Have a good end of the year and see you in 2020

Dear How to Crack a Nut friends,

As the year (and decade) draws to a close, I hope you will all have the time to unwind and enjoy some quality time with friends, family and (why not?) yourselves. That is my plan, as I wrap up study leave and get ready to go back to ‘normal’ after more than 16 months away from teaching and other duties.

I hope to continue blogging in the new year, but perhaps not as soon or as frequently as I would like to.

For now, I just wanted to thank you all for reading and engaging, and for keeping an eye on the blog despite starts and stops, and its more ‘techy’ reorientation. Seeing that the community has grown despite the more reduced and narrower content offering is most encouraging to me, and definitely a highlight of this year. Thank you for being on the other side of the screen.

Wishing you all the best for the weeks ahead and the festive season,

Albert

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Some thoughts on the SMART project's reform proposals for transition to sustainability

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The Sustainable Market Actors for Responsible Trade (SMART) project, led by Prof Beate Sjåfjell (University of Oslo) and with the participation of many dear friends and colleagues from the University of Bristol and beyond, has published a first report presenting its reform proposals aimed to support the transition to sustainability and is encouraging feedback.

Following that invitation to engage with their proposals, in this post, I reflect on the SMART projects’ transition to sustainability reform proposals (the ‘SMART proposals’), in particular those concerned with public procurement. Everyone is invited to contribute further thoughts and to engage in the debate with the SMART project, which you can do through this online form or by e-mail to smart-admin@jus.uio.no. Engagement at this stage can influence the more detailed proposals that SMART will publish in the first quarter of 2020, on which they announce a further round of public consultation.

General framework

It should be stressed that the SMART proposals, as the project more generally, 'employ the broadly recognised definition of sustainability as securing the social foundation for humanity now and in the future within planetary boundaries – encapsulated in the goal of a safe and just space for humanity' (at 6). This is broader than alternative approaches to sustainability that conceptualise it as the ability of satisfying current needs without jeopardising the ability of future generations to satisfy their own, and the concept is explored in detail in another SMART document (see here).

The SMART proposals have the ‘aim to make it possible and easy for business and finance to create value in a sustainable manner, and for products to be produced and consumed in a way that contributes to securing a safe and just space for humanity within planetary boundaries. As such, [their] reform proposals concern the EU as a global actor, and the EU as a legislator and policymaker’ (at 5, emphases in the original). Moreover, it is stressed that the SMART ‘reform proposals are interconnected. The proposals concerning business are prerequisites for the proposals concerning finance and products, forming the basis also for more sustainable investments and lending, and more sustainable private and public consumption. In turn, the proposals concerning finance and products may act as enforcers and drivers for the timely and successful implementation of the changes we suggest in the way business operates’ (at 8).

The set of recommendations is thus mainly oriented at changing, but not substituting or significantly re-regulating, existing markets through a shift in incentives for economic and socio-political actors. The proposals are indeed conceived as a set of interlinked alternative incentives to what is seen as the main cause of unsustainable business practices: shareholder primacy, and the fact that ‘this norm results in pressure on decision-makers in those companies to maximise returns for investors, especially shareholders’ (at 7).

This evidences the strong influence of corporate governance scholarship and approaches on the project as a whole, with the relative exception of the international trade-related aspects, which follow a different logic of inter-governmental and multilateral negotiations. It also clearly signals that the SMART proposals cannot be seen as radical or disruptive, but rather incremental and sometimes rather modestly incremental. While this has a clear rationale in trying to facilitate adoption by policy-makers, and in particular the European Commission, the general approach could also limit the potential upside of the much needed transition to sustainability by not including more radical proposals—eg such as enacting new legislation prohibiting specific types of products or activities, or introducing heavy environmental corporate and consumer taxes, as well as sanctions for specific unsustanaible behaviour—which perhaps fall outwith the remit of the project, with the exception of the chapter on finance, which discusses ‘brown’ penalising charges against specific non-sustainable investments (at 17).

Somehow, despite framing the proposals in terms of incentives, it seems like most of the proposals concentrate on non-economic incentives, with the relative exception of trying to boost market demand for sustainable products, in particular in the context of procurement (see below). To my mind, this is a significant limitation of the ensemble of proposals, as they still largely hinge on soft incentives and do not seem to put the necessary focus on much more intense public intervention in a manner that can create effective short-term changes in consumption and production patterns. For a project that is normatively premised on market failure—in particular, in the context of the market for corporate control—such an approach is perhaps surprising. Given the repeated indications that some of the existing problems derive from limited or non-enforcement of current rules, there is surprisingly little in the SMART proposals by way of institutional development and capacity building for national enforcement agencies.

