Reg.79 of the Public Contracts Regulations 2015 (PCR2015) transposes Art 79 of Directive 2014/24 regarding transparency obligations through notices connected to design contests. The rules fundamentally repeat the general obligations on the publication of notices, as well as the general possibility for contracting authorities to withhold information which disclosure would impede law enforcement, would be contrary to the public interest or would prejudice the legitimate commercial interests of a particular enterprise, whether public or private, or might prejudice fair competition between service providers. In my view, the provision does not deserve much comment.
Scope of rules on design contests under Reg. 78 Public Contracts Regulations 2015
Changing tack and moving on from the regulation of contracts for public and other specific services that we discussed last week, reg.78 of the Public Contracts Regulations 2015 (PCR2015) defines the scope of application of the rules governing design contests, and transposes Article 78 of Directive 2014/24 word by word.
It may be worth reminding that design contests are defined in reg.2(1) PCR2015 as those procedures which enable a contracting authority to acquire, mainly in the fields of town and country planning, architecture and engineering or data processing, a plan or design selected by a jury after being put out to competition with or without the award of prizes.
According to reg.78(1) PCR2015, the rules on design contests apply to two types of contests: (a) design contests organised as part of a procedure leading to the award of a public service contract [ie design contests leading to an award]; and (b) design contests with prizes or payments to participants [ie self-standing design contests or design contests leading to negotiations].
The regulation then goes on to establish the method for the calculation of the value of these contests for the purposes of determining the obligation to comply with EU rules for their tender.
Regarding design contests leading to an award of a public service contract [reg.78(1)(a)], the value threshold mentioned in reg.5 PCR2015 shall be calculated on the basis of the estimated value net of VAT of the public service contract, including any possible prizes or payments to participants [reg.78(2)].
In turn, the case of self-standing design contests [reg.78(1)(b)], the threshold mentioned in reg.5 PCR2015 shall be calculated on the basis of the total amount of the prizes and payments [reg.78(2)].
However, where the design contest can be used for the award of a subsequent public services contract on the basis of negotiations entered into with the winner(s) of the design contest because the contracting authority has announced its intention to award such a contract in the contest notice in accordance with regs.32(7) and (8) PCR2015, its estimated value shall be calculated including the estimated value net of VAT of the public services contract which might subsequently be concluded following a negotiated procedure without prior publication.
The general criterion is, quite clearly, that the estimated value of the design contest must include the estimated value of any follow-up public services contracts derived from the contest. One may wonder why a design contest cannot be used to award public works contracts (Pedro does), but that is sorted out by the definition of public works contracts, which covers both design and execution phases. Consequently, where the potential follow up of a design contest is a public works contract, the contracting authority needs to either tender it as a public works contract or decouple the design contest from the award of the public works contract for its execution, and subject each to their own rules--which may trigger particular instances of application of reg.41 PCR2015 if the original "designer" bids for the construction of the public works, either directly or through undertakings related to them.
The rest of the rules in reg.78 PCR2015 are pretty straightforward and, in my view, do not require much more comment.
Reserved contracts for certain services under Reg. 77 Public Contracts Regulations 2015
As I already discussed (here), this is probably the novelty within the light touch regime applicable to the award of contracts for social and other specific services that better suits the regulatory needs implicit in the UK public sector reform strategy, since Art 77 Dir 2014/24 allows contracting authorities to reserve for the participation of given types of organisations (such as ‘public sector mutuals’, for instance) the award of contracts for certain services in the areas of health, social and cultural services, which basically comprise all, or the most relevant, medical services, personal services, educational and training services (including eLearning), sports and cultural services.
In terms of reg.77(1) PCR2015, contracting authorities may reserve to "qualifying organisations" (below) the right to participate in procedures for the award of reservable public contracts, which are those comprised in the categories listed in reg.77(2) PCR2015, which include 75121000-0 (Administrative educational services), 75122000-7 (Administrative healthcare services), 75123000-4 (Administrative housing services), 79622000-0 (Supply services of domestic help personnel), 79624000-4 (Supply services of nursing personnel), 79625000-1 (Supply services of medical personnel), 80110000-8 (Pre-school education services), 80300000-7 (Higher education services), 80420000-4 (E-learning services), 80430000-7 (Adult-education services at university level), 80511000-9 (Staff training services), 80520000-5 (Training facilities), 80590000-6 (Tutorial services), from 85000000-9 to 85323000-9 (fundamentally, all types of medical services), 92500000-6 (Library, archives, museums and other cultural services), 92600000-7 (Sporting services), 98133000-4 (Services furnished by social membership organisations), and 98133110-8 (Services provided by youth associations).
However, reg.77(6) PCR2015 determines that this does not apply in relation to the procurement of health care services for the purposes of the NHS within the meaning and scope of the National Health Service (Procurement, Patient Choice and Competition) (No. 2) Regulations 2013. This exclusion and its meaning is very unclear to me, particularly in view of the coverage given in reg.77(2) PCR2015, which includes a significant volume of services that can be procured for the NHS (should those not have been excluded, then?). Furthermore, in view of the special rules applicable to NHS procurement, it seems odd that no attempt to reconcile all these bodies of exceptional, sector-based procurement regimes is attempted [for discussion of the rules applicable to NHS procurement, see A Sanchez-Graells, “New Rules for Health Care Procurement in the UK. A Critical Assessment from the Perspective of EU Economic Law” (2015) 24(1) Public Procurement Law Review 16-30].
The guidance offered by CCS in this regard does not sort out the issue, but seems to defer resolving the need for harmonisation of these competing regimes until after ongoing consultations: "At present, it is not possible to use the reserved contracts provision for healthcare commissioning by NHS England or Clinical Commissioning Groups in England. This is to ensure consistency with the general requirements in regulation 3 of the existing NHS (Procurement, Patient Choice and Competition Regulations) (No. 2) 2013 Regulations, in particular the prohibition on favouring types of provider. This position is subject to further consultation with the sector. Part of the role of the Mutuals in Health: Pathfinder Programme is to consider any potential legislative hurdles to the further development of health mutual in clinical services" (Guidance on the light touch regime, 14). We shall wait for further developments.
In the cases where reserving contracts under reg.77 PCR2015 is possible, the contracting authority will need to make sure that the (type of) organisation chosen to be awarded the contract--ie the "qualifying organisation" meets all of the following requirements [reg.77(3)]: (a) its objective is the pursuit of a public service mission linked to the delivery of the services to be contracted; (b) its profits are reinvested with a view to achieving the organisation’s objective (and where profits are distributed or redistributed, this should be based on participatory considerations); (c) the structures of management or ownership of the organisation performing the contract shall be based on employee ownership or participatory principles, or shall require the active participation of employees, users or stakeholders; and (d) the organisation shall not have been awarded a contract for the services concerned by the contracting authority concerned pursuant to this special rules within the past three years.
However, reg.77(6) PCR2015 determines that this does not apply in relation to the procurement of health care services for the purposes of the NHS within the meaning and scope of the National Health Service (Procurement, Patient Choice and Competition) (No. 2) Regulations 2013. This exclusion and its meaning is very unclear to me, particularly in view of the coverage given in reg.77(2) PCR2015, which includes a significant volume of services that can be procured for the NHS (should those not have been excluded, then?). Furthermore, in view of the special rules applicable to NHS procurement, it seems odd that no attempt to reconcile all these bodies of exceptional, sector-based procurement regimes is attempted [for discussion of the rules applicable to NHS procurement, see A Sanchez-Graells, “New Rules for Health Care Procurement in the UK. A Critical Assessment from the Perspective of EU Economic Law” (2015) 24(1) Public Procurement Law Review 16-30].
The guidance offered by CCS in this regard does not sort out the issue, but seems to defer resolving the need for harmonisation of these competing regimes until after ongoing consultations: "At present, it is not possible to use the reserved contracts provision for healthcare commissioning by NHS England or Clinical Commissioning Groups in England. This is to ensure consistency with the general requirements in regulation 3 of the existing NHS (Procurement, Patient Choice and Competition Regulations) (No. 2) 2013 Regulations, in particular the prohibition on favouring types of provider. This position is subject to further consultation with the sector. Part of the role of the Mutuals in Health: Pathfinder Programme is to consider any potential legislative hurdles to the further development of health mutual in clinical services" (Guidance on the light touch regime, 14). We shall wait for further developments.
In the cases where reserving contracts under reg.77 PCR2015 is possible, the contracting authority will need to make sure that the (type of) organisation chosen to be awarded the contract--ie the "qualifying organisation" meets all of the following requirements [reg.77(3)]: (a) its objective is the pursuit of a public service mission linked to the delivery of the services to be contracted; (b) its profits are reinvested with a view to achieving the organisation’s objective (and where profits are distributed or redistributed, this should be based on participatory considerations); (c) the structures of management or ownership of the organisation performing the contract shall be based on employee ownership or participatory principles, or shall require the active participation of employees, users or stakeholders; and (d) the organisation shall not have been awarded a contract for the services concerned by the contracting authority concerned pursuant to this special rules within the past three years.
This seems to aim to allow for entities in the process of becoming "qualifying organisations" to already tender for these reserved contracts, maybe also enabling for brake provisions (of the mutualisation process) linked to an eventual lack of success in being awarded the contract--ie, the government seems to be aiming to be in a position to ensure that mutuals are only created and go ahead if contracts are awarded to them, which would certainly make the mutualisation option much more attractive by reducing the risk undertaken by public officials seeking to spin-off from the public sector.
However, in my view, this is not necessarily in line with EU law, particularly because it refers to a future-looking contract compliance clause that triggers access to the competition for the reserved contract--which, in my opinion, is not compatible with the exceptional nature of this set of special provisions [for discussion of this type of requirements, A Sanchez-Graells, Public Procurement and the EU Competition Rules, 2nd edn (Oxford, Hart, 2015) 390].
On top of complying with the above requirements (of the Directive), the maximum duration of the contract shall not be longer than three years [reg.77(4)] and the call for competition shall make reference to Art 77 Dir 2014/24, so that there is sufficient transparency on the use of this set of special rules [reg.77(5) PCR2015].
General comments
However, in my view, this is not necessarily in line with EU law, particularly because it refers to a future-looking contract compliance clause that triggers access to the competition for the reserved contract--which, in my opinion, is not compatible with the exceptional nature of this set of special provisions [for discussion of this type of requirements, A Sanchez-Graells, Public Procurement and the EU Competition Rules, 2nd edn (Oxford, Hart, 2015) 390].
On top of complying with the above requirements (of the Directive), the maximum duration of the contract shall not be longer than three years [reg.77(4)] and the call for competition shall make reference to Art 77 Dir 2014/24, so that there is sufficient transparency on the use of this set of special rules [reg.77(5) PCR2015].
General comments
Under these special rules within the light-touch regime, contracting authorities seem almost completely free to decide to award the contracts to public service mutuals (and, most likely, to a specific public sector mutual, given their initial lack of capacity to tender for contracts to be awarded by contracting authorities other than the one they have just “spun-off”).
This creates a significant risk of ‘sweet deals’ aimed at supporting, fostering and consolidating public sector mutuals, which may well end up resulting in (3-year long, local) monopolies for the provision of those services in the hands of the newly spun-off public sector mutuals, which may extend their dominance beyond that point in time as incumbency advantages pile up. That would result in distortions of competition similar to those just identified by the UK’s Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) in the market enquiry on private health care services (final report here) and, as such, it is an undesirable prospect.
Generally speaking, it is worth stressing that public procurement rules and the general principles of public procurement can be applicable beyond the regulated cases, as the CJEU has been expanding the coverage of the procurement regime and systematically imposed certain obligations to the tendering of contracts not, or not-fully, covered by the Directives. Hence, the possibility for the CJEU to significantly restrict the discretion to resort to reg.77 PCR2015 / Art 77 Dir 2014/21 cannot be totally excluded.
Generally speaking, it is worth stressing that public procurement rules and the general principles of public procurement can be applicable beyond the regulated cases, as the CJEU has been expanding the coverage of the procurement regime and systematically imposed certain obligations to the tendering of contracts not, or not-fully, covered by the Directives. Hence, the possibility for the CJEU to significantly restrict the discretion to resort to reg.77 PCR2015 / Art 77 Dir 2014/21 cannot be totally excluded.
However, in recent cases such as Libert and Others (C-197/11 & C-203/11, EU:C:2013:288; see here) and Azienda sanitaria locale n. 5 «Spezzino» and Others (C-113/13, EU:C:2014:2440; see here), the CJEU appears to show very significant (and I would claim ‘excessive’) deference towards social and special services. Consequently, it may be unlikely to extend obligations to the award of contracts under reg.77 PCR2015. And, ultimately, I would think that this will be a provision mostly litigated at domestic level on grounds of judicial review due to deviations of power or excess of competences.
