New CJEU case law against excessive disclosure: quid de open data? (C‑54/21, and joined C‑37/20 and C‑601/20)

In the last few days, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has delivered two judgments imposing significant limitations on the systematic, unlimited disclosure of procurement information with commercial value, such as the identity of experts and subcontractors engaged by tenderers for public contracts; and beneficial ownership information. In imposing a nuanced approach to the disclosure of such information, the CJEU may have torpedoed ‘full transparency’ approaches to procurement and beneficial ownership open data.

Indeed, these are two classes of information at the core of current open data efforts, and they are relevant for (digital) procurement governance—in particular in relation to the prevention of corruption and collusion, which automated screening requires establishing relationships and assessing patterns of interaction reliant on such data [for discussion, see A Sanchez-Graells, ‘Procurement Corruption and Artificial Intelligence: Between the Potential of Enabling Data Architectures and the Constraints of Due Process Requirements’ in S Williams & J Tillipman (eds), Routledge Handbook of Public Procurement Corruption (forthcoming)]. The judgments can thus have important implications.

In Antea Polska, the CJEU held that EU procurement rules prevent national legislation mandating all information sent by the tenderers to the contracting authorities to be published in its entirety or communicated to the other tenderers, with the sole exception of trade secrets. The CJEU reiterated that the scope of non-disclosable information is much broader and requires a case-by-case analysis by the contracting authority, in particular with a view to avoiding the release of information that could be used to distort competition. Disclosure of information needs to strike an adequate balance between meeting good administration duties to enable the right to the effective review of procurement decisions, on the one hand, and the protection of information with commercial value or with potential competition implications, on the other.

In a related fashion, in Luxembourg Business Registers, the CJEU declared invalid the provision of the Anti-Money Laundering Directive whereby Member States had to ensure that the information on the beneficial ownership of corporate and other legal entities incorporated within their territory was accessible in all cases to any member of the general public—without the need to demonstrate having a legitimate interest in accessing it. The CJEU considered that the disclosure of the information to undefined members of the public created an excessive interference with the fundamental rights to respect for private life and to the protection of personal data.

In this blog post, I analyse these two cases and reflect on their implications for the management of (big) open data for procurement governance purposes, in particular from an anti-corruption perspective and in relation to the EU law data governance obligations incumbent on public buyers.

There is more than trade secrets to procurement confidentiality

In Antea Polska and Others (C-54/21, EU:C:2022:888), among other questions, the CJEU was asked whether Directive 2014/24/EU precludes national legislation on public procurement which required that, with the sole exception of trade secrets, information sent by the tenderers to the contracting authorities be published in its entirety or communicated to the other tenderers, and a practice on the part of contracting authorities whereby requests for confidential treatment in respect of trade secrets were accepted as a matter of course.

I will concentrate on the first part of the question on full transparency solely constrained by trade secrets—and leave the ‘countervailing’ practice aside for now (though it deserves some comment because it creates a requirement for the contracting authority to assess the commercial value of procurement information in the wider context of the activities of the participating economic operators, at paras 69-85). I will also not deal with the discrepancy between the concept of ‘trade secret’ under the Trade Secrets Directive and the concept of ‘confidential information’ in Directive 2014/24 (which the CJEU clarifies, again, at paras 51-55).

The issue of full transparency of procurement information subject only to trade secret protection raises an interesting question because it concerns the compatibility with EU law of a maximalistic approach to procurement transparency that is not peculiar to Poland (where the case originated) but shared by other Member States with a permissive tradition of access to public documents [for in-depth country-specific analyses and comparative considerations, see the contributions to K-M Halonen, R Caranta & A Sanchez-Graells, Transparency in EU Procurements. Disclosure Within Public Procurement and During Contract Execution (Edward Elgar 2019)].

The question concerns the interpretation of multiple provisions of Directive 2014/24/EU and, in particular, Art 21(1) on confidentiality and Arts 50(4) and 55(3) on the withholding of information [see my comments to Art 21 and 55 in R Caranta & A Sanchez-Graells, European Public Procurement. Commentary on Directive 2014/24/EU (Edward Elgar 2021)]. All of them are of course to be interpreted in line with the general principle of competition in Art 18(1) [see A Sanchez-Graells, Public Procurement and the EU Competition Rules (2nd edn, hart 2015) 444-445].

In addressing the question, the CJEU built on its recent judgment in Klaipėdos regiono atliekų tvarkymo centras (C‑927/19, EU:C:2021:700), and reiterated its general approach to the protection of confidential information in procurement procedures:

‘… the principal objective of the EU rules on public procurement is to ensure undistorted competition … to achieve that objective, it is important that the contracting authorities do not release information relating to public procurement procedures which could be used to distort competition, whether in an ongoing procurement procedure or in subsequent procedures. Since public procurement procedures are founded on a relationship of trust between the contracting authorities and participating economic operators, those operators must be able to communicate any relevant information to the contracting authorities in such a procedure, without fear that the authorities will communicate to third parties items of information whose disclosure could be damaging to those operators’ (C-54/21, para 49, reference omitted, emphasis added).

The CJEU linked this interpretation to the prohibition for contracting authorities to disclose information forwarded to it by economic operators which they have designated as confidential [Art 21(1) Dir 2014/24] and stressed that this had to be reconciled with the requirements of effective judicial protection and, in particular, the general principle of good administration, from which the obligation to state reasons stems because ‘in the absence of sufficient information enabling it to ascertain whether the decision of the contracting authority to award the contract is vitiated by errors or unlawfulness, an unsuccessful tenderer will not, in practice, be able to rely on its right .. to an effective review’ (C-54/21, para 50).

The Court also stressed that the Directive allows Member States to modulate the scope of the protection of confidential information in accordance with their national legislation, in particular legislation concerning access to information [Art 21(1) Dir 2014/24, C-54/21, para 56]. In that regard, however, the CJEU went on to stress that

‘… if the effectiveness of EU law is not to be undermined, the Member States, when exercising the discretion conferred on them by Article 21(1) of that directive, must refrain from introducing regimes … which undermine the balancing exercise [with the right to an effective review] or which alter the regime relating to the publicising of awarded contracts and the rules relating to information to candidates and tenderers set out in Article 50 and 55 of that directive … any regime relating to confidentiality must, as Article 21(1) of Directive 2014/24 expressly states, be without prejudice to the abovementioned regime and to those rules laid down in Articles 50 and 55 of that directive’ (C-54/21, para 58-59).

Focusing on Art 50(4) and Art 55(3) of Directive 2014/24/EU, the CJEU stressed that these provisions empower contracting authorities to withhold from general publication and from disclosure to other candidates and tenderers ‘certain information, where its release would impede law enforcement, would otherwise be contrary to the public interest or would prejudice the legitimate commercial interests of an economic operator or might prejudice fair competition’ (para 61 and, almost identically, para 60). This led the Court to the conclusion that

‘National legislation which requires publicising of any information which has been communicated to the contracting authority by all tenderers, including the successful tenderer, with the sole exception of information covered by the concept of trade secrets, is liable to prevent the contracting authority, contrary to what Articles 50(4) and 55(3) of Directive 2014/24 permit, from deciding not to disclose certain information pursuant to interests or objectives mentioned in those provisions, where that information does not fall within that concept of a trade secret.

Consequently, Article 21(1) of Directive 2014/24, read in conjunction with Articles 50 and 55 of that directive … precludes such a regime where it does not contain an adequate set of rules allowing contracting authorities, in circumstances where Articles 50 and 55 apply, exceptionally to refuse to disclose information which, while not covered by the concept of trade secrets, must remain inaccessible pursuant to an interest or objective referred to in Articles 50 and 55’ (paras 62-63).

In my view, this is the correct interpretation and an important application of the rules seeking to minimise the risk of distortions of competition due to excessive procurement transparency, on which I have been writing for a long time [see also K-M Halonen, ‘Disclosure rules in EU public procurement: balancing between competition and transparency’ (2016) 16(4) Journal of Public Procurement 528].

