#publicprocurement in price regulated markets: you cannot have your cake and eat it too, Mme. Spanish Minister of Health

The Spanish press has just reported that the Ministry of Health, Social Services and Equality has mandated some pharmaceutical companies to lower the prices of certain common use drugs. This would not be in the news but for the important detail that the Ministry has adopted this decision in retaliation for the low bids submitted by those pharmaceutical companies in a centralized procurement process run by the Andalusian Health Department in 2012 (which re-run is currently taking place). 

The Spanish Health Minister was upset to see that, as a result of the centralized purchase of drugs, the Andalusian regional authorities were receiving better offers than the Ministry and other (regional) Health Authorities had managed to secure from the same pharmaceutical companies. Moreover, the prices offered in the Andalusian tender were significantly lower than those charged in the 'private' market to users whose medication is not covered by Social Security.

Instead of learning the proper lessons and exploring the potential benefits of more efficient procurement techniques (which remain to be seen in the long run, particularly in terms of sustainability of low prices, rate of innovation, protection of effective competition, etc--of which I am personally highly skeptical), the Ministry adopted a rather childish and short-sighted strategy whereby it has sought to punish the drug manufacturers by damaging their revenue stream.

In today's reported decision, the Ministry is forcing the unruly pharma companies to lower their prices for the affected drugs to levels even lower than those offered in Andalusia.  The Ministry can impose such a price reduction as part of its general regulatory powers. In my opinion, this is an enormous mistake. The use of price regulation powers as a poison pill against pharma companies that bid aggressively in public tenders is simply nonsensical.

The only message that pharma companies should take home is the following: never, ever again, compete on prices. Surely, in the immediate future, the safest position for pharmaceutical companies will be to always bid the maximum authorized price, in order to avoid a downward revision every time they offer a discount in a public procurement procedure. And, in order to protect their revenue stream, to then lobby the Ministry to protect (or raise) the level of authorized prices. 

Could one think of a worse outcome in terms of effective market competition and efficiency of public procurement? I can't. But I am sure that the Spanish Ministry of Health may surprise me in the future...

Impossible dialogue on EU #publicprocurement reform? Council and Parliament follow parallel roads

I may be about to show how naive I am, but I have just astonishingly discovered that the EU Institutions in charge of discussing the European Commission's 2011 Proposal for a new general Directive on public procurement are working in parallel and do not seem to be talking to each other at all.

While the Council has been negotiating intensely and trying to find a compromise and common position for over a year (the most recently publicly available compromise text is dated 2 October 2012), the European Parliament's Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection has been looking at the 2011 Proposal independently and has published a Report that includes several hundred amendments to the original proposal (dated 11 January 2013). So far so good. Everybody seems to be doing its homework.

What is astonishing and a proof of the weak governance mechanisms in the EU Institutions is that the European Parliament's IMCO Committee has not incorporated the changes negotiated between Member States at the Council (which were disclosed, at least, on 24 July 2012 and again in the latest October 2012 compromise text). 

At this point, when the Council and the EU Parliament's representatives meet to discuss the amendments each institution wants to make on the Commission's 2011 Proposal, they will simply be speaking different languages. In some cases, the EU Parliament has proposals that concern articles the Council wants completely eliminated. Reversely, the Council has managed to reach a compromise on articles the Parliament wants to suppress. And all other types of inconsistent proposals can be found in both rather lengthy documents. It is plain to see that a first effort will need to be made to focus the terms of the discussion and work on a single basis text (which seems likely to be the one prepared by the Council, in my opinion). Therefore, waste of time and energies is sadly guaranteed.

In this situation, it is hard to anticipate that the new Directive can be adopted in early 2013 (which would already be a delay on the initial goal of having it published in the OJ by the end of 2012) and that it can be fully effective any time before 2016. Moreover, it is hard to see how such a scattered and uncoordinated legislative process can lead to a consistent and coherent final text--which imperfections can only be magnified at transposition stage, particularly if Member States use any ambiguities to include their preferred policy options.

All in all, I guess I am just puzzled by the fact that two institutions that have to cooperate in the adoption of new legislation can work in such a parallel and disconnected manner. Again, this just probably shows how naive I am. Or maybe it is an indicator that the system does not really work... 