The other main shortcoming of the project is perhaps the absence of proposals in terms of public education. Most of the proposals are addressed to regulating the behaviour of corporate entities. However, and this does not make things any easier, the behaviour of those entities (particularly large ones) will only really change if their stakeholders, either in their role as (sustainable) consumers or civil society, have a strong transition to sustainability drive. More thought seems necessary around how to inform, educate and mobilise stakeholders. The SMART project seems to presume that such knowledge and activism not only exist, but are the majoritarian position. Daily events show that, quite the contrary, this is not the case and that there continue to be many a disconnect between expressed opinions and actual (private) unsustainable behaviour. This is a major challenge. Until we are not sustainability-minded consumers and citizens, we will not be able to act as sustainability-minded stakeholders able to maximise the effect of the type of soft incentives on which the proposals rely.

Public procurement related SMART proposals

The proposals concerning public procurement are mainly focused on the ‘products’ element of their triad of priorities. They are premised on the starting point that ‘products sold in the EU must be produced in manner that supports sustainable circular production and consumption. Products are the objects of the linear business models based on overconsumption, and sold to private consumers and public procurers. [Their] proposals aim firstly to broaden and strengthen the EU’s Circular Economy initiative, secondly to make it easier to be a sustainability- oriented consumer, and thirdly to reinforce sustainable public procurement’ (at 5). Therefore, there seems to be a dual lever for the transition to sustainability in procurement. First, a more general promotion of circular economy. Second, a more specific boost of sustainable procurement (on which the SMART project is working more generally).

Accelerated transition to circular economy

This first subset of proposals has the ‘aim to increase efficiencies in production systems, extends the lifetime of products, and promote sustainable consumption. To this end, regulation should enable access to repair, promote the right to repair, and ensure the internalization of the social and environmental risks prevalent in global value chains’ (at 19). The specific instruments that would be deployed to this effect are listed, although in not much detail. One that bears some attention is the proposal to extend ‘eco-design and labelling requirements to include durability, reparability, reusability and recoverability, and also to cover more product types (e.g. textiles)’ (ibid).

Along the same lines already discussed above, this proposal seems to also go down the voluntary/soft incentive road. Labelling and eco-design will only generate a significant impact if there is a significant shift in demand. And although the proposals seek to bolster that demand, both from private consumers (at 20) and public buyers (see below), the question is left unaddressed as to why would those requirements not be made mandatory? Having the opportunity of formulating ambitious proposals to significantly shift the policy-making approach would surely support a bolder take and a recommendation to ban products that do not meet specific requirements of durability, reparability, reusability and recoverability. I would have very much preferred for the SMART proposals to take that more ambitious stance.

Sustainable public procurement

The thrust of the procurement aspects of the SMART proposals has a strong environmental component, in particular in relation to (non)circular consumption, and thus closely corresponds to the formulation of the UN Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) more closely related to public procurement, which establishes as part of the goal to ensure sustainable consumption and production patterns (SDG 12), the aim to ‘promote public procurement practices that are sustainable, in accordance with national policies and priorities’ (SDG 12.7).

The SMART proposals related to public procurement concern three main areas: (1) professionalisation and facilitation of knowledge exchange; (2) supply chain monitoring; and (3) making the legislative environment more 'SPP friendly'. Both (2) and (3) would, in the SMART project’s view, ‘require amendments to Directives 2014/23/EU, 2014/24/EU and 2014/25/EU. Ad hoc regulations need to be adopted to enact further sectoral mandatory legislation’ (at 22). It is worth looking at each of the three proposals in turn.

(1) Professionalisation and facilitation of knowledge exchange

The SMART proposal is for ‘the EU [to] invest significantly in the capacity of contracting officials, procurement strategists and financial auditors by (a) encouraging the institution of Sustainable Public Procurement (SPP) knowledge centres at EU, national and regional levels following the model already provided by virtuous Central Purchasing Bodies; (b) creating a network of knowledge centres working closely together in developing and disseminating best practices on SPP, including through training materials, and in collecting information and data on the uptake of SPP and the difficulties encountered in applying the relevant EU rules, and (c) providing financial and technical assistance targeted to specific SPP formation for ground-level contracting officials' (at 21).