The Antea Polska judgment stresses the importance of developing a nuanced approach to the management, restricted disclosure and broader publication of information submitted to the contracting authority in a procurement procedure. Notably, this will create particular complications in the context of the design and rollout of procurement open data, especially in the context of the new eForms (see here, and below).

Transparency for what? Who really cares about beneficial ownership?

In Luxembourg Business Registers (joined cases C‑37/20 and C‑601/20, EU:C:2022:912, FR only—see EN press release on which I rely to avoid extensive own translations from French) the CJEU was asked to rule on the compatibility with the Charter of Fundamental Rights—and in particular Articles 7 (respect for private and family life) and 8 (protection of personal data)—of Article 30(5)(c) of the consolidated version of the Anti-Money Laundering Directive (AML Directive), which required Member States to ensure that information on the beneficial ownership of corporate and other legal entities incorporated within their territory is accessible in all cases to any member of the general public. In particular, members of the general public had to ‘be permitted to access at least the name, the month and year of birth and the country of residence and nationality of the beneficial owner as well as the nature and extent of the beneficial interest held.’

The CJEU has found that the general public’s access to information on beneficial ownership constitutes a serious interference with the fundamental rights to respect for private life and to the protection of personal data, which is exacerbated by the fact that, once those data have been made available to the general public, they can not only be freely consulted, but also retained and disseminated.

While the CJEU recognised that the AML Directive pursues an objective of general interest and that the general public’s access to information on beneficial ownership is appropriate for contributing to the attainment of that objective, the interference with individual fundamental rights is neither limited to what is strictly necessary nor proportionate to the objective pursued.

The Court paid special attention to the fact that the rules requiring unrestricted public access to the information result from a modification of the previous regime in the original AML Directive, which required, in addition to access by the competent authorities and certain entities, for access by any person or organisation capable of demonstrating a legitimate interest. The Court considered that the suppression of the requirement to demonstrate a legitimate interest in accessing the information did not generate sufficient benefits from the perspective of combating money laundering and terrorist financing to offset the significantly more serious interference with fundamental rights that open publication of the beneficial ownership data entails.

Here, the Court referred to its judgment in Vyriausioji tarnybinės etikos komisija (C‑184/20, EU:C:2022:601), where it carried out a functional comparison of the anti-corruption effects of a permissioned system of institutional access and control of relevant disclosures, versus public access to that information. The Court was clear that

‘… the publication online of the majority of the personal data contained in the declaration of private interests of any head of an establishment receiving public funds … does not meet the requirements of a proper balance. In comparison with an obligation to declare coupled with a check of the declaration’s content by the Chief Ethics Commission … such publication amounts to a considerably more serious interference with the fundamental rights guaranteed in Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter, without that increased interference being capable of being offset by any benefits which might result from publication of all those data for the purpose of preventing conflicts of interest and combating corruption’ (C-184/20, para 112).

In Luxembourg Business Registers, the CJEU also held that the optional provisions in Art 30 AML Directive that allowed Member States to make information on beneficial ownership available on condition of online registration and to provide, in exceptional circumstances, for an exemption from access to that information by the general public, were not, in themselves, capable of demonstrating either a proper balance between competing interests, or the existence of sufficient safeguards.

The implication of the Luxembourg Business Registers is that a different approach to facilitating access to beneficial ownership data is required, and that an element of case-by-case assessment (or at least of an assessment based on categories of organisations and individuals seeking access) will need to be brought back into the system. In other words, permissioned access to beneficial ownership data seems unavoidable.

Implications for open data and data governance

These recent CJEU judgments seem to me to clearly establish the general principle that unlimited transparency does not equate public interest, as there is also an interest in preserving the (relative) confidentiality of some information and data and an adequate, difficult balance needs to be struck. The interests in competition with transparency can be either individual (fundamental rights, or commercial value) or collective (avoidance of distortions of competition). Detailed and comprehensive assessment on a case-by-case basis is required.

As I advocated long ago, and recently reiterated in relation to the growing set of data governance obligations incumbent on public buyers, under EU law,

‘It is thus simply not possible to create a system that makes all procurement data open. Data governance requires the careful management of a system of multi-tiered access to different types of information at different times, by different stakeholders and under different conditions. While the need to balance procurement transparency and the protection of data subject to the rights of others and competition-sensitive data is not a new governance challenge, the digital management of this information creates heightened risks to the extent that the implementation of data management solutions is tendentially ‘open access’ (and could eg reverse presumptions of confidentiality), as well as in relation to system integrity risks (ie cybersecurity)’ (at 10, references omitted).

The CJEU judgments have (re)confirmed that unlimited ‘open access’ is not a viable strategy under EU law. It is perhaps clearer than ever that the capture, structuring, retention, and disclosure of governance-relevant procurement and related data (eg beneficial ownership) needs to be decoupled from its proactive publication. This requires a reconsideration of the open data model and, in particular, a careful assessment of the implementation of the new eForms that only just entered into force.

Governing the Assessment and Taking of Risks in Digital Procurement Governance

In a previous blog post, I explored the main governance risks and legal obligations arising from the adoption of digital technologies, which revolve around data governance, algorithmic transparency, technological dependency, technical debt, cybersecurity threats, the risks stemming from the long-term erosion of the skills base in the public sector, and difficult trade-offs due to the uncertainty surrounding immature and still changing technologies within an also evolving regulatory framework. To address such risks and ensure compliance with the relevant governance obligations, I stressed the need to embed a comprehensive mechanism of risk assessment in the process of technological adoption.

In a new draft chapter (num 9) for my book project, I analyse how to embed risk assessments in the initial stages of decision-making processes leading to the adoption of digital solutions for procurement governance, and how to ensure that they are iterated throughout the lifecycle of use of digital technologies. To do so, I critically review the model of AI risk regulation that is emerging in the EU and the UK, which is based on self-regulation and self-assessment. I consider its shortcomings and how to strengthen the model, including the possibility of subjecting the process of technological adoption to external checks. The analysis converges with a broader proposal for institutionalised regulatory checks on the adoption of digital technologies by the public sector that I will develop more fully in another part of the book.

This post provides a summary of my main findings, on which I will welcome any comments: a.sanchez-graells@bristol.ac.uk. The full draft chapter is free to download: A Sanchez-Graells, ‘Governing the Assessment and Taking of Risks in Digital Procurement Governance’ to be included in A Sanchez-Graells, Digital Technologies and Public Procurement. Gatekeeping and experimentation in digital public governance (OUP, forthcoming), Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4282882.

AI Risk Regulation

The emerging (global) model of AI regulation is risk-based—as opposed to a strict precautionary approach. This implies an assumption that ‘a technology will be adopted despite its harms’. This primarily means accepting that technological solutions may (or will) generate (some) negative impacts on public and private interests, even if it is not known when or how those harms will arise, or how extensive they will be. AI are unique, as they are ‘long-term, low probability, systemic, and high impact’, and ‘AI both poses “aggregate risks” across systems and low probability but “catastrophic risks to society”’ [for discussion, see Margot E Kaminski, ‘Regulating the risks of AI’ (2023) 103 Boston University Law Review, forthcoming]

This should thus trigger careful consideration of the ultimate implications of AI risk regulation, and advocates in favour of taking a robust regulatory approach—including to the governance of the risk regulation mechanisms put in place, which may well require external controls, potentially by an independent authority. By contrast, the emerging model of AI risk regulation in the context of procurement digitalisation in the EU and the UK leaves the adoption of digital technologies by public buyers largely unregulated and only subject to voluntary measures, or to open-ended obligations in areas without clear impact assessment standards (which reduces the prospect of effective mandatory enforcement).

Governance of Procurement Digitalisation in the EU

Despite the emergence of a quickly expanding set of EU digital law instruments imposing a patchwork of governance obligations on public buyers, whether or not they adopt digital technologies (see here), the primary decision whether to adopt digital technologies is not subject to any specific constraints, and the substantive obligations that follow from the diverse EU law instruments tend to refer to open-ended standards that require advanced technical capabilities to operationalise them. This would not be altered by the proposed EU AI Act.