Again on the protection of confidentiality in procurement evaluation: A step forward? (T-339/10 and T-532/10)

In its Judgment of 29 January 2013 in Joined Cases T‑339/10 and T‑532/10 Cosepuri Soc. Coop. pA v European Food Safety Authority (EFSA), the General Court has ruled again on the topical issue of the protection of confidentiality and business secrets in tender evaluation--and, in principle, has shown a more balanced approach than in previous Judgments concerned with transparency at debriefing stage

However, in my opinion, the case law in this area still falls short from guaranteeing a proper balance between transparency and protection of business secrets and continues to promote excessive disclosure.

In the case at hand, Cosepuri challenged the EFSA's evaluation procedure on the basis of the confidential treatment of financial assessment. The GC has taken no issue with the degree of confidentiality imposed by EFSA, but on a series of grounds that still seem (partially) inadequate:

32 First, the applicant calls into question the fact that Part II.8.2 of the tender specifications provided that the tender evaluation procedure was to be confidential. It should be noted in that regard that the applicant has the right to challenge, as an incidental plea, the lawfulness of the specifications in the present action (see, to that effect, Case T495/04 Belfass v Council [2008] ECR II781, paragraph 44). […]
33 Article 89(1) of the Financial Regulation provides that all public contracts financed in whole or in part by the budget are to comply, inter alia, with the principle of transparency. In the present case, it must be noted that Part II.8.2 of the specifications, which provides that the procedure for the evaluation of the tenders is to be conducted in secret, satisfies the requirement of preserving the confidentiality of the tenders and the need to avoid, in principle, contact between the contracting authority and the tenderers (see, on this point, Article 99 of the Financial Regulation and Article 148 of the Implementing Rules). The principle of transparency, referred to in Article 89(1) of the Financial Regulation, which is invoked by the applicant, must be reconciled with those requirements. Accordingly, there is no basis on which it can be concluded that Part II.8 of the specifications is vitiated by unlawfulness.
34 Second, the applicant challenges the fact that it was not able to ascertain the price proposed by the successful tenderer. In particular, the applicant states that EFSA ensured that it would not be possible for any subsequent verification to be carried out by redacting from the evaluation report the price offered by the successful tenderer. In that regard, without there being any need to rule in the present case on whether the price proposed by the successful tenderer formed part of the information which the contracting authority should have communicated to the unsuccessful tenderers (sic), it is clear from the evidence submitted that the applicant was in a position to ascertain the price in questionIt is apparent from Section 2.4 of the evaluation committee report that the applicant and the successful tenderer offered the same price in respect of points 2 to 7 of the financial bid, both obtaining the maximum score of 15 points. The price offered by the successful tenderer in respect of points 2 to 7 of the financial bid is therefore abundantly clear from the evaluation committee report. Moreover, with regard to point 1 of the financial bid, the evaluation committee report indicated the price offered by the applicant and the mark obtained. Although it does not expressly refer to the price offered by the successful tenderer, that report specifies the mark obtained by it. Taking account of those factors, it was possible to calculate, without any difficulty, the price proposed by the successful tenderer in respect of point 1 of the financial bid, as submitted by EFSA in connection with the second plea. Furthermore, the Court has been able to verify, by way of the measure of inquiry adopted at the hearing (see paragraph 16 above), that the price mentioned by EFSA in its written pleadings was in fact the price proposed by the successful tenderer. In view of all the foregoing considerations, the Court considers that, even if EFSA had erred by failing to indicate expressly to the applicant the price proposed by the successful tenderer, such an error would have had no effect on the lawfulness of EFSA’s decision to reject the applicant’s tender and award the contract at issue to another tenderer whose bid was considered to be better, since the applicant was in a position to ascertain that price. The applicant’s arguments in that regard must therefore be rejected.
35 Third, with regard to the principle of sound administration relied on by the applicant, according to caselaw, guarantees afforded by the European Union legal order in administrative proceedings include, in particular, the principle of sound administration, which entails the duty on the part of the competent institution to examine carefully and impartially all the relevant aspects of the individual case (see the judgment of 15 September 2011 in Case T407/07 CMB and Christof v Commission, not published in the ECR, paragraph 182 and the caselaw cited). In the present case, the arguments put forward by the applicant in the first plea, which essentially consist in criticising the fact that it was not granted access to the financial bid of the successful tenderer, do not demonstrate that EFSA failed to examine carefully and impartially all the relevant aspects of the case. In the absence of more detailed evidence, the applicant’s arguments in that regard must be rejected. (T-339/10 and 532/10 at paras. 32 to 35, emphasis added).