Principles of awarding contracts for social and other specific services under Reg. 76 Public Contracts Regulations 2015
Where the transposition keeps the defects of the the Directive
The only part where reg.76 PCR2015 follows Art 76(2) Dir 2014/24 is reg.76(8) PCR2015 where it is set out that, in the award of contracts for social and other specific services covered by reg.74 PCR2015, contracting authorities may take into account any relevant considerations, including the need to ensure quality, continuity, accessibility, affordability, availability and comprehensiveness of the services, the specific needs of different categories of users, including disadvantaged and vulnerable groups, the involvement and empowerment of users and innovation. However, reg.76 PCR2015 has not transposed the possibility given by Art 76(2) in fine Dir 201/24 whereby Member States may also provide that the choice of the service provider shall be made on the basis of the tender presenting the best price-quality ratio, taking into account quality and sustainability criteria for social services.
These provisions are not free from interpretive difficulties, particularly when it comes to their coordination with general principles for the award of contracts. Briefly, my general views are as follows [extracted, but updated, from A Sanchez-Graells and E Szyszczak, “Modernising Social Services in the Single Market: Putting the Market into the Social”, in JM Beneyto and J Maillo (eds), Fostering Growth: Reinforcing the Internal Market (Madrid, CEU Ediciones, 2014) 61-88].
Article 76 sets out the principles for the award of these contracts, although their regulation is left to the Member States (see below) provided that they take measures ‘to ensure contracting authorities comply with the principles of transparency and equal treatment of economic operators. Member States are free to determine the procedural rules applicable as long as such rules allow contracting authorities to take into account the specificities of the services in question’. The general requirement for contracting authorities to make sure that those procedures shall be at least sufficient to ensure compliance with the principles of transparency and equal treatment of economic operators is encapsulated in reg.76(2) PCR2015, whereas reg.76(1) in fine stresses that contracting authorities may take into account the specificities of the services in question.
A key element to take into consideration will be the need to further comply with the (more) general principles of procurement set out in Article 18, which requires that procurement also complies with the principles of competition and proportionality, and that economic operators participating in public procurement comply with applicable obligations in the fields of environmental, social and labour law. Given that Article 18 is nested in Title I and that the procurement of social and other specific services is regulated in Title III, Article 76(1) may be seen as a lex specialis that would de-activate the requirements for proportionality and undistorted competition in their procurement. However, such interpretation may not be welcome by the CJEU and it is my personal view that this is not the best approach.
With a permissive tone, Article 76(2) continues to regulate that: ‘contracting authorities may take into account the need to ensure quality, continuity, accessibility, affordability, availability and comprehensiveness of the services, the specific needs of different categories of users, including disadvantaged and vulnerable groups, the involvement and empowerment of users and innovation. Member States may also provide that the choice of the service provider shall be made on the basis of the most economically advantageous tender, taking into account quality and sustainability criteria for social services’. The drafting of the last sentences leaves an open question as to the obligation to choose the awardee of the contract on the basis of the most economically advantageous tender (MEAT), although (functionally) it seems to be out of the question, and the provision should simply be seen as allowing for the introduction of ‘specific’ criteria in the determination of the MEAT, such as quality and sustainability.
With a permissive tone, Article 76(2) continues to regulate that: ‘contracting authorities may take into account the need to ensure quality, continuity, accessibility, affordability, availability and comprehensiveness of the services, the specific needs of different categories of users, including disadvantaged and vulnerable groups, the involvement and empowerment of users and innovation. Member States may also provide that the choice of the service provider shall be made on the basis of the most economically advantageous tender, taking into account quality and sustainability criteria for social services’. The drafting of the last sentences leaves an open question as to the obligation to choose the awardee of the contract on the basis of the most economically advantageous tender (MEAT), although (functionally) it seems to be out of the question, and the provision should simply be seen as allowing for the introduction of ‘specific’ criteria in the determination of the MEAT, such as quality and sustainability.
By not going beyond the wording of the Directive and, in particular, not offering guidance on how to interpret the elements of reg.76(8) PCR2015 when it comes to determining the MEAT, the PCR2015 do not provide any workable clarification and do not resolve difficult issues that were already present in sectoral procurement regimes, such as that applicable to healthcare [see A Sanchez-Graells, “New Rules for Health Care Procurement in the UK. A Critical Assessment from the Perspective of EU Economic Law” (2015) 24(1) Public Procurement Law Review 16-30].
One of the initial difficulties in assessing the appropriateness of the transposition of Art 76 Dir 2014/24 by means of reg.76 PCR2015 derives from the opening clause of the EU provision, whereby "Member States shall put in place national rules for the award of contracts" for social and other specific services (emphasis added). In a literal reading, this may be seen as requiring the creation of a general (national) procedural framework for the award of these contracts or, in other words, a set of common, generally applicable rules. If that was the proper interpretation, then reg.76(1) PCR2015 may have failed to properly create those "national rules for the award of contracts" by determining that "[c]ontracting authorities shall determine the procedures that are to be applied in connection with the award of contracts" or social and other specific services.
By granting contracting authorities (almost) unfettered discretion to determine the applicable procedures--whether they correspond (with or without variations) to procedures, techniques or other features provided for in Part 2 PCR2015, or not--the PCR2015 may have failed to set any sort of specific "national rules for the award of contracts". However, such a literal reading of the requirement in Art 76(1) ab initio Dir 2014/24 may be opposed on the basis of the principles of procedural autonomy and subsidiarity, so this may not carry as much weight as one may initially have thought. In any case, it is also possible to read national as domestic, in which case this discussion would be moot.
Be it as it may, however, looking at the details of the very light touch approach adopted by reg.76 PCR2015, the defects seems even more apparent. Reg.76(3) PCR2015 sets out bare minimum requirements for procedures initiated by one of the notices mentioned in reg.75 PCR2015, whereby the contracting authority shall conduct the procurement, and award any resulting contract, in conformity with the information contained in the notice about conditions for participation, time limits for contacting the contracting authority, and the award procedure to be applied. Reg.76(6) PCR2015 adds that all time limits imposed on economic operators, whether for responding to a contract notice or taking any other steps in the relevant procedure, shall be reasonable and proportionate. Taken together, this barely creates any specific rule other than implicitly following the case law preventing substantial modifications of tender procedures without cancellation and readvertisement.
The big problem comes, in my view, with reg.76(4) PCR2015 whereby contracting authority may, however, deviate from the content of the previous notice and conduct the procurement, and award any resulting contract, in a way which is not in conformity with that information. It is true that reg.76(4) PCR2015 imposes a relatively stringent set of conditions, so that disregard for the (procedural) information disclosed in the previous notice can take place only if all the following conditions are met: (a) the failure to conform does not, in the particular circumstances, amount to a breach of the principles of transparency and equal treatment of economic operators; and (b) the contracting authority has, before proceeding to deviate from the published information, (i) given due consideration to the matter, (ii) concluded that there is no breach of the principles of transparency and equal treatment, (iii) documented that conclusion and the reasons for it in accordance with regs.84(7) and (8) PCR2015, and (iv) informed the participants of the respects in which the contracting authority intends to proceed in a way which is not in conformity with the information contained in the notice. For these purposes, "participants" means any economic operators which have responded to the notice and have not been informed by the contracting authority that they are no longer under consideration for the award of a contract within the scope of the procurement concerned [reg.76(5) PCR2015].
In my view, there are two main difficulties. First, it adopts a very narrow interpretation of the principle of equal treatment that falls into a participation trap that will result in de facto discrimination and an unavoidable infringement of the principle of transparency. And, second, this is very likely to trigger infringements on the rules applicable to cancellation and retendering of public tenders.
As to the participation trap or ‘trap of tender-specific reasoning’, by designing a system that allows contracting authorities to (1) disclose information that preselects a subset of potential suppliers and (2) later on, alter the rules of the procedure in a way that potential suppliers not included in that subset cannot challenge (because they are not informed and, seemingly, there is no further transparency/publication requirement), reg.76(4) PCR2015 fails to ensure actual compliance with the principle of non-discrimination [by analogy, see the reasoning of the EGC regarding the need for clarity of tender specifications in Commission v Cyprus, C-251/09, EU:C:2011:84 35-51 (not available in English)].
As to the infringement of the requirements for cancellation and retendering of procedures that would otherwise be substantially amended, it seems clear to me that the case law applicable to changes of disclosed contractual conditions applies (if nothing else, by analogy). In that regard, the CJEU has been clear that "where the amended condition, had it been part of the initial award procedure, would have allowed tenders submitted in the procedure with a prior call for competition to be considered suitable or would have allowed tenderers other than those who participated in the initial procedure to submit a tender" (emphasis added) are to be deemed substantial modifications of the tender conditions and, consequently, not acceptable [Case C-250/07 Commission v Greece [2009] ECR I-4369 52. See also, by analogy, Case C-454/06 Pressetext Nachrichtenagentur [2008] ECR I-4401 35]. Thus, unless contracting authorities could clearly prove that no other tenderers would have participated had the modified (procedural) conditions been disclosed from the beginning, reliance on reg.76(4) PCR2015 is bound to trigger an infringement of EU law.
For all of the above, I consider reg.76 PCR2015 a very clear instance of defective (if not outright improper) transposition of the requirements in Art 76 Dir 2014/24 and, consequently, I think that it should be modified as soon as possible and substituted by a sensible, fully-developed set of procedural rules applicable to the award of contracts for social and other specific services.
By granting contracting authorities (almost) unfettered discretion to determine the applicable procedures--whether they correspond (with or without variations) to procedures, techniques or other features provided for in Part 2 PCR2015, or not--the PCR2015 may have failed to set any sort of specific "national rules for the award of contracts". However, such a literal reading of the requirement in Art 76(1) ab initio Dir 2014/24 may be opposed on the basis of the principles of procedural autonomy and subsidiarity, so this may not carry as much weight as one may initially have thought. In any case, it is also possible to read national as domestic, in which case this discussion would be moot.
Be it as it may, however, looking at the details of the very light touch approach adopted by reg.76 PCR2015, the defects seems even more apparent. Reg.76(3) PCR2015 sets out bare minimum requirements for procedures initiated by one of the notices mentioned in reg.75 PCR2015, whereby the contracting authority shall conduct the procurement, and award any resulting contract, in conformity with the information contained in the notice about conditions for participation, time limits for contacting the contracting authority, and the award procedure to be applied. Reg.76(6) PCR2015 adds that all time limits imposed on economic operators, whether for responding to a contract notice or taking any other steps in the relevant procedure, shall be reasonable and proportionate. Taken together, this barely creates any specific rule other than implicitly following the case law preventing substantial modifications of tender procedures without cancellation and readvertisement.
The big problem comes, in my view, with reg.76(4) PCR2015 whereby contracting authority may, however, deviate from the content of the previous notice and conduct the procurement, and award any resulting contract, in a way which is not in conformity with that information. It is true that reg.76(4) PCR2015 imposes a relatively stringent set of conditions, so that disregard for the (procedural) information disclosed in the previous notice can take place only if all the following conditions are met: (a) the failure to conform does not, in the particular circumstances, amount to a breach of the principles of transparency and equal treatment of economic operators; and (b) the contracting authority has, before proceeding to deviate from the published information, (i) given due consideration to the matter, (ii) concluded that there is no breach of the principles of transparency and equal treatment, (iii) documented that conclusion and the reasons for it in accordance with regs.84(7) and (8) PCR2015, and (iv) informed the participants of the respects in which the contracting authority intends to proceed in a way which is not in conformity with the information contained in the notice. For these purposes, "participants" means any economic operators which have responded to the notice and have not been informed by the contracting authority that they are no longer under consideration for the award of a contract within the scope of the procurement concerned [reg.76(5) PCR2015].
In my view, there are two main difficulties. First, it adopts a very narrow interpretation of the principle of equal treatment that falls into a participation trap that will result in de facto discrimination and an unavoidable infringement of the principle of transparency. And, second, this is very likely to trigger infringements on the rules applicable to cancellation and retendering of public tenders.
As to the participation trap or ‘trap of tender-specific reasoning’, by designing a system that allows contracting authorities to (1) disclose information that preselects a subset of potential suppliers and (2) later on, alter the rules of the procedure in a way that potential suppliers not included in that subset cannot challenge (because they are not informed and, seemingly, there is no further transparency/publication requirement), reg.76(4) PCR2015 fails to ensure actual compliance with the principle of non-discrimination [by analogy, see the reasoning of the EGC regarding the need for clarity of tender specifications in Commission v Cyprus, C-251/09, EU:C:2011:84 35-51 (not available in English)].
As to the infringement of the requirements for cancellation and retendering of procedures that would otherwise be substantially amended, it seems clear to me that the case law applicable to changes of disclosed contractual conditions applies (if nothing else, by analogy). In that regard, the CJEU has been clear that "where the amended condition, had it been part of the initial award procedure, would have allowed tenders submitted in the procedure with a prior call for competition to be considered suitable or would have allowed tenderers other than those who participated in the initial procedure to submit a tender" (emphasis added) are to be deemed substantial modifications of the tender conditions and, consequently, not acceptable [Case C-250/07 Commission v Greece [2009] ECR I-4369 52. See also, by analogy, Case C-454/06 Pressetext Nachrichtenagentur [2008] ECR I-4401 35]. Thus, unless contracting authorities could clearly prove that no other tenderers would have participated had the modified (procedural) conditions been disclosed from the beginning, reliance on reg.76(4) PCR2015 is bound to trigger an infringement of EU law.