Procurement-related AI uses are classified as minimal risk under the EU AI Act, which leaves them subject only to voluntary self-regulation via codes of conduct—yet to be developed. Such codes of conduct should encourage voluntary compliance with the requirements applicable to high-risk AI uses—such as risk management systems, data and data governance requirements, technical documentation, record-keeping, transparency, or accuracy, robustness and cybersecurity requirements—‘on the basis of technical specifications and solutions that are appropriate means of ensuring compliance with such requirements in light of the intended purpose of the systems.’ This seems to introduce a further element of proportionality or ‘adaptability’ requirement that could well water down the requirements applicable to minimal risk AI uses.

Importantly, while it is possible for Member States to draw such codes of conduct, the EU AI Act would pre-empt Member States from going further and mandating compliance with specific obligations (eg by imposing a blanket extension of the governance requirements designed for high-risk AI uses) across their public administrations. The emergent EU model is thus clearly limited to the development of voluntary codes of conduct and their likely content, while yet unknown, seems unlikely to impose the same standards applicable to the adoption of high-risk AI uses.

Governance of Procurement Digitalisation in the UK

Despite its deliberate light-touch approach to AI regulation and actively seeking to deviate from the EU, the UK is relatively advanced in the formulation of voluntary standards to govern procurement digitalisation. Indeed, the UK has adopted guidance for the use of AI in the public sector, and for AI procurement, and is currently piloting an algorithmic transparency standard (see here). The UK has also adopted additional guidance in the Digital, Data and Technology Playbook and the Technology Code of Practice. Remarkably, despite acknowledging the need for risk assessments—and even linking their conduct to spend approvals required for the acquisition of digital technologies by central government organisations—none of these instruments provides clear standards on how to assess (and mitigate) risks related to the adoption of digital technologies.

Thus, despite the proliferation of guidance documents, the substantive assessment of governance risks in digital procurement remains insufficiently addressed and left to undefined risk assessment standards and practices. The only exception concerns cyber security assessments, given the consolidated approach and guidance of the National Cyber Security Centre. This lack of precision in the substantive requirements applicable to data and algorithmic impact assessments clearly constrains the likely effectiveness of the UK’s approach to embedding technology-related impact assessments in the process of adoption of digital technologies for procurement governance (and, more generally, for public governance). In the absence of clear standards, data and algorithmic impact assessments will lead to inconsistent approaches and varying levels of robustness. The absence of standards will also increase the need to access specialist expertise to design and carry out the assessments. Developing such standards and creating an effective institutional mechanism to ensure compliance therewith thus remain a challenge.

The Need for Strengthened Digital Procurement Governance

Both in the EU and the UK, the emerging model of AI risk regulation leaves digital procurement governance to compliance with voluntary measures such as (future) codes of conduct or transparency standards or impose open-ended obligations in areas without clear standards (which reduces the prospect of effective mandatory enforcement). This follows general trends of AI risk regulation and evidences the emergence of a (sub)model highly dependent on self-regulation and self-assessment. This approach is rather problematic.

Self-Regulation: Outsourcing Impact Assessment Regulation to the Private Sector

The absence of mandatory standards for data and algorithmic impact assessments, as well as the embedded flexibility in the standards for cyber security, are bound to outsource the setting of the substantive requirements for those impact assessments to private vendors offering solutions for digital procurement governance. With limited public sector digital capability preventing a detailed specification of the applicable requirements, it is likely that these will be limited to a general obligation for tenderers to provide an impact assessment plan, perhaps by reference to emerging (international private) standards. This would imply the outsourcing of standard setting for risk assessments to private standard-setting organisations and, in the absence of those standards, to the tenderers themselves. This generates a clear and problematic risk of regulatory capture. Moreover, this process of outsourcing or excessively reliance on private agents to commercially determine impact assessments requirements is not sufficiently exposed to scrutiny and contestation.

Self-Assessment: Inadequacy of Mechanisms for Contestability and Accountability

Public buyers will rarely develop the relevant technological solutions but rather acquire them from technological providers. In that case, the duty to carry out the self-assessment will (or should be) cascaded down to the technology provider through contractual obligations. This would place the technology provider as ‘first party’ and the public buyer as ‘second party’ in relation to assuring compliance with the applicable obligations. In a setting of limited public sector digital capability, and in part as a result of a lack of clear standards providing an applicable benchmark (as above), the self-assessment of compliance with risk management requirements will either be de facto outsourced to private vendors (through a lack of challenge of their practices), or carried out by public buyers with limited capabilities (eg during the oversight of contract implementation). Even where public buyers have the required digital capabilities to carry out a more thorough analysis, they lack independence. ‘Second party’ assurance models unavoidably raise questions about their integrity due to the conflicting interests of the assurance provider who wants to use the system (ie the public buyer).

This ‘second party’ assurance model does not include adequate challenge mechanisms despite efforts to disclose (parts of) the relevant self-assessments. Such disclosures are constrained by general problems with ‘comply or explain’ information-based governance mechanisms, with the emerging model showing design features that have proven problematic in other contexts (such as corporate governance and financial market regulation). Moreover, there is no clear mechanism to contest the decisions to adopt digital technologies revealed by the algorithmic disclosures. In many cases, shortcomings in the risk assessments and the related minimisation and mitigation measures will only become observable after the materialisation of the underlying harms. For example, the effects of the adoption of a defective digital solution for decision-making support (eg a recommender system) will only emerge in relation to challengeable decisions in subsequent procurement procedures that rely on such solution. At that point, undoing the effects of the use of the tool may be impossible or excessively costly. In this context, challenges based on procedure-specific harms, such as the possibility to challenge discrete procurement decisions under the general rules on procurement remedies, are inadequate. Not least, because there can be negative systemic harms that are very hard to capture in the challenge to discrete decisions, or for which no agent with active standing has adequate incentives. To avoid potential harms more effectively, ex ante external controls are needed instead.

Creating External Checks on Procurement Digitalisation

It is thus necessary to consider the creation of external ex ante controls applicable to these decisions, to ensure an adequate embedding of effective risk assessments to inform (and constrain) them. Two models are worth considering: certification schemes and independent oversight.

Certification or Conformity Assessments

While not applicable to procurement uses, the model of conformity assessment in the proposed EU AI Act offers a useful blueprint. The main potential shortcoming of conformity assessment systems is that they largely rely on self-assessments by the technology vendors, and thus on first party assurance. Third-party certification (or algorithmic audits) is possible, but voluntary. Whether there would be sufficient (market) incentives to generate a broad (voluntary) use of third-party conformity assessments remains to be seen. While it could be hoped that public buyers could impose the use of certification mechanisms as a condition for participation in tender procedures, this is a less than guaranteed governance strategy given the EU procurement rules’ functional approach to the use of labels and certificates—which systematically require public buyers to accept alternative means of proof of compliance. This thus seems to offer limited potential for (voluntary) certification schemes in this specific context.

Relatedly, the conformity assessment system foreseen in the EU AI Act is also weakened by its reliance on vague concepts with non-obvious translation into verifiable criteria in the context of a third-party assurance audit. This can generate significant limitations in the conformity assessment process. This difficulty is intended to be resolved through the development of harmonised standards by European standardisation organisations and, where those do not exist, through the approval by the European Commission of common specifications. However, such harmonised standards will largely create the same risks of commercial regulatory capture mentioned above.

Overall, the possibility of relying on ‘third-party’ certification schemes offers limited advantages over the self-regulatory approach.

Independent External Oversight

Moving beyond the governance limitations of voluntary third-party certification mechanisms and creating effective external checks on the adoption of digital technologies for procurement governance would require external oversight. An option would be to make the envisaged third-party conformity assessments mandatory, but that would perpetuate the risks of regulatory capture and the outsourcing of the assurance system to private parties. A different, preferable option would be to assign the approval of the decisions to adopt digital technologies and the verification of the relevant risks assessments to a centralised authority also tasked with setting the applicable requirements therefor. The regulator would thus be placed as gatekeeper of the process of transition to digital procurement governance, instead of the atomised imposition of this role on public buyers. This would be reflective of the general features of the system of external controls proposed in the US State of Washington’s Bill SB 5116 (for discussion, see here).

