El empresario de responsabilidad limitada: ¿Puntillazo al principio de responsabilidad patrimonial universal, o crisis de la ficción de la personalidad jurídica?

Quizá haya sido sólo una idea feliz (como tantas que se oyen estos días, desafortunadamente) pero el Ministro de Economía anunció ayer la creación de la figura del “empresario de responsabilidad limitada” como parte del paquete de medidas de apoyo a las PYME y autónomos que el Gobierno espera aprobar en el primer trimestre de 2013 (ver, por ejemplo, la niticia en Expansion.com http://www.expansion.com/2012/09/27/juridico/1348767542.html).
Sin perjuicio de que la medida pueda ser una atajo para la eliminación (casi total) de los costes de creación de una sociedad de responsabilidad limitada (unipersonal)—que hasta ahora ha sido el vehículo favorito de los emprendedores que no querían poner en riesgo la totalidad de su patrimonio por su aventura empresarial—y pueda fomentar una oleada de creación de microempresas (unipersonales), creo que sería una carga de profundidad contra dos principios básicos de nuestro ordenamiento jurídico privado. De una parte, el sacrosanto principio de responsabilidad patrimonial universal del artículo 1911 del Código Civil. Y, de otra parte, la no menos dogmatica ficción jurídica de la personalidad separada e independencia patrimonial de las sociedades (unipersonales) respecto a sus socios (únicos).
Bien pensado, puede ser el puntillazo necesario a dos pilares de un ordenamiento jurídico patrimonial desfasado que, en el fondo, comulga con ruedas de molino y sigue descansando en la asunción de que todo el que opera en el tráfico económico (civil o mercantil, qué mas da) es en principio solvente. Quizá sea, en definitiva, el primer paso hacia una concepción de las relaciones económicas basada en la solvencia y liquidez efectiva de los empresarios, y hacia el desarrollo de un sistema de responsabilidad patrimonial menos formalista y más ajustado a las (dificilísimas) circunstancias de nuestros tiempos—en las que hay que autorresponsabilizar a los operadores que siguen activos en el trafico y generan importantes riesgos de impago (definitivo) de sus deudas.
O quizá, como decía, sólo haya sido una idea feliz... Pero, en todo caso, creo que es una idea que debería generar debate entre los iusprivatistas, que seguimos sin responder a los desafíos que la iliquidez e insolvencia generalizada generan en las estructuras básicas de nuestra realidad económica y social. Para botón de muestra, me remito a la inacabable discusión de la dación en pago en el ámbito hipotecario, o al mal resuelto problema del concurso de las personas físicas… ¿Como daríamos respuesta a ambas cuestiones si el deudor insolvente fuera un empresario de responsabilidad limitada? Sin duda, el Ministro nos ha dado algo en lo que empeñarnos.

Bankruptcy-proofness as a (new) source of (illegal) State aid: GC backs the Commission in T-154/10

In its Judgment of 20 September 2012 in case T‑154/10 French Republic vs. European Commission, the General Court of the EU (GC) has established a new test of "bankruptcy-proofness" as an advantage contrary to Article 107(1) TFEU that may generate a significant shake up in the control of State aid granted (implicitly) to establishments of an industrial and commercial character (EICC, or EPIC in their French acronym)--ie legal entities governed by public law which have distinct legal personality from the State, financial independence and certain special powers, including the performance of one or more public service tasks.

In a nutshell, the controversy concerned the Commission's position that there is (illegal) State aid where the legal form and status of EICCs shield them from general rules on bankruptcy and winding up under the relevant national legislation (in the case, French law). Indeed, in the view of the Commission as summarised by the GC,

[the EICC concerned (La Poste)] was not subject to the ordinary law rules governing the administration and winding-up of firms in difficulty and that, according to point 1.2, second paragraph, fourth indent of the 2008 Notice [on the application of Articles 87 [EC] and 88 [EC] to State aid in the form of guarantees (OJ 2008 C 155, p. 10)], there is aid in the form of a guarantee where more favourable credit terms are obtained by undertakings whose legal status rules out bankruptcy or other insolvency procedures (T-154/10, at para. 23, emphasis added).

In short, the GC concurred with the Commission and found that, where a given entity is shielded from general bankruptcy procedures, there is an (implicit advantage) that can constitute State aid. Therefore, a new test of bankruptcy-proofness has been instituted by the GC and this may have deep and far-reaching implications in the control of State aid control to EICCs.

However, the detail of the reasoning is worth reading, since there is a number of elements to take into consideration in the analysis whether a given entity is subjected or excluded from the scope of 'regular' bankruptcy and winding up procedures. In the reasoning of the GC:

79 The French Republic considers that, contrary to the view put forward by the Commission, the inapplicability of insolvency and bankruptcy procedures under ordinary law [...] does not mean that La Poste cannot go bankrupt or find itself in a situation of insolvency. The French Republic observes that specific procedures, which do not give creditors any guarantee that they will recover all of their claims, are applicable to [EICCs] [...] the primary objective of which was to regulate situations in which public entities, although solvent, refused to honour certain debts, established a scheme of enforcement remedies, which give the governing body the power to substitute itself for the executive of a publicly-owned establishment so as to release the ‘necessary credits’ – and not State resources – in that establishment’s budget, with a view to satisfying potential creditors. That law, however, confers no authority and even less the obligation on the State, whose role can be compared to that of an ad hoc legal representative, to release State resources for the benefit of potential creditors of publicly-owned establishments. [...] Lastly, the existence of the programmes [...] allowing advances to be made to organisations distinct from the State that manage public services, do not mean that an implied guarantee mechanism has been established.
80 In that regard, the Court observes that the parties agree that [French bankruptcy law] excluded from its scope all public entities, in particular [EICCs]. Under [...] that law [...] ‘[r]ecovery and judicial winding-up shall be applicable to all traders, all persons registered in the business directory, all farmers and all legal entities governed by private law’. The corresponding provision in force on the date of adoption of the contested decision provides, in the same vein, that ‘[t]he safeguard procedure shall be applicable to all persons pursuing commercial activities or crafts, all farmers, all other natural persons pursuing independent professional activity, including the liberal professions subject to legislative or regulatory status or whose title is protected, and also to all legal entities governed by private law’. Moreover, it is apparent from the case-law [...] that the legislation indicated ‘that property not belonging to private persons shall be administered and alienated according to the specific rules applicable to them; that, in respect of property belonging to public entities, even those pursuing industrial and commercial activities, the principle of non-seizability of that property precludes recourse to private-law enforcement remedies; that only the creditor who has obtained an enforceable favourable judicial decision having acquired the force of res judicata and ordering a public entity to pay, even provisionally, an amount of money, may have enforced the specific rules [applicable].
81 The parties disagree, however, as the inferences to be drawn from the inapplicability of ordinary law rules governing compulsory administration or winding-up to [EICCs] with a view to determining whether there is a State guarantee in favour of La Poste.
82 It should be noted at the outset that [...] the Commission took the view that, in order to establish whether there was a guarantee for individual claims, it was appropriate, after examining the national legislation and case-law (see first part of the second plea above), to begin by considering whether, in order to determine whether the procedure followed by a creditor of [the EICC] in order to settle its claim in the event of [the EICC] being in financial difficulty was comparable to that followed by the creditor of an undertaking subject to commercial law. Contrary to the impression the French Republic’s line of argument might give, the Commission’s approach was not aimed at finding that an [EICC], by virtue of the fact that it was subject to the application of ordinary law rules governing compulsory administration or winding-up, could not go bankrupt.
83 In the event, the Commission reached the conclusion that the creditors of [EICCs] were in a more favourable situation than private creditors on the ground that, contrary to what happened under the application of ordinary law rules governing compulsory administration or winding-up, the creditor of a publicly-owned establishment did not run the risk of seeing his claim cancelled because of a judicial winding-up procedure being triggered (see recital 150 of the contested decision).
84 This conclusion is to be endorsed[French bankruptcy law] provides for a mechanism that is different from that established under ordinary law procedures governing compulsory administration or winding-up. That law and the legislation adopted to give it effect implement a claims recovery procedure which, unlike a winding-up procedure under ordinary law, does not, when triggered, extinguish claims but at the most postpones the payment of them. Thus, the creditors of publicly-owned establishments are necessarily in a more favourable situation than creditors of persons coming within the scope of  [general French bankruptcy law] which, in the event of insufficient assets on the part of the debtor person or entity, may see their claim cancelled.
85 As shown by the description of the procedures applicable to [EICCs] [...] in the event of an [EICC] having insufficient assets, the payment of claims will be postponed or the competent governing body will release resources in order to honour the claims. It follows that creditors of publicly-owned establishments are necessarily in a more favourable situation than creditors of persons governed by private law.
86 Moreover, although [French bankruptcy law] does not provide explicitly that the State is bound to release State resources in order to enforce a judicial decision [...] the Commission made no error in asserting that, once a defaulting publicly-owned establishment’s own resources have been exhausted, State funds will in all likelihood be used to honour the debts of the publicly-owned establishment debtor.
87 Nor did the Commission make an error of assessment in referring [...] to certain financial tasks and programmes with a view to highlighting the existence of State resources which might be used in the event of an [EICC] defaulting and, therefore, an indication of the effectiveness of the implied State guarantee in favour of [EICCs].
88 In the light of the foregoing, the conclusions [...] as to the consequences [... of] indicia of the existence of an unlimited State guarantee in favour of [EICCs], must be endorsed. (T-154/10, at paras. 79 to 87, emphasis added).

It will be interesting to see the reaction of Member States to this Judgment of the GC, but it seems difficult to anticipate a general submission of EICCs (whichever the specific legal configuration in any given Member State) to general bankruptcy procedures, or the disregard of the (general) principle of non-seizability of public assests. most likely, the discussion will continue before the CJEU, where the hight of the interests at stake will be easier to measure.

GC backs broad Commission discretion not to pursue antitrust cases in absence of "Community interest"

In its Judgment of 13 September 2012 in case T‑119/09 Protégé International Ltd v European Commission and Pernod Ricard SA, the General Court has backed the Commission's decision not to pursue a complaint filed by Protégé International Ltd regarding a potential abuse of a dominant position by Pernod Ricard SA in the whisky market, in view of the absence of a sufficient "Community interest" [Decision C (2009) 505 (Case COMP/39414 - International Protégé / Pernod Ricard)].

The GC basically restates the prexisting case law of the CJEU on the Commission's discretion to pursue or drop cases in view of their "Community interest" and extends it to the post-Regulation 1/2003 enforcement scenario (as expressly mentioned in Recital 18 of that Regulation). Most importantly, the GC expressly shows certain judicial deference towards the Commission's assessment of the existence (or lack of) "Community interest", which review will be limited to check that the Commission's assessment guaranteees that the facts have been accurately stated and that there has been no manifest error or appraisal or misuse of power (on such "marginal review", see the key contribution by M Jaeger, "Standard of review in Competition Cases Involving Complex Economic Assessments: Towards the Margnialisation of the Marginal Review?" (2011) J of Eur Comp Law & Practice 2(4):295-314].