For all of the above, I consider reg.76 PCR2015 a very clear instance of defective (if not outright improper) transposition of the requirements in Art 76 Dir 2014/24 and, consequently, I think that it should be modified as soon as possible and substituted by a sensible, fully-developed set of procedural rules applicable to the award of contracts for social and other specific services.
Interesting paper on use of theory in public procurement research (Flynn & Davis, 2014)
I have just read A Flynn and P Davis, "Theory in public procurement research" (2014) 14 (21) Journal of Public Procurement 139-180, which had been on the "to read" pile for a bit too long. Their paper focuses on procurement/supply-chain management scholarship, which will make it seem "peripheral" for legal academics. However, I think that their findings on the need to beef up the use of theory in public procurement research will translate well to legal scholarship, particularly that of an interdisciplinary nature. Well worth reading.
Publication of notices under Reg. 75 Public Contracts Regulations 2015
When it comes to pre-award transparency, reg.75(1) PCR2015 gives contracting authorities a choice to advertise their intention to award a contract by means of either (a) a simplified contract notice, which shall contain the information referred to in part H of Annex V to Dir 2014/24; or (b) an enhanced prior information notice, which shall be published continuously (ie be made available throughout the period covered by the notice?), contain the information set out in part I of Annex V to Dir 2014/24, refer specifically to the types of services that will be the subject-matter of the contracts to be awarded, and indicate that the contracts will be awarded without further publication and invite interested economic operators to express their interest in writing.
Of course, as recognised by reg.75(2) PCR2015, contracting authorities can dispense with these requirements where a negotiated procedure without prior publication could have been used in accordance with reg.32 PCR2015. In my view, the two cases that are more likely to trigger controversy are the use of reg.32(2)(b) PCR2015 whereby contracting authorities may be tempted to argue that particular social or special services can be provided "only by a particular economic operator" particularly under reg.32(2)(b)(iii) PCR2015 on the basis of "the protection of exclusive rights", such as an act of entrustment, licence or authorisation to provide certain services; as well as reg.32(9) PCR2015 for the award of new services which repeat similar ones, which would try to cover a clear renewal of an expiring contract as an extension of the previous contract.
The first argument could be devised in situations where (local) contracting authorities intend to keep the provision on social or other special services local/in hands of the incumbent. In that regard, the authorities could be tempted to argue that the existence of a de facto local monopoly requires them to award the contract directly and without publicity because there is no alternative provider in the market. This would simply be a misunderstanding of the applicable rules and cannot be accepted. It is worth stressing that the CJEU has permanently stressed the strict requirements that control decisions to proceed to the direct award of contracts under this ‘non-procedure’, which are subject to a strict assessment of whether the contracting authority "acted diligently and whether it could legitimately hold that the conditions [for recourse to this procedure] were in fact satisfied" [Fastweb, C-19/13, EU:C:2014:2194 50]. Consequently, there is no doubt that this procedure must be understood as exceptional [C-292/07 Commission v Belgium [2009] I-59 106].
In a refined form, the (local) contracting authority may try to justify the direct award on the basis of any sort of "exclusive right" they can see as being held by the local provider. In that regard, the case law of the CJEU as to what constitutes an exclusive or special right will gain significant prominence [for discussion in relation to utilities rules under Directive 2014/25, see T Kotsonis, "The 2014 Utilities Directive of the EU: codification, flexibilisation and other misdemeanours" (2014) 23 (4) Public Procurement Law Review 169-187], and will likely result in the conclusion that the local provider does not hold an exclusive right that merits protection for the purposes of excluding competition in the award of the contract.
In a refined form, the (local) contracting authority may try to justify the direct award on the basis of any sort of "exclusive right" they can see as being held by the local provider. In that regard, the case law of the CJEU as to what constitutes an exclusive or special right will gain significant prominence [for discussion in relation to utilities rules under Directive 2014/25, see T Kotsonis, "The 2014 Utilities Directive of the EU: codification, flexibilisation and other misdemeanours" (2014) 23 (4) Public Procurement Law Review 169-187], and will likely result in the conclusion that the local provider does not hold an exclusive right that merits protection for the purposes of excluding competition in the award of the contract.
It is also worth stressing that the granting of such exclusive or special rights should have complied with fundamentally the same requirements in their award, which may make reliance on the apparent exclusivity equally illegal under EU law [see GS Ølykke, "Is the granting of special and exclusive rights subject to the principles applicable to the award of concessions? Recent developments in case law and their implications for one of the last sanctuaries for protectionism" (2014) 23 (1) Public Procurement Law Review 1-20]. Moreover, contracting authorities need to keep in mind the very high threshold imposed by the last caveat of reg.32(2)(b), which stresses that recourse to direct award under the argument of protection of exclusive rights can only take place "where no reasonable alternative or substitute exists and the absence of competition is not the result of an artificial narrowing down of the parameters of the procurement".
When the first 3-year period is over, the contracting authority effectively resorts to the possibility to directly award a contract for the same/similar services for another 3 years [or three times, consecutively, for 1 year, or any other combination of contract durations up to the 3 year limit established in reg.32(12) PCR2015]. In my view, this would be a circumvention of the exceptional circumstances that are covered by reg.77 PCR2015 and would amount to an infringement of reg.18(2) PCR2015 / Art 18(1) Dir 2014/24.
Consequently, overall, I would stress that the reference to reg.32 PCR2015 and the possibility to enter into directly-awarded contracts for social and special services should fundamentally be disregarded by contracting authorities if they want to avoid risks of legal challenge, unless very clear grounds exist and they can make sure that the lack of competition in the market / existence of exclusive rights is not a situation they created themselves (in contravention of EU law).
Post-award transparency is also flexibilised. Generally speaking, the award of a contract for services covered by reg.74 PCR triggers the obligation to make known the results of the procurement procedure by means of a contract award notice, which shall contain the information referred to in part J of Annex V to Dir 2014/24 [reg.75(3)] and be sent for publication in compliance with reg.51 PCR2015 [reg.75(5) PCR2015]. Contracting authorities may, however, group such notices on a quarterly basis, in which
case they shall send the grouped notices within 30 days of the end of
each quarter [reg.75(4) PCR2015]. My hunch is that quarterly publication will become the norm, which is not a bad thing.
Award of contracts for social and other specific services under Reg. 74 Public Contracts Regulations 2015
Reg.74 of the Public Contracts Regulations 2015 (PCR2015) transposes Art 74 of Directive 2014/24 and simply opens the section on the procurement of social and special services by indicating that public contracts for social and other specific services listed in Schedule 3 (which replicates Annex XIV of Dir 2014/24) shall be awarded in accordance with the rules in regs.75 to 77 PCFR2015.
Other than creating this "light touch regime" for social and special services, reg.74 PCR2015 does not have much substantive content of its own. For discussion of the light touch regime, which we will be commenting during the rest of the week, see the Crown Commercial Services Guidance here and S Smith, "Articles 74 to 76 of the 2014 Public Procurement Directive: the new "light regime" for social, health and other services and a new category of reserved contracts for certain social, health and cultural services contracts" (2014) 23(4) Public Procurement Law Review 159-168.
For some background discussion on the role of the light touch regime in enabling Member States to reform their public sector and, in the specific case of the UK (England), to deepen the mutualisation strategy supported by the current Tory government and the previous Coalition government, see A Sanchez-Graells & E Szyszczak, 'Modernising Social Services in the Single Market: Putting the Market into the Social' (2013), as well as shorter comments here and here.
It may be worth pointing out that reg.74 PCR2015 deviates from Art 74 Dir 2014/24 in that it does not reiterate the value threshold above which those contracts are covered--which, however, is to be found in reg.5(1)(d) PCR2015 as a mere referral to the value determined in the Directive (see here and here). Ultimately, it is worth remembering that such value is of €750,000, which is converted into £625,050 for OJEC advertisement purposes (cfr with about £540,000 at today's exchange rate).
After having heard Pedro's presentation at Global Revolution last week (available here), where he criticised with good arguments the arbitrariness of EU thresholds in general, I am quite sure that he will have some specific issues concerning the threshold for social and special services, not least due to the unavolidable exchange risk fluctuation that imposed a strong de facto variation in coverage. Pedro?
Other than creating this "light touch regime" for social and special services, reg.74 PCR2015 does not have much substantive content of its own. For discussion of the light touch regime, which we will be commenting during the rest of the week, see the Crown Commercial Services Guidance here and S Smith, "Articles 74 to 76 of the 2014 Public Procurement Directive: the new "light regime" for social, health and other services and a new category of reserved contracts for certain social, health and cultural services contracts" (2014) 23(4) Public Procurement Law Review 159-168.
For some background discussion on the role of the light touch regime in enabling Member States to reform their public sector and, in the specific case of the UK (England), to deepen the mutualisation strategy supported by the current Tory government and the previous Coalition government, see A Sanchez-Graells & E Szyszczak, 'Modernising Social Services in the Single Market: Putting the Market into the Social' (2013), as well as shorter comments here and here.
It may be worth pointing out that reg.74 PCR2015 deviates from Art 74 Dir 2014/24 in that it does not reiterate the value threshold above which those contracts are covered--which, however, is to be found in reg.5(1)(d) PCR2015 as a mere referral to the value determined in the Directive (see here and here). Ultimately, it is worth remembering that such value is of €750,000, which is converted into £625,050 for OJEC advertisement purposes (cfr with about £540,000 at today's exchange rate).
After having heard Pedro's presentation at Global Revolution last week (available here), where he criticised with good arguments the arbitrariness of EU thresholds in general, I am quite sure that he will have some specific issues concerning the threshold for social and special services, not least due to the unavolidable exchange risk fluctuation that imposed a strong de facto variation in coverage. Pedro?
Termination of contracts under Reg. 73 Public Contracts Regulations 2015
Reg.73 of the Public Contracts Regulations 2015 (PCR2015) transposes the new rules on termination of contracts set out in Article 73 of Directive 2014/24. In my view, the provision transposes the rules in the Directive correctly. Pedro harbours some doubts here. However, it does so in a way that, from a contract law perspective may require some comments. I split my reflections below in two parts. The first one addresses the issues raised by Dir 2014/24 itself, which apply equally to reg.73(1) PCR2015. The second one focuses on the contract law aspects under regs.73(2) and (3) PCR2015.
New EU rules on termination of contract
The restrictions on the admissible renegotiation of the basic or
substantial elements of a contract sometimes leave the contracting authorities
with limited alternatives for the cancellation of the tendering procedure or
the termination of the contract, and its subsequent re-tendering [on the
different, although related, issue of the obligation of contracting authorities
to terminate contracts concluded in breach of public procurement rules—ie, of
termination as a remedy, see Case C-503/04 Commission v Germany [2007]
ECR I-6153 25–42; see also, with numerous references, S Treumer, ‘Towards an
Obligation to Terminate Contracts Concluded in Breach of the EC Public
Procurement Rules: The End of the Status of Concluded Public Contracts as
Sacred Cows’ (2007) 16 Public Procurement Law Review 371, 377–78; and P Delvolvé, ‘Note à
Trstenjak, Verica, Conclusions sur CJCE, 18 juillet 2007, Commission v Allemagne, affaire C-503/04’ (2007) 5 Révue
française de Droit administratif 972, 975 and ff].
Given that the principles of non-discrimination, competition,
objectivity and diligent administration (other than additional principles such
as the duty of contracting authorities not to depart from their previous acts)
restrict the circumstances under which the cancellation of a tender can take
place—while the principle of legal certainty and of the protection of legitimate
expectations, and the principle pacta sunt servanda, should be adapted
so as not to impair the objectives of the public procurement directives and the
rules of the TFEU [Case C-503/04 Commission v Germany [2007] ECR I-6153
33–36. For a critical view, see Treumer, Towards an Obligation to Terminate
Contracts Concluded in Breach of the EC Public Procurement Rules (2007) 377 and 381–82]—it is submitted that the decision of the
contracting authority as regards the termination of the contract and its
subsequent re-tendering cannot be adopted freely [maybe the only exception to
this rule is that of contracts entered into for an indefinite period of time,
which should be looked at with disfavour, following the dictum of the
Case C-454/06 Pressetext Nachrichtenagentur [2008] ECR I-4401 73].
Therefore, termination decisions should comply
with the same general principles restricting the discretion of contracting
authorities to cancel a tender procedure. This has now been supported in broad
terms in recital (113) of Directive 2014/24, which recognises that contracting
authorities are sometimes faced with circumstances that require the early
termination of public contracts in order to comply with obligations under Union
law in the field of public procurement, and requires Member States to ensure
that contracting authorities have the possibility, under the conditions
determined by national law, to terminate a public contract during its term if
so required by Union law. This general approach to the termination of contracts
has been further specified in the rules of article 73 of Directive 2014/24.
Under this new provision, contracting authorities must have the possibility to
terminate a public contract during its term, at least in three cases. Firstly,
and in support of the restrictions on the modification
of contracts, where the contract has been subject to a substantial
modification not exempted under article 72 and, consequently, would have required a new procurement
procedure [see JM Hebly and P Heijnsbroek, ‘When amending leads to ending:
a theoretical and practical insight into the retendering of contracts after a
material change’, in G Piga and S Treumer (eds), The Applied Law and Economics of Public Procurement: the economics of
legal relationships (London: Routledge, 2013) 163–84]. Secondly, where the contractor
should have been excluded from the procurement procedure because, at the
time of contract award, was affected by one of the situations imposing its
mandatory exclusion under article 57(1) of Directive 2014/24. And, finally,
where the contract should not have been awarded to the contractor in view of a serious infringement of the obligations
under the Treaties and Directive 2014/24 that has been declared by the CJEU
in a procedure pursuant to article 258 TFEU.