The main goal would be to introduce an element of external verification of the assessment of potential AI harms and the related taking of risks in the adoption of digital technologies. It is submitted that there is a need for the regulator to be independent, so that the system fully encapsulates the advantages of third-party assurance mechanisms. It is also submitted that the data protection regulator may not be best placed to take on the role as its expertise—even if advanced in some aspects of data-intensive digital technologies—primarily relates to issues concerning individual rights and their enforcement. The more diffuse collective interests at stake in the process of transition to a new model of public digital governance (not only in procurement) would require a different set of analyses. While reforming data protection regulators to become AI mega-regulators could be an option, that is not necessarily desirable and it seems that an easier to implement, incremental approach would involve the creation of a new independent authority to control the adoption of AI in the public sector, including in the specific context of procurement digitalisation.

Conclusion

An analysis of emerging regulatory approaches in the EU and the UK shows that the adoption of digital technologies by public buyers is largely unregulated and only subjected to voluntary measures, or to open-ended obligations in areas without clear standards (which reduces the prospect of effective mandatory enforcement). The emerging model of AI risk regulation in the EU and UK follows more general trends and points at the consolidation of a (sub)model of risk-based digital procurement governance that strongly relies on self-regulation and self-assessment.

However, given its limited digital capabilities, the public sector is not best placed to control or influence the process of self-regulation, which results in the outsourcing of crucial regulatory tasks to technology vendors and the consequent risk of regulatory capture and suboptimal design of commercially determined governance mechanisms. These risks are compounded by the emerging ‘second party assurance’ model, as self-assessments by technology vendors would not be adequately scrutinised by public buyers, either due to a lack of digital capabilities or the unavoidable structural conflicts of interest of assurance providers with an interest in the use of the technology, or both. This ‘second party’ assurance model does not include adequate challenge mechanisms despite efforts to disclose (parts of) the relevant self-assessments. Such disclosures are constrained by general problems with ‘comply or explain’ information-based governance mechanisms, with the emerging model showing design features that have proven problematic in other contexts (such as corporate governance and financial market regulation). Moreover, there is no clear mechanism to contest the decisions revealed by the disclosures, including in the context of (delayed) specific uses of the technological solutions.

The analysis also shows how a model of third-party assurance or certification would be affected by the same issues of outsourcing of regulatory decisions to private parties, and ultimately would largely replicate the shortcomings of the self-regulatory and self-assessed model. A certification model would thus only generate a marginal improvement over the emerging model—especially given the functional approach to the use of certification and labels in procurement.

Moving past these shortcomings requires assigning the approval of decisions whether to adopt digital technologies and the verification of the related impact assessments to an independent authority: the ‘AI in the Public Sector Authority’ (AIPSA). I will fully develop a proposal for such authority in coming months.

UK REGULATION AFTER BREXIT REVISITED -- PUBLIC PROCUREMENT

Negotiating the Future’ and ‘UK in a Changing Europe’ have published a second edition of their interesting report on ‘UK Regulation after Brexit - Revisited’. I had contributed a procurement chapter to the first edition (which has recently been cited in this interesting report for the European Committee of the Regions on the impact on regions and cities of the new trade and economic relations between EU-UK). So I was invited to update the analysis, paying special attention to the (slow) progress of reform of the UK procurement rulebook with the Procurement Bill.

The procurement analysis is below, but I would recommend reading the report in full, as it gives a rather comprehensive picture of how regulation is moving in the UK. For more targeted analysis on regulatory divergence with the EU, this other UK in a Changing Europe ‘Divergence Tracker’ (v5.0) will be of interest.

Public procurement

Public procurement regulation is the set of rules and policies that controls the award of public contracts for works, supplies, and services. Its main goal is to ensure probity and value for money in the spending of public funds – to prevent corruption, collusion, and wastage of taxpayers’ money. It does so by establishing procedural requirements leading to the award of a public contract, and by constraining discretion through requirements of equal treatment, competition, and proportionality. From a trade perspective, procurement law prevents favouritism and protectionism of domestic businesses by facilitating international competition.

In the UK, procurement rules have long been considered an excessive encumbrance on the discretion and flexibility of the public sector, as well as on its ability to deploy ambitious policies with social value to buy British products made by British workers. The EU origin of UK domestic rules, which ‘copied out’ EU Directives before Brexit, has long been blamed for perceived rigidity and constraint in the allocation of public contracts, even though a ‘WTO regime’ would look very similar.

Capitalising on that perception during the Brexit process, public procurement was ear-marked for reform. Boris Johnson promised a ‘bonfire of procurement red tape to give small firms a bigger slice of Government contracts’. The Johnson Government proposed to significantly rewrite and simplify the procurement rulebook, and to adopt an ambitious ‘Buy British’ policy, which would reserve some public contracts to British firms. However, although one of the flagship areas for regulatory reform, not much has changed in practical terms. Reforms are perhaps on the horizon in 2023 or 2024, but the extent to which they will result in material divergence from the pre-Brexit EU regulatory baseline remains to be seen.

Post-Brexit changes so far, plus ça change…

To avoid a regulatory cliff edge and speed up its realignment under international trade law, the UK sought independent membership of the World Trade Organisation Government Procurement Agreement (GPA) from 1 January 2021 on terms that replicate and give continuity to its previously indirect membership as an EU Member State. The UK’s current individual obligations under the GPA are the same as before Brexit. Moreover, to maintain market access, the EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA) replicates obligations under EU law that go beyond the GPA in substantive and procedural elements (‘GPA+’), with only the exception of some contracts for healthcare services. The Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) with Australia and New Zealand, and the envisioned accession of the UK to the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) foresee further GPA+ market access obligations and increasingly complicated constraints related to trade.

These commitments prevent the adoption of an expansive ‘Buy British’ policy and could in fact restrict it in some industries, although healthcare is explicitly excluded from procurement-related trade negotiations. Despite misleading claims to the contrary in UK governments reports, such as the January 2022 Benefits of Brexit report, which gives the impression that Brexit ‘enabled goods and services contracts below £138,760 (central government), £213,477 (sub-central authorities) and £5.3 million (construction throughout the public sector) to be reserved for UK suppliers’ (art 8), official procurement guidance makes clear that the situation remains unchanged. Contracts above the values quoted above – those covered by the GPA, the TCA, and Free Trade Agreements – remain open to international competition. In other words, the government has not achieved its stated Brexit aspiration of reserving ‘a bigger slice’ of procurement to domestic businesses.

A similar picture emerges in relation to procedural requirements under procurement law. While the UK Government declared that its aim was to ‘rewrite the rulebook’ (as discussed below), the pre-Brexit ‘copy out’ of EU procurement rules remains in effect as retained EU law. Brexit required some marginal technical adjustments, such as a change in the digital platform where contract opportunities are advertised and where high value contract opportunities are published in the Find a Tender portal rather than the EU’s official journal, or the substitution of the European Single Procurement Document (ESPD) with a near-identical Single Procurement Document (SPD). The main practical change following Brexit is the UK being disconnected from the e-Certis database. The lack of direct access to documentary evidence makes it more difficult and costly for businesses and public sector entities to complete pre-award checks, especially in cases of cross-border EU-UK tendering. However, TCA provisions seek to minimise these documentary requirements (Art 280) and could mitigate the practical implications of the UK no longer being part of the e-Certis system.

With Brexit, the Minister for the Cabinet Office assumed the powers and functions relating to compliance with procurement rules. Even if the bar was already quite low before Brexit, since virtually no infringement procedures had been opened against the UK for procurement breaches, this change is likely to result in a weakening of enforcement due to the lack of separation between Cabinet Office and other central government departments. The shortcomings of current oversight mechanisms are reflected in the proposed reforms discussed below, which include a proposal to create a dedicated Procurement Review Unit.