In more detail, in its Judgment (only available in French), the GC stressed that:

32 Il ressort d’une jurisprudence constante que l’article 7, paragraphe 2, du règlement n° 1/2003 ne confère pas à l’auteur d’une demande présentée en vertu dudit article le droit d’exiger de la Commission une décision définitive quant à l’existence ou non de l’infraction alléguée (voir, en ce sens, arrêts de la Cour du 18 octobre 1979, GEMA/Commission, 125/78, Rec. p. 3173, points 17 et 18, et du 4 mars 1999, Ufex e.a./Commission, C‑119/97 P, Rec. p. I‑1341, point 87 ; arrêt du Tribunal du 18 septembre 1992, Automec/Commission, T‑24/90, Rec. p. II‑2223, point 75).
33 En effet, la Commission, investie par l’article 85, paragraphe 1, CE, de la mission de veiller à l’application des principes fixés par les articles 81 CE et 82 CE, est appelée à définir et à mettre en œuvre l’orientation de la politique communautaire de la concurrence. Afin de s’acquitter efficacement de cette tâche, elle est en droit d’accorder des degrés de priorité différents aux plaintes dont elle est saisie et dispose à cet effet d’un pouvoir discrétionnaire (arrêt Ufex e.a./Commission, précité, point 88, et arrêt de la Cour du 17 mai 2001, IECC/Commission, C‑449/98 P, Rec. p. I‑3875, point 36).
34 La Commission est notamment en droit de se référer à l’intérêt communautaire pour déterminer le degré de priorité à accorder aux différentes plaintes dont elle est saisie (arrêt Automec/Commission, précité, point 85, et arrêt du Tribunal du 13 décembre 1999, Européenne automobile/Commission, T‑9/96 et T‑211/96, Rec. p. II‑3639, point 28). La possibilité pour la Commission de rejeter une plainte pour défaut d’intérêt communautaire est par ailleurs explicitement reconnue au considérant 18 du règlement n° 1/2003 (voir, en ce sens, arrêt du Tribunal du 16 janvier 2008, Scippacercola et Terezakis/Commission, T‑306/05, non publié au Recueil, point 93).
35 Le pouvoir discrétionnaire dont dispose la Commission à cet égard n’est cependant pas sans limites (arrêts Ufex e.a./Commission, précité, point 89, et Européenne automobile/Commission, précité, point 29).
36 En effet, d’une part, la Commission est tenue d’examiner attentivement l’ensemble des éléments de fait et de droit qui sont portés à sa connaissance par les plaignants (arrêts de la Cour du 11 octobre 1983, Schmidt/Commission, 210/81, Rec. p. 3045, point 19 ; du 28 mars 1985, CICCE/Commission, 298/83, Rec. p. 1105, point 18 ; du 17 novembre 1987, British American Tobacco et Reynolds Industries/Commission, 142/84 et 156/84, Rec. p. 4487, point 20).
37 D’autre part, la Commission est astreinte à une obligation de motivation lorsqu’elle refuse de poursuivre l’examen d’une plainte. La motivation devant être suffisamment précise et détaillée pour mettre le Tribunal en mesure d’exercer un contrôle effectif sur l’exercice par la Commission de son pouvoir discrétionnaire de définir des priorités, cette institution est tenue d’exposer les éléments de fait dont dépend la justification de la décision et les considérations juridiques qui l’ont amenée à prendre celle-ci (arrêts Ufex e.a./Commission, précité, points 90 et 91 ; Automec/Commission, précité, point 85, et Européenne automobile/Commission, précité, point 29).
38 De même, il importe de relever que le contrôle juridictionnel des décisions de rejet de plaintes ne doit pas conduire le Tribunal à substituer son appréciation de l’intérêt communautaire à celle de la Commission, mais vise à vérifier que la décision litigieuse ne repose pas sur des faits matériellement inexacts et qu’elle n’est entachée d’aucune erreur de droit ni d’aucune erreur manifeste d’appréciation ou de détournement de pouvoir (arrêt Automec/Commission, précité, point 80 ; arrêt du Tribunal du 18 septembre 1996, Asia Motor France e.a./Commission, T‑387/94, Rec. p. II‑961, point 46, et Européenne automobile/Commission, précité, point 29).
39 Par ailleurs, aux fins de l’appréciation de l’intérêt communautaire, il appartient à la Commission de mettre en balance l’importance de l’infraction prétendue pour le fonctionnement du marché commun, la probabilité de pouvoir établir son existence et l’étendue des mesures d’investigation nécessaires, en vue de remplir, dans les meilleures conditions, sa mission de surveillance du respect des articles 81 CE et 82 CE (voir, en ce sens, arrêt Automec/Commission, précité, point 86, et arrêt du Tribunal du 24 janvier 1995, Tremblay e.a./Commission, T‑5/93, Rec. p. II‑185, point 62).
40 En tout cas, l’évaluation de l’intérêt communautaire présenté par une plainte étant fonction des circonstances de chaque espèce, il ne convient ni de limiter le nombre de critères d’appréciation auxquels la Commission peut se référer ni de lui imposer le recours exclusif à certains critères (voir arrêt IECC/Commission, précité, point 46).
41 Enfin, la Commission n’est pas tenue de prendre position sur tous les arguments que les intéressés ont soumis à l’appui de leur plainte. Il suffit qu’elle expose les faits et les considérations juridiques revêtant une importance essentielle dans l’économie de la décision (voir, en ce sens, arrêt AEPI/Commission, précité, point 61, et la jurisprudence citée). (GC T-119/09,, at paras. 32-41, emphasis added).
In my view, this endorsement by the GC comes to strengthen the Commission's control over its own docket and case load, while still guaranteeing effective judicial review for aggrieved parties (ie complainants) in a sufficient degree.

La intervención del Gobierno en control de concentraciones: Se ha abierto la caja de Pandora(?)