These are all very grave breaches
of the rules of Directive 2014/24 (and the TFEU), but there seems to be no
difficulty to expand the grounds for termination of the contract to other
situations with identity of function,
such as where the contractor is affected by domestic mandatory exclusion
grounds, or by discretionary exclusion grounds where there is no good reason
not to take them into account, or where the infringement of the TFEU or
Directive 2014/24 is found by other jurisdictional bodies (either as a result
of a case where a preliminary reference under art 267 TFEU is posed to the CJEU,
or otherwise). Overall, however and as already stressed, a general restriction
on the use of termination rights should be found in the requirement that
contracting authorities discharge the same duties of good administration
implicit in decision to cancel tenders.
The UK (Eng & W) adaptation through (implied) contract terms
I am not an expert in UK contract law by any stretch of the imagination but it strikes me as slightly odd that the regulatory option adopted in reg.73 PCR2015 combines a mix of contract requirements and implied contractual terms, rather than an alternative statutory power to terminate that would be more easily aligned with continental approaches.
On the one hand, reg.73(1) PCR2015 imposes a duty for contracting authorities to "ensure that every public contract which they award contains provisions enabling [them] to terminate the contract", whereas reg.73(2) further indicates that "[t]hose provisions may address the basis on which the power is to be exercisable in those circumstances, for example by providing for notice of termination to be given and by addressing consequential matters that will or might arise from the termination". On the other hand, and as a catch-all clause, reg.73(3) PCR2015 establishes that "[t]o the extent that a public contract does not contain provisions enabling the contracting authority to terminate the contract on any of the grounds mentioned in paragraph (1), a power for the contracting authority to do so on giving reasonable notice to the contractor shall be an implied term of that contract". In my view, this apparently establishes an unnecessary duplication.
Given that reg.73(3) PCR2015 sorts out the problem and reg.73(1) + (2) still fall short from imposing specific means of ensuring termination powers and ways of determining its consequences, it seems unnecessary to have included the latter provisions in the PCR2015. In my view, it would have sufficed to establish the provision on implied terms and simply have allowed contracting authorities to agree explicit terms provided they did not limit the contracting authority's power to terminate.
Additionally, the provisions of reg.73 PCR2015 are at the same time insufficient, since they do not indicate what are the consequences of the termination (on the basis of the implied term) and this lack of regulation triggers significant questions that revive old discussions on the scope of ineffectiveness under the remedies Directive. For instance, can/should/must the rules in reg.101 PCR215 on the consequences of ineffectiveness be applied in these cases (ie is the contract to be considered to be prospectively, but not retrospectively, ineffective) or can retrospective effects be determined? Can the contractor be compensated? Can the contracting authority avoid termination on the basis of public interest as per reg.57(6) PCR2015, particularly if reg.73(1)(b) is applicable? In my view, this is another instance of insufficient regulation (not improper transposition), where the UK legislator would have been well-advised to take some more time to think before enacting the PCR2015 as is [for further discussion, listen to the podcast here].
What level of transparency for award/call-off decisions within framework agreements?
During several recent conversations with participants at the Global Revolution conference, and particularly with my colleague Dr Marta Andrecka and some members of the European Institutions, I have been asked repeatedly about my views on the level of transparency that should apply to award/call-off decisions within framework agreements.
There is no doubt that full transparency is mandated regarding the conclusion of the framework agreement itself and, subject to my general concerns about excessive transparency (here), I agree that this is the existing legal situation. However, there is significant uncertainty and an ongoing practical debate regarding the level of 'intra-framework' transparency that the EU rules require (as well as the applicability of rules on award criteria to those decisions, but that is a topic for another day).
There is no rule that expressly covers this issue from the perspective of the individual rights of information of contractors/tenderers either under Article 55 of Directive 2014/24 or reg.55 of the Public Contracts Regulations 2015 (PCR2015), which only make reference to transparency/debriefing obligations related to the conclusion (or not) of the framework agreement itself, but not the subsequent awards/call-offs within the framework. This creates uncertainty as to the applicability of these (or analogous) rights to be informed in relation to intra-framework awards/call-offs [for in-depth discussion, see S Arrowsmith, The Law of Public and Utilities Procurement. Regulation in the EU and UK, 3rd edn., vol. 1 (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2014) 1153 and ff, esp 1156-57, and 1347].
More generally, when it comes to transparency of the awards/call-offs within framework agreements, the general transparency rules are clearly limited in Art 50 Dir 2014/24, according to which "[i]n the case of framework agreements... contracting authorities shall not be bound to send a notice of the
results of the procurement procedure for each contract based on that
agreement. Member States may provide that contracting authorities shall
group notices of the results of the procurement procedure for contracts
based on the framework agreement on a quarterly basis. In that case,
contracting authorities shall send the grouped notices within 30 days of
the end of each quarter."
As I criticised in relation to reg.50 PCR2015 [see here], the drafting of this clause may make it susceptible of being interpreted as fully discretionary for Member States, which could opt (like the UK) for not imposing any sort of transparency obligation (quarterly, or otherwise) connected to the results of the procurement procedure for contracts
based on the framework agreement. I argued that such an approach could be an infringement of EU law and, more specifically, the requirements of the principle of transparency in Art 18(1) Dir 2014/24.
To my surprise (I should have known, though), the uncertainty seems to be much more limited when it comes to the draft new procurement rules for the European Institutions under the foreseen 2016 Financial Regulation (proposal available here), which Art 113 [equivalent to Art 55 Dir 2014/24] expressly excludes almost all 'intra-framework' transparency when it comes to award/call-off decisions. According to that provision,
2. The contracting authority shall notify all candidates or tenderers whose requests to participate or tenders are rejected of the grounds on which the decision was taken, as well as the duration of the standstill period referred to in Article 118(2). For the award of specific contracts under a framework contract with reopening of competition, the contracting authority shall inform the tenderers of the result of the evaluation.This comes to determine that there is no transparency obligation whatsoever for award/call-off decisions that do not follow a 'mini-competition' and, in even in the case of such reopening of competition, the transparency obligation is limited to the evaluation (likely of their own tender), but does not seem to cover other aspects of the award/call-off decision.
3. The contracting authority shall inform each tenderer who is not in a situation of exclusion, whose tender is compliant with the procurement documents and who makes a request in writing of any of the following: (a) the characteristics and relative advantages of the successful tender and the name of the tenderer to whom the contract is awarded, except in the case of a specific contract under a framework contract with reopening of competition; (emphasis added).
The European Court of Auditors criticised this situation in its January 2015 Opinion on the draft revised Financial Regulation (available here) in the following terms: "The proposed wording of Article 113(2)(2) and (3)(a) would not require the contracting authority, in the case of specific contracts awarded under a framework contract with reopening of competition, to notify the contractors whose tenders have been rejected of the reasons for their rejection, the relative advantages of the successful tender and the name of the tenderer to whom the contract is awarded. This exception to the rules governing transparency and the obligation to state reasons cannot be justified" (para 37, emphasis added).
In my view, this is an indication that my previous assessment regarding the lack of compatibility with EU law of the total lack of transparency of intra-framework awards is not shared by the European Commission (unless that Institution is looking to impose stricter standards to Member States' procurement than to its own and that of the rest of European Institutions). It could also be that DG BUDGET has a more process-oriented (buyer) approach to procurement regulation than DG GROWTH, which would explain the difference in willingness to (self)impose transparency obligations. However, be it as it may, I still think that this is not a desirable regulatory option and I would like to see the proposal for a new Financial Regulation amended on this point.
I would not favour full transparency of intra-framework award decisions. However, I accept that contractors included in a framework agreement (and third parties) should be given information regarding the evolution of the intra-framework, at least of a 'historical' and overall nature, so that they can have a rough idea of how the implementation of the contract is being carried out.
Moreover, there is no clear reason why frameworks would require being less transparent than dynamic purchasing systems (which are, in the end, open frameworks), particularly because the contracting authority is in a good position to identify any instances of intra-framework collusion in which the contractors could engage on the basis of the periodical reports they may get.
Consequently, I would favour the creation of a system of delayed and grouped (quarterly) reporting of the intra-framework award/call-off decisions, along the lines of what Art 50(3) Dir 2014/24 and reg.50(5) PCR2015 establish for dynamic purchasing systems.
Modification of contracts during their term under Reg. 72 Public Contracts Regulations 2015
Reg. 72 of the Public Contracts Regulations 2015 (PCR2015) transposes the rules on modification of contracts during their term newly established by Article 72 of Directive 2014/24. I have some comments on the new regime from a competition perspective (below) and an observation concerning the wording of reg.72 PCR2015 from a transposition perspective. Pedro's shorter and possibly sharper remarks are here.
The transposition alters the structure of the provision and groups some limitations [reg.72(2) PCR2015] in a way that eliminates repetition and slightly simplifies it. Reg.72 does not transpose the possibility under Art 72(1)(d)(iii) Dir 2014/24 for contracting authorities to assume themselves the main contractor’s obligations towards its subcontractors, since this was not included in reg.71 PCR2015. This does not represent any infringement of the transposition obligations.
Differently, the only point where re.72 PCR2015 diverges from Art 72 Dir 2014/24 in a (seemingly) material way concerns the possibility to modify contracts under reg.72(1)(b) PCR2015 due to technical or economic issues, particularly concerning interchangeability and interoperability requirements. Art 72(1)(b) Dir 2014/24 allows for such modifications up to 50 % of the value of the original contract (per modification) where the following two cumulative conditions are met: "a change of contractor (i) cannot be made for economic or technical reasons such as requirements of interchangeability or interoperability with existing equipment, services or installations procured under the initial procurement; and (ii) would cause significant inconvenience or substantial duplication of costs for the contracting authority". Conversely, reg.72(1)(b) presents both conditions as alternative "a change of contractor (i) cannot be made for economic or technical reasons such as requirements of interchangeability or interoperability with existing equipment, services or installations procured under the initial procurement, or (ii) would cause significant inconvenience or substantial duplication of costs for the contracting authority".
This is an issue that Dr Totis Kotsonis discussed in Global Revolution VII last Tuesday (and went beyond this general overview). In my own view, the divergence is material because the second condition seems to impose a "threshold of significant inconvenience/duplication of cost" that gets lost if both conditions are not met simultaneously. In my view, this may potentially lead to an infringement of EU law and, consequently, contracting authorities will be well advised to make sure that they comply with both requirements in case they modify contracts under this heading.
More generally, from a competition perspective, my views are as follows [Public Procurement and the EU Competition Rules, 2nd edn (Oxford, Hart, 2015) 426-429]. I have further thoughts on the extension of contracts (ie the modifications covered by reg.72(1)(c) and 72(5) PCR2015, but I save them for some other time.
Renegotiation
of the Main Conditions of the Contract and its Modification
Renegotiation
of the contract during its implementation is another circumstance partially
covered previously in the analysis of the closely related issue of negotiations
immediately before or shortly after contract award. As a preliminary issue, it is
necessary to distinguish between modifications of certain elements of the
contract according to the rules included in the call for tenders and
contractual conditions—such as, for instance, price adjustments according to the
evolution of a given index over time, or the revision of deadlines for the
execution of certain parts of the contract that depend on future events—and
proper renegotiations of the terms of the contract in other cases.[1]
While
the former, which we could label ‘contractual adjustments’ or ‘contractual
revisions’, are not strictly affected by the ban on negotiations (as they
result from the direct implementation of contractual clauses and tender
conditions set and disclosed from the beginning—which, logically, are not re-negotiated
at this stage), the amendment of basic or substantial elements of the contract during
its implementation raises significant concerns. In this regard, it is worth
remembering that negotiation and amendments to the call for tenders and the
tenders themselves are generally restricted, especially before the award of the
contract. By the same token, renegotiation at later stages of contract
implementation has to be approached from a restrictive perspective,[2] since it
could be used to provide favourable treatment to the awardee and, in the end,
generate significant distortions of competition.[3]
In
this regard, it should be stressed that there can be a larger need for limited
renegotiation as the implementation of the contract progresses (as compared to
the same renegotiation right before or shortly after the award of the
contract), as contractors and contracting authorities might be faced with
unexpected situations that require an adjustment of the contract.[4] However, those
renegotiations should normally refer to relatively secondary issues related to the
subject-matter of the contract, and so the adjustment should not require a
material amendment of the basic or fundamental elements of the contract (such
as liability clauses, rules regarding transfer of risk, insurance or guarantee
schemes, etc)—perhaps with the only exception of the scope, delay and price for
the works, goods and services, provided they do not alter the essence of the
contract, which should be analysed separately as instances of extension or
award of additional works.