Future change

The government has been promoting the reform of the UK’s procurement rulebook. Its key elements were included in the 2020 Green Paper Transforming Public Procurement. The aim was ‘to speed up and simplify [UK] procurement processes, place value for money at their heart, and unleash opportunities for small businesses, charities and social enterprises to innovate in public service delivery’, through greater procedural flexibility, commercial discretion, data transparency, centralisation of a debarment mechanism, and regulatory space for non-economic considerations. The Green Paper envisaged the creation of a new Procurement Review Unit with oversight powers, as well as measures to facilitate the judicial review of procurement decisions. Despite the rhetoric, the proposals did not mark a significant departure from the current rules. They were ‘EU law+’, at best. However, a deregulatory approach that introduces more discretion and less procedural limitations carries potential for significantly complicating procurement practice by reducing procedural standardisation and increasing tendering costs.

The 2021’s government response to the consultation mostly confirmed the approach in the Green Paper and, on 11 May 2022, the Procurement Bill was introduced in the House of Lords, the day after the Queen’s Speech. The Procurement Bill is hardly an exemplar of legislative drafting and it was soon clear that it would need very significant amending. As of 1 September 2022, the Bill had reached its committee stage in the Lords. Five hundred amendments have been put forward with over three hundred of those originating from the government itself. The amendments affect the ‘transformative’ elements of the Bill, and sometimes there are competing amendments over the same clause that would result in different outcomes. It is difficult to gauge whether the government’s proposals will result in a legislative text that materially deviates from the current rules. It is also unclear to what extent the new Procurement Review Unit will have effective oversight powers, or enforcement powers.

The Procurement Bill, moreover, contains only the bare bones of a future regime. Secondary legislation and volumes of statutory guidance will be adopted and developed once the final legislation is in place. Given the uncertainty, the government has committed to provide at least six months’ notice of the new system. It is therefore unlikely that the new rules will be in place before mid-2023. The roll-out of the new rules will require a major training exercise, but most of the government’s training programme is directed towards the public sector. Business can expect to shoulder significant costs associated with the introduction of the new rules.

These legislative changes will not apply UK-wide. Scotland has decided to keep its own separate (EU-derived) procurement rules in place. Divergence between the rules in Scotland and those that apply in the rest of the UK is governed by the 2022 revised Common Framework for Public Procurement. The Common Framework allows for policy divergence, and has already resulted in different national procurement strategies for England, Wales and Scotland, as well as keeping in place a pre-existing policy for Northern Ireland. It is too early to judge, but different policy approaches may in the medium term fragment the UK internal market for public contracts, especially non-central government procurement.

Conclusion

The process of UK procurement reform may be the ‘perfect Brexit story’. Perceived pre-Brexit problems and dissatisfaction were largely a result of long-lasting underinvestment in public sector capacity and training and constraints that mostly derive from international treaties rather than EU law. As an EU member state, the UK could have decided to transpose EU rules other than copying them, thereby building a more comprehensive set of procurement rules that could address some of the shortcomings in the EU framework. It could have funded a better public sector training programme, implemented open procurement data standards and developed analytical dashboards, or centralised debarment decisions. It decided not to opt for any of these measures but blamed the EU for the issues that arose from that decision.

When Brexit rhetoric had to be translated into legal change, reality proved rather stubborn. International trade commitments were simply rolled over, thereby reducing any prospect of a ‘Buy British’ policy. Moreover, the ongoing reform of procurement law is likely to end up introducing more complexity, while only deviating marginally from EU standards in practice. Despite all the effort expended and resource invested, a Brexit dividend in public procurement remains elusive.

'Britannia II' abandoned. A true Brexit procurement story?

© 10 Downing Street/PA.

In May 2021, the Johnson government was ‘riding high’ after ‘getting Brexit done’ a few months back. Very much in that mood, they announced a project for a new national flagship to promote British businesses around the world. The official press release stressed that the ship would ‘be the first of its kind constructed in the UK, creating jobs and reinvigorating the shipbuilding industry’.

The news got a mixed reception, not least because of the expected cost, potentially well above £200 mn (and later on estimated at £250 mn plus £30 mn contingency). However, the possibility for it to be commissioned in the UK and for the project to act as a boost for the industry was (reluctantly) embraced by the opposition too.

Quite how it would be (legally) ensured that the ship would be constructed in the UK and that the project generated jobs to reinvigorate the UK shipbuilding industry was unclear, as the UK had already bound itself to the WTO Government Procurement Agreement (GPA). The UK’s GPA schedules of coverage clearly include tenders for ships, boats and floating structures except warships (annex 4). The UK government however planned to sidestep its international commitments by invoking a national security exemption to restrict competition to UK design and build.

The UK government was indeed trying to pass the flagship off as a defence procurement, as the Defence Secretary confirmed that the ‘capital cost of building the National Flagship will fall to the defence budget as part of the Government's wider commitment to the UK shipbuilding industry‘, and the project was led by a ‘National Flagship Taskforce’ set up within the Ministry of Defence (see eg the March 2022 National Shipbuilding Strategy, at 23). At the time, the Minister for Defence Procurement sought to justify this: ‘Under WTO there is a security exemption. The security of the vessel is incredibly key to how we think about it. Given the nature of what it will be doing, it is important that there are security ramifications around that, which is something we take very seriously. There are legitimate reasons, under WTO, why we can direct this to be a UK build, which it will be’ (Q209).

Legally, this is rather risible.

The security exemption does not relate to procurement objects that will need securing once acquired, but rather to procurement objects to be used for security purposes, or procurement objects that are crucial to security interests (eg critical infrastructure). There was no (public) evidence that the ship would meet those requirements. On the contrary, the declared (primary) role for the ship was ‘to promote British businesses around the world’, in particular by hosting trade events. This is not a defence and security use, even if the boat would of course require protecting. The Commons Defence Committee also stressed that it received ‘no evidence of the advantage to the Royal Navy of acquiring the National Flagship‘ (“We’re going to need a bigger Navy”, at [20]).

A trade dispute might well have been in the making…

Anyway. The project has now been abandoned by the Sunak government, despite the £2.5m of taxpayers’ money already spent on the “vanity project”. The trade dispute, if there was to be one, has been averted. But the ‘Britannia II’ story should serve as a reminder of why Brexit continues to be problematic in the field of procurement regulation — with some of it still permeating the proposals in the Procurement Bill and the National Procurement Policy Statement.

Other than the waste of public funds in yet another unnecessary project rather reminiscent of the ‘lost’ British Empire, the story clearly revolves around an uncashable Brexit dividend: protectionism through procurement. This was a clear goal of the reformist agenda in Brexiteer governments, but one that became simply (legally) unattainable with the UK’s accession to the GPA. And the space for a ‘mini’ Buy British procurement policy keeps reducing under the growing thicket of international trade agreements the UK is seeking to put in place.

The story also reminds us of the disregard for international law and international trade commitments of recent UK Governments, which one can only hope will now be systematically revisited and complied with by the current administration.

Registration open: TECH FIXES FOR PROCUREMENT PROBLEMS?

As previously announced, on 15 December, I will have the chance to discuss my ongoing research on procurement digitalisation with a stellar panel: Eliza Niewiadomska (EBRD), Jessica Tillipman (GW Law), and Sope Williams (Stellenbosch).

The webinar will provide an opportunity to take a hard look at the promise of tech fixes for procurement problems, focusing on key issues such as:

  • The ‘true’ potential of digital technologies in procurement.

  • The challenges arising from putting key enablers in place, such as an adequate big data architecture and access to digital skills in short supply.

  • The challenges arising from current regulatory frameworks and constraints not applicable to the private sector.

  • New challenges posed by data governance and cybersecurity risks.

The webinar will be held on December 15, 2022 at 9:00 am EST / 2:00 pm GMT / 3:00 pm CET-SAST. Full details and registration at: https://blogs.gwu.edu/law-govpro/tech-fixes-for-procurement-problems/.

Unpacking the logic behind the magic in the use of AI for anticorruption screening (re Pastor Sanz, 2022)

‘Network of public contracts, contracting bodies, and awarded companies in Spain’ in 2020 and 2021; Pastor Sanz (2022: 7).