En una dura e interesante columna de opinión en El País (http://tinyurl.com/9ou4wmx), el anterior Presidente de la Comisión Nacional de Competencia (CNC) critica la intervención del Gobierno en la concentración Antena 3 / La Sexta. En un ejercicio que no sólo es de defensa institucional de la CNC (admitámoslo, es principalmente o, cuanto menos, también un ataque político al PP), Berenguer critica el uso de la facultad de intervención del Gobierno por motivos de interés general distintos de la defensa de la competencia prevista en los arts 10 y 60 de la Ley 15/2007 de Defensa de la Competencia (LDC).
Conforme a estas reglas, y con la única excepción de las operaciones aprobadas sin condiciones por la CNC, el Ministro de Economía puede remitir al Consejo de Ministros una concentración empresarial para que revise la decisión adoptada por la CNC sobre la base de criterios de interés general distintos de la defensa de la competencia, tales como la defensa y seguridad nacional, la libre circulación de bienes y servicios dentro del territorio nacional, la protección del medio ambiente, o la garantía de un adecuado mantenimiento de los objetivos de la regulación sectorial.
Según Berenguer, esta posibilidad de intervención se concibió como una ‘cláusula durmiente’ en la redacción, tramitación y aprobación de la LDC; pese a la interposición de una enmienda expresa por la que el PP (y aquí está la base del ataque político, ciertamente) propuso su supresión por considerarla una puerta abierta al intervencionismo económico. En breve, se mantuvo la cláusula sobre la base de que nunca (o casi nunca) iba a ser utilizada (lo cual es, de por sí, muy criticable desde un punto de vista de calidad regulatoria) y de que, en su caso, las razones de interés general esgrimidas por el Gobierno serían claras (y suficientes).
Como Berenguer enfatiza en su columna, el punto de partida pretende ser el de dejar un resquicio por el que introducir en el sistema una salvaguardia frente al ‘imperialismo de la normativa de competencia’ en casos en que pueda existir un verdadero conflicto de intereses (públicos).
Es cierto que hay casos excepcionales en los que una decisión basada exclusivamente en competencia puede impedir objetivos de interés general distintos de los de la libre competencia, y es igualmente cierto que algunas legislaciones, pero no todas, tienen cláusulas que permiten la intervención del Gobierno. Esta intervención debe resultar en todo caso excepcional. Habría que preguntarse si existen en este caso las razones de interés general que se aducen por el Consejo de Ministros, que consisten en las necesidades del plan de liberación del dividendo digital y la defensa del pluralismo informativo. Difícilmente la respuesta puede ser positiva.
El problema es que esta valoración es necesariamente subjetiva y política y, en vista de la discrecionalidad que se otorga al Consejo de Ministros para la adopción de esas decisiones, ni siquiera podemos confiar en el control por el Tribunal Supremo como última defensa frente al intervencionismo político. Por tanto, el mantenimiento de la cláusula de intervención en los arts 10 y 60 LDC era, pese a las buenas intenciones del legislador (sic) una apuesta muy arriesgada.
Esa fue una opción de política legislativa que ya critiqué en fase de observaciones al Proyecto de Ley de Defensa de la Competencia, al considerar que la posible intervención del Gobierno se configuraba en términos excesivamente propicios a una intervención ‘estratégica’ (y difícilmente justificable en el verdadero interés público) [Sanchez Graells, “La reforma del sistema español de defensa de la competencia. La intervención del Gobierno en el control de concentraciones económicas” (Instituto Universitario de Estudios Europeos, CEU San Pablo, Serie Política de la Competencia, Documento de Trabajo Número 21 / 2006) http://tinyurl.com/8buo3rz].
en el nuevo sistema, el Consejo de Ministros podrá intervenir por motivos de interés general distintos de la defensa de la competencia, en una clara politización de un procedimiento de control de concentraciones que siempre ha sido criticado por la falta de independencia del Gobierno en la toma de determinadas decisiones […]
el sistema propuesto incrementa la discrecionalidad del Consejo de Ministros y dificulta la fiscalización de sus decisiones, a la vez que puede generar un comportamiento “extremo” de la CNC en la adopción de sus decisiones en casos particularmente delicados y que permite que se siga utilizando el procedimiento de control de concentraciones para regular sectores económicos – lo que excede claramente de sus objetivos y posibilidades […]
en contra de lo aparentemente pretendido por la reforma, la propuesta del Proyecto de LDC puede debilitar la independencia de la futura CNC en esta materia y, por tanto, su credibilidad frente a los operadores económicos. Por tanto, de lege ferenda, consideramos muy conveniente la supresión de la intervención del Gobierno –i.e. tanto del Ministro de Economía y Hacienda como del Consejo de Ministros- del procedimiento de control de operaciones de concentración económica
El tiempo, desgraciadamente, ha dado la razón a los que pensábamos que la intervención política en el procedimiento de control de concentraciones no es deseable por los riesgos de abuso. En cierto modo, creo que esta es una lección que debemos entender en su justa medida y tenerla en cuenta para la redacción de nuevas normas en materia de defensa de la competencia y, en general, en el ámbito de la regulación de la actividad económica. Porque el día menos pensado, se activarán ‘cláusulas durmientes’ como los arts 10 y 60 LDC (y hay muchas más esparcidas por una cada vez más compleja maraña regulatoria) y no habrá quien cierre la caja de Pandora.

La cuestión prejudicial no funciona así. Si el arancel de los procuradores es desproporcionado, declárelo, pero no quiera pasar la patata caliente al TJUE