In my view, paragraphs 33 and 35 of the Cosepuri Judgment must be welcome, as they set a more balanced framework for the assessment of the obligation to disclose confidential information and business secrets under the principles of transparency and good administration.

On the contrary, paragraph 34 deserves a clear rejection, given that the GC keeps a very formalistic approach to the protection of confidential information and takes no issue with the fact that such sensitive information as price can be disclosed indirectly, and considers that that does not infringe either the rights of the 'disclosed' undertaking to protection of its business secrets, nor the procedural rights of the disappointed bidder that is granted indirect access to that information.

I think that the GC should have taken a stronger position and clearly confirmed that both direct and indirect disclosure of price elements and financial evaluations can be restricted or excluded on grounds of protection of confidentiality. Otherwise, the incentives continue to push contracting authorities for an excessive degree of transparency in public procurement settings--which creates significant risks of collusion [Sánchez Graells, "Public Procurement and Competition: Some Challenges Arising from Recent Developments in EU Public Procurement Law" in Bovis (ed) Research Handbook on European Public Procurement  (forthcoming), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2206502]. 

A bunch of perfectly useless deposit-guarantee schemes will do ( EFTA Court E-16/11 #icesave )

In its recent Judgment of 28 January 2013 in Case E-16/11 EFTA Surveillance Authority and Commission v Iceland (Icesave Judgment), the EFTA Court has given an interpretation to Directive 94/19/EC on deposit-guarantee schemes (even as amended by Directive 2009/14/EC) that significantly reduces the potential effectiveness of EU/EEA/EFTA banking and security deposit-guarantee schemes. This is worrying.

According to the EFTA Court,
135 [...] pursuant to Article 3 of the Directive, EEA States have to introduce and officially recognise a deposit-guarantee scheme. Moreover, they have to fulfil certain supervisory tasks in order to ensure the proper functioning of the deposit-guarantee scheme. However, it is not envisaged in that provision that EEA States have to ensure the payment of aggregate deposits in all circumstances.
139 It appears that under the new version of the provision EEA States are obliged to ensure a certain level of coverage. Whether this obligation is limited to a banking crisis of a certain size would require further assessment. However, that question can be left open here since […] Directive 2009/14 is not applicable in the present case.
140 At any rate, the rewording of Article 7 of the Directive shows that the European legislature considered substantial change necessary to extend the responsibility of the EEA States beyond the establishment of an effective framework.
141 This supports the view that the obligation on the EEA States under the version of the provision applicable in the case at hand is limited to ensuring that national rules which require a coverage level of at least EUR 20 000 are maintained or adopted.
144 […] it must be held that Article 7 of the Directive does not lay down an obligation on the State and its authorities to ensure compensation if a deposit-guarantee scheme is unable to cope with its obligations in the event of a systemic crisis.
148 […] an obligation on the State and its national authorities to ensure compensation if a deposit-guarantee scheme is unable to cope with its obligations under exceptional circumstances such as in a systemic crisis cannot be derived from that provision [Article 10 of the Directive].
172 […] recital 24 in the preamble to the Directive states that liability of a State and its competent authorities in respect of depositors is precluded “if they have ensured that one or more schemes guaranteeing deposits or credit institutions themselves and ensuring the compensation or protection of depositors under the conditions prescribed in this Directive have been introduced and officially recognized.”
176 […] the reservation set out in recital 24 in the preamble to the Directive aims expressly to preclude an excessive shifting to the State of the costs arising from a major banking failure.
178 In view of the above, the Court holds that the Directive does not envisage that the defendant itself must ensure payments to depositors in the Icesave branches in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, in accordance with Articles 7 and 10 of the Directive, in a systemic crisis of the magnitude experienced in Iceland. (E-16/11 at paras 135 to 178, emphasis added).
In my view, this jeopardises the effectiveness of deposit-guarantee schemes (DGS) by allowing Member States and their supervision entities to shield behind formalities linked to the design of such DGS and to reject any liability potentially derived from their errors of assessment or insufficient solvency requirements in case of a systemic crisis. The issue of State liability is discussed in such formalistic terms that the Icesave Judgment seems completely disconnected from the general supervisory trends required in an area where risk assessment and risk-avoidance / risk-mitigation policies impose a much more sophisticated exercise to all other players (namely, the banks and the DGSs themselves). 