The thrust of this recommendation can but be shared. There is a clear need for environmental sustainability in particular to become a core focus of public sector consumption, and that requires an investment in skills and the development of a more effective knowledge-management system. However, whether this is something that the European Commission is primarily in a good place to do remains dubious. The clear fiasco (whether temporary or permanent) of the Commission’s initiative on large infrastructure procurement evidences that such a centralised but devolved approach to the collection and dissemination of best practices can hardly work. The important barrier of language needs to be addressed in a different manner. Moreover, the initiative on procurement professionalisation also makes it clear that the Commission can only develop a relatively marginal facilitative role, but that the main changes need to be developed and implemented at national level. From that perspective, it would perhaps be preferable to address the recommendations to Member States.

There is, for example, a clear need to promote the domestic adoption and use of the already developed European Green Procurement criteria, as well as a need to educate the domestic procurement workforce and review bodies on the very significant flexibility of the current EU rules (see (3) below). Once more, then, the focus should in my view be on more specific and differently targeted education and continuous professional development proposals, rather than on proposals addressed to the Commission, which may not have the budget or be in the best position to implement them.

(2) Supply chain monitoring

The SMART proposal is that ‘the EU make it mandatory for contracting authorities to map and monitor their supply chains for risks of breaches of environmental and social rules, including those protecting human rights. That the EU takes those breaches seriously, mandating the exclusion from award procedures of those found in violation and the taking of appropriate remedial actions in case of violations during contract performance. That the EU makes it easier for contracting authorities to know about the economic operators having breached environmental and social rules, including those protecting human rights' (at 21-22).

This proposal seems to reflect frustration with the way in which compliance with environmental, social and labour (and human rights) standards is regulated in the current EU rules and, perhaps, in particular in Arts 18(2), 56(1) in fine, 57(4)(a), 69(2)(d) and 69(3), and 71(1) and 71(6) of Directive 2014/24/EU. However, the proposal is, in my view, targeting the wrong governance level.

Reading such rules and taking them into account as a whole—in particular Art 69(3)—makes it plain that the EU rules create an enabling framework for contracting authorities to engage in oversight of their supply chains for risks of breaches of environmental and social rules, including those protecting human rights. Therefore, shortcomings in this area are not a result of regulatory constraints at EU level, but rather of either a lack of political will at domestic level or, more probably, the complexity of such endeavour and the limited resources contracting authorities can dedicate to it. This seems implicit in the final part of the recommendation, which calls for the EU to make ‘it easier for contracting authorities to know about the economic operators having breached environmental and social rules, including those protecting human rights’.

I will be very interested to see how the proposal is further developed at the next stage. I think that this is setting the EU up to fail because the issue of ensuring global compliance within supply chains poses fiendish challenges and, as I have argued elsewhere, both assumes too much capability in the public procurement function and is bound to diminish its effectiveness [see A Sanchez-Graells, ‘Regulatory Substitution Between Labour and Public Procurement Law: The EU’s Shifting Approach to Enforcing Labour Standards in Public Contracts’ (2018) 24(2) European Public Law 229–254].

Related to earlier comments, I think that the extent to which procurement can be used to monitor supply chains will in part hinge on expanded skills and capabilities (as already addressed at (1) above) and, in a much larger part, depend on the development or reinforcement of other mechanisms of public intervention of horizontal application. Just like private consumption, public consumption needs to rely on a broader regulatory framework fostering sustainability and preventing illegal behaviour, rather than be tasked with those goals itself.

(3) Making the legislative environment more 'SPP friendly'

The SMART proposal is that ‘the EU makes the legislative environment more 'SPP friendly'. Contracting authorities must be allowed to require suppliers to have effective sustainability policies in place. A shift is needed from enabling the Member States to pursue SPP to requiring them to buy sustainably by increasing the number of mandatory sectoral legislation and by requiring contracting authorit[ies] to take into account the life-cycle costs associated with their purchases.’

Again, this reflects a double frustration with the regulation of sustainability-enabling mechanisms in the current EU rules and, in my view, in particular with the requirement of the ‘link to the subject matter’ in Arts 42(1) and 67(3), and in relation to the limited uptake of the possibility to rely on life-cycle costing under Art 68 of Directive 2014/24/EU; as well as in the voluntary nature of most sustainability-oriented rules, eg on technical specifications (Art 42), eco-labels (Art 43), or environmental management standards (Art 62).