Therefore,
in order to prevent potential discrimination and distortions of competition,
the same rules applicable to (re)negotiations at earlier stages of the process
should apply, so that changes in the basic, substantial or fundamental elements
of the contract are prevented. In case the contracting authorities’ needs can
no longer be satisfied without introducing such material amendments to the
contractual relationship, it is submitted that the only option will then be to
proceed to the termination of the current contract and the re-tendering of its
subject-matter under new conditions adjusted to the present circumstances
(subject to certain limits). This position has now been endorsed by recital
(107) of Directive 2014/24, which clearly indicates that
It is necessary to clarify the conditions under which modifications to a contract during its performance require a new procurement procedure … A new procurement procedure is required in case of material changes to the initial contract, in particular to the scope and content of the mutual rights and obligations of the parties, including the distribution of intellectual property rights. Such changes demonstrate the parties’ intention to renegotiate essential terms or conditions of that contract. This is the case in particular if the amended conditions would have had an influence on the outcome of the procedure, had they been part of the initial procedure (emphasis added).
Indeed,
these issues have now been regulated in Directive 2014/24, which includes a new
article 72 on the modification of contracts during their term. Most of the
novelties in the Directive 2014/24 are clearly aligned with the proposals
outlined above.[5]
First,
article 72(1)(a) of Directive 2014/24 recognises the possibility to carry out modifications
that have been provided for in the initial procurement documents in clear,
precise and unequivocal review clauses, such as price revision clauses, or
options, and irrespective of their monetary value.[6]
In order to prevent abuses in the use of this possibility, it requires that such
clauses shall state the scope and nature of possible modifications or options
as well as the conditions under which they may be used, and that they shall not
provide for modifications or options that would alter the overall nature of the
contract or the framework agreement.[7]
Secondly, article 72(4) of Directive 2014/24 prevents modifications of contracts that render them materially different in character from the one initially concluded. Article 72(4) also provides a list of conditions that will trigger a modification being considered substantial,[8] which include the following situations: (a) the change of conditions that restricted competition in earlier phases (ie modifications that introduce conditions which, had they been part of the initial procurement procedure, would have allowed for the admission of other candidates than those initially selected or for the acceptance of a tender other than that originally accepted or would have attracted additional participants in the procurement procedure); (b) changes in the economic balance of the contract or the framework agreement in favour of the contractor in a manner which was not provided for in the initial contract or framework agreement; (c) modifications that considerably extend the scope of the contract or framework agreement; or (d) where a new contractor replaces the one to which the contracting authority had initially awarded the contract, except in cases excluded by article 72(1)(d).[9]
However, none of these situations is absolute and, in particular, Directive 2014/24 exempts some sorts of substantial modifications in view of their need or their limited effects. At this point, it is important to stress that, as mentioned, articles 72(1)(a) and 72(4)(a) of Directive 2014/24 exempt modifications of any value or relevance that are carried out in accordance with previously disclosed revision clauses or options, provided they are clear, precise and unequivocal—which, no doubt, will be the focus of significant litigation in the future.[10] In a similar vein, there is some room for modifications that affect the economic balance of the contract (art 72(4)(c)) and/or extend its scope (art 72(4)(d)) by means of additional work.
However, none of these situations is absolute and, in particular, Directive 2014/24 exempts some sorts of substantial modifications in view of their need or their limited effects. At this point, it is important to stress that, as mentioned, articles 72(1)(a) and 72(4)(a) of Directive 2014/24 exempt modifications of any value or relevance that are carried out in accordance with previously disclosed revision clauses or options, provided they are clear, precise and unequivocal—which, no doubt, will be the focus of significant litigation in the future.[10] In a similar vein, there is some room for modifications that affect the economic balance of the contract (art 72(4)(c)) and/or extend its scope (art 72(4)(d)) by means of additional work.
Equally, articles 72(1)(d) and and 72(4)(d) of Directive 2014/24 exempt certain unavoidable changes of contractor, which include three cases: (i) changes that derive from the application of an unequivocal review clause or option (which, probably, would not have needed this reiterative regulation); (ii) changes of contractor derived from the universal or partial succession into the position of the initial contractor, following corporate restructuring, including takeover, merger, acquisition or insolvency, provided that the economic operator taking over fulfils the criteria for qualitative selection initially established, and provided that this does not entail other substantial modifications to the contract and is not aimed at circumventing the application of the Directive; or (iii) in the event that the contracting authority itself assumes the main contractor’s obligations towards its subcontractors where this possibility is provided for under national legislation pursuant to Article 71. Of these three possibilities, and from a competition perspective, the only one that deserves careful consideration is the second one, given that it is the only one that changes the competitive dynamics in the market. In that regard, the application of the last anti-circumvention clause may be particularly relevant in controlling cases of fraudulent corporate restructurings.
Finally, article 72(5) of Directive 2014/24 is very clear in establishing that a new procurement procedure in accordance with its rules (ie, the termination of the existing contract and the consequent re-tendering of the substantially modified contract) will be necessary in all situations where the modification of the contract is substantial and does not derive either from clear, precise and unequivocal revision clauses, or from changes justified on grounds of necessity.
Globally, then, the new rules on the modification of contracts during their term fundamentally keep a pro-competitive orientation and set an appropriate framework that, if properly applied, should minimise competition distortions. However, the rules are not fully-compliant with the needs of a pro-competitive procurement system when it comes to the issue of contractual extensions and the award of additional works, which have received a particularly lenient treatment in Directive 2014/24, as discussed in the following sub-section.
[1] For further details on modifications of
certain (even basic) elements of the contract according to predefined rules
clearly included in the call for tenders, see Case C-496/99 P Succhi di
Frutta [2004] ECR I-3801 118; where the
ECJ determined that, for the contracting authority to be able to amend some conditions
of the invitation to tender after the successful tenderer has been selected,
this possibility has to be expressly regulated in the tender documentation in a
way that determines the framework applicable to this revision and guarantees
that all tenderers are on equal footing when formulating their respective
tenders.
[2] Arrowsmith et al (n 50) 488–503.
[3] Arrowsmith (n 293) 127 and 145.
[4] For discussion, see ME Comba, ‘Contract
Execution in Europe: Different Legal Models with a Common Core’ (2013) European Procurement & Public Private
Partnership Law Review 302.
[5] Which were already included in the first
edition of this book, see Sanchez Graells (n 176) 345–46.
[6] See recital (111) dir 2014/24.
[7] See ST Poulsen, ‘The possibilities of
amending a public contract without a new competitive tendering procedure under
EU law’ (2012) 21 Public Procurement Law
Review 167–87; K Hartlev and M Wahl Liljenbøl, ‘Changes to Existing
Contracts under the EU Public Procurement Rules and the Drafting of Review
Clauses to Avoid the Need for a New Tender’ (2013) 22 Public Procurement Law Review 51–73; and K Smith, ‘Contract
adjustments and public procurement: an analysis of the law and its application’
(PPRG PhD Conference Paper, 2014), available
at nottingham.ac.uk/pprg/documentsarchive/phdconference2014/smith.pdf.
[8] It has been stressed that the key
criteria for the assessment of whether a change should be considered as
substantial are in accordance with the ruling in Case C-454/06 Pressetext
Nachrichtenagentur [2008] ECR I-4401. See Treumer ‘Contract changes and the duty to retender under the
new EU public procurement Directive’ (2014) 149, who also stresses the
differences in drafting between article 72(4) dir 2014/24 and Pressetext.
[9] See recital (110), which provides
clarification regarding cases of justified and unjustified substitution of the
contractor with or without a new procurement procedure.
[10] Similarly, Hartlev and Wahl Liljenbøl,
‘Drafting of Review Clauses to Avoid the Need for a New Tender’ (2013).
Subcontracting under Reg. 71 Public Contracts Regulations 2015
After some refreshing and thought-provoking discussions at the Global Revolution VII conference in Nottingham earlier this week [yes, we inadvertently showed up in the exact same attire... but presented different topics: Pedro's paper is here and mine is here], we now restart our procurement tennis. We have 52 regulations to go, so this will be an interesting summer and we hope that you will continue joining us in the debate.
Pedro's serve on reg.71 is available here. He rightly questions whether contracting authorities have the right incentives to actually engage in significant supply chian monitoring beyond limited obligations for works and services carried out in their premises. I agree. I also think that contracting authorities should not extensively use subcontracting powers to either mandate or prevent subcontracting (see below).
Reg.71 of the Public Contracts Regulations 2015 transposes Art 71 of Directive 2014/24 concerning rules applicable to subcontracting. This is an area where the Commission introduced novelties to foster SMEs' (indirect) participation in procurement through streamlined subcontracting opportunities, as well as some rules strengthening the supply/value added chain monitoring possibilities for contracting authorities [see rec (105) dir 2014/24].
In that regard, and without prejudice to the main contractor's liability vis-a-vis the
contracting authority [reg.71(2) PCR2015; that is, without establishing a direct contractual relationship between the subcontractor(s) and the contracting authority], the latter may ask tenderers
to indicate any share of the contract that they may intend to
subcontract to third parties and any proposed subcontractors [reg.71(1)], and it shall do so where works and/or services are to be provided at a facility under the direct oversight of the contracting authority [reg.71(3) PCR2015]. Any changes in the subcontracting structure for the contract need to be notified to the contracting authority promptly [reg.71(4) PCR2015]. Contracting authorities can extend this obligation to certain contracts not carried out in facilities under the direct oversight of the contracting authority, as well to suppliers involved in works or services contracts, and they can go down the chain beyond the first subcontracting tier [reg.71(7) PCR2015].
This immediately places the contracting authority in a situation where it can monitor and influence the subcontracting activity related to a given contract. However, the transposition of Art 71 Dir 2014/24 in reg.71 PCR2015 has not maximised the subcontracting management possibilities foreseen in the EU rule.
Reg.71 PCR2015 does not include some of the optional mechanisms in Art 71 Dir 2014/24, such as the possibility to create mechanisms of direct payment to subcontractors as per Art 71(3) and (7) Dir 2014/24. However, there are specific rules in reg.113 of Part 4 PCR2015 requiring that 30 day payment terms are flowed down the public sector supply chain, which may mitigate the effects of such transposition option (as we will discuss in due course).
The new rules in reg.71 PCR2015 also try to mitigate the burden of controlling the supply chain that contracting authorities may otherwise face. It is interesting to note that Art 71(1) Dir 2014/24 stresses that "Observance of the obligations referred to in Article 18(2) by subcontractors is ensured through appropriate action by the competent national authorities acting within the scope of their responsibility and remit." Consequently, the duty for contracting authorities to monitor and ensure compliance with environmental, social and labour law by subcontractors is limited to the general principle of reg.56(2) PCR2015, which refers to the tender itself and seems to restrict the scope of monitoring obligations in a significant way.
The new rules in reg.71 PCR2015 also try to mitigate the burden of controlling the supply chain that contracting authorities may otherwise face. It is interesting to note that Art 71(1) Dir 2014/24 stresses that "Observance of the obligations referred to in Article 18(2) by subcontractors is ensured through appropriate action by the competent national authorities acting within the scope of their responsibility and remit." Consequently, the duty for contracting authorities to monitor and ensure compliance with environmental, social and labour law by subcontractors is limited to the general principle of reg.56(2) PCR2015, which refers to the tender itself and seems to restrict the scope of monitoring obligations in a significant way.
This is without prejudice of their discretion to check that subcontractors are not affected by exclusion grounds under reg.57 PCR2015 [see reg.71(8) PCR2015] and seems to fall short from the possibilities foreseen in Art 71 Dir 2014/24 (and, particularly, the lack of transposition of rules imposing joint liability between subcontractors and the main contractor for compliance with environmental, social and labour law (which is, however, not excluded and thus subjected to general contract and tort law principles).
In relation to the enforcement of exclusion grounds on subcontractors, reg. 71(9) PCR2015 determines that the contracting authority shall require that the economic operator replaces a subcontractor in respect of which the verification has shown that there are compulsory grounds for exclusion; and may require the economic operator to do so where there are non-compulsory grounds for exclusion.
Subcontracting and competition
Beyond these supply/value added chain management issues, subcontracting can trigger competition-related concerns that, in my view, also deserve some thought. In that regard, this is what I have submitted in my Public Procurement and the EU Competition Rules, 2nd edn (Oxford, Hart, 215) 353-355.
EU public procurement directives establish
rules on subcontracting with the specific ‘secondary’
policy objective of encouraging the involvement of small and medium-sized
undertakings in the public contracts procurement market (eg, recital (78) dir
2014/24). In this regard, article 71(2) of Directive 2014/24 establishes that
contracting authorities may ask tenderers to indicate any share of the contract
they may intend to subcontract to third parties and any proposed subcontractors—with
the aim of providing transparency in the subcontracting chain (rec (105) dir
2014/24). It also makes it clear that subcontracting does not alter the principal
economic operator’s liability (art 71(4) dir 2014/24) and, in any case, leaving
Member States’ discretion to opt for more stringent liability rules under
national law (art 71(7) dir 2014/24).