The simplicity of the analysis, which omits any appraisal of the proportionality of the regulatory measures carried out by the State (both in terms of their suitability and their sufficiency), sets a bad precedent in an area where the incentive to set per-se rules in discharge of State liabilities seem already excessive.

Moreover, regardless of the attempt to restrict these findings to the 'pre-2009' version of the Directive, the extremely broad wording of paragraphs 144, 172 and 176 of the Icesave Judgment indicate otherwise. Particularly in view of the fact that at paragraph 139 the EFTA Court hints at the inapplicability of the 'post-2009' version to 'a banking crisis of a certain size[, which] would require further assessment'--and, indeed, this seems to be the most plausible (future) interpretation, unless a significant reversal of the Icesave Judgment is intended.

In this day and age, it looks implausible to have (significant) non-systemic banking crises (which, at any rate, would not be a significant problem if the existing mechanisms are properly in place and States keep any type of financial muscle). And, after the Icesave Judgment, I think that the most optimistic assessment is that, in cases of (ever more likely) systemic crises, the current 'guarantees' are perfectly useless and leave savers and investors unprotected and on their own. And this does not seem to be the best way to trigger investor confidence and to support the reconstruction of the banking industry.


Coupled with the recent reduction of capital requirements derived from the delayed start of Basel III, this 'new configuration' of DGS' as absolute safeguards of Member States' liability  (limited, seemingly, to setting them up even if improperly or insufficiently), seems a worrying sign that the banking industry and, what is worse, its supervision is back to business as usual. I think I will start looking for a way to burn my limited savings before somebody else does it for me.

Public Procurement and Competition: Some Challenges Arising from Recent Developments in EU Public Procurement Law


I have just published on SSRN a new paper on "Public Procurement and Competition: Some Challenges Arising from Recent Developments in EU Public Procurement Law": http://ssrn.com/abstract=2206502.


The paper updates some of my previous commentary to the competition law implications of the ongoing reforms of EU public procurement rules, particularly in view of the 2 October 2012 revised Compromise Text published by the EU Council: http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/12/st14/st14418.en12.pdf 

This is the abstract:
The relationship between public procurement and competition has recently been receiving an increasing amount of attention, both in academic and policy-making circles. It is becoming common ground that public procurement holds a complex and bidirectional relationship with market competition and that, consequently, a tighter link between public procurement and competition law enforcement needs to be established.
This paper explores the recent OECD push for more competition in public procurement and its role as an influential factor in the ongoing reform of EU public procurement rules. Afterwards, it critically assesses three of the main challenges to keeping public procurement precompetitive: (i) the difficult balance in terms of procurement transparency created by the clash between competition and corruption concerns; (ii) the magnification of the undesired (potential) anticompetitive effects of public procurement that centralised procurement may generate, as well as its increasing use as an improper tool of market regulation; and (iii) the possible competitive distortions and the potential advantages resulting from the generalization of eProcurement. The conclusions extract some common patterns derived from the previous analysis and suggest some policy recommendations mainly oriented at boosting oversight and professionalization of procurement.
The paper is due to appear in C Bovis (ed) Research Handbook on European Public Procurement (Elgar Publishing, 2013).

Who is an interested undertaking in procurement and State aid cases? (T-182/10)

The recent Judgment of the General Court of 15 January 2013 in case T-182/10 Aiscat v Commission (not available in English) raises a relevant question for the EU system of oversight of public procurement procedures that may have State aid implications--in the case at hand, due to the direct award of a works concession contract, as well as in view of the terms of the remuneration paid to the works concessionaire. 

In particular, the Aiscat Judgment establishes who is to be considered an "interested undertaking" and, consequently, who can act as complainant before the Commission and, eventually, challenge its Decisions in a State aid procedure based on Regulation 659/1999. In my view, a detailed analysis of the position of the GC in Aiscat shows certain inconsistencies between the (broad) concept of "disappointed bidder" under the EU public procurement regime and the concept of "affected undertaking" under State aid rules--which can diminish the effectiveness of a coordinated enforcement of both sets of rules.