Once again, this seems to me unfocused. First, because it reflects an obsession with getting rid of the link to the subject matter of the contract that risks throwing the baby out with the bath water. It seems to me indisputable that the 2014 EU public procurement rules have significantly expanded the discretionary scope for the inclusion of sustainability-oriented requirements, in particular concerning environmental sustainability through green procurement. This may not unlock maximum or unlimited room for sustainability considerations (which is debatable), but this does not constitute a main regulatory barrier to a large uptake of more sustainable procurement practices. It could be argued that it is perceived as a major barrier but, in that case, what is necessary is an effort in debunking that myth and in fostering a better understanding of the current rules, which once again goes back to (1) above.

Second, and by the same token, making those provisions mandatory at EU level would not necessarily generate practical changes. Where current structures have not moved despite increased flexibility and discretion, imposing the behaviour as mandatory without addressing the root causes of the immobility would simply result in extended non-compliance or, worse, window-dressing. Thus, in order to generate a practical effect, focusing on enabling further exercises of discretion seems to me preferable to imposing compliance.

Relatedly, advocating for more sectoral legislation imposing sustainability requirements for public purchases only (which is what I understand by the reference to ‘increasing the number of mandatory sectoral legislation’) is undesirable. First, because it generates a ‘feel good’ factor for the public sector without addressing the broader social distortions of allowing for private consumption of the unsustainable goods or services. However large procurement expenditure, sectoral legislation will only cover the smaller part of the economy. If procurement represented 20% of GDP, imposing sectoral product or service-related sustainability requirements would still leave 80% of the economy free from such constraint. Second, and also very important, the creation of such sectoral requirements will fracture (or perpetuate the fracture) between ‘public and private’ markets for equivalent goods and services. This would only result in a reduction of competition for public contracts, a shrinking of the supplier base and worse conditions (in terms of value for money) for the public buyer. Therefore, where sustainability considerations need to reduce or exclude the availability of specific types of goods or services, this needs to be addressed at an economy-wide level, as suggested above re acceleration of the transition to the circular economy.

All in all, any limitations in the uptake of more sustainable procurement seem to me mainly related to issues of procurement workforce skills, public sector dimensioning and knowledge-management. There is significant space for a much larger uptake of sustainable considerations in procurement if recommendations along the lines of (1) above are seriously implemented. In my view, this should be the focus of action in the short to medium term. Advocating for legislative change in a context where there are significant difficulties in consolidating the changes of the 2014 revision and where digitalisation is already driving regulatory and practice changes over the next three years seems to me self-defeating. As does advocating for ‘procurement-only’ interventions.

(4) Excursus: the need to include digital technologies in the scope of the recommendations

One of the aspects I have found missing in the chapter on procurement in the SMART recommendations concerns digital technologies and their potential contribution to more sustainable procurement. As things stand, improving the generation and collection of procurement data, including of the outcomes of earlier procurement exercises, in order to create an evidence base that can then enable the deployment of machine learning and other artificial intelligence techniques to promote more sustainable procurement should be a priority. These are issues I discuss in detail in a recent working paper: A Sanchez-Graells, ‘Digital Technologies, Public Procurement and Sustainability: Some Exploratory Thoughts’ (November 7, 2019). I would be happy to engage with the SMART team if the inclusion of this dimension in their final report was of interest.

Interesting paper on effects of open procurement data on outcomes: Duguay, Rauter & Samuels (2019)

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A recently published working paper has assessed the impact of increased availability of procurement data on competition for public contracts and on procurement outcomes in the EU context: R Duguay, T Rauter & D Samuels, ‘The Impact of Open Data on Public Procurement’ (November 22, 2019).

Duguay, Rauter & Samuels concentrate on the increased availability of TED data in a (more) user-friendly format in July 2015 (when the data started being available for a bulk download on CSV format) to assess the effects that easier access to procurement data has on the functioning of procurement markets and on procurement outcomes. The paper is very interesting and their results are quite striking.