En su Auto de 1 de marzo de 2012, la Audiencia Provincial de Barcelona (Secc. 15ª) se enfrentó a la peliaguda cuestión de si el arancel de los procuradores es desproporcionado. En el caso concreto, el procurador emitió una minuta de más de setecientos mil Euros, que difícilmente se podría justificar en función de la complejidad del caso y del trabajo realmente realizado (sobre este tipo de minutas, ya publiqué un desahogo aquí).
En el caso concreto, y como no podría ser de otra manera, la Audiencia Provincial parece tener muy claro que el arancel no se ajusta al marco legislativo comunitario aplicable (fundamentalmente, la Directiva de Servicios) y, sin embargo, intenta pasarle la patata caliente al Tribunal de Justicia con las siguientes consideraciones:
27. […] albergamos la duda de que el estado español haya cumplido adecuadamente con las obligaciones asumidas y que nuestra regulación sobre los aranceles de los procuradores cumpla con la normativa europea.
Es cierto que como tribunal nacional podríamos juzgar sobre ello, tal y como expresamente afirma la Sentencia recaída en el caso Cipolla, e inaplicar la normativa interna aplicando la legislación comunitaria. No obstante, creemos que, al menos tras la publicación de la Directiva de Servicios, los conceptos de necesidad y proporcionalidad han pasado a ser conceptos de carácter comunitario (sic), lo que hace aconsejable que tengan interpretación y aplicación en el ámbito de la justicia comunitaria, pues de otra forma no se podría evitar que los diversos tribunales nacionales hagan interpretaciones diversas y enfrentadas. Esa es la razón que nos lleva a solicitar al Tribunal de Justicia Europeo que se pronuncie sobre si considera que nuestra normativa interna respeta los referidos principios de necesidad y proporcionalidad al establecer un sistema de baremo vinculante para la determinación de los honorarios de unos profesionales liberales como son los procuradores de los tribunales […]
28. Adelantamos al Tribunal Europeo que tenemos serias dudas de que nuestra legislación en la materia respete esos principios. Aunque el procurador de los tribunales ostenta algunas atribuciones de carácter próximo a lo público, y resulta innegable que constituye un excelente colaborador en la gestión de los procesos que se sustancian en los tribunales, de ello no se deriva que exista necesidad alguna de someter su régimen retributivo a reglas imperativas cuando el sistema de elección de este profesional es enteramente libre, salvo en los supuestos en los que el ciudadano tiene reconocido el derecho a justicia gratuita.
29. Tampoco creemos que la necesidad de preservar la calidad del servicio que imparten exija someter su retribución a un sistema que no les permite competir en precios cuando esa finalidad se cumple de manera mucho más razonable a través de normas de acceso a la profesión, como creemos que de forma efectiva ocurre en nuestro ordenamiento jurídico. Por consiguiente, tampoco estimamos que concurra proporcionalidad.

Francamente, no sé cómo la Audiencia Provincial de Barcelona se pudo plantear la necesidad de formular esta cuestión prejudicial que no deja de ser una pregunta retórica (en esta misma línea parece ir el voto particular del Magistrado Forgas Folch). De haberse admitido a trámite la cuestión prejudicial (hasta donde he podido comprobar con el buscador del TJUE, no aparece entre los casos pendientes), la respuesta hubiera sido, como en el caso Cipolla, que es el órgano judicial nacional al que corresponde valorar los requisitos de necesidad y proporcionalidad establecidos por la normativa comunitaria (en el marco de una cuestión prejudicial el TJUE interpreta, pero no aplica). 
Por eso, creo que sería bueno que todos nuestros jueces y tribunales tengan un poco más claro que la cuestión prejudicial no está (y no debe servir) para tratar de quitarse una patata caliente de encima, sobre todo porque para cuando vuelva de Luxemburgo, estará más caliente…


This is not (well, yes) binding, but (maybe) you can disregard it. AG Kokott on soft law and EU competition policy

On 6 September 2012, AG Kokott issued her Opinion in case C‑226/11 Expedia Inc. The case is about the effects of soft law instruments adopted by the European Commission on other competition authorities and courts entrusted with the enforcement of EU Competition Law. Or, as the AG shortly puts it, the CJEU must decide if  the notices of the European Commission in the field of competition law are binding on the national competition authorities and the national courts.

The question has arisen in relation to the ‘de minimis notice’, in which the Commission sets out the circumstances under which it presumes that there is an appreciable restriction of competition within the meaning of Article 101 TFEU. Given the narrow scope of the question (ie whether the de minimis notice is binding), it is odd that the case has actually gone through, since the notice itself clearly indicates that "[a]lthough not binding on them, this notice also intends to give guidance to the courts and authorities of the Member States in their application of Article [101 TFEU]" (para. 4, emhasis added).

The answer should almost be automatic: "No, it is not binding". However, since most domestic EU rules (directly or indirectly, expressly or implicitly, willingly or reluctantly) incorporate the corpus of Commission's competition notices, the question becomes trickier than a mere literalist approach to the (originally) soft law instruments would suggest.

Therefore, as clearly indicated by the AG, given that the case affects the 'enforcement thresholds' for EU Competition rules, it can be seen as a matter involving the delineation of the scope of application of EU Competition Law: "The Court’s reply to the question referred will to a large extent determine the scope which the national competition authorities and courts will have in the future when applying Article 101 TFEU" (AG Kokott in C-226/11, at para 5).

However, the general framework in which the reference for a preliminary ruling by the French Cour de Cassation has been assessed by AG Kokott in Expedia relates to the broader topic of the legal nature and effects of soft law instruments in the area of EU Competition Law (and, more generally, on the topic of 'soft EU Law', although in most other policy areas it is much less used)--which oddly enough (and probably not unexpectedly), are in a fast and steep 'hardening' process that might as well end up equating them to full EU legislative instruments, at least in terms of their legal effects.

This topic is a personal favourite of mine, and one which is due to raise a myriad of cases in the decentralised system of (private) EU Competition Law enforcement (as discussed in Sánchez Graells, A., 'Soft Law and the Private Enforcement of the EU Competition Rules' in JL Velasco San Pedro (ed), Private Enforcement of Competition Law, Valladolid, Lex nova, 2011, p. 507-520,  http://ssrn.com/abstract=1639851).

Even if the wording of her opinion seems to adjust to the natural, automatic answer already hinted at:  "it must be concluded that the de minimis notice is not, of itself, intended to produce binding legal effects" (see AG Kokott in C-226/11, at paras. 26 to 34), actually, her position is almost the opposite. In my reading of her opinion, AG Kokott basically submits to the CJEU that Commission's notices are (somehow) binding on the national competition authorities and the national courts in that they must take them in due account when conducting competition analysis, but that authorities and courts can depart from the content of the notices as long as they prove in some way that the content of the notice is inadequate (in the case at hand)--which brings an onus of proof to the picture that seems to tilt the standard position to the Commission's soft law instruments indeed having (initial) binding effects.