In Aiscat, the Italian association of road concessionaires challenged the direct award of a works concession in the Padua region. The complaint submitted to the European Commission had a dual set of legal grounds. On the one hand, a "pure" public procurement claim that challenged the legality of the direct award of the contract under the in-house provision doctrine (which the Commission dismissed by considering that the awardee was in fact a "Teckal" entity controlled by the Italian contracting authorities). And, on the other hand, a State aid claim whereby the (illegal) direct award of the works concession contract and its terms of remuneration were considered an undue economic advantage in breach of Article 107 TFEU (which was also dismissed by the European Commission on the basis of the previously declared legality of the award and the absence of "direct" public funding).

Aiscat challenged the State aid decision of the Commission before the GC, which the Commission opposed on the basis of lack of active standing on the part of the association. In my view, the analysis conducted by the GC regarding the standing of the association to challenge the direct award of the contract is particularly relevant:
61 [...] with respect to the area of ​​State aid, persons other than the recipients who question the merits of the decision appraising the aid are considered individually concerned by that decision if their market position is substantially affected by the aid analysed in the decision in question (see, to that effect, Cofaz/ Commission [169/84, ECR p. 391] paragraphs 22 to 25, and Commission / Aktionsgemeinschaft Recht und Eigentum, [C-78/03, ECR I-10737] paragraphs 37 and 70).
62 This issue should be examined separately with respect to each of the two measures challenged by the applicant before the General Court, namely the award of the concession contract of the Passante without competitive bidding and increasing toll on the Tangenziale [which was the undue advantage identified by the appellant].
- The award without competitive bidding for the concession on the Passante
63 In the absence of any indication of the parties on the relevant market, it must be identified as that of motorway concessions in Italy, a market in which the 23 members of the applicant association that operate toll roads represent the demand, while the the State, represented by ANAS, which awards grants, represents the offer. According to statistics presented by the applicant, in November 2009, the toll road network in Italy extended over about 5,500 km.
64 As regards the determination of a substantial impairment of the market position, the Court of Justice has observed that the mere fact that an act such as the contested decision could influence the competitive relationships existing in market in question, and that the affected undertaking is in a competitive relationship of any kind with the beneficiary of that act does not suffice to conclude that it is of concern to that undertaking (see, to that effect, Case Justice of 10 December 1969, Eridania and others / Commission, 10/68 and 18/68, ECR p. 459, paragraph 7, the order of the Court of Justice of 21 February 2006, Deutsche Post and DHL Express / Commission, C-367/04 P, not published in the ECR, paragraph 40, and the judgment of the Court of 22 November 2007, Spain / Lenzing, C-525/04 P, ECR p. I-9947 , paragraph 32).
65 Therefore, an undertaking cannot rely solely on its status as a competitor of the beneficiary, but must also prove that it is in a factual situation that individualises it just as much as the beneficiary (judgment of the Court of May 23, 2000, Comité d'entreprise de la Société française de production and others / Commission, C-106/98 P, ECR p. I-3659, paragraph 41; Deutsche Post and DHL Express / Commission, cited in paragraph 64 above, paragraph 41, and judgment in Spain / Lenzing, cited in paragraph 64 above, paragraph 33).
66 However, the evidence that the position of a competitor in the market was significantly affected cannot be limited to the presence of certain elements indicating a worsening of its commercial or financial results, but may result from demonstrating the existence of a loss of revenue or less favorable business evolution than would have taken place had such aid not been granted (judgment in Spain / Lenzing, cited in paragraph 64 above, paragraph 35).
67 In the present case, in what respects the substantial affectation of the market position of the members of the applicant association due to the award of the concession on the Passante without competitive bidding, it should be noted that the applicant states in the claim the reasons why it considers that such direct award constitutes a breach of the principle of prohibition of State aid. As part of its observations on the objection of inadmissibility, the applicant claims an interest of its 23 members, as they were allegedly deprived from the opportunity to participate in a public tender for the award of the contract for the management and exploitation of the Passante.
68 However, in a market that consists of 5,500 km of toll roads, although the award without competitive bidding for the concession on a stretch of highway of about 32 km may have some impact on competition because other operators have not had the opportunity to increase the length of the networks that each exploits, it cannot be regarded that as such, this constitutes a substantial impairment of the competitive position of those other operators. Therefore, the applicant association has not demonstrated that the contested decision affected its members differently than all other operators wishing to exploit the concession on the Passante.
69 Consequently, the Court concludes that, with respect to the award of the concession on the Passante without competitive bidding, the contested decision did not affect the individual members of the applicant association. Consequently, they are not entitled to bring an action themselves to that effect and the applicant association also lacks standing to bring an action on behalf of those interests. (T-182/10, paras 61 to 69, own translation, emphasis added).

