Did you use AI to write this tender? What? Just asking! -- Also, how will you use AI to deliver this contract?

The UK’s Cabinet Office has published procurement policy note 2/24 on ‘Improving Transparency of AI use in Procurement’ (the ‘AI PPN’) because ‘AI systems, tools and products are part of a rapidly growing and evolving market, and as such, there may be increased risks associated with their adoption … [and therefore] it is essential to take steps to identify and manage associated risks and opportunities, as part of the Government’s commercial activities’.

The crucial risk the AI PPN seems to be concerned with relates to generative AI ‘hallucinations’, as it includes background information highlighting that:

‘Content created with the support of Large Language Models (LLMs) may include inaccurate or misleading statements; where statements, facts or references appear plausible, but are in fact false. LLMs are trained to predict a “statistically plausible” string of text, however statistical plausibility does not necessarily mean that the statements are factually accurate. As LLMs do not have a contextual understanding of the question they are being asked, or the answer they are proposing, they are unable to identify or correct any errors they make in their response. Care must be taken both in the use of LLMs, and in assessing returns that have used LLMs, in the form of additional due diligence.’

The PPN has the main advantage of trying to tackle the challenge of generative AI in procurement head on. It can help raise awareness in case someone was not yet talking about this and, more seriously, it includes an Annex A that brings together the several different bits of guidance issued by the UK government to date. However, the AI PPN does not elaborate on any of that guidance and is thus as limited as the Guidelines for AI procurement (see here), relatively complicated in that it points to rather different types of guidance ranging from ethics, to legal, to practical considerations, and requires significant knowledge and expertise to be operationalised (see here). Perhaps the best evidence of the complexity of the mushrooming sets of guidance is that the PPN itself includes in Annex A a reference to the January 2024 Guidance to civil servants on use of generative AI, which has been superseded by the Generative AI Framework for HMG, to which it also refers in Annex A. In other words, the AI PPN is not a ‘plug-and-play’ document setting out how to go about dealing with AI hallucinations and other risks in procurement. And given the pace of change in this area, it is also bound to be a PPN that requires multiple revisions and adaptations going forward.

A screenshot showing that the January guidance on generative AI use has been superseded (taken on 26 March 2024 10:20am).

More generally, the AI PPN is bound to be controversial and has already spurred insightful discussion on LinkedIn. I would recommend the posts by Kieran McGaughey and Ian Makgill. I offer some additional thoughts here and look forward to continuing the conversation.

In my view, one of the potential issues arising from the AI PPN is that it aims to cover quite a few different aspects of AI in procurement, as well as neglecting others. Slightly simplifying, there are three broad areas of AI-procurement interaction. First, there is the issue of buying AI-based solutions or services. Second, there is the issue of tenderers using (generative) AI to write or design their tenders. Third, there is the issue of the use of AI by contracting authorities, eg in relation to qualitative selection/exclusion, or evaluation/award decisions. The AI PPN covers aspects of . However, it is not clear to me that these can be treated together, as they pose significantly different policy issues. I will try to disentangle them here.

Buying and using AI

Although it mainly cross-refers to the Guidelines for AI procurement, the AI PPN includes some content relevant to the procurement and use of AI when it stresses that ‘Commercial teams should take note of existing guidance when purchasing AI services, however they should also be aware that AI and Machine Learning is becoming increasingly prevalent in the delivery of “non-AI” services. Where AI is likely to be used in the delivery of a service, commercial teams may wish to require suppliers to declare this, and provide further details. This will enable commercial teams to consider any additional due diligence or contractual amendments to manage the impact of AI as part of the service delivery.’ This is an adequate and potentially helpful warning. However, as discussed below, the PPN suggests a way to go about it that is in my view wrong and potentially very problematic.

AI-generated tenders

The AI PPN is however mostly concerned with the use of AI for tender generation. It recognises that there ‘are potential benefits to suppliers using AI to develop their bids, enabling them to bid for a greater number of public contracts. It is important to note that suppliers’ use of AI is not prohibited during the commercial process but steps should be taken to understand the risks associated with the use of AI tools in this context, as would be the case if a bid writer has been used by the bidder.’ It indicates some potential steps contracting authorities can take, such as:

  • ‘Asking suppliers to disclose their use of AI in the creation of their tender.’