This is a rather creative and flexible solution (which circumvents the standard position that soft law instruments cannot generate binding legal effects), for sure, but one that leaves many questions unanswered and that merits some further thought. In that regard, it is interesting to see how the AG reached her conclusion.

According to AG Kokott,
35. Although the de minimis notice has no binding legal effects, as I have just shown, it would be a mistake to regard it as of no importance at all in law for proceedings concerning cartels. Publications like the de minimis notice are in the nature of ‘soft law’ the relative importance (sic) of which in cartel proceedings, at the European and the national levels, should not be underestimated [...]
38. The Commission’s leading role, firmly anchored in the system of Regulation No 1/2003, in framing European competition policy would be undermined if the authorities and courts of the Member States simply ignored a competition policy notice issued by the Commission. It therefore follows from the duty of sincere cooperation which applies to all the Member States (Article 10 EC, now Article 4(3) TEU) that the national authorities and courts must take due account of the Commission’s competition policy notices, such as the de minimis notice, when exercising their powers under Regulation No 1/2003 [...]
39. [...] even though no binding requirements concerning the competition-law assessment of agreements between undertakings arise for national competition authorities and courts from the Commission’s de minimis notice, those authorities and courts must nevertheless consider the Commission’s assessment, as set out in the notice, of what constitutes an appreciable restriction of competition and must give reasons which can be judicially reviewed for any divergences (AG Kokott in C-226/11, at paras. 35-39, references omitted and emphasis added).
In my view, this is quite an amazing exercise of saying one thing and the opposite in the space of less than 10 paragraphs. Reading the conclusion suggested by AG Kokott, one is left scratching his head and thinking "so, no legal effects, huh?":
Consequently the national competition authorities and courts are free to proceed against agreements between undertakings below the thresholds of the de minimis notice, provided that they have taken due account of the Commission’s guidance in the notice and that, in the particular case, there is evidence, other than the market shares of the undertakings concerned, which suggests that the effect on competition is appreciable (AG Kokott in C-226/11, at para. 43, emphasis added).
I think that this is a very dangerous step that follows the rocky path of attaching (soft!) legal effects to soft law instruments, and I sincerely hope that the CJEU will only follow the position advanced by AG Kokott in paragraphs 26 to 34 of her Opinion in Expedia. More specifically, the preferable answer to the reference for a preliminary ruling by the French Cour de Cassation would be very short: "[a]s the Court has found in another connection, Commission notices in the area of EU competition law do not have binding legal effect for national authorities and courts. That is so also in the present case with regard to the de minimis notice" (AG Kokott in C-226/11, at para. 26). Any other answer will open a Pandora's box.

An interesting reminder on institutional culture and public service commitment: First speech by Clive Maxwell, new OFT's Chief Executive

The new Chief Executive of the Office of Fair Trading, Clive Maxwell, gave his first speech on 10 September 2012 at the RPI Annual Competition and Regulation Conference (http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/speeches/2012/0612.pdf). Even if he will only hold this post for about two years due to the already launched and significant reform of the UK's competition enforcement bodies (ie the establishment of the Competition and Markets Authority, which will take on the competition, markets and remaining consumer functions of the OFT plus all of those of the Competition Commission), I think that his speech is an interesting reminder of institutional culture and public service commitment that deserves praise and diffusion.
One of the keys to a strong delivery culture is to invest in people and their skills. Only then can we efficiently deliver high impact, outcomes across our portfolio. This is a critical issue not just for the OFT but for regulators more generally, and one that may get overlooked in the rush to discuss processes and procedures
I care about how we choose what we do, how we achieve change for the better in the real world most efficiently and effectively.
I led an ‘enforcement debate’ at the start of 2012 within the OFT, to identify what we at the OFT do well and less well, and the challenges we face in doing it even better. We also discussed these issues with similar bodies in the UK and abroad. I was especially struck that we need to look outside the competition and consumer community and more generally at the way in which other authorities – such as the FSA, the Serious Fraud Office and Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs – tackle what are broadly similar challenges in addressing wrongdoing by businesses and individuals.
The conclusions to this work included three points:
• The importance of skills.
• The need for the right attitude –or culture– for successful enforcement work.
• The importance of intelligence.
What does this all show?For me, there are three important points to all of this.
The first is that while it is right that any agency needs to work hard at its processes and procedures, the skills and culture of the people in the organisation is at least as important. I believe that some of the potential for sharing such ideas between authorities remains to be exploited further. It is also the case that tackling this requires putting your money where your mouth is – skills development is an investment and it is important to recognise that this costs money. [...]
The second is that even where we are facing big organisational changes and uncertainty it is important to continue to invest time and effort doing things better. [...]
The third is that in running agencies such as the OFT it’s really important to continue to review how we do things, to experiment where needed, and to learn lessons from our own and others’ experiences. 

I hope that the observations I have made have some relevance to the challenges your organisations are facing. For me, delivery is about people and commitment, as well as processes, and we must not forget that our staff are the major driver of our organisations’ success
I think that this is a reflection of the instutional culture present in most market regulators (broadly understood) in the UK, and an important ingredient in the recipe for a smooth transition to the new institutional framework for competition law enforcement.

It seems to me too that there are many lessons to be learned by other competition authorities immersed in enforcement architecture redesign, such as the Spanish National Competition Commission–which remains in a state of shock since a reform similar to the UK's was hinted at in the last Spring.

Distinguishing 'lawyers' and 'legal advisors': The CJEU has its say: It all rests on independence

In its Judgment of 6 September 2012 in Joined Cases C‑422/11 P and C‑423/11 P - Prezes Urzędu Komunikacji Elektronicznej and Republic of Poland v European Commission, the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) has faced the tricky question of whether 'legal advisors' are qualified to represent clients before the EU Courts on equal footing with 'lawyers'.