[Note: please don’t be put off by talk of complex algorithms. The main point is precisely that we need to look past them in this area of digital governance!].

I have read a new working paper on the use of ‘blackbox algorithms’ as anti-corruption screens for public procurement: I Pastor Sanz, ‘A New Approach to Detecting Irregular Behavior in the Network Structure of Public Contracts’. The paper aims to detect corrupt practices by exploiting network relationships among participants in public contracts. The paper implements complex algorithms to support graphical analysis to cluster public contracts with the aim of identifying those at risk of corruption. The approach in the paper would create ‘risk maps’ to eg prioritise the investigation of suspected corrupt awards. Such an approach could be seen to provide a magical* solution to the very complex issue of corruption monitoring in procurement (or more generally). In this post, I unpack what is behind that magic and critically assess whether it follows a sound logic on the workings of corruption (which it really doesn’t).

The paper is technically very complex and I have to admit to not entirely understanding the specific workings of the graphical analysis algorithms. I think most people with an interest in anti-corruption in procurement would also struggle to understand it and, even data scientists (and even the author of the paper) would be unable to fully understand the reasons why any given contract award is flagged as potentially corrupt by the model, or to provide an adequate explanation. In itself, this lack of explainability would be a major obstacle to the deployment of the solution ‘in the real world’ [for discussion, see A Sanchez-Graells, ‘Procurement Corruption and Artificial Intelligence: Between the Potential of Enabling Data Architectures and the Constraints of Due Process Requirements’]. However, perhaps more interestingly, the difficulty in understanding the model creates a significant additional governance risk in itself: intellectual debt.

Intellectual debt as a fast-growing governance risk

Indeed, this type of very complex algorithmic approach creates a significant risk of intellectual debt. As clearly put by Zittrain,

‘Machine learning at its best gives us answers as succinct and impenetrable as those of a Magic 8-Ball – except they appear to be consistently right. When we accept those answers without independently trying to ascertain the theories that might animate them, we accrue intellectual debt’ (J Zittrain, ‘Intellectual Debt. With Great Power Comes Great Ignorance’, 178).

The point here is that, before relying on AI, we need to understand its workings and, more importantly, the underlying theories. In the case of AI for anti-corruption purposes, we should pay particular attention to the way corruption is conceptualised and embedded in the model.

Feeding the machine a corruption logic

In the paper, the model is developed and trained to translate ‘all the public contracts awarded in Spain in the years 2020 and 2021 into a bi-dimensional map with five different groups. These groups summarize the position of a contract in the network and their interactions with their awarded companies and public contracting bodies’ (at 14). Then, the crucial point from the perspective of a corruption logic comes in:

‘To determine the different profiles of the created groups in terms of corruption risk, news about bad practices or corruption scandals in public procurements in the same period (years 2020 and 2021) has been used as a reference. The news collection process has been manual and the 10 most important general information newspapers in Spain in terms of readership have been analyzed. Collected news about irregularities in public procurements identifies suspicions or ongoing investigations about one public contracting body and an awarded company. In these cases, all the contracts granted by the Public Administration to this company have been identified in the sample and flagged as “doubtful” contracts. The rest of the contracts, which means contracts without apparent irregularities or not uncovered yet, have been flagged as “normal” contracts. A total of 765 contracts are categorized as “doubtful”, representing 0.36% of total contracts … contracts belong to only 25 different companies, where only one company collects 508 granted contracts classified as “doubtful”’ (at 14-15, references omitted and emphasis added).

A sound logic?

This reflects a rather cavalier attitude to the absence of reliable corruption data and to difficulties in labelling datasets for that purpose [for discussion, again, see A Sanchez-Graells, ‘Procurement Corruption and Artificial Intelligence: Between the Potential of Enabling Data Architectures and the Constraints of Due Process Requirements’].

Beyond the data issue, this approach also reflects a questionable understanding of the mechanics of corruption. Even without getting into much detail, or trying to be exhaustive, it seems that this is a rather peculiar approach, perhaps rooted in a rather simplistic intuition of how tenderer-led corruption (such as bribery) could work. It seems to me to have some rather obvious shortcomings.

First, it treats companies as either entirely corrupt or not at all corrupt, whereas it seems plausible that corrupt companies will not necessarily always engage in corruption for every contract. Second, it treats the public buyer as a passive agent that ‘suffers’ the corruption and never seeks, or facilitates it. There does not seem to be any consideration to the idea that a public buyer that has been embroiled in a scandal with a given tenderer may also be suspicious of corruption more generally, and worth looking into. Third, in both cases, it treats institutions as monolithic. This is particularly problematic when it comes to treating the ‘public administration’ as a single entity, specially in an institutional context of multi-level territorial governance such as the Spanish one—with eg potentially very different propensities to corruption in different regions and in relation to different (local/not) players. Fourth, the approach is also monolithic in failing to incorporate the fact that there can be corrupt individuals within organisations and that the participation of different decision-makers in different procedures can be relevant. This can be particularly important in big, diversified companies, where a corrupt branch may have no influence on the behaviour of other branches (or even keep its corruption secret from other branches for rather obvious reasons).

If AI had been used to establish this approach to the identification of potentially corrupt procurement awards, the discussion would need to go on to scrutinise how a model was constructed to generate this hypothesis or insight (or the related dataset). However, in the paper, this approach to ‘conceptualising’ or ‘labelling corruption’ is not supported by machine learning at all, but rather depends on the manual analysis and categorisation of news pieces that are unavoidably unreliable in terms of establishing the existence of corruption, as eg the generation of the ‘scandals’ and the related news reporting is itself affected by a myriad of issues. At best, the approach would be suitable to identify the types of contracts or procurement agents most likely to attract corruption allegations and to have those reported in the media. And perhaps not even that. Of course, the labelling of ‘normal’ for contracts not having attracted such media attention is also problematic.

Final thoughts

All of this shows that we need to scrutinise ‘new approaches’ to the algorithmic detection of corruption (or any other function in procurement governance and more generally) rather carefully. This not only relates to the algorithms and the related assumptions of how socio-technical processes work, but also about the broader institutional and information setting in which they are developed (for related discussion, see here). Of course, this is in part a call for more collaboration between ‘technologists’ (such as data scientist or machine learning engineers) and domain experts. But it is also a call for all scholars and policy-makers to engage in critical assessment of logic or assumptions that can be buried in technical analysis or explanations and, as such, difficult to access. Only robust scrutiny of these issues can avoid incurring massive intellectual debt and, perhaps what could be worse, pinning our hopes of improved digital procurement governance on faulty tools.

_____________

* The reference to magic in the title and the introduction relates to Zittrain’s Magic-8 ball metaphor, but also his reference to the earlier observation by Arthur C. Clarke that any sufficiently advanced technology is indistinguishable from magic.

A hot potato? CJEU faces questions on rules applicable to cross-border procurement litigation (C-480/22)

The Court of Justice has received a very interesting preliminary reference from the Austrian Supreme Administrative Court (Verwaltungsgerichtshof) concerning international conflict of laws issues relating to cross-border public procurement involving contracting entities from different Member States (Case C-480/22, EVN Business Service and Others, hereafter the ‘EVN II’ case). The preliminary reference covers issues of judicial competence and applicable procedural law to cross-border challenges of procurement decisions.

Interestingly, the case concerns a negative conflict of jurisdiction, where neither the Bulgarian nor the (first instance) Austrian courts consider themselves competent. The case thus seems to be a bit of a hot potato—although the referring (higher) Austrian court seems interested in nipping the issue in the bud, presumably to avoid a situation of deprivation of procurement remedies that would ultimately violate EU procurement rules and general requirements of access to justice under the Charter of Fundamental Rights (though this is not explicit in the preliminary reference).

The root of the problem is that the conflict of laws dimension of the administrative review of procurement decisions involving contracting authorities from different Member States is not explicitly addressed in the 2014 Procurement Directives. Although the case concerns the interpretation of Article 57 of Directive 2014/25/EU, it is of direct relevance to the interpretation of Article 39 of Directive 2014/24/EU, as the wording of provisions is near identical (with the exception of references to contracting entities rather than contracting authorities in Art 57 Dir 2014/25/UE, and the suppression of specific public sector rules on awards under framework contracts that are not relevant to this case).