  • ‘Undertaking appropriate and proportionate due diligence:

    • If suppliers use AI tools to create tender responses, additional due diligence may be required to ensure suppliers have the appropriate capacity and capability to fulfil the requirements of the contract. Such due diligence should be proportionate to any additional specific risk posed by the use of AI, and could include site visits, clarification questions or supplier presentations.

    • Additional due diligence should help to establish the accuracy, robustness and credibility of suppliers’ tenders through the use of clarifications or requesting additional supporting documentation in the same way contracting authorities would approach any uncertainty or ambiguity in tenders.’

  • ‘Potentially allowing more time in the procurement to allow for due diligence and an increase in volumes of responses.’

  • ‘Closer alignment with internal customers and delivery teams to bring greater expertise on the implications and benefits of AI, relative to the subject matter of the contract.’

In my view, there are a few problematic aspects here. While the AI PPN seems to try not to single out the use of generative AI as potentially problematic by equating it to the possible use of (human) bid writers, this is unconvincing. First, because there is (to my knowledge) no guidance whatsoever on an assessment of whether bid writers have been used, and because the AI PPN itself does not require disclosure of the engagement of bid writers (o puts any thought on the fact that third-party bid writers ma have used AI without this being known to the hiring tenderer, which would then require an extension of the disclosure of AI use further down the tender generation chain). Second, because the approach taken in the AI PP seems to point at potential problems with the use of (external, third-party) bid writers, whereas it does not seem to object to the use of (in-house) bid writers, potentially by much larger economic operators, which seems to presumptively not generate issues. Third, and most importantly, because it shows that perhaps not enough has been done so far to tackle the potential deceit or provision of misleading information in tenders if contracting authorities must now start thinking about how to get expert-based analysis of tenders, or develop fact-checking mechanisms to ensure bids are truthful. You would have thought that regardless of the origin of a tender, contracting authorities should be able to check their content to an adequate level of due diligence already.

In any case, the biggest issue with the AI PPN is how it suggests contracting authorities should deal with this issue, as discussed below.

AI-based assessments

The AI PPN also suggests that contracting authorities should be ‘Planning for a general increase in activity as suppliers may use AI to streamline or automate their processes and improve their bid writing capability and capacity leading to an increase in clarification questions and tender responses.’ One of the possibilities could be for contracting authorities to ‘fight fire with fire’ and also deploy generative AI (eg to make summaries, to scan for errors, etc). Interestingly, though, the AI PPN does not directly refer to the potential use of (generative) AI by contracting authorities.

While it includes a reference in Annex A to the Generative AI framework for HM Government, that document does not specifically address the use of generative AI to manage procurement processes (and what it says about buying generative AI is redundant given the other guidance in the Annex). In my view, the generative AI framework pushes strongly against the use of AI in procurement when it identifies a series of use cases to avoid (page 18) that include contexts where high-accuracy and high-explainability are required. If this is the government’s (justified) view, then the AI PPN has been a missed opportunity to say this more clearly and directly.

The broader issue of confidential, classified or proprietary information

Both in relation to the procurement and use of AI, and the use of AI for tender generation, the AI PPN stresses that it may be necessary:

  • ‘Putting in place proportionate controls to ensure bidders do not use confidential contracting authority information, or information not already in the public domain as training data for AI systems e.g. using confidential Government tender documents to train AI or Large Language Models to create future tender responses.‘; and that

  • ‘In certain procurements where there are national security concerns in relation to use of AI by suppliers, there may be additional considerations and risk mitigations that are required. In such instances, commercial teams should engage with their Information Assurance and Security colleagues, before launching the procurement, to ensure proportionate risk mitigations are implemented.’