The rest of article 71 introduces new
rules on the control of subcontractors and their compliance with exclusion and
qualitative selection criteria and, particularly, compliance with the
environmental and social rules indicated in article 18(2) of Directive 2014/24 (art
71(6) dir 2014/24), as well as new rules on the required checks when
subcontractors are to perform contractual obligations at a facility under the
direct oversight of the contracting authority (art 71(5) dir 2014/24). It also introduces
new rules concerning the direct payment to subcontractors by the contracting
authority. Firstly, it facilitates the establishment of mechanisms of direct
payment to subcontractors upon their request (art 71(3) dir 2014/24) and,
secondly, it allows Member States to go further, for instance, by providing for
direct payments to subcontractors without it being necessary for them to
request such direct payment (art 71(7) dir 2014/24). Therefore, the directive does not impose, but
seems to favour, buying strategies aimed at inducing or mandating the
subcontracting of significant parts of the tendered contracts.[1]
In this regard, it should be stressed
that, although there is no express indication in the directive to that effect,
the percentage of work to be subcontracted by tenderers could in principle be
used as an award criterion in determining the most economically advantageous
tender (ex art 67(2) dir 2014/24)—although doubts can be harboured as to the
relevance of this criterion, particularly for its questionable link to the
subject-matter of the contract (which should not be affected by direct
execution or subcontracting of the works, as long as the undertaking entrusted with
the activity meets the relevant suitability criteria), and for the difficulties
in envisaging the economic advantage that can derive from different levels of subcontracting
(for further details as regards the requirements applicable to award criteria).
Finally, it is also worth underlining
that, according to the interpreting case law of the EU judicature—and largely in
the opposite direction of the approach followed by Directive 2014/24 in article
71, but in line with what is established in article 63(2)[2]—contracting
authorities can prohibit or restrict
the
use of subcontracting for the performance of essential parts of the contract
[more] precisely in the case where the contracting authority has not been in a
position to verify the technical and economic capacities of the subcontractors
when examining the tenders and selecting the lowest tenderer.[3]
Indeed, unchecked subcontracting could
be used to circumvent the controls set up by the public procurement system, particularly
as regards the evaluation of the professional, economic and technical standing
of tenderers. Therefore, restrictions on subcontracting can be justified under
certain circumstances.
In general, then, according to the rules
of the EU public procurement directives and the relevant case law, contracting
authorities enjoy substantial discretion to induce, mandate or prohibit
(depending on the circumstances) the subcontracting of significant parts of the
tendered contracts. However, as economic theory has shown and as experts have
rightly warned, ‘measures to facilitate sub-contracting (or an explicit
requirement to subcontract) may have undesirable competition effects because
they could reduce participation and facilitate collusion’.[4] Consequently,
it seems appropriate to undertake an assessment of these rules in the light of
the principle of competition.
From an economic perspective, it is important
to stress that it has been shown that subcontracting does not usually
reallocate work in an efficient manner and provides the main contractor with
the ability to extract rents from its subcontractors.[5] Consequently,
contrary to the common wisdom encapsulated in recital (78) of Directive 2014/24
(and previously in recital (32) of Directive 2004/18),[6] induced
or mandatory subcontracting is an inadequate instrument to ‘spread’ work or
foster efficient SME participation in public procurement—or, at least, is inferior
to alternative measures such as lot division.[7] Moreover,
subcontracting amongst competitors can be an effective way to enforce collusive
agreements,[8]
or to impose restrictions of competition that could go beyond the indispensible
limits to ensure the proper deployment of the subcontract.[9] Therefore,
in general terms, there seems to be no good reason for contracting authorities to
induce or mandate tenderers to subcontract any significant amount of the works,
services or supplies involved in the tendered contract—particularly taking into
account that the alternative (and less restrictive) mechanism of lot division
is available to them in order to increase competition and foster participation,
specially by SMEs.
In the light of the potential
distortions of competition that can arise from subcontracting requirements, and
as yet another instance of application of the competition principle embedded in
the EU public procurement directives, it is submitted that contracting
authorities should refrain from mandating or inducing subcontracting (in
particular, by using the percentage of subcontracted work as an award
criterion) if this could result in restrictions or distortions of
competition—which is a highly probable situation. It could be argued that, in such
scenario, a general prohibition of subcontracting could be preferable as the default
rule—which could be waived where the subject matter of the contract or the
industry structure so requires. However, this more restrictive rule would
require the contracting authority to second-guess the subcontracting decisions of
the market. Therefore, it is submitted that an obligation to abstain from requiring
or mandating subcontracting is preferable to banning it altogether.
[1] See: S Arrowsmith, The Law of Public and Utilities Procurement. Regulation in the EU and
the UK, Vol. 1, 3rd edn (London, Sweet & Maxwell,2014) 1325–28.
[2] Indeed, it should be taken into
consideration that in the case of works contracts, service contracts and siting
or installation operations in the context of a supply contract, contracting
authorities may require that certain critical tasks be performed directly by
the tenderer itself or by a participant in a group of economic operators as
referred to in article 19(2) of Directive 2014/24, which seems to run contrary
to the facilitation or mandate of subcontracting, at least under specific
circumstances.
[3] Case C-314/01 ARGE [2004] ECR
I-2549 45; and Opinion of AG Kokott in case C-454/06 Pressetext Nachrichtenagentur 56.
[4] OFT (n 13) 19 and 125–27. Along the same
lines, OECD, Public Procurement: Role of Competition Authorities (2007)
9.
[5] Adams and Gray, Monopoly in America (1955)
104. For some empirical support in the same direction, see L Moretti and P
Valbonesi, Subcontracting in Public
Procurement: an empirical investigation (Department of Economics and
Management, University of Padova, Working Paper No. 158, 2012) available at works.bepress.com/paola_valbonesi/24.
[7] Grimm et al (n 386) 174 and 180; also V
Grimm, ‘Sequential versus Bundle Auctions for Recurring
Procurement’ (2007) 90 Journal of Economics 1, 2 and 18.
[8] See: OFT (n 13) 19 and 125–27; Carpineti
et al (n 214) 34; and MJ Shockro, ‘An Antitrust Analysis of the Relationship between Primer Contractors and Their
Subcontractors under a Government Contract’ (1982) 51
Antitrust Law Journal 725.
Another interesting paper on corruption and (induced) collusion in public procurement (Gong & Zhou, 2015)
Still on the topic of interaction between corruption and collusion, or how corrupt officials can create or consolidate collusion in procurement markets, I have come across another interesting recent paper: T Gong & N Zhou, "Corruption and marketization: Formal and informal rules in Chinese public procurement" (2014) 9(1) Regulation & Governance 63-76.
This time, the research focuses on the Chinese experience and shows shockingly (not) similar trends to the Russian case study mentioned yesterday. The paper forcefully argues that 'empirical findings from China indicate that the relationship between
market liberalization and corruption is more complex and nuanced than
conventional wisdom suggests'.
Some of the most interesting insights refer to the collusion (in broad terms) of bidders and public officials to avoid the application of formal public procurement rules (72-73) which, once again, will sound very familiar to scholars and practitioners with experience in any jurisdiction.
Interesting paper on corruption and (induced) collusion in public procurement (Ostrovnaya & Podkolzina, 2015)
In their recent paper "Antitrust Enforcement in Public Procurement: the Case of Russia" (2015) 11(2) Journal of Competition Law & Economics 331-352, M Ostrovnaya and E Podkolzina of the International Laboratory for Institutional Analysis of Economic Reforms discuss an example of interaction between corruption and (apparent) collusion in public procurement for drugs in Russia.
I found the paper an interesting read and some of their insights on how corrupt officials can create or consolidate collusion in procurement markets will certainly ring many bells. This was an issue we recently discussed extensively at a knowledge exchange event at the Law School of the University of Sussex, and one that seems to be triggering increased attention in academic and practitioner circles.
Ostrovnaya and Podkolzina's analysis clearly shows that antitrust intervention against the public sector's restrictive procurement practices was resisted by a specific public buyer, which most likely decided to resort to an orchestrated system of bid covers (or passive bidding, as they label it) to avoid further antitrust intervention--thus deviating the attention of the antitrust watchdog towards the behaviour of the (certainly non-innocent) bidders.
Their case study will be a useful guideline for the development of more effective competition rules applicable to the public sector. Or, at least, a warning against naive assumptions that antitrust intervention can ipso facto exclude issues of (induced) collusion in procurement markets.
CJEU implicitly rejects GC's views on subjective assessment of two-part State aid measures under Art 107(1) TFEU (C-15/14)
In its Judgment in Commission v MOL, C-15/14, EU:C:2015:362, the CJEU upheld the previous Judgment of the GC where the selectivity of two-part State aid measures was assessed with very generous deference towards the State's exercise of regulatory powers (which I criticised here).
The CJEU assessed the criticism by the Commission of the GC's position (T-499/10, paras 64 and 65) that the presence of a selective advantage cannot be deduced from the mere fact that the operator is left better off than other operators when the Member State concerned justifiably confined itself to exercising its regulatory power following a change on the market.
Remarkably, the Commission took issue with the fact that the General Court linked "the
assessment of the selective nature of the ... agreement, and therefore
the measure at issue, to whether or not the Member State concerned had
the intention, at the time of concluding that agreement, of protecting
one or more operators from the application of a new fee regime" (C-15/14, para 85, emphasis added). As the CJEU stresses
According to the Commission, the General Court thus disregarded the settled case-law of the Court of Justice to the effect that Article 107(1) TFEU defines State interventions on the basis of their effects, and independently of the techniques used by the Member States to implement their interventions (see, inter alia, judgments in Belgium v Commission, C‑56/93, EU:C:1996:64, paragraph 79; Belgium v Commission, C‑75/97, EU:C:1999:311, paragraph 25; British Aggregates v Commission, C‑487/06 P, EU:C:2008:757, paragraph 89; and Commission v Government of Gibraltar and United Kingdom, C‑106/09 P and C‑107/09 P, EU:C:2011:732, paragraphs 91, 92 and 98) (C-15/14, para 86).
I had also criticised the GC for the inclusion of the element of "intention" in its previous Judgment. However, I also expressed doubts as to the CJEU's willingness to side by the GC. In my view back then,
If Article 107(1) TFEU is meant to avoid distortions of competition in the internal market, when confronted with sequential, two-part or complex aid measures, the fact that they all formed part of a 'master plan' from the outset or are the 'random or supervening' result of discrete interventions should be irrelevant. Otherwise, the burden of proving 'distortive intent' from the outset may simply make it impossible to pursue these cases. However, it may well be that the remarks made by the GC in para 67 of MOL v Commission will remain a 'mere' obiter dictum and that the assessment of two-part or complex measures will remain much more objective in the future.
Consequently, I was hoping that the CJEU would quash this part of the Judgment in T-499/10. However, the CJEU rejected the argument of the Commission and determined that the GC's argumentation in paras 64 to 67 and 82 of the Judgment in T-499/10 was not vitiated by any error of law. I disagree with the CJEU's arguments to support the GC's position, which deserve close scrutiny (below). However, given that the CJEU has managed to uphold the GC's reasoning and at the same time stress that two-part or complex State aid measures must be assessed without any reference to the "intention" of the Member State, I agree with the outcome of the case.
According to the CJEU,
92 ... the General Court stated, in paragraph 67 of the judgment under appeal, that [under] the case-law of the Court of Justice, ... for the purposes of Article 107(1) TFEU, a single aid measure may consist of combined elements on condition that, having regard to their chronology, their purpose and the circumstances of the undertaking at the time of their intervention, they are so closely linked to each other that they are inseparable from one another (judgment in Bouygues and Bouygues Télécom v Commission and Others and Commission v France and Others, C‑399/10 P and C‑401/10 P, EU:C:2013:175, paragraphs 103 and 104 and the case-law cited).
93 In that context, the General Court emphasised, in paragraph 67 of the judgment under appeal, that a combination of elements such as that relied upon by the Commission in the decision at issue may be categorised as State aid when the State acts in such a way as to protect one or more operators already present on the market, by concluding with them an agreement granting them fee rates guaranteed for the entire duration of that agreement, while having the intention at that time of subsequently exercising its regulatory power, by increasing the fee rate so that other market operators are placed at a disadvantage, be they operators already present on the market on the date on which that agreement was concluded or new operators.
94 It was in the light of those considerations that the General Court, in paragraph 68 of the judgment under appeal, decided that it was necessary to examine whether, in those proceedings, the Commission was entitled to consider that the contested measure was selective.
95 It follows from the foregoing that, as MOL contends, paragraphs 64 to 67 of the judgment under appeal do not, as such, concern the examination of the selectivity of the 2005 agreement, but are preliminary explanations aimed at introducing the relevant framework in relation to which the General Court examined whether the Commission was correct in finding that the measure at issue was selective (sic).
96 As the Advocate General stated in points 107 and 114 of his Opinion, by those preliminary explanations, the General Court in fact sought to deal with the issue of the links existing between the 2005 agreement and the 2008 amendment, which the Commission had not specifically addressed in the decision at issue, and more particularly, to underline the fact that, given that there is no chronological and/or functional link between those two elements, they cannot be interpreted as constituting a single aid measure.