In some Member States this discussion can be moot, since there is no distinction between 'legal advisors' and 'lawyers' (and all legal professionals must belong to the same bar, and are usually considered lawyers regardless of their actual role or of whether they ever appear in court). However, in countries where there is a distinction between both professions (such as in Poland or Denmark), or where there is a similar distinction under other names (such as the distinction between barristers and solicitors in the UK, although it is growing increasingly diffuminated), this issue may be highly relevant.

In the case at hand, a Polish entity was represented before the European General Court by its in-house legal advisors (not lawyers), which had an employment relationship with the entity. The GC considered that this fell short from the requirement in Article 19 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union of being represented by a 'lawyer' and, consequently, dismissed the action as inadmissible.

In view of the GC, it was irrelevant that the professionals where formally qualified as 'legal advisors' rather than 'lawyers', but the disqualifying circumstance for them to represent the entity lied in 'the existence of a subordinate relationship within the [entity] – even if only to its Director General – when their sole function is to assist [it], [which] implies a degree of independence less than that of a legal adviser or a lawyer practising in a firm that is external to their client.' (GC Order in case T-226/10 Prezes Urzędu Komunikacji Elektronicznej v Commission, at para. 21, emphasis added).

The CJEU has concurred with the GC and has insisted on the basic elements of the profession of a 'lawyer' under EU Law. In my opinion, it is worth highligting that
23. [...] the conception of the lawyer’s role in the legal order of the European Union, which is derived from the legal traditions common to the Member States, and on which Article 19 of the Statute of the Court of Justice is based, is that of collaborating in the administration of justice and of being required to provide, in full independence and in the overriding interests of that cause, such legal assistance as the client needs (see, to that effect, Case 155/79 AM & S Europe v Commission [1982] ECR 1575, paragraph 24; [Case C-550/07 P Akzo Nobel Chemicals and Akcros Chemicals v Commission and Others], paragraph 42; and [Joined Cases C-74/10 P and C-75/10 P EREF v Commission] , paragraph 52).
24. The requirement of independence of a lawyer implies that there must be no employment relationship between the lawyer and his client (see EREF v Commission, paragraph 53 and the case-law cited). As the General Court correctly held at paragraph 18 of the contested order, the concept of the independence of lawyers is determined not only positively, that is by reference to professional ethical obligations, but also negatively, that is to say, by the absence of an employment relationship (Akzo Nobel Chemicals and Akcros Chemicals v Commission, paragraph 45).
The CJEU also clarified that adopting this interpretation is not in breach of Member States' competences for the regulation of the legal professions--even if, indeed, in the absence of specific EU rules in the field, each Member State is free to regulate the exercise of the profession of lawyer in its territory and, therefore, the rules applicable to that profession may differ substantially from one Member State to another. The CJEU saved this obstacle by considering that
34. Although, as noted in paragraph 23 [...] the conception of the lawyer’s role in the legal order of the European Union derives from the legal traditions common to the Member States, in the context of disputes brought before the Courts of the European Union, that conception is implemented objectively and is necessarily independent from the national legal orders.
This generates a logic puzzle, since it is for Member States to determine who qualifies as a 'lawyer' under their national laws in the first instance, and generates a worrying pressure for potential reform in those Member States where some legal professionals face the difficulty of being qualified to represent clients under national law, but unable to appear before the EU Courts due to this additional independence requirement.

A different reading could be that, in view of the concept of 'lawyer' under EU Law, all legal professionals that do not meet the stated independence requirements should not be called 'lawyers' and, consequently, that all Member States may now face pressure to distinguish between 'lawyers' and 'legal advisors' in their domestic rules governing the legal professions.

Either way, in my view, the Judgment of the CJEU in Prezes Urzędu Komunikacji Elektronicznej can be seen as an uncomfortable reminder that the harmonisation of the rules governing the legal professions in the EU are still a pending item in the creation of a truly unified European Legal / Judicial Space, and that more efforts will be needed in this area in the coming years.

Public buyers will self-protect against bid rigging

Another of the interesting developments included in the compromise text that reflects the current status of negotiations for the modernisation of  EU public procurement rules (http://tinyurl.com/modernisationcompromise) is the inclusion of a new Article 54(3) that clarifies that tenderers affected by any grounds for exclusion can be disqualified by contracting authorities at any time:
Contracting authorities may at any moment during the procedure exclude an economic operator where it turns out that the economic operator in question is, in view of acts committed either before or during procedure, in one of the situations referred to in Article 55(1) to (3).
This is a relevant clarification that prevents a rigid interpretation that would have limited the possibility to exclude tenderers at the beginning of the procurement process (ie only at selection stage).

Notwithstanding the above, and maybe most interestingly, this provision is coupled with a new Article 55(3)(d) in virtue of which a tenderer can be excluded
where the contracting authority can demonstrate that the economic operator has entered into agreements with other economic operators aimed at distorting competition.
This is an important development in terms of reducing the impact of bid rigging on procurement, which stresses the need for contracting authorities to cooperate closely with competition watchdogs (both at regional and national levels, and with the European Commission's Directorate General for Competition) and that opens the door to potential difficulties in terms of due process (eg what is the burden of proof to be discharged by contracting authorities?) and an eventual conflict of enforcement competences (both by administrative bodies and in terms of judicial review, particularly where competition matters are assigned to specialised courts).

Therefore, when the time to transpose Articles 54 and 55 of the new Directive (if adopted in the terms of the compromise text) comes, it will be interesting to revisit the institutional architecture of procurement authorities to ensure the appropriate collaboration channels with antitrust authorities (on this, see A Sanchez Graells, Public Procurement and the EU Competition Rules [2011] Hart Publishing 381-389).

What is wrong with the principle of competition in procurement? Back to the non-discrimination rhetoric

Much to my disappointment, one of the changes included in the compromise text that reflects the current status of negotiations for the modernisation of  EU public procurement rules  is a change of wording in Article 15 of the proposal for a new Directive replacing 2004/18(http://tinyurl.com/modernisationcompromise).

According to the initial proposal, that provision dedicated to the 'Principles of procurement' read: "Contracting authorities shall treat economic operators equally and without discrimination and shall act in a transparent and proportionate way. The design of the procurement shall not be made with the objective of excluding it from the scope of this Directive or of artificially narrowing competition" (emphasis added). In my view, this was an excellent development of EU public procurement rules.

As I said some months ago (Are the Procurement Rules a Barrier for Cross-Border Trade within the European Market? A View on Proposals to Lower that Barrier and Spur Growth: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1986114), it seemed to be getting clearer and clearer that market integration in procurement must go hand in hand with promoting and protecting effective competition for public contracts, and the drafting of Article 15 of the proposal for a new Directive finally overcame some difficulties in the development of EU procurement rules--which still suffer the problem of being excessively focused on preventing discrimination based on nationality (which has overshadowed other discrimination problems, protectionist policies and competition restrictions and distortions in European public procurement; Public Procurement and the EU Competition Rules [2011] Hart Publishing 108-110 and 212-219)—although a broader objective of fostering competition on the basis of fair and open access to procurement (not only for bidders from different Member States) can be identified in Directive 2004/18 and is further reinforced in the proposed new procurement Directive.

Now, with the compromise text, we go back to square zero and the non-discrimination rhetoric, since the new drafting of Article 15 reads: "Contracting authorities shall treat economic operators equally and without discrimination and shall act in a transparent and proportionate manner that avoids or remedies conflicts of interest and prevents corrupt practices. The design of the procurement shall not be made with the intention of excluding it from the scope of this Directive or of unduly favouring or disadvantaging certain economic operators or certain works, supplies or services" (emphasis added).

In my view, this is a step back in the modernisation of the EU procurement system and I cannot see what would be wrong with the consolidation of the principle of competition in the text of the Directives, since it is a general principle of EU Law already explicitly recognised in the field of public procurement (The Principle of Competition Embedded in EC Public Procurement Directives, http://ssrn.com/abstract=1928724) and that provides a fantastic analytical framework on which to develop welfare-enhancing public procurement rules and practice.

Therefore I would personally like to see the text of the intial proposal reinstated in Article 15 of the new Directive. Otherwise, there will still be scope for (apparently) non-discriminatory restrictions of competition in public procurement, and that would only result in losses of economic welfare for EU citizens [Distortions of Competition Generated by the Public (Power) Buyer: A Perceived Gap in EC Competition Law and Proposals to Bridge It http://ssrn.com/abstract=1458949].

Goodbye to the European Procurement Passport: Hello false claims and/or criminalisation rules?

According to the UK Cabinet Office's latest Progress Update on the Modernisation of the EU Procurement Rules  (http://tinyurl.com/modernisationupdate), the creation of a new European Procurement Passport (EPP) that the Commission had included in the December 2011 proposal for the modernisation of Directive 2004/18 has been dropped from the compromise text (http://tinyurl.com/modernisationcompromise).

This should be seen as a welcome development, since it will finally not increase the red tape involved in public procurement procedures (as anticipated in my  Are the Procurement Rules a Barrier for Cross-Border Trade within the European Market? A View on Proposals to Lower that Barrier and Spur Growth: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1986114).

Indeed, as the Cabinet Office stresses, since the information to be included in the EPP is now largely going to be provided by self-declaration with only the winning bidder submitting the documentary evidence (in case the rules of art 57 in the compromise text hold the rest of the EU legislative process), it now seems an unnecessary administrative burden.

However, it should be stressed that self declarations still present some issues, due to the risk of strategic behaviour on the part of bidders. Failure to submit the supporting evidence regarding the information included in a self-declaration is configured exclusively as a (discretionary) exclusion ground under Article 55(3)(f) of the compromise text (which comes to replace the suppressed provisions in article 68 of the December 2011 proposal), in the following terms:
Contracting authorities may exclude or may be required by Member States to exclude from participation in a procurement procedure any economic operator in any of the following situations: [...] (f) where the economic operator has been guilty of serious misrepresentation in supplying the information required for the verification of the absence of grounds for exclusion or the fulfilment of the selection criteria, has withheld such information or [is] not able to submit the supporting documents required pursuant to Article 57;
This is in, my opinion, the proper treatment of this circumstance (and clearly better than its treatment as a 'mere' awarding impediment, as initially proposed by the Commission). However, I think that it is worth stressing that this rule still leaves excessive uncovered risks in case of strategic behaviour by non-compliant bidders that would require second or ulterior awards (with the corresponding difficulties regarding the need to ensure that other bidders keep their offers open, new award notices, etc). Even if the buying body can (self)protect its interests by excluding the tenderer [and, possibly, by pushing for an extended exclusion from all procurement procedures, depending on the national rules on debarment--which will need to be developed to implement art 57(4) of the compromise text] there is a risk of uncompensated damages and, implicilty, scope for criminal proceedings for fraud (or related) offences.

Therefore, I still think that it is necessary to strengthen the consequences of failing to produce supporting evidence for the self-declarations (and, more generally, of providing false information), which should not only be a ground for exclusion, but also be reinforced by rules that set it as a head of damage that allowed contracting authorities to recover any additional expenses derived from the need to proceed to a second-best, delayed award of the contract (without excluding the eventual enforcement of criminal law provisions regarding deceit or other types of fraud under applicable national laws). Also, rules on annulment of the awarded contract and other sanctions are needed for those instances where the discovery of the falsity of the documents occurs after contract award, when exclusion does not seem to be an apropriate remedy.