This is a very narrow analysis of the actual interest of potential bidders to participate in a tender and it follows a "de minimis-like approach" that does not match (easily) the requirements of Art 1(3) of Directive 2007/66/EC on public procurement remedies, which requires that "Member States shall ensure that the review procedures are available, under detailed rules which the Member States may establish, at least to any person having or having had an interest in obtaining a particular contract and who has been or risks being harmed by an alleged infringement". In my view [Sanchez Graells, Public Procurement and the EU Competition Rules (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2011) 354], this means that
Directive 2007/66 requires Member States to adopt a broad approach to the setting of detailed rules regulating active standing to access bid protests and review procedures (as clearly indicated by the requirement of making these procedures available ‘at least’ to potentially affected parties—which seems to be oriented towards not excluding systems granting universal standing); and to do so attending both to the criterion of participation in the tender, and to the criterion of the effects generated or potentially generated by the alleged infringement.
To be sure, an alternative reading could suggest a more restrictive approach, requiring a potential challenger to meet simultaneously participation and harm requirements in order to have standing in bid protest and review procedures. However, from a logical perspective, configuring both requirements in a cumulative manner seems superfluous—since it would be very difficult to envisage a situation where a person having had an interest in obtaining a particular contract would not risk being harmed by an alleged infringement of public procurement rules. Moreover, it would seem an overly restrictive measure—particularly in cases where compliance with the first criterion is factually impossible, eg because a given contract was awarded without tender. Along the same lines, a systematic interpretation of Directive 2007/66 seems to exclude the possibility of restricting the standing for review to the candidates and tenderers that have participated in the tender, which are defined as ‘tenderers and candidates concerned’ [art 2a(2) dir 89/665 and art 2a(2) dir 92/13 (both as amended by dir 2007/66)]. The use of a much broader wording as regards the rule on standing [art 1(3) dir 89/665 and art 1(3) dir 92/13 (both as amended by dir 2007/66)] seems to clearly depart from its narrow construction. Moreover, it is submitted that such a restrictive approach would be undesirable from the perspective of guaranteeing the effectiveness of EU public procurement directives in general—and the embedded principle of competition in particular—and, therefore, would be contrary to the main goal of Directive 2007/66. Therefore, as anticipated, in our view, the best reading of the standing requirements imposed by Directive 2007/66 is that Member States have to adopt a broad approach to the setting of detailed rules regulating active standing to access bid protests and review procedures, and that they have to do so attending both to the criterion of participation in the tender, and to the criterion of the effects actually or potentially generated by the alleged infringement—so that bid protest and review procedures are open to any party that has taken part in the tender or that can otherwise prove that it has been harmed or risks being harmed as a result of the alleged infringement, regardless of its actual participation (or lack of it) in the specific tender that gave rise to it.
Therefore, by requiring a "singular" negative effect of the direct award on a complainant to allow it to raise a challenge on the basis of State aid rules generates frictions in the system. In some scenarios, it is not hard to see how an undertaking may be unable to challenge a direct award of a contract both under "pure" public procurement and State aid rules. And, certainly, this is not a situation that leads to effective enforcement of either of these important sets of EU economic law.
 
In my view, a revision of the Aiscat Judgment by the CJEU would be desirable in order to broaden the active standing of "disappointed bidders" (broadly conceived), and would also give the CJEU an opportunity to clarify its unclear decision in case C-496/99 Succhi di Frutta [2004] ECR I-3801 (where it seemed to adopt a similarly restrictive approach to active standing contrary to the posterior criteria of Directive 2007/66/EC).

CJEU puts a noose around its neck: Again on hypertrophy of Art 267 TFEU (C-416/10)

In its Judgment (Grand Chamber) of 15 January 2013 in case C-416/10 Križanand Others, the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) has reiterated its constant case law whereby internal constitutional rules cannot trump or diminish its role as the only authentic interpreter of EU Law (art 267 TFEU). 