These are issues that can easily exceed the technical capabilities of most contracting authorities. It is very hard to know what data has been used to train a model and economic operators using ‘off-the-shelf’ generative AI solutions will hardly be in a position to assess themselves, or provide any meaningful information, to contracting authorities. While there can be contractual constraints on the use of information and data generated under a given contract, it is much more challenging to assess whether information and data has been inappropriately used at a different link of increasingly complex digital supply chains. And, in any case, this is not only an issue for future contracts. Data and information generated under contracts already in place may not be subject to adequate data governance frameworks. It would seem that a more muscular approach to auditing data governance issues may be required, and that this should not be devolved to the procurement function.

How to deal with it? — or where the PPN goes wrong

The biggest weakness in the AI PPN is in how it suggests contracting authorities should deal with the issue of generative AI. In my view, it gets it wrong in two different ways. First, by asking for too much non-scored information where contracting authorities are unlikely to be able to act on it without breaching procurement and good administration principles. Second, by asking for too little non-scored information that contracting authorities are under a duty to score.

Too much information

The AI PPN includes two potential (alternative) disclosure questions in relation to the use of generative AI in tender writing (see below Q1 and Q2).

I think these questions miss the mark and expose contracting authorities to risks of challenge on grounds of a potential breach of the principle of equal treatment and the duty of good administration. The potential breach of the duty of good administration could be on grounds that the contracting authority is taking irrelevant information into account in the assessment of the relevant tender. The potential breach of equal treatment could come if tenders with some AI-generated elements were subjected to significantly more scrutiny than tenders where no AI was used. Contracting authorities should subject all tenders to the same level of due diligence and scrutiny because, at the bottom of it, there is no reason to ‘take a tenderer at its word’ when no AI is used. That is the entire logic of the exclusion, qualitative selection and evaluation processes.

Crucially, though, what the questions seem to really seek to ascertain is that the tenderer has checked for and confirms the accuracy of the content of the tender and thus makes the content its own and takes responsibility for it. This could be checked generally by asking all tenderers to confirm that the content of their tenders is correct and a true reflection of their capabilities and intended contractual delivery, reminding them that contracting authorities have tools to sanction economic operators that have ‘negligently provided misleading information that may have a material influence on decisions concerning exclusion, selection or award’ (reg.57(8)(i)(ii) PCR2015 and sch.7 13(2)(b) PA2023). And then enforcing them!

Checking the ‘authenticity’ of tenders when in fact contracting authorities are meant to check their truthfulness, accuracy and deliverability would be a false substitution of the relevant duties. It would also potentially eschew the incentives to disclose use of AI generation (lest contracting authorities find a reliable way of identifying it themselves and start applying the exclusion grounds above)—as thoroughly discussed in the LinkedIn posts referred to above.

too little information

Conversely, the PPN takes too soft and potentially confusing an approach to the use of AI to deliver the contract. The proposed disclosure question (Q3) is very problematic. It presents as ‘for information only’ a request for information on the use of AI or machine learning in the context of the actual delivery of the contract. This is information that will either relate to the technical specifications, award criteria or performance clauses (or all of them) and there is no meaningful way in which AI could be used to deliver the contract without this having an impact on the assessment and evaluation of the tender. The question is potentially misleading not only because of the indication that the information would not be scored, but also because it suggests that the use of AI in the delivery of a service or product is within the discretion of the tenderers. In my view, this would only be possible if the technical specifications were rather loosely written in performance terms, which would then require a very thorough description and assessment of how that performance is to be achieved. Moreover, the use of AI would probably require a set of organisational arrangements that should also not go unnoticed or unchecked in the procurement process. Moreover, one of the main challenges may not be in the use of AI in new contracts (were tenderers are likely to highlight it to stress the advantages, or to justify that their tenders are not abnormally low in comparison with delivery through ‘manual’ solutions), but in relation to pre-existing contracts. It also seems that a broader policy, recommendation and audit of the use of generative AI for the delivery of existing contracts and its treatment as a (permissible??) contract modification would have been needed.