97 By those preliminary explanations, the General Court merely applied the case-law laid down by the Court of Justice in the judgment in Bouygues and Bouygues Télécom v Commission and Others and Commission v France and Others (C‑399/10 P and C‑401/10 P, EU:C:2013:175), to which the General Court also expressly referred in paragraph 67 of the judgment under appeal, and according to which, since State interventions take various forms and have to be assessed in relation to their effects, it cannot be excluded that several consecutive measures of State intervention must, for the purposes of Article 107(1) TFEU, be regarded as a single intervention. That could be the case, in particular when consecutive interventions, having regard to their chronology, their purpose and the circumstances of the undertaking at the time of those interventions, are so closely related to each other that they are inseparable from one another (C-15/14, paras 92 to 97, emphasis added).
I find the reasoning of the CJEU very poor. By artificially breaking up paragraph 67 of the GC's Judgment in paras 92 and 93 of its own Judgment, the CJEU attempts to limit the requirement of the element of "intention" to some mysterious "preliminary explanations" excluded from the selectivity assessment, and this is very unsatisfactory and unconvincing.
In my view, the CJEU should have plain and simply said that the GC would have been wrong to include an element of "intention" in the test applicable to two-part or complex State aid measures, which assessment needs to be carried out in view of objective factors such as 'their chronology, their
purpose and the circumstances of the undertaking at the time of their
intervention, [or whether] they are so closely linked to each other that they are
inseparable from one another' as per Bouygues and Bouygues Télécom v Commission and Others and Commission v France and Others.
Allowing the GC to save face by limiting its erroneous interpretation of that case law in para 67 of T-499/10, or failing to stress the fact that it was an unfortunate expression made obiter dictum (if they wanted to remain deferential) pays lip service to legal certainty. In my view, the CJEU could have decided otherwise because the element of "intention" is actually not assessed at any point of the GC's Judgment and the CJEU was ready to accept the selectivity analysis carried out by the GC. Consequently, there was no need for the strange and convoluted analysis in paras 92 to 97 of the Judgment in C-15/14.
Be it as it may, the silver lining is in the fact that the CJEU has clearly rejected that the test it progressively laid down for the analysis of two-part or complex State aid measures encompasses any subjective element of "intention" on the part of the granting Member State. Consequently, the analysis of the selectivity of measures closely connected will continue to have to be carried out on the basis of purely objective factors, such as 'their chronology, their
purpose and the circumstances of the undertaking at the time of their
intervention, [or whether] they are so closely linked to each other that they are
inseparable from one another. All is well that ends well.
Public procurement podcast series now launched
Dr Pedro Telles (Swansea University) has now launched the Public Procurement Podcast
(PPP), a series of 20 podcasts where he will be interviewing early career researchers in public procurement over the course of the next 12 months. As he puts it, the PPP (funny acronym, talking about procurement) 'is a new and different way of disseminating knowledge related with
public procurement. The PPP aims to provide a platform for Early Career
Academics to talk about key topics of their research in a way and tone
approachable to lay people'.
The PPP is part of a wider project kindly sponsored by the British Academy Rising Star Engagement Awards which will include an Early Career Academic Day during the next Procurement Week conference to be held in March 2016.
Overall, his project aims to give some voice and space to the "new blood" in public procurement and is bound to be a major contribution to the dissemination of very interesting research in the field. The website he has put together looks really good.
His only questionable decision in this project was to invite me for the first podcast, although I am flattered to be considered "young blood". Now seriously, I am really honored to participate in the PPP project and happy with the result of the interview, which is now available here. I think I managed to bomb the end of the recording, though... Listen for yourselves!
Conditions for performance of contracts under Reg. 70 Public Contracts Regulations 2015 [and pause]
Reg. 70 of the Public Contracts Regulations 2015 (PCR2015) transposes the rules of Article 70 of Directive 2014/24 on conditions for the performance of contracts, or contract performance clauses, whereby contracting authorities may lay down special conditions relating to the
performance of a contract, provided that they are linked to the
subject-matter of the contract within the meaning of reg.67(5) PCR2015 / art 67(3) Dir 2014/24, and indicated in the call for competition or in the procurement documents. It also clarifies that those conditions may include economic, innovation-related, environmental, social or employment-related considerations.
I am not a fan of such contract compliance clauses because they are an easy way of imposing restrictions on participation of economic agents by including forward-looking criteria that would require significant monitoring after contract award. My argument is as follows:
I am not a fan of such contract compliance clauses because they are an easy way of imposing restrictions on participation of economic agents by including forward-looking criteria that would require significant monitoring after contract award. My argument is as follows:
An (admittedly controversial) way in which competition could be distorted and equal treatment not guaranteed would be by means of the introduction of requirements that are not possible to validate at tender evaluation stage by the contracting authority, independent certifying companies or other tenderers—or, in the event of a review of the contracting decision, by the review board or authority. Such requirements would be largely related to ‘contract compliance’ conditions or ‘conditions for performance of contracts’ and to commitments by tenderers to accept the contractual obligation to develop a certain activity or to comply with certain forward-looking requirements. This is in principle openly accepted in the modernised rules (see reg.70 PCR2015 and art 70 dir 2014/24). However, it is important to stress that the CJEU has recently quashed the use of this provision for purposes such as the establishment of mínimum wage requirements, given that it would prevent economic operators from exploiting their competitive (cost) advantages, which in my opinion comes to restrict very significantly the virtuality of this provision. In that regard, see Case C-549/13 Bundesdruckerei [2014] pub. electr. EU:C:2014:2235.].
In these cases, competition could be rather easily distorted by strategic tenderers offering to comply with those additional requirements ex ante—thereby formally complying with the award criterion—and breaching the contractual covenant ex post—being then subject to penalties or other contractual remedies, which are largely irrelevant for analytical purposes [in similar terms, harbouring doubts about the legality of forward-looking award criteria, see Racca, Cavallo Perin & Albano, ‘Competition in the Execution Phase of Public Procurement’ (2011) 41(1) Public Contract Law Journal 89].
Ensuring that the award of contracts according to this type of award criteria— particularly if they are given significant weight by the contracting authority—does not result in discrimination or a distortion of competition through the strategic behaviour of tenderers (and, eventually, of contracting authorities) would require a significant amount of monitoring and surveillance after the award of the contract—which is costly and difficult to conduct by any agent other than the parties to the contract. In such circumstances, the room for discrimination and distortions of competition is widened and, consequently, the possibilities for the exercise of unlimited discretion and for the generation of discriminatory and anti-competitive outcomes might be unduly increased.
In this regard, unless very relevant circumstances make the adoption or weighting of such criteria essential or difficult to avoid in relation to the subject-matter of the contract, contracting authorities are bound not to adopt, or to give marginal weight to, award criteria of a forward-looking nature that are not possible to verify or validate at tender evaluation stage (or, more generally, before contract implementation) [on the ban against using award criteria that are not possible to verify, see Case C-448/01 EVN and Wienstrom [2003] ECR I-14527 52. However, cf. with the situation in Case C-19/00 SIAC Construction [2001] ECR I-7725.].
[Pause] I pause for now because this daily commentary is much less fun since Pedro had to take a break. The added value of discussing each other's views is difficult to create with a 4-5 day lag.
Hence, I will resume commenting the provisions of the PCR2015 once Pedro has had time to catch up, which will probably be from Monday 15 June. In the meantime, why not listen to our interview in his first podcast in the PPP series? Click here.
Postscript: Pedro has now caught up, and his views are here.
Postscript: Pedro has now caught up, and his views are here.
Abnormally low tenders under Reg. 69 Public Contracts Regulations 2015
The treatment of abnormally low tenders is configured as a mechanism that allows contracting authorities to depart from the automatic or ‘acritical’ application of award criteria in cases where, for a given contract, tenders appear to be abnormally low in relation to the goods, works or services concerned [reg.69(1) PCR2015]. In these cases, contracting authorities are entitled to reject tenders that, in relation to any of the relevant parameters and award criteria (ie, not only price, at least where the award criterion is that of the most economically advantageous offer; see Case T-495/04 Belfass [2008] ECR II-781 100), appear to be abnormally low.
To do so, contracting authorities should, before rejecting those tenders, request in writing details of the constituent elements of the tender which are considered relevant for the appraisal or verification of its apparent anomaly, such as: the economics of the manufacturing process, of the services provided or of the construction method; technical solutions chosen or exceptionally favourable conditions available to the tenderer for the supply of the products or services or for the execution of the work; originality of the work, supplies or services proposed by the tenderer; compliance with the environmental, labour and social obligations referred to in reg.56(2); compliance with the subcontracting obligations established in reg.71 and the possibility of the tenderer obtaining State aid [reg.69(2) PCR2015]. I will not touch upon the issue of abnormally low tenders tainted with State aid [for that, see A Sanchez Graells, 'Enforcement of State Aid Rules for Services of General Economic Interest before Public Procurement Review Bodies and Courts' (2014) 10(1) Competition Law Review 3-34].
To do so, contracting authorities should, before rejecting those tenders, request in writing details of the constituent elements of the tender which are considered relevant for the appraisal or verification of its apparent anomaly, such as: the economics of the manufacturing process, of the services provided or of the construction method; technical solutions chosen or exceptionally favourable conditions available to the tenderer for the supply of the products or services or for the execution of the work; originality of the work, supplies or services proposed by the tenderer; compliance with the environmental, labour and social obligations referred to in reg.56(2); compliance with the subcontracting obligations established in reg.71 and the possibility of the tenderer obtaining State aid [reg.69(2) PCR2015]. I will not touch upon the issue of abnormally low tenders tainted with State aid [for that, see A Sanchez Graells, 'Enforcement of State Aid Rules for Services of General Economic Interest before Public Procurement Review Bodies and Courts' (2014) 10(1) Competition Law Review 3-34].
The list in reg.69)2) PCR2015 ‘is not exhaustive, [but] it
is also not purely indicative, and therefore does not leave contracting
authorities free to determine which are the relevant factors to be
taken into consideration before rejecting a tender which appears to be
abnormally low’ [see Case C-292/07 Commission v Belgium [2009] I-59 159; and Case C-599/10 Slovensko [2011] ECR I-10873 30].
In view of the evidence supplied by the tenderer upon consultation, the contracting authority shall verify those constituent elements and reach a final decision on whether to reject the apparently abnormally low tender or not [reg.69(3) PCR2015; for a discussion of the standard applicable to the justification of this decision, particularly in the context of a challenge to that decision, see Case T-638/11 European Dynamics Belgium and Others v EMA [2013] pub. electr. EU:T:2013:530.].
In view of the evidence supplied by the tenderer upon consultation, the contracting authority shall verify those constituent elements and reach a final decision on whether to reject the apparently abnormally low tender or not [reg.69(3) PCR2015; for a discussion of the standard applicable to the justification of this decision, particularly in the context of a challenge to that decision, see Case T-638/11 European Dynamics Belgium and Others v EMA [2013] pub. electr. EU:T:2013:530.].
It has been stressed by EU case law that this is ‘a fundamental requirement in the field of public procurement, which obliges a contracting authority to verify, after due hearing of the parties and having regard to its constituent elements, every tender appearing to be abnormally low before rejecting it’ [Case T-495/04 Belfass [2008] ECR II-781 98. Similarly, Joined Cases C-285/99 and C-286/99 Lombardini and Mantovani [2001] ECR I-9233 51]. Indeed, as the CJEU has clearly emphasised, this is a positive and unavoidable requirement, and ‘Article 55 of Directive 2004/18 [now art 69 dir 2014/24] does preclude … a contracting authority from claiming … that it is not obliged to request a tenderer to clarify an abnormally low price’ [Case C-599/10 Slovensko [2011] ECR I-10873 34].
To be sure, other than in the case of violations of the obligations established in reg.56(2) PCR2015, contracting authorities are not expressly obliged to reject abnormally low tenders—their duty is just to identify suspect tenders and scrutinise them following the inter partes procedure established in the directives, whereby ‘the contracting authority must set out clearly the request sent to the tenderers concerned so that they are in a position fully and effectively to show that their tenders are genuine’ [Case C-599/10 Slovensko [2011] ECR I-10873 31]. In this regard, the CJEU has been clear in stressing that the contracting authority is
As stressed by the case law, the directives do not provide a definition of ‘abnormally low tenders’, or a method to calculate an ‘anomaly threshold’—which are issues consequently left to Member States’ domestic regulation, and should be determined for each contract according to the specific purpose it is intended to fulfill (ie, it must be tender-specific). Therefore, the rules of the directives seem to be adequately conceived as a check or balance to the general power of contracting authorities to reject abnormally low tenders—which is an instance of exercise of their broad discretion with regard to the factors to be taken into account for the purpose of deciding to award a contract, or not to award it to a given tenderer.