However, it is important to stress the important caveat that their analysis is still based on TED data and, thus, potentially affected by the quality shortcomings of that data. As mentioned in other occasions, the TED database has problems because it is constructed as a result of the self-declaration of data by the contracting authorities of the Member States, which makes its content very inhomogeneous and difficult to analyse, including significant problems of under-inclusiveness, definitional fuzziness and the lack of filtering of errors—as recognised, repeatedly, in the methodology underpinning the SMSPP itself (see here and here).

With that in mind, however, it is interesting to look closely at their findings.

A seemingly striking insight derived from the paper is that ‘the new European government contracting provisions have anti-competitive effects‘ (at 17). This is in the context of an analysis of the ‘likelihood that government agencies allocate public contracts through an open procedure‘ and should thus not be surprising, given the flexibilisation in the use of procedures involving negotiations. However, even with this regulatory effect, the authors find that more open data triggers more use of open procedures, in particular in EU countries with weaker institutional frameworks (at 18-19, and see below). This could be symptomatic of the fact that more complexity in procurement subjected to higher levels of transparency pushes for a risk-averse approach to procurement compliance. The same would be supported by their finding of higher levels of award of contracts on the basis of price-only award criteria (at 25, and see below).

This tension between procurement complexity and transparency is generally strongly evidenced in the paper.

On the one hand, and in line with claims of the pro-competitive nature of more openness in procurement data (note, not of more openness or transparency of contract opportunities), the authors find that

  • the likelihood of competitive bidding increases sharply for TED contracts around July 2015 and that this increase persists through the end of our sample period [ie to the end of 2018] (at 18);

  • open procurement data leads government officials to implement more competitive bidding processes [ie open procedures], and that this increase in competitive bidding is driven by countries that do not have the institutions to effectively monitor public officials (at 19);

  • the number of bids increases sharply for TED contracts soon after the open data initiative, and this increase persists throughout our sample period (at 20);

  • public officials are 8.7 percentage points more likely to award government contracts to new vendors after the open data initiative (at 21);

  • contract values fall by approximately 8% ... after the open data initiative (at 23).

On the other hand, and also in line with theoretical expectations of a degradation of procurement decisions subjected to higher levels of transparency (and the fact that this transparency does not concern contract opportunities, but more general open procurement data), the authors also find that

  • [the results] are inconsistent with the idea that easier access to procurement data fosters cross-border competition throughout the European Union … open procurement data fosters local competition among vendors by reducing barriers to entry but does not promote cross-border competition across the European single market (at 22);

  • after the open data initiative, the likelihood of a contract modification increases by 2.9 percentage points for contracts above TED publication thresholds (at 24);

  • after the open data initiative, public officials are 38% ... more likely to award contracts above TED publication thresholds exclusively based on price (at 25);

  • the performance ... is significantly worse if price was the only award criterion in the allocation decision (at 26);

  • the increase in modifications is driven by contracts awarded to new government suppliers, consistent with information asymmetries contributing to the observed deterioration in contract performance. Moreover, this evidence suggests that procurement relationships before the open data initiative were not necessarily corrupt or otherwise inefficient (at 26);

  • the decline in contract performance is stronger for complex procurements, consistent with project complexity exacerbating the potential allocative distortions of open procurement data (at 27).

Their overall conclusion is that

Comparing government contracts above and below EU publication thresholds, we find that increasing the public accessibility of procurement data raises the likelihood of having competitive bidding processes, increases the number of bids per contract, and facilitates market entry by new vendors. After the open data initiative, procurement prices decrease and EU government agencies are more likely to award contracts to the lowest bidder. However, the increased competition comes at the expense of lower contract performance, particularly if suppliers are new, procurement projects are complex, and contracts are awarded solely based on price.

Overall, our results suggest that open data on procurement awards facilitates competition and lowers ex-ante procurement prices, but does not necessarily increase allocative efficiency in government contracting (at 27-28, emphases added).

I find these results striking and difficult to assess from the perspective of evidence-based policy-making. There are two issues of particular concern/interest to me.

One, the finding that more availability of data does not generate more cross-border procurement, and that the push for more competitive (ie open) procedures is mostly appreciable in countries with weaker institutional frameworks. This could support the position that institutional robustness is an alternative to data transparency, which would significantly alter the prioritisation of systemic procurement reforms and take the sides of systems that favour strong institutional oversight in a context of relative opacity.