I have been interested in the regulatory gaps left by Art 39 Dir 2014/24/EU for a while. In this post, I address the first two questions posed to the CJEU, as the proposed answers would make it unnecessary to answer the third question. My analysis is based on my earlier writings on the topic: A Sanchez-Graells, ‘The Emergence of Trans-EU Collaborative Procurement: A “Living Lab” for European Public Law’ (2020) 29(1) PPLR 16-41 (hereafter Sanchez-Graells, ‘Living Lab’)); and idem, ‘Article 39 - Procurement involving contracting authorities from different Member States’ in R Caranta and A Sanchez-Graells (eds), European Public Procurement. Commentary on Directive 2014/24/EU (Edward Elgar 2021) 436-447 (hereafter Sanchez-Graells, ‘Art 39’).

The ‘EVN II’ case

Based on the facts of the preliminary reference, the legal dispute originates in a ‘public house’ environment within the Austrian EVN group. The Land of Lower Austria owns 51% of EVN AG, which in turn indirectly wholly owns both (i) EVN Business Service GmbH (‘EBS GmbH’), an Austrian central purchasing body (CPB), and (ii) Elektrorazpredelenie YUG EAD (‘EY EAD’), a Bulgarian utilities company. EBS GmbH had the task of procuring services on behalf of and for the account of EY EAD through a framework agreement on the performance of electrical installation works and related construction and dismantling works divided into 36 lots, the place of performance being located in Bulgaria.

Notably, in the invitation to tender, the Landesverwaltungsgericht Niederösterreich (Regional Administrative Court, Lower Austria) was named as the competent body for appeal proceedings/review procedures. Austrian law is stated as the law applicable to the ‘procurement procedure and all claims arising therefrom’, and Bulgarian law as the law applicable to ‘the performance of the contract’.

Two Bulgarian companies unsuccessfully submitted tenders for several lots and subsequently sought to challenge the relevant award decisions. However, those claims were dismissed by the Austrian Regional Administrative Court on grounds of lack of competence. The Court argued that a decision on whether a Bulgarian undertaking may conclude a contract with a contracting entity located in Bulgaria, which is to be performed in Bulgaria and executed in accordance with Bulgarian law, would interfere massively with Bulgaria’s sovereignty, thereby giving rise to tension with the territoriality principle under international law. Moreover, the Court argued that it is not apparent from the Austrian Federal Law on public procurement which procedural law is to be applied to the review procedure.

The case thus raises both an issue of the competence for judicial review and the applicable procedural law. The conflict of jurisdiction is negative because the Bulgarian Supreme Administrative Court confirmed the lack of competence of the Bulgarian procurement supervisory authority.

An avoidable gap in the 2014 Directives

The issue of cross-border use of CPB services is regulated by Art 57(3) Dir 2014/25/EU, which in identical terms to Art 39(3) Dir 2014/24/EU, establishes that ‘The provision of centralised purchasing activities by a central purchasing body located in another Member State shall be conducted in accordance with the national provisions of the Member State where the central purchasing body is located.’

The main contention in the case is whether Article 57(3) of Directive 2014/25 must be interpreted as covering not only the procurement procedure itself, but also the rules governing the review procedure. The argument put forward by the Bulgarian challengers is that if the CPB is required to apply Austrian law from a substantive point of view, the appeal proceedings before the Austrian review bodies must also be conducted in accordance with Austrian procedural law.

As mentioned above, conflict of laws issues are not regulated in the 2014 Procurement Directives, despite explicit rules having been included by the European Commission in the 2011 proposal for a new utilities procurement directive (COM(2011) 895 final, Art 52) and the 2011 proposal for a new public sector procurement directive (COM(2011) 896 final, Art 38). With identical wording, the proposed rule was that

Several contracting [authorities/entities] may purchase works, supplies and/or services from or through a central purchasing body located in another Member State. In that case, the procurement procedure shall be conducted in accordance with the national provisions of the Member State where the central purchasing body is located [Art 52(2)/Art 38(2) of the respective proposals].

Decisions on the award of public contracts in cross-border public procurement shall be subject to the ordinary review mechanisms available under the national law applicable [Art 52(8)/Art 38(8) of the respective proposals].

The 2011 proposals would thus have resolved the conflict of laws in favour of the jurisdiction where the CPB is based. Reference to subjection ‘to the ordinary review mechanisms available under the national law applicable’ would also have encompassed the issue of applicable procedural law. The 2011 proposals also included explicit rules on the mutual recognition and collaboration in the cross-border execution of procurement review decisions (for discussion, see Sanchez-Graells, ‘Living Lab’, 25-26).

However, the 2014 Directives omit such rules. While there are indications in the recitals that the ‘new rules on cross-border joint procurementshould determine the conditions for cross-border utilisation of central purchasing bodies and designate the applicable public procurement legislation, including the applicable legislation on remedies’ (rec (82) Dir 2014/25/EU and, identically, rec (73) Dir 2014/24/EU), this is not reflected in the provisions of the Directives. While the position in the recitals could be seen as interpretive guide to the effect that the system of conflict of laws rules implicit in the Directives is unitary and the location of the CPB is determinative of the jurisdiction and applicable law for the review of its procurement decisions, this is not necessarily a definitive argument as the CJEU has made clear that recitals may be insufficient to create rules [see C-215/88, Casa Fleischhandel v BALM, EU:C:1989:331, para 31; Sanchez-Graells, ‘Art 39’, para 39.26. For discussion, see S Treumer and E Werlauff, ‘The leverage principle: Secondary Community law as a lever for the development of primary Community law’ (2003) 28(1) European Law Review 124-133].

Questions before the CJEU — and proposed answers

Given the lack of explicit solution in the 2014 Procurement Directives, the CJEU now faces two relevant questions in the EVN II case. The first question concerns the scope of the rules on the provision of cross-border CPB services, which is slightly complicated by the ‘public house’ background of the case. The second question concerns whether the rules subjecting such procurement to the law of the CPB extend to both the legislation applicable to review procedures and the competence of the review body.

Question 1 - contracting authorities/entities from different Member States

In the EVN II case, the CJEU is first asked to establish whether Art 57(3) Dir 2014/25/EU (and, implicitly Art 39(3) Dir 2014/24/EU) should be interpreted as meaning that the provision of centralised purchasing activities by a CPB located in another Member State exists where the contracting entity – irrespective of the question as to the attribution of the control exercised over that contracting entity – is located in a Member State other than that of the CPB. The issue of attribution of control arises from the fact that, in the case at hand, the ‘client’ Bulgarian contracting entity is financially controlled by an Austrian regional authority—which, incidentally, also controls the CPB providing the centralised purchasing services. This raises the question whether the client entity is ‘truly’ foreign, or whether it needs to be reclassified as Austrian on the basis of the financial control.

While I see the logic of the question in terms of the formal applicability of the Directive, from a functional perspective, the question does not make much sense and an answer other than yes would create significant complications.

The question does not make much sense because the aim of the rule in Art 57(3) does not gravitate on the first part of the article: ‘The provision of centralised purchasing activities by a central purchasing body located in another Member State shall be conducted in accordance with the national provisions of the Member State where the central purchasing body is located.’ Rather, the relevance of the rule is in the extension of the law of the CPB to ‘(a) the award of a contract under a dynamic purchasing system; [and] (b) the conduct of a reopening of competition under a framework agreement’ by the ‘client’ (foreign) contracting authority or entity. The purpose of Art 57(3) Dir 2014/25/EU is thus the avoidance of potentially conflicting rules in the creation of cross-border CPB procurement vehicles and in the call-offs from within those vehicles (Sanchez-Graells, ‘Art 39’, paras 39.13-39.15).