Final thought

The AI PPN is an interesting development and will help crystallise many discussions that were somehow hovering in the background. However, a significant rethink is needed and, in my view, much more detailed guidance is needed in relation to the different dimensions of the interaction between AI and procurement. There are important questions that remain unaddressed and, in my view, one of the most pressing ones concerns the balance between general regulation and the use of procurement to regulate AI use. While the UK government remains committed to its ‘pro-innovation’ approach and no general regulation of AI use is put in place, in particular in relation to public sector AI use, procurement will continue to struggle and fail to act as a regulator of the technology.

The principle of competition is dead. Long live the principle of competition (recording)

Here is the recording for the first part of today’s seminar ‘The principle of competition is dead. Long live the principle of competition’, with renewed thanks to Roberto Caranta, Trygve Harlem Losnedahl and Dagne Sabockis for sharing their great insights. A transcript is available here, as well as the slides I used. As always, comments welcome and more than happy to continue the discussion!

Transposing Directives no longer so discretionary! The Court of Justice forces transposition of discretionary exclusion grounds and hints at ‘intra-State’ vertical direct effect (C‑66/22)

** This comment was first published as an Op-Ed for EU Law Live on 8 December 2022 (see formatted version). I am reposting it here in case of broader interest. **

On the face of it, in Infraestruturas de Portugal and Futrifer Indústrias Ferroviárias (C-66/22), the Court of Justice had to assess whether Member States can limit the exclusion of competition law violators from participation in tenders for public contracts to cases where the national competition authority has previously imposed such debarment as an ancillary penalty. While this is a plausible transposition approach that seeks to centralise competition law analysis under the control of the specialist administrative authority, it can also reduce the effectiveness of procurement mechanisms seeking to preserve (much needed) competition for public contracts. It is thus fair enough to test the boundaries of the discretion that contracting authorities can retain in this context. However, in Infraestruturas, the Court of Justice did two other things that are potentially significant beyond the narrower field of procurement governance. First, the Court reversed its previous case law and established that Member States are (no longer) allowed not to transpose discretionary exclusion grounds. This says something (but I am not too sure what) about the more general level of discretion that Member States retain in the transposition of (prescriptively worded) Directives into their national systems under Art 288 TFEU. Second, the Court furthered a line of reasoning that comes to assign ‘individual rights’ to contracting authorities—that is, entities within the public sector—in what could seem like the creation of an ‘intra-State’ modality of vertical direct effect. In this Op-Ed, I try to make some sense of these two developments and leave aside for now the details of the interpretation of the specific grounds for the exclusion of economic operators under Directive 2014/24/EU.

No longer discretionary to transpose discretionary exclusion grounds

It is trite EU law that, under Art 288 TFEU, Member States retain discretion in the choice of form and methods for the transposition of a Directive. While Directives can be prescriptive about their aims and goals and, sometimes, about specific modes of protection of the relevant legal interest, there seems to be a (theoretical) agreement that Directives still (must) leave a margin of discretion to Member States—else, they surreptitiously shapeshift into Regulations. Such discretion would seem to cover in particular those elements of a Directive that are explicitly labelled as discretionary. This ‘orthodoxy’ seemed to be straightforwardly applied by the Court of Justice in the analysis of the constraints on the transposition of the Public Procurement Directive 2014/24.

The Public Procurement Directive contains a set of rules on the exclusion from tenders for public contracts of economic operators that have fallen short of their legal obligations. In Art. 57, in addition to setting rules applicable to all exclusion decisions, the Directive distinguishes between, on the one hand, mandatory exclusion grounds that require contracting authorities to exclude economic operators convicted by final judgment for one of a series of breaches (Art. 57(1)) and, on the other hand, discretionary exclusion grounds that allow contracting authorities to exclude the affected economic operators (Art. 57(4)). Member States are explicitly allowed to turn discretionary exclusion grounds mandatory under their transposing legislation. Conversely, until now, the Court had been clear that Member States were allowed not to transpose discretionary exclusion grounds. So far, so good.