Second, that transparency exacerbates problems at execution phase, in particular in complex projects and/or projects with new suppliers. This would take the wind out of the sails of reform and policy-making approaches concentrating on perceived or apparent competition for the contract at award stage, and rather force a refocus on an analysis of procurement outcomes at the end of the relevant project. This would also side with approaches that would advocate for more robust institutional approaches to contract design and performance management, rather than relying on transparency to correct contract execution problems.

The mixed results of the paper are also interesting in the context of the long-term effect of more open procurement data on competition, as well as on cartelisation and bid rigging risks, which are not assessed in the paper.

On the round, I think that the paper offers some interesting evidence to back up that there is a need to reconsider the level of transparency given to procurement data. I do not think this should stop the development of an improved procurement data architecture in the EU. To the contrary. I think this should reignite and prioritise discussions concerning the level of disclosure or public access to that information (ie its openness), which cannot be simply assumed to be positive in what, in my view, is currently an excessively simplistic approach in leading policy-making and think tank proposals. For more (but not new) discussion, see here and here.

Golden nugget or poison pill? 'Clearly minor' breach of EU law in the Whistleblower Protection Directive

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The recently-adopted Directive 2019/1937 of 23 October 2019 on the protection of persons who report breaches of Union law (aka the ‘Whistleblower Protection Directive’ or WPD) explicitly covers reports of breaches of public procurement law (Art 2(1)(a)(i) WPD)—with a limited exception for defence and security procurement not covered by the relevant EU rules (Art 3(2) WPD and Annex, Part I(A) WPD).

The Whistleblower Protection Directive needs to be transposed towards the end of 2021 (with a further delay to 2023 for covered SMEs). The decisions made by Member States in the transposition of the Whistleblower Protection Directive may generate significant impacts on public procurement practice in the medium term. However, the likely future effectiveness of the Directive hinges on a problematic discretionary provision on ‘clearly minor’ breaches of EU law, on which this blog post will focus.

Background

Implicitly, the coverage of public procurement by the Whistleblower Protection Directive is a recognition of the limitations of the public enforcement of (EU) public procurement law, as well as their private enforcement through the procurement remedies system (despite the Commission’s recent decision not to reform the Remedies Directives…).

Indeed, the recitals of the Whistleblower Protection Directive stress that procurement coverage is necessary

… to enhance the enforcement of Union law on public procurement. It is necessary, not only to prevent and detect procurement-related fraud and corruption in the context of the implementation of the Union budget, but also to tackle insufficient enforcement of rules on public procurement by national contracting authorities and contracting entities in relation to the execution of works, the supply of products or the provision of services. Breaches of such rules create distortions of competition, increase costs for doing business, undermine the interests of investors and shareholders and, in general, lower attractiveness for investment and create an uneven playing field for all businesses across the Union, thus affecting the proper functioning of the internal market (rec 6 WPD, emphasis added).

Therefore, creating (or boosting) national mechanisms to enable whistleblowers to shine a light on potential infringements of EU public procurement law is expected to generate gains on procurement compliance and probity. This is largely aimed at reporting by ‘insiders’, to the extent that there are already other strategies to seek to increase the visibility of procurement information and trigger engagement by civil society and external stakeholders, eg through the new rules on eForms, due to be transposed by end of 2022.

Broadly, the Whistleblower Protection Directive seeks to enhance compliance with EU law, and in particular public procurement rules, by requiring Member States to mandate private and public entities to create new internal and external reporting mechanisms, as well as to afford specific protective measures to (good faith) whistleblowers that report internally or externally, or publicly disclose, breaches of EU law on the basis of information gained in a work-related context. The Directive creates rather granular requirements depending on the size of the private or public sector entity allegedly involved in the EU law breach.

‘Clearly minor’ breaches

In the context of external reporting of suspected breaches of EU (public procurement) law, Art 11(3) of the Whistleblower Protection Directive establishes that

Member States may provide that competent authorities, after having duly assessed the matter, can decide that a reported breach is clearly minor and does not require further follow-up pursuant to this Directive, other than closure of the procedure (emphasis added).

Different to other fields covered by the Directive (eg securities regulation or competition law), I think that this will be the crux of the whistleblowing system in the context of procurement, in particular if Member States opt to designate procurement review bodies as those competent to receive and/or process reports on potential infringements of EU public procurement law—which seems like a rather natural option. However, this would largely amount to a mere broadening of the active standing to launch procurement review procedures.