The protection that CJEU has built around its ultimate jurisdiction concerning EU Law interpretation has been strengthened in several decisions adopted since 2010 and, in my view, the wording of the Križanand Judgment is definitive:
68 A rule of national law, pursuant to which legal rulings of a higher court bind another national court, cannot take away from the latter court the discretion to refer to the Court of Justice questions of interpretation of the points of European Union law concerned by such legal rulings. That court must be free, if it considers that a higher court’s legal ruling could lead it to deliver a judgment contrary to European Union law, to refer to the Court of Justice questions which concern it (Case C378/08 ERG and Others [2010] ECR I1919, paragraph 32; and [Case C-173/09 Elchinov [2010] ECR I8889], paragraph 27).
69 At this stage, it must be noted that the national court, having exercised the discretion conferred on it by Article 267 TFEU, is bound, for the purposes of the decision to be given in the main proceedings, by the interpretation of the provisions at issue given by the Court of Justice and must, if necessary, disregard the rulings of the higher court if it considers, in the light of that interpretation, that they are not consistent with European Union law (Elchinov, paragraph 30).
70 The principles set out in the previous paragraphs apply in the same way to the referring court with regard to the legal position expressed, in the present case in the main proceedings, by the constitutional court of the Member State concerned in so far as it follows from well-established case-law that rules of national law, even of a constitutional order, cannot be allowed to undermine the unity and effectiveness of European Union law (Case 11/70 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft [1970] ECR 1125, paragraph 3, and Case C-409/06 Winner Wetten [2010] ECR I-8015, paragraph 61). Moreover, the Court of Justice has already established that those principles apply to relations between a constitutional court and all other national courts (Joined Cases C-188/10 and C-189/10 Melki and Abdeli [2010] ECR I5667, paragraphs 41 to 45). [...]
72 Finally, as a supreme court, the Najvyšší súd Slovenskej republiky [Slovak Supreme Court] is even required to submit a request for a preliminary ruling to the Court of Justice when it finds that the substance of the dispute concerns a question to be resolved which comes within the scope of the first paragraph of Article 267 TFEU. The possibility of bringing, before the constitutional court of the Member State concerned, an action against the decisions of a national court, limited to an examination of a potential infringement of the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the national constitution or by an international agreement, cannot allow the view to be taken that that national court cannot be classified as a court against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law within the meaning of the third paragraph of Article 267 TFEU. (C-416/10 paras 68 to 72, emphasis added).
In my view, paragraph 72 of the Križanand Judgment broadens the scope of the obligations of national Supreme Courts and imposes a counterintuitive (and somehow extensive) interpretation of the concept of domestic court "against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law" (interpreting "remedy" as "full review", I would say). A straightforward reading of the Križanand Judgment seems to imply that all Supreme Courts and all Constitutional Courts of the Member States (where both of them exist) are bound to submit preliminary references under Article 267 TFEU, regardless of the system of checks and balances between both institutions established under the relevant national constitution.

This seems a logic consequence of the supremacy of EU Law and the central position of the CJEU in its interpretation. However, it may generate an even larger number of preliminary references to CJEU--which volume is already generating significant management difficulties. As I already indicated, the preliminary reference system is under significant pressure and risks hypertrophy. 

 In my view, this implies that we need to allow all domestic courts, including the highest courts of the Member States against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law to "ask responsibly". Otherwise, we face a significant risk of hypertrophy of the preliminary ruling instrument. Therefore, in my opinion, the  boundless wording of the Križanand Judgment scenifies the CJEU putting a noose around its own neck.

A vueltas con las costas judiciales excesivas (Martinsa v Fadesa II)

Acabo de leer en Expansion.com que las costas del conocido proceso de Martinsa contra los antiguos administradores de Fadesa por sobrevaloración de activos podrían ascender a más de 85 millones de Euros tras la desestimación de la apelación.

Honestamente, no tengo mucho que añadir a lo que ya dije aquí sobre las costas excesivas en este tipo de pleitos. Únicamente que la transformación del sistema de determinación de costas es urgente (mucho más que otras de las reformas proyectadas por el Ministerio de Justicia, aunque igual de controvertida, por lo que debería ser del gusto del Ministro Gallardón).

Creo que es urgente reducir las oportunidades de pleitos dirigidos (al menos en parte) por los intereses financieros derivados de las actuales reglas sobre costas de abogados y procuradores. También en esto, por decirlo claro, creo que debemos abandonar la cultura del pelotazo. No deja de ser otra burbuja que, si no desinflamos, puede estallarnos en las manos. Y ya son tantas...