In its Judgments of 20 March 2014 in cases C-639/11 Commission v Poland and C-61/12 Commission v Lithuania, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has found that both countries infringed their obligations under Art 34 TFEU by making registration in their territory of passenger vehicles having their steering equipment on the right-hand side, whether they are new or previously registered in other Member States, dependent on the repositioning of the steering wheel to the left-hand side. In my view, this case is interesting for at least two reasons.
Firstly, the CJEU has 'consolidated' the so-called 'market access test' in the enforcement of Art 34 TFEU by recasting the traditional 'Dassonville' formula and focussing the assessment on hindrances to market access. Indeed, in the 'new' (re)formulation of the test, the CJEU considers that
In view of the Court’s settled case-law, the contested legislation constitutes a measure having equivalent effect to quantitative restrictions on imports within the meaning of Article 34 TFEU, in so far as its effect is to hinder access to the Polish [sic, Lithuanian (oh, the joys of copy and paste!)] market for vehicles with steering equipment on the right, which are lawfully constructed and registered in Member States other than the Republic of Lithuania (see, concerning the origins of that case-law, Case 8/74 Dassonville [1974] ECR 837, paragraph 5; Case 120/78 Rewe Zentral, ‘Cassis de Dijon’ [1979] ECR 649, paragraph 14; and, more recently, Case C‑110/05 Commission v Italy [2009] ECR I‑519, paragraph 58) (C-61/12 at para 57 emphasis added and, equally, C-639/11 at para 52, correction needed in the English version of the C-61/12 Judgment but not in other linguistic versions].
This may be seen as a relatively welcome development, as it continues in the line of clarification already initiated in C-110/05 Commission v Italy (mopeds) and consolidates a more encompassing test that allows for the harmonious assessment of potential restrictions to free movement of goods under a single, unified (and probably more functional) test.
Secondly, the case is important in that the CJEU deviates significantly from C-110/95 in applying a much more stringent test of (strict) proportionality to the measures adopted by Poland and Lithuania (basically, requiring a repositioning of the steering wheel prior to registration of the motor vehicles) than it did to the measures adopted by Italy (an outright ban of a specific type of trailers to be towed by motorbikes and other vehicles) on the grounds of road safety [see C-61/12 paras 63-69 and C-639/11 paras 58-65].
In my view, the application of such a stringent proportionality test (with which the CJEU seems to revitalise the pro-integrationist agenda in the enforcement of Art 34 TFEU) will create frictions with Member States for two main reasons.
Firstly, the 'consolidation' of the new (re)formulation around hindrance of market access indicates an effective substitution of the underlying rationale in internal market rules (art 34 TFEU particularly) from a producers’ freedom (push market) to a consumers’ right (pull market). This will be problematic unless free movement rules further converge with (effective) consumer protection and safety and similar concerns receive a common treatment throughout the EU (ultimately, the goal of the CJEU, particularly when it uses the argument that in 22 of the 28 Member States registration would not have required changing the wheel location).
And, secondly, because the new (re)formulation of the case law creates a dangerous test leading to a (very, too broad) Dassonville-like formula limited only by (subjective) proportionality analysis carried out by the CJEU, which can result in an encroachment of domestic regulatory powers if the CJEU adopts a tough stance, as it has done against Poland and Lithuania (and differently from its previous, more timid approach in the case against Italy).
In the future, it will be interesting to see if the CJEU does not find itself under the same amount of criticism as when it first adopted the Dassonville fomula and, consequently, whether the next round of evolution of the law on free movement of goods does not initiate a new restriction of the rules under a new version of Cassis de Dijon. All in all, the development of the law in this area of the internal market seems to evolve in cycles.