The justification for this empowerment of contracting authorities to reject abnormally low tenders seems to be that they should not be forced to award the contract under circumstances where there is a reasonable risk of non-performance of the contract or of financial instability or disequilibrium, or a risk of breach of applicable legislation by the contractor during the execution of the contract under the tendered conditions (particularly as regards labour and risk prevention legislation, which have now been transformed into mandatory rejection grounds for abnormally low tenders); since such an award would hardly satisfy the needs of the contracting authorities and/or would force them to assume certain risks that they might not be willing to accept. The appraisal of such risks must be undertaken by contracting authorities from a neutral or objective perspective and be sufficiently motivated [by analogy with reg.69(4) PCR2015].
under a duty, first, to identify suspect tenders, secondly to allow the undertakings concerned to demonstrate their genuineness by asking them to provide the details which it considers appropriate, thirdly to assess the merits of the explanations provided by the persons concerned, and, fourthly, to take a decision as to whether to admit or reject those tenders [Joined Cases C-285/99 and C-286/99 Lombardini and Mantovani [2001] ECR I-9233 55].Hence, the rules of the directive exclusively impose procedural guarantees to be complied with by contracting authorities prior to rejecting apparently abnormally low tenders, and, consequently, seem to be mainly oriented towards providing affected tenderers with the opportunity to demonstrate that their tenders are genuine—ie, are primarily a mechanism to prevent discretionary (or arbitrary) decisions by contracting authorities. In this regard, contracting authorities are obliged to take into account the explanations and proof provided by the affected tenderers and, consequently, cannot apply automatic or simple mathematic rules to reject apparently abnormal tenders—although the use of such rules to identify suspicious tenders should not be ruled out.
As stressed by the case law, the directives do not provide a definition of ‘abnormally low tenders’, or a method to calculate an ‘anomaly threshold’—which are issues consequently left to Member States’ domestic regulation, and should be determined for each contract according to the specific purpose it is intended to fulfill (ie, it must be tender-specific). Therefore, the rules of the directives seem to be adequately conceived as a check or balance to the general power of contracting authorities to reject abnormally low tenders—which is an instance of exercise of their broad discretion with regard to the factors to be taken into account for the purpose of deciding to award a contract, or not to award it to a given tenderer.
The justification for this empowerment of contracting authorities to reject abnormally low tenders seems to be that they should not be forced to award the contract under circumstances where there is a reasonable risk of non-performance of the contract or of financial instability or disequilibrium, or a risk of breach of applicable legislation by the contractor during the execution of the contract under the tendered conditions (particularly as regards labour and risk prevention legislation, which have now been transformed into mandatory rejection grounds for abnormally low tenders); since such an award would hardly satisfy the needs of the contracting authorities and/or would force them to assume certain risks that they might not be willing to accept. The appraisal of such risks must be undertaken by contracting authorities from a neutral or objective perspective and be sufficiently motivated [by analogy with reg.69(4) PCR2015].
To be sure, contracting authorities cannot exercise unlimited discretion in the assessment and eventual rejection of abnormally low tenders and their decisions should be guided by and be compliant with the general principles of the procurement directives and the TFEU—notably, non-discrimination and competition. In this regard, it should be remembered that the treatment of abnormally low tenders by contracting authorities might generate competition distortions and/or have a negative impact on innovation and, consequently, its analysis also merits further consideration.
This is an area where Dr Grith Skovgaard Ølykke made a significant
contribution with her PhD [Abnormally Low Tenders—with an Emphasis on Public Tenderers (Copenhagen, DJØF, 2010)] and where she continues to research very
actively. For her views on the novelties regarding abnormally low
tenders in Dir 2014/24, see this video of last year's Procurement Week.
(c) ICPS Bangor
My own views on the novelties and the interpretation of Art 69 Dir 2014/24, which apply without changes to reg.69 PCR2015, are further developed in Public procurement and the EU competition rules, 2nd edn (Oxford, Hart, 2015) 400-410, as well as in 'Rejection of Abnormally Low and Non-Compliant Tenders in EU Public Procurement: A Comparative View on Selected Jurisdictions', M Comba & S Treumer (eds) Award of Contracts in EU Procurements, vol. 5 European Procurement Law Series (Copenhagen, DJØF, 2013) 267-302.
Life-cycle costing under Reg. 68 Public Contracts Regulations 2015
Reg.68 of the Public Contracts Regulations 2015 (PCR2015) introduces new rules on life-cycle costing and transposes Article 68 of Directive 2014/24. This is an area of heated debate. See Pedro's views and the stream of comments in his blog.
It is interesting to stress the rationale given in recital (96) Dir 2014/24 for the adoption of life-cycle costing, which presents it as a particular methodology linked to the award of contracts under either the most cost effective (MCE) or the best price-quality ratio (BPQR) criterion in any cases where price is not the only consideration.
It should be taken into account that Dir 2014/24 allows Member States to prohibit or restrict the use of price only or cost only to assess the most economically advantageous tender (MEAT), where they deem this appropriate 'to encourage a greater quality orientation of public procurement' (rec (90) and art 67(2) in fine dir 2014/24). The PCR2015, however, have not included such a restriction and, consequently, contracting authorities in England and Wales can still opt for price-only award where they consider it a workable award criterion.
Generally, though, Dir 2014/24 is clear in stressing that 'except where it is assessed on the basis of price
only, contracting authorities can determine the most economically
advantageous tender and the lowest cost using a life-cycle costing
approach ... [which] includes all costs over the
life cycle of works, supplies or services.' This is reflected in reg.67(2) PCR2015, according to which the MEAT 'shall be identified on the basis of the price or cost, using a
cost-effectiveness approach, such as life-cycle costing'.
That general approach is fleshed out in reg.68(1) PCR2015, according to which contracting authorities can take into consideration the prices offered by tenderers and other costs included in the applicable life cycle costing methodology, if any, which would include both (a) costs borne by the contracting authority or other users such as costs relating to acquisition, costs of use, such as consumption of energy and other resources, maintenance costs, or end of life costs, such as collection and recycling costs; and (b) costs imputed to environmental externalities linked to the product, service or works during its life cycle. However, these externalities can only be taken into account if their monetary value can be determined and verified [reg.68(1)(b) PCR2015].
Such externality-related costs may include the cost of emissions of greenhouse gases and of other pollutant emissions and other climate change mitigation costs [reg.68(2) PCR2015; for discussion, see D Dragos and B Neamtu, ‘Sustainable Public Procurement: Life-Cycle Costing in the New EU Directive Proposal’ (2013) European Procurement & Public Private Partnership Law Review 19–30. See also O Perera, B Morton and T Perfrement, Life Cycle Costing in Sustainable Public Procurement: A Question of Value (IISD Paper, 2009)].
Reg.68 PCR2015 then goes on to specify that the methods used for assessing
costs imputed to environmental externalities should be established in
advance in an objective and non-discriminatory manner and be accessible
to all interested parties. Such methods can be established at national,
regional or local level, but they should, to avoid distortions of
competition through tailor-made methodologies, remain general in the
sense that they should not be set up specifically for a particular
public procurement procedure [see rec (96) Dir 2014/24]. In the specific terms of reg.68(3)(a) PCR2015, the methods must be 'based on objectively verifiable and non-discriminatory criteria and, in particular, where [they have] not been established for repeated or continuous application, [they] shall not unduly favour or disadvantage certain economic operators'.
Common methodologies should be
developed at Union level for the calculation of life-cycle costs for
specific categories of supplies or services. Where such common
methodologies are developed, their use should be made compulsory [reg.68(5) PCR2015]. However, it is worth stressing that, to date, the only methodology developed at EU level affects vehicles (see Directive 2009/33/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and additional information here).
Rec (96) Dir 2014/24 goes beyond reg.68 PCR2015 (and art 68 dir 2014/24) and expresses a political desideratum that, furthermore, the feasibility of
establishing a common methodology on social life cycle costing should be
examined, taking into account existing methodologies such as the
Guidelines for Social Life Cycle Assessment of Products adopted within
the framework of the United Nations Environment Programme.
What to make of this? Or, actually, what not to make of this...
In my view, the treatment of life-cycle costing must be distinguished in two parts. A relatively feasible part (which is desirable and should be promoted) and a science-fiction part (which is loaded with space for political and strategic behaviour and should be avoided).
The relatively feasible part concerns the costs actually borne by the contracting authority or third parties and is limited to the costs comprised by reg.68(1)(a) PCR2015, that is, costs relating to acquisition, costs of use, such as consumption of energy and other resources, maintenance costs, and end of life costs, such as collection and recycling costs.
This is life-cycle costing strictly speaking and it should be possible to develop costing models that are sufficiently simple and easy to apply so as to comply with the requirement of reg.68(3)(c) PCR2015--for some reason, not directly applicable to this specific bit of life-cycle costing (but an obvious implicit requirement in operative terms)--that 'the data required [must be susceptible of being] provided with reasonable effort by normally diligent economic operators, including economic operators from third countries'.
In contrast, the science-fiction part concerns the imputation of environmental externalities, given that they refer to costs not actually (directly) borne by any specific economic agent [or reversely, indirectly borne by us all, in the textbook example of the tragedy of the commons; see G Hardin, 'The Tragedy of the Commons' (1968) 162(3859) Science 1243-1248]. If read in its straightforward literal meaning, the provisions related to the calculation of costs covered by reg.68(1)(b) are dis-applied by the final caveat that 'costs imputed to environmental externalities linked to the product, service or works during its life cycle [can be taken into account] provided their monetary value can be determined and verified.'
As things stand today, and regardless of the well-intended promotion of studies and research in the environmental economics field, it is actually impossible to determine the monetary value of those externalities to any degree of predictability that could be operationalised in a well-functioning legal rule.
Any non-market based model is bound to be based on an enormous and vastly complicated set of assumptions that make its verification (as in reality check) impossible [see M Sagoff, 'The rise and fall of ecological economics. A cautionary tale' (2012) 2 Breakthrough Journal 45-58; and I Røpke, The emergence and current challenges of ecological economics (Inagural lecture, University of Aarhus)]. Environmental economists are confronted with a very notable set of difficulties when trying to price or monetize very significant elements of their models [for discussion, see the brief account of difficulties presented by SL Conner & MR Hyman, 'Adjusting prices for externalities' (2012) Readings and Cases in Sustainability Marketing: A Strategic Approach to Social Responsibility 1-25]. Consequently, the difficulties faced by this branch of economics makes it at least premature (if not reckless) to import their models and apply them in practice. Not to mention the complexity of using those models, which would in any case make it disproportionate for most contracting authorities to engage in this sort of complicated exercise for their regular purchases.
Equally, any market-based model is bound to fail [for thought-provoking discussion, see P Bond, ‘Climate’s value, prices and crises. Geopolitical limits to financialization’s ecological fix’ (2015) Leverhulme Centre for the Study of Value Working Paper Series No. 9], not least due to the lack of actual political will of the Member States to create a properly working European market for greenhouse emission rights trading, despite the repeated efforts of the European Union [as warned by even kind approaches to an assessment of its effectiveness; see T Laing, M Sato, M Grubb & C Comberti, ‘Assessing the effectiveness of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme’ (2013) Centre for Climate Change Economics and Policy Working Paper No. 126]. The hands-off approach adopted by the CJEU and its reluctance to twist the Member States' arms in this area definitely doesn't help.
Consequently, in my opinion, contracting authorities will be well advised to use only the life-cycle costing provisions related to costs actually borne by specific economic agents (either themselves or third parties) under reg.68(1)(a) PCR2015, and to leave overly-complicated and technically unsolved issues with the pricing of environmental externalities aside, regardless of the legally enabling nature of reg.68(1)(b) and (2) PCR2015.
New SSRN short paper on Art 18(1) Dir 2014/24 and other competition and procurement issues
I have been invited by the e-Competitions Bulletin to write the third edition of my foreword to their special issue on public procurement. I have uploaded the draft on SSRN and the paper is now downloadable as A Sanchez Graells, 'Public Procurement: A 2015 Updated Overview of EU and National Case Law' (June 1, 2015), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2613076.
Contract award criteria under Reg. 67 Public Contracts Regulations 2015
Reg.67 of the Public Contracts Regulations 2015 (PCR2015) transposes Art 67 of Directive 2014/24 regarding the rules applicable to the selection and application of award criteria. Pedro has contributed some sharp critical remarks here.
The 2014 EU rules (and now the PCR2015) introduce some significant changes on this crucial issue and, primarily, aim to erode the traditional distinction between selection and award criteria derived from Lianakis, which is now 'adjusted' to allow for the consideration of the experience of specific members of staff as an award criterion [reg.67(3)(b) PCR2015].
They also aim at furthering the flexibility given by the CJEU in the Dutch coffee case, and therefore allowing for the use of 'invisible' factors as award criteria even where those factors do not form part of the material substance of the works, supplies or services covered by the contract, provided that they are involved in either (a) the specific process of production, provision or trading of those works, supplies or services, or (b) a specific process for another stage of their life cycle [reg.67(5) PCR2015].
Nonetheless, or precisely as an important check to that increased flexibility, the new rules keep the classical pro-competitive requirement whereby award criteria 'shall ensure the possibility of effective competition' [reg.67(7)(a) PCR2015]. This needs to be connected to the general principle of competition in reg.18(2) PCR2015, and it is not hard to foresee that a significant number of cases where infringement of the general principle is raised will be concerned with issues with award criteria and/or their interpretation and application.
I think that Art 67 Dir 2014/24 deserves quite extensive analysis and I have covered most of the issues I can identify in that provision in my Public Procurement and the EU Competition Rules, 2nd edn (Oxford, Hart, 2015) 378-391. They are too lengthy to repeat them here. Hence, I will only discuss the two main changes that Art 67 has brought about. I hope that, despite being limited, the comments will be interