choice between either (i) sticking to the secrecy created by the leniency mechanism and thus accepting exclusion from procurement procedures for an adequate period of time, or (ii) waiving that secrecy vis-a-vis the contracting authority (which would implicitly require compensation of the damage resulting from the cartel), so that the contracting authority can form an adequate view of whether the organisational and personnel self-cleaning measures really address the root causes of the past illegal behaviour and, if appropriate, set aside the relevant exclusion ground.

The Vossloh Laeis Opinion allows the economic operator to avoid this simple choice and to have two bites at the cherry. It also makes it difficult for the contracting authority to satisfactorily carry our its limited investigative functions under Art 57(6). Without knowing exactly what happened, it is difficult to judge whether the self-cleaning measures are 'appropriate to prevent further criminal offences or misconduct'. Additionally, it forces the contracting authority to make this decision in a context where it can have other grounds to doubt the economic operators' loss of integrity, such as its resistence to provide damages compensation despite having engaged in illegal behaviour that damaged the contracting authority's interests.

Ultimately, if AG Campos was worried about the existence of a conflict of interest between the contracting authority that has an outstanding claim for damages and at the same time needs to assess the self-cleaning efforts of the economic operator--which is a fair enough point--it would have been interesting to learn about the ways in which Article 24 of Directive 2014/24/EU needs to be applied and interpreted in situations such as this. It would have also been interesting to explore in more detail the extent to which the discrete requirements for satisfactory self-cleaning in Article 57(6) interact as, in the case of leniency-related situations, the lack of collaboration with the contracting authority or entity has a bearing on the extent to which the economic operator can be seen to have 'undertaken to pay compensation in respect of any damage caused by the criminal offence or misconduct'. 

However, by not addressing these issues, the Vossloh Laeis Opinion seems to seek to protect the effectiveness of leniency programmes without even mentioning them, which in my view is an odd position to take.

The false promise of e-procurement portals? A comment on Yukins & Ramish (2018) from a European perspective

 ©nist6dh

In a very thought-provoking recent paper*, Chris Yukins and Dan Ramish discuss two proposed reforms of US defence procurement law that would reduce access to bid protest mechanisms as an (unintended) consequence of efforts to streamline procurement on the basis of new (?) technologies. They concentrate, in particular, on the proposal to 'launch a pilot program to allow federal officials to buy directly from electronic portals [which] could—depending on its implementation—allow procurements to bypass the normal public solicitation process, and foreclose pre-award protests [the 'section 846 proposal']. The second set of proposals [... the 'section 809 proposal' ...] might radically streamline off-the-shelf purchasing, which again could make pre-award protests practically impossible' (p 4).

In simple terms, Yukins and Ramish analyse the impact that direct access to e-procurement portals could have for the system of checks and balances resulting from bid protest possibilities. As they put it, '[a]s a practical matter, if either initiative ... ultimately means that federal officials will be allowed to purchase commercially available goods and services directly from commercial electronic marketplaces without the prior publication normally required ..., that streamlined procedure could exempt billions of procurement dollars from accountability in the bid protest process. That, in turn, could have serious consequences, only some of which are fully foreseeable' (p 5).

Their paper provides an excellent overview of the relevance of bid protest (or procurement challenge) mechanisms for the proper functioning of the procurement function. It also stresses the relevance that review procedures have in international law--and in particular for the United Nations Convention Against Corruption, and the World Trade Organisation Government Procurement Agreement (WTO GPA)--which is particularly relevant in the context of the on-going Brexit process (for discussion, see P Telles & A Sanchez-Graells, 'Examining Brexit Through the GPA's Lens: What Next for UK Public Procurement Reform?' (2017) 47(1) PCLJ 1-33).

Maybe of even more interest, Yukins and Ramish raise very important points about the potential unintended consequences of the implementation of a policy that relied on e-procurement portals or an e-marketplace for the public sector in terms of the incentives for the exercise of administrative discretion. In their view

Because of the important protections they provide against error and corruption, bid protests have been adopted across the U.S., and indeed around the world (p 1, emphasis added).

... bid protests ... give vendors competing in international procurement markets a means of challenging unfair barriers to competition (p 2, emphasis added).

If the [section 846 proposal] results in direct purchases from electronic portals (thus in practice exempting an entire phase of procurement from protest), these changes would make it easier for officials to indulge in pre-award discrimination and could pose serious questions ... (p 4, emphasis added).

These considerations are best understood under the framework of Yukins' previous work on agency theory and procurement [see 'A Versatile Prism: Assessing Procurement Law Through the Principal-Agent Model' (2010) 40 PCLJ 63-86]. From that perspective, it is clear that pre-award bid protests serve as both a mechanism to incentivise and to discipline the public buyer as an agent. It creates incentives to design the procurement properly and in a pro-competitive manner to avoid the delays implicit in bid protests, as well as to achieve best value for money (which is the prime concern the procuring agent should have, and which an adequate system of rewards and performance evaluation should support). It also deters improper conduct through the threat of litigation (and, potentially, personal liability, depending on the specific features of the bid protest system, and the criminalisation of corrupt practices).

In short, bid protest mechanisms serve to improve the quality of procurement--in particular, through incentives to carry out market research prior to the launch of a procurement procedure--and its probity and integrity--through mechanisms to challenge discrimination and corrupt practices. Ultimately, then, the existence of bid protest mechanisms is in the public interest--even if they are engaged by private actors (disappointed bidders), acting as private attorney general. This does not detract from the need to design the bid protest mechanism in a way that weeds out spurious litigation. However, as a matter of principle, agency theory supports that having a bid protest mechanism is better than not having it.

Against this backdrop, it seems obvious that a suppression of the possibility of pre-award bid protest will erode public interest by creating a risk of both lower quality procurement design and diminished procurement probity. Whether these increased risks are countered by the practical advantages derived from streamlined e-procurement practices may be controversial. However, in the absence of evidence about the redundancy of bid protest mechanisms, and in view of the functional role they serve, I happily sit with Yukins' and Ramish's call not to suppress them in the name of (theoretical) procedural expeditiousness.

The risk of allowing contracting authorities to simply go to the (e)market is that it (re)creates the same problems of misuse of public funds that procurement rules are there to minimise. In every conversation about public procurement, the question arises what are these rules for, and the answer ends up converging towards: 'competition, transparency, and integrity', as proxies to promote value for money and probity [see S Schooner 'Desiderata: Objectives for a System of Government Contract Law' (2002) 11 PPLR 103]. The difficulty with the use of an e-marketplace for public buyers is that, either it is created within the same system of checks and balances of the procurement rules, or the procurement function will be exposed to the shortcomings of inadequate or limited competition (in particular if the gatekeeper of the e-market has a way of extracting rents from willing suppliers) and discrimination or corruption (if there is the possibility for either the gatekeeper or the agent, ie the public buyer, to appropriate rents). More importantly, the monitoring of the 'quality of the marketplace' and its integrity will be eroded by the suppression of the specific mechanisms included in procurement regulation--possibly leaving it all to antitrust/competition law, with its notorious shortcomings in addressing similar issues in platform markets with strong potential for innovation. On the whole, then, the risks created by unbridled access to e-markets are not different from the risks of uncontrolled access to standard markets that justified the emergence of procurement law centuries ago.

In the context of European procurement law, I think that this is an important reflection to engage with. A move towards e-procurement portals and off-the-shelf purchasing would, as things stand and in principle, require the existence of procurement challenge mechanisms at the point of setting up those mechanisms--either as framework agreements or dynamic purchasing systems, or as a result of the intervention of a centralised purchasing body tasked with the creation (and operation) of the e-marketplace. However, there have been recent developments that jeopardise this position, such as the contraction of the concept of procurement in Falk Pharma and Tirkkonen, or the underlying problem that led to the regulation of the activities of 'separate operational units' within a contracting authority for the purposes of value aggregation. These issues raise important questions as to whether the evolution of EU procurement (case) law is also creating an (inadvertent) threat of erosion of the quality and probity of the system whereby public funds are channelled towards the meeting of needs in the public interest.

* C R Yukins & D Ramish, 'Section 809 and "E-Portal" Proposals, by Cutting Bid Protests in Federal Procurement, Could Breach International Agreements and Raise New Risks of Corruption' (2018) 60 GOV’T CONTRACTOR ¶ 138. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3176223.

A Duty to ‘Save’ Seemingly Non-Compliant Tenders for Public Contracts? -- New SSRN paper

35422166855_ed7986dce9_z.jpg

I have published a short paper commenting on the transposition of Article 56(3) of Directive 2014/24/EU  through the 2017 reform version of Article 72 of the Portuguese Code of Public Contracts. I think this is an interesting case study on some of the difficulties that the new provision on the contracting authority's power to seek clarifications can pose in practice--and maybe anticipates some of the future challenges in the development of the Slovensko-Manova-Archus and Gama case law. The abstract of the paper is as follows:

This paper provides a critical assessment of the rules regarding the clarification, supplementation and correction of tenders in procedures for the award of public contracts regulated by the EU 2014 Public Procurement Package. It does so through a detailed assessment of the transposition of Article 56(3) of Directive 2014/24/EU by means of the post-2017 reform version of Article 72 of the Portuguese Code of Public Contracts. The paper concentrates on four main issues: the existence of a mere discretionary power or a positive duty to seek clarifications, corrections or supplementations of tenders and their accompanying documentation; the constraints imposed on such power or duty; the desirability of unilateral tender corrections by the contracting authority; and the transparency given to the correction, supplementation or clarification of tenders. The paper assesses each of these issues against the backdrop of the existing case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union, as well as with a functional approach to the operationalisation of the Portuguese rules on correction, supplementation and clarification of tenders for public contracts.

The paper is freely downloadable from SSRN: A Sanchez-Graells, 'A Duty to "Save" Seemingly Non-Compliant Tenders for Public Contracts? - Comments on Art 72 of the 2017 Portuguese Code of Public Contracts' (2018) 2 Revista de Direito Administrativo 59-68.

'Certain cross-border interest' for a public contract cannot be purely hypothetical (C-486/17)

TalkToTheHand.jpg

I am currently-re-reading all CJEU procurement decisions of 2015, 2016 and 2017 for a new book that will consolidate and revise the comments published in this blog and in other papers (more details on this soon), as well as new comments on those cases I did not manage to cover at the time (there are 10 of those). Doing that, I came upon the Order of 23 November 2017 in Olympus Italia, C-486/17, EU:C:2017:899 (only available in FR and IT), which I find interesting because it reinforces the Tecnoedi approach to the burden of proof of the existence of a 'certain cross-border interest' that engages the CJEU's jurisdiction to provide the relevant interpretation of EU public procurement law (for discussion, see here).

In Olympus Italia, the CJEU was sent a request for interpretation of Directive 2014/24/EU and, in particular, in relation to the regulation of negotiated procedures and the possibility for tenderers to amend their tenders in that context. However, the CJEU rejected the request on the basis that the referring court had provided insufficient information to establish the existence of a certain cross-border interest in a contract for an "all-hazards" technical assistance service for flexible endoscopes and machines used for washing such devices. 

As justification for the rejection of the case, the CJEU stressed that

... the objective criteria which may indicate certain cross-border interest ... may be, in particular, the fact that the contract in question is for a significant amount, in conjunction with the place where the work is to be carried out or the technical characteristics of the contract and the specific characteristics of the products concerned. In that context, it is also possible to take account of the existence of complaints brought by operators situated in other Member States, provided that it is determined that those complaints are real and not fictitious...

...  a conclusion that there is certain cross-border interest cannot be inferred hypothetically from certain factors which, considered in the abstract, could constitute evidence to that effect, but must be the positive outcome of a specific assessment of the circumstances of the contract at issue. More particularly, the referring court may not merely submit to the Court of Justice evidence showing that certain cross-border interest cannot be ruled out but must, on the contrary provide information capable of proving that it exists ...

In the present case, it is common ground, that the amount of the public contract at issue in the main proceedings amounts to EUR 85,000, which is considerably below the thresholds for application laid down in Article 4 of Directive 2014/24 ... On the other hand, in its reference for a preliminary ruling, the referring court has not provided any information enabling the Court to ... demonstrate the existence of a certain cross-border interest ... In those circumstances, the Court finds itself unable to provide a useful answer to the question raised... (C-486/17, paras 17-22, references omitted, own translation from French and emphasis added).

I find the Olympus Italia case interesting (and potentially worrying) if it is indicative of the willingness of the CJEU to avoid answering preliminary references on the basis of the absence of irrefutable proof of the existence of cross-border interest. I think that there have been plenty other cases where the CJEU was unable to establish this and, in any case, it provided an answer on the premise that the referring court would first have to assess whether such cross-border interest existed (for recent examples, see eg the 2015 Judgments in UNIS, C-25/14, EU:C:2015:821; or Enterprise Focused Solutions, C-278/14, EU:C:2015:228). If the CJEU is using the (evidence of the) existence of a certain cross-border interest as a 'docket-management' device, we can only expect further distortions of the case law in an area that is not precisely clear...