Functionally, then, the logic of the entirety of Art 57(3) (and Art 39(3)) rests on the avoidance of a risk of conflicting procurement rules applicable to the cross-border use of CPB services, presumably for the benefit of participating economic operators, as well as in search of broader consistency of the substantive legal framework. Either such a risk exists, because the ‘client’ contracting entity or authority would otherwise be subjected to a different procurement legislation than that applicable to the CPB, or it doesn’t. That is in my view the crucial functional aspect.

If this approach is correct, the issue of (potential) Austrian control over the Bulgarian contracting entity is irrelevant, as the crucial issue is whether it is generally subjected to Bulgarian utilities procurement law or not when conducting covered procurement. There is no information in the preliminary reference, but I would assume it is. Primarily because of the formal criteria determining subjection to the domestic implementation of the EU Directives, which tends to be (implicitly) based on the place of location of the relevant entity or authority.

More fundamentally, if this approach is correct, the impingement on Bulgarian sovereignty feared by the Austrian first instance court is a result of EU procurement law. There is no question that the 2014 Directives generate the legal effect that contracting authorities of a given Member State (A) are bound to comply with the procurement legislation of a different Member State (B) when they resort to the services of that State (B) CPB and then implement their own call-off procedures, potentially leading to the award of a contract to an undertaking in their own Member State (A). This potentially puts the legislation of State B in the position of determining whether an undertaking of State A may conclude a contract with a contracting entity located in State A, which is to be performed in State A and executed in accordance with the law of State A. It is thus not easily tenable under EU law that this represents a massive interference with State A’s sovereignty—unless one is willing to challenge the EU’s legal competence for the adoption of the 2014 Directives (see Sanchez-Graells, ‘Living Lab’, 31-33).

A further functional consideration is that the cross-border provision of CPB services does not need to be limited to a two-country setting. If the CPB of country B is eg creating a framework agreement that can be used by contracting authorities and entities from countries A, C, D, and E, the applicability of Art 57(3) Dir 2014/25/EU (and Art 39(3) Dir 2014/24/EU) could not vary for entities from those different countries, or from within a country, depending on a case-by-case analysis of the location of the entities controlling the ‘client’ authorities and entities. In other words, Art 57(3) Dir 2014/25/EU (and Art 39(3) Dir 2014/24/EU) cannot reasonably be of variable application within a single procurement.

Taking the facts of the EVN II case, imagine that in addition to EY EAD, other Bulgarian utilities were also able to draw from the (same lots of the) framework agreement put in place by EBS GmbH. How could it be that Art 57(3) controlled the procurement for the ‘clearly’ Bulgarian utilities, whereas it may not be applicable for the Bulgarian utility controlled by an Austrian authority?

In my view, all of this provides convincing argumentation for the CJEU to answer the first question by clarifying that, from a functional perspective, the need to create a unitary legal regime applicable to procurement tenders led by CPBs where there is a risk of conflicting substantive procurement rules requires interpreting Art 57(3) Dir 2014/25/EU (and Art 39(3) Dir 2014/24/EU) as applicable where the location of ‘client’ contracting authorities or entities is in one or more Member States other than that where the CPB is itself located.

Question 2 - presumption of jurisdiction and applicable law

The second question put to the CJEU builds on the applicability of Art 57(3) Dir 2014/25/EU and asks whether its ‘conflict-of-law rule … according to which the “provision of centralised purchasing activities” by a [CPB] located in another Member State is to be conducted in accordance with the national provisions of the Member State where the [CPB] is located, also cover[s] both the legislation applicable to review procedures and the competence of the review body’. Other than on the basis of the interpretive guide included in the recitals of Dir 2014/25/EU (and Dir 2014/24/EU) as above, I think there are good reasons to answer this question in the affirmative.

The first line of arguments is systematic and considers the treatment of conflict of laws situations within Art 57 Dir 2014/25/EU (and 39 Dir 2014/24/EU; see Sanchez-Graells, ‘Living Lab’, 21-24). In that regard, while there is a hard conflict of laws rule in Art 57(3) (and 39(3)) that selects the law of the CPB to the entirety of the procurement procedure, including ‘foreign’ call-offs, the situation is very different in the remainder of the provision. Indeed, when it comes to occasional cross-border joint procurement, in the absence of a binding international agreement, the choice of the applicable substantive procurement legislation is left to the agreement of the participating contracting authorities or entities (Art 57(4) Dir 2014/25/EU, and Art 39(4) Dir 2014/24/EU). Similarly, where the cross-border procurement is carried out through a joint entity, including European Groupings of territorial cooperation, the participating contracting authorities have a choice between the law of the Member State where the joint entity has its registered office, or that of the Member State where the joint entity is carrying out its activities (Art 57(5) Dir 2014/25/EU, and Art 39(5) Dir 2014/24/EU). This indicates that the choice of law rule applicable to the cross-border provision of CPB services leaves much less space (indeed, no space) to the application of a substantive procurement law other than that of the CPB. An extension of this argument supports answering the question in the affirmative and extending the choice of law rule to both the legislation applicable to review procedures and the competence of the review body.

A second line of argument concerns the effectiveness of the available procurement remedies. Such effectiveness would, on the one hand, be increased by a reduced judicial burden of considering foreign procurement law where the location of the CPB determines jurisdiction and procedural applicable law, which can also be expected to be coordinated with substantive procurement law. On the other hand, answering the question in the affirmative would require economic operators to challenge decisions concerning potential contracts with a domestic contracting authority or entity in a foreign court. However, given that the substantive rules are those of the foreign jurisdiction and that they were expected to tender (or tendered) in that jurisdiction, the effect may be relatively limited where the CPB decisions are being challenged—as compared to a challenge of the call-off decision carried out by their domestic contracting authority or entity, but subject to foreign procurement law. In my view, the last set of circumstances is very unlikely, as the applicability of the ‘foreign’ law of the CPB generates a very strong incentive for the CPBs to also carry out the call-off phase on behalf of the client authority or entity (Sanchez-Graells, ‘Art 39’, 39.14).

Overall, in my view, the CJEU should answer the second question by clarifying that the reference to the national provisions of the Member State where the CPB is located in Art Art 57(3) Dir 2014/25/EU (and 39(3) Dir 2014/24/EU, also covers both the legislation applicable to review procedures and the competence of the review body.

Some further thoughts

Beyond the specific issues before the CJEU, the EVN II case raises broader concerns around the flexible contractualised approach (not to say the absence of an approach) to conflict of laws issues in the 2014 Procurement Directives—which leave significant leeway to participating contracting authorities and entities to craft the applicable legal regime.

While the situation can be relatively easy to sort out with an expansive interpretation of Art 57(3) Dir 2014/25/EU and Art 39(3) Dir 2014/24/EU in the relatively simple case of the cross-border provision of CPB services (as above), these issues will be much more complex in other types of procurement involving contracting authorities from (multiple) different Member States. The approach followed by the first instance Austrian court in EVN II seems to me reflective of more generalised judicial approaches and attitudes towards unregulated conflict of laws situations where they can be reluctant to simply abide by whatever is published in the relevant procurement notices—as was the case in EVN II, where the invitation to tender was explicit about allocation of jurisdiction and selection of applicable procedural law and, that notwithstanding, the first instance court found issues on both grounds.

This can potentially be a major blow to the ‘contractualised’ approach underpinning the 2014 Procurement Directives, especially where situations arise that require domestic courts of a Member State to make decisions imposing liability on contracting authorities of another Member State, and the subsequent need to enforce that decision. The issue of the conflict of laws dimension of the administrative review of procurement decisions involving contracting authorities from different Member States will thus not be entirely addressed by the Judgement of the CJEU in EVN II, although the CJEU could hint at potential solutions, depending on how much it decided to rely on the 2011 proposals as a steppingstone towards an expansive interpretation of the current provisions—which is by no means guaranteed, as the suppression of explicit rules could as easily be interpreted as a presumption or as a rejection of those rules by the CJEU.

It seems clearer than ever that the procurement remedies Directives need to be reformed to create a workable and transparent system of conflict of laws dimension of the administrative review of procurement decisions involving contracting authorities from different Member States, as well as explicit rules on cross-border enforcement of those decisions (Sanchez-Graells, ‘Living Lab’, 39-40).