In Infraestruturas, however, the Court of Justice U-turned. It stated that:

… the first subparagraph of Article 57(4) of Directive 2014/24 … states that ‘contracting authorities may exclude or may be required by Member States to exclude any economic operator from participation in a procurement procedure’ in any of the situations referred to in points (a) to (i) of that provision.

In that connection, it admittedly follows from certain judgments of the Court … that the Member States can decide whether or not to transpose the facultative grounds for exclusion referred to in that provision. The Court has in fact held that … the Member States are free not to apply the facultative grounds for exclusion set out in that directive or to incorporate them into national law with varying degrees of rigour according to legal, economic or social considerations prevailing at national level (see, to that effect, judgments of 19 June 2019, Meca, C‑41/18, EU:C:2019:507, paragraph 33; of 30 January 2020, Tim, C‑395/18, EU:C:2020:58, paragraphs 34 and 40; and of 3 June 2021, Rad Service and Others, C‑210/20, EU:C:2021:445, paragraph 28).

However, an analysis of the wording of the first subparagraph of Article 57(4) of Directive 2014/24, the context into which that provision fits, and the aim that the latter pursues within the framework of that directive, shows that contrary to what is apparent from those judgments, the Member States are under the obligation to transpose that provision into their national law (C-66/22, paras. 48-50, emphases added).

In my view, this U-turn challenges the ‘orthodoxy’ to the extent that the Court subjects the margin of discretion left to the Member States by the EU legislators to the Court’s assessment of whether what is clearly labelled as discretionary—and was as such treated in earlier case law—is permissibly left to the discretion of the Member States in view of the aims of the Directive. I think that this introduces a potentially tricky line of challenge of the content of EU Directives on the grounds that the EU legislators could not have left to the Member States’ discretion specific aspects of their content without undermining the goals of the Directive itself. This can ultimately constrain the upstream discretion in the choice of legal instrument under Art 288 TFEU by the EU legislators themselves, and further erode the distinction between Regulations and Directives if the content of the Directives can in fact eventually be binding in their entirety and directly applicable in all Member States. Further, this U-turn is based on a rather peculiar interpretation of the wording of the Public Procurement Directive that comes to assign ‘individual rights’ to the public sector. Given this peculiarity, I am not too sure whether the deviation from the orthodoxy in Infraestruturas indicates a significant shift by the Court of Justice or ‘just’ an exception or oddity that may confirm the general rule.

‘Intra-State’ vertical direct effect?

In justifying its U-turn, the Court of Justice stresses that, under Art. 57(4) of the Public Procurement Directive:

the choice as to the decision whether or not to exclude an economic operator from a public procurement procedure on one of the grounds set out in that provision falls to the contracting authority, unless the Member States decide to transform that option to exclude into an obligation to do so. Accordingly, the Member States must transpose that provision either by allowing or by requiring contracting authorities to apply the exclusion grounds laid down by the latter provision. … a Member State cannot omit those grounds from its national legislation transposing Directive 2014/24 and thus deprive contracting authorities of the possibility – which must, at the very least, be conferred on them by virtue of that provision – of applying those grounds.

… it should be noted that recital 101 of that directive states that ‘contracting authorities should … be given the possibility to exclude economic operators which have proven unreliable’. That recital thus confirms that a Member State must transpose that provision in order not to deprive contracting authorities of the possibility referred to in the preceding paragraph and that recital.

Lastly, as to the objective pursued by Directive 2014/24 in so far as concerns the facultative grounds for exclusion, the Court has acknowledged that that objective is reflected in the emphasis placed on the powers of contracting authorities. Thus the EU legislature intended to confer on the contracting authority, and on it alone, the task of assessing whether a candidate or tenderer must be excluded from a procurement procedure during the stage of selecting the tenderers (see, to that effect, judgments of 19 June 2019, Meca, C‑41/18, EU:C:2019:507, paragraph 34, and of 3 October 2019, Delta Antrepriză de Construcţii şi Montaj 93, C‑267/18, EU:C:2019:826, paragraph 25).

The option, or indeed obligation, for the contracting authority to apply the exclusion grounds set out in the first subparagraph of Article 57(4) of Directive 2014/24 is specifically intended to enable it to assess the integrity and reliability of each of the economic operators participating in a public procurement procedure.

The EU legislature thus intended to ensure that contracting authorities have, in all Member States, the possibility of excluding economic operators who are regarded as unreliable by those authorities (C-66/22, paras. 51-52 and 55-57, emphases added).

Even if not altogether new—see Meca (C-41/18) and Delta (C-267/18)—I find this line of reasoning puzzling. The way the Court of Justice has interpreted Art. 57(4) of the Public Procurement Directive equates to an ‘individual right’ for contracting authorities not to contract with economic operators they deem unreliable and, crucially, this is an ‘individual right’ that Member States cannot deprive them from. The protection of such right implies an ‘intra-State’ modality of vertical direct effect—at least to the extent that, after Infraestruturas, a contracting authority of any Member State with centralised exclusion decision-making can challenge any constraints on its administrative discretion and simply set aside the domestic rules and directly rely on the Directive to proceed to exclusion on the basis of discretionary grounds.

To my mind, this line of reasoning extracts the wrong implications from the wording of the Directive because of the quasi-anthropomorphism of contracting authorities. Given that the Directive conceptualises contracting authorities as the relevant unit of decision-making, references to contracting authorities should be seen as references to decisions within a procurement procedure, not as references to agents that derive rights independently from—or even against—the structure of the State into which they are embedded. In the end, contracting authorities are defined as ‘the State, regional or local authorities, bodies governed by public law or associations formed by one or more such authorities or one or more such bodies governed by public law’ (Art. 2(1)(1) Directive 2014/24). A functional interpretation of the wording of Article 57(4) of the Public Procurement Directive would recognise that the meaning of ‘contracting authorities may exclude or may be required by Member States to exclude’ is that ‘in a covered procurement procedure, it is permissible to exclude, and it can be made mandatory to exclude’—which would then straightforwardly follow the orthodoxy in allowing Member States to exercise the discretion on the form and method of transposition of that possibility.

I submit that the Court of Justice has followed a line of reasoning that is also problematic in relation to other provisions of the Public Procurement Directive, in particular in relation to the potential effects it could have in ‘empowering’ contracting authorities to take courses of action (eg international collaboration) that could imply domestic ultra vires.

Final thoughts

What I find most confusing in this part of the Infraestruturas Judgment is that the Court could have found much less disruptive and confusing ways to reach the same conclusion. For example, it could have found that, in empowering the national competition authority to make decisions on the exclusion of tenderers through the imposition of ancillary penalties, Portugal had decided to transpose the relevant discretionary exclusion ground, but done so incorrectly or defectively by simultaneously transposing the ground but limiting the discretion of the contracting authority. I would still find issue with that approach, but at least it would be easier to reconcile with important parts of the orthodoxy of fundamental aspects of EU law.

Will the ECJ mandate protectionism in procurement -- comments on AG Collins' Kolin Opinion (C-652/22)

In the Opinion in Kolin Inşaat Turizm Sanayi ve Ticaret (C-652/22, EU:C:2024:212, hereafter ‘Kolin’), Advocate General Collins has argued that only economic operators established in countries party to international agreements on public contracts that bind the EU may rely on the provisions of Directive 2014/25/EU. This would imply that economic operators established in other countries are not entitled to participate in a public contract award procedure governed by Directive 2014/25/EU and, consequently, are unable to rely on the provisions of that Directive before Member State courts. In my view, this interpretation is both protectionist and problematic. The ECJ should not follow it. In this blog I sketch the reasons for this view.

Limited (international law) obligation of equal treatment does not imply a general (EU) obligation to exclude or discriminate

The Kolin Opinion concerns the interpretation of Art 43 of Directive 2014/25/EU, which could be relevant to the interpretation of Art 25 of Directive 2014/24/EU (on which see A La Chimia, ‘Article 25’ in R Caranta and A Sanchez-Graells (eds), European Public Procurement. Commentary on Directive 2014/24/EU (Edward Elgar 2021) 274-286. Art 43 of Dir 2014/25/EU establishes that:

In so far as they are covered by Annexes 3, 4 and 5 and the General Notes to the European Union’s Appendix I to the GPA and by the other international agreements by which the Union is bound, contracting entities within the meaning of Article 4(1)(a) shall accord to the works, supplies, services and economic operators of the signatories to those agreements treatment no less favourable than the treatment accorded to the works, supplies, services and economic operators of the Union.

AG Collins considers that

It follows that economic operators from non-covered third-countries do not fall within the scope ratione personae of Directive 2014/25 ... Since the applicant is not entitled to participate in a procedure for the award of a public contract governed by Directive 2014/25, it cannot seek to rely on the provisions thereof before a Member State court. The referring court therefore cannot obtain a response to a reference for a preliminary ruling on the interpretation of those provisions, since any answer that the Court might give to its request would not have binding effect. That reason suffices to justify a finding that this reference for a preliminary ruling is inadmissible (para 33, emphases added).

This position implies a logical jump in the reasoning. While it is plain that only economic operators from covered third-countries have a legally enforceable right to participate in public tenders on equal terms, it is by no means clear that other economic operators must necessarily be excluded from participation. If that was the plain interpretation and implication of that provision (and Art 25 Dir 2014/24/EU), the Commission would not have needed to develop the International Procurement Instrument (IPI) to establish circumstances in which exclusion of economic operators from non-covered third countries can be mandated. Along the same lines, AG Rantos argued in the Opinion in CRRC Qingdao Sifang and Others (C-266/22, EU:C:2023:399, not available in English) that ‘Member States can grant less favourable treatment to economic operators from non-covered third parties’ (para 65, own translation from Spanish).

In fact, as the Opinion reflects, ‘[a]lmost all of the parties to the procedure before the Court take the view that Member States may regulate the participation of economic operators from third-countries in procedures for the award of public contracts’ (para 35). In particular, the Croatian government submitted ‘that EU law contains no general prohibition on the participation of economic operators from third-countries in procedures for the award of public contracts in the European Union’ and provided sound arguments in support of that, as the ‘Commission’s Guidance on the participation of third-country bidders confirms that proposition where it states that economic operators from third-countries may be excluded from these procedures, without requiring their exclusion’ (para 36). Those arguments are also aligned with AG Rantos’ CRRC Opinion (paras 72-74). Estonia also submitted there is no obligation under EU law to limit participation by economic operators from non-covered third parties (para 38). Denmark, France, and Austria also considered that there is no ban stemming from EU law, even if the Union has exclusive competence in relation to the common commercial policy (paras 39-40). This should have given the AG pause.

Instead, as suggested by the Commission, AG Collins seeks to support the Opinion’s logical jump in an additional legal argument based on the remit of the EU’s competence to regulate the participation of economic operators from third-countries in procurement procedures in the European Union. The key issue here is not whether the EU has an exclusive or a shared competence in procurement, but that AG Collins considers that

by adopting Article 43 of Directive 2014/25, the European Union has exercised its competence in relation to economic operators established in a country party to the GPA or to another international agreement on the award of public contracts by which the European Union is bound. … economic operators established in Türkiye do not come within that category. Although the European Union has not exercised its exclusive competence to establish whether economic operators from non-covered third-countries may participate in such procedures, Member States may not rely on that fact in order to regain competence to act in that area (para 50, emphases added).

Since the European Union does not appear to have exercised its exclusive competence to determine access by economic operators from non-covered third-countries to procedures for the award of public contracts, Member States wishing to take steps to that end may inform the competent EU institutions of their proposed course of action with a view to obtaining the requisite authorisation. Nothing in the Court’s file indicates that Croatia has taken such a step. Second, unilateral action by Member States could undermine the European Union’s bargaining position in the context of its efforts to open, on a reciprocal basis, markets for public contracts in third countries. Third, it could interfere with the uniform application of EU law, since in such circumstances the application of Directive 2014/25 ratione personae could vary from one Member State to another. (para 52, emphases added).

In my view, AG Collins is conflating normative and positive analysis. It is clear that dissimilar approaches in the Member States undermine the Commission’s bargaining position—thus the need to bring in the IPI as well as other instruments such as the Foreign Subsidies Regulation (FSR)—and can lead an absence of uniformity in the application of the Directive. However, these are normative issues. From a positive standpoint, it is in my view incorrect to state that the EU has exercised its competence in relation to GPA and other covered third country operators through Article 43 of Directive 2014/25/EU or, for that matter, Article 25 of Directive 2014/24/EU. The exercise of the relevant competence concerns the entering into those international treaties, not the internal legislative measures put in place to promote their effectiveness.

To me, it is clear that the obligation to grant equal treatment to GPA and other covered economic operators stems from the GPA or the relevant international treaty, not the Directive. Art 43 Dir 2014/25/EU (and Art 25 Dir 2014/24/EU are mere reminders of the obligations under international law and cannot alter them. Their omission would not have made any difference in covered third country economic operators’ legal position. By the same token, their inclusion cannot serve to prejudice the position of non-covered third country economic operators. As above, the whole process leading to the IPI and FSR would have been entirely superfluous. In my view, the Kolin Opinion follows too closely the dangerously protectionist policy approach pushed by the Commission, and does so in a way that is not legally persuasive (or accurate, in my view).

‘Tolerance’ of third country economic operators’ participation must engage legal protection under the CFR

Moreover, the Kolin Opinion would open a very dangerous path in terms of rule of law and upholding the effectiveness of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, especially Articles 41 and 47—and allow contracting authorities two bites of the cherry in relation to tenders submitted by economic operators from non-covered third countries. Contracting authorities could ‘tolerate’ participation of non-covered third country economic operators to see if those are the ones providing the most economically advantageous offer and, if not, or if other (industrial policy) considerations kicked in, they could simply reject or set aside the tender. This would happen in a context of insufficient guarantees.

Even assuming there was an obligation to exclude under Art 43 of Directive 2014/28/EU or Art 25 of Directive 2014/24/EU, which there is not, contracting authorities would be bound by the duties under Art 41 CFR in relation to EU and covered third-country economic operators. The relevant duty would require an immediate exclusion of the not covered economic operators to protect the (in that case) participation rights of those covered. A contracting authority that had not carried out such exclusion could seek to benefit from the advantages provided by the third country economic operator in breach of its duties, which is not permissible.

Conversely, a contracting authority that had not discharged its duty to exclude would be allowed to still benefit from its inaction by discriminating against and eventually excluding at a later stage the tender of the third-country economic operator without the latter having legal recourse. This would also not be in line with the effectiveness of Arts 41 and 47 CFR and certainly not in line with the doctrine of legitimate expectations. Once an economic operator or tenderer is not excluded or rejected at the first opportunity, there is a positive and very specific representation made by the contracting authority that the economic operator and/or its tender is in the run for the contract. This must trigger legal protection—although the specific form is likely to depend on domestic administrative law.

In the case at hand, like in many other cases in daily practice, despite Kolin not being eligible for equal treatment under Art 43 of Directive 2014/24/EU—and thus not having an enforceable right to participate in the tender and to equal treatment within it deriving from international law—the contracting authority had ‘tolerated’ its participation. The Opinion is plain that, following the receipt of tenders, the contracting authority ‘concluded that 6 out of the 15 tenders submitted fulfilled the selection criteria. [Kolin], a company established in Türkiye, submitted one of the tenders selected’ (para 16). However, the Opinion does not grant Kolin any rights because of such tolerance.

Contrary to the view held by AG Collins, ‘The Austrian Government contends that, although, in principle, Directive 2014/25 does not apply to economic operators from non-covered third-countries, such operators may rely on that directive once a contracting authority has permitted their participation in a procedure for the award of a public contract award’ (para 26). I share this view. Crucially, this is not an issue the Opinion explicitly addresses. But this is the main reason why the ECJ should not follow the Opinion.