I would expect most Member States to avail themselves of the discretionary nature of this provision. Thus, I think that the effectiveness of the system will hinge on the provisions of Art 11(3) WPD because external reporting of non-obvious breaches is the most likely focus of (potential) whistleblower activity.

First, because internal reporting mechanisms are unlikely to gain much traction in either private entities (I find it difficult to see how a company that has taken a specific position in the context of a tender would be willing to reverse it due to an internal report, unless it had a very decentralised system to approve the offers) or public entities (again, as the mechanisms of control and decision-making should have already addressed any concerns and, failing that, would have galvanised the public buyers’ position).

It is hard for me to envisage a significant number of inadvertent breaches of procurement law that go undetected and can easily be fixed upon realisation, as is also hard to imagine the possibility of creating a multi-track system whereby concerns harboured by those ‘in the know’ within an organisation can be reported in a manner that results in a significant revision of the situation (barring, perhaps, in the context of very large organisations, or shared mechanisms for intermediate ones).

Second, because very major shortcomings in the probity of the procurement process (ie straight out corruption) or major deviations from procurement law (eg illegal direct awards or ‘cooking’ of the technical specifications or award criteria) should already be covered by other mechanisms, including criminal law. In that context, the main issue is not the administrative responsibility or liability of those involved in the illegality (criminality?), and probably also not (primarily) an issue of work-related retaliation against the whistleblower (which is the core coverage of the protective measures of Art 19 WPD, as far as I can see).

So, unless there is a fear that criminal behaviour is widespread and largely under-reported and under-detected in the field of EU public procurement practice due specifically to limited protections for whistleblowers (which I find a relatively implausible claim), in my opinion, the area of EU procurement law compliance that can probably be practically targeted is somewhat intermediate—ie that of relatively unclear rules of EU public procurement law, of the (mis)implementation of rules in non-observable manner (eg the ‘doctoring’ of evaluation reports), as well as deviations that fall within the area of discretion afforded to contracting authorities.

In those cases, and for the reasons indicated above, the most likely materialisation of any whistleblowing is an external report to the competent authority, which will then have to assess the extent to which the reported breach is (or not) ‘clearly minor and does not require further follow-up’ pursuant to the Whistleblower Protection Directive—ie, presumably, whether the issue of (strict) compliance can be left to the ordinary (if faulty?) enforcement mechanisms for EU (public procurement) law.

Why is public procurement different?

Against that practical backdrop, in my view, the importance of Art 11(3) WPD in the context of procurement stems from the long-lasting discussion of the types of infringements of EU law—ie ‘any breach’, a ‘sufficiently serios breach’, etc—that should trigger relevant consequences; eg the termination of the contract under Art 73 of Directive 2014/24/EU, the ineffectiveness of an awarded contract under Art 2d of the Remedies Directive, or more recently State liability in damages, in the context of the Fosen-Linjen saga (see here).

What constitutes a ‘clearly minor’ breach will need to be somewhat reconciled with the existing rules on procurement remedies. It would seem not only undesirable, but also counter-intuitive, for the Whistleblower Protection Directive to be interpreted in a more stringent way than other rules on procurement remedies. If a public entity could legally follow a course of action under regular administrative and liability rules, why would it be subjected to a more stringent threshold of compliance solely due to the origin of the information/report that prompts the review of its actions and decisions?

Moreover, the application of a common standard would seem a natural consequence of the accumulation of competences for the review of procurement complaints by the same authorities, where this happens. Therefore, as indicated above, it seems to me that the effect of the implementation of the Whistleblower Protection Directive is largely constrained to expanding the active standing to launch procurement review procedures. Whether this can make a significant difference remains an empirical unknown.

Other effects would only be generated if the choices leading to the domestic implementation resulted eg in the attribution of the competence to investigate procurement whistleblowing reports to authorities other than procurement review bodies—but this would create all sorts of practical complications in terms of expertise availability and two-track review procedures, eg in the case of a whistleblowing report concerning a tender in relation to which disappointed tenderers also launch ‘standard’ review procedures.

All in all, then, I think that the likely future effectiveness of the application of the Whistleblower Protection Directive in the field of procurement will hinge on the concept of ‘clearly minor’ breach and its relationship to the current standards triggering ineffectiveness of procurement procedures, awarded contract and/or liability in damages at the domestic level. This is thus perhaps an area where the European Commission could issue interpretive guidance ahead of the transposition deadline of 17 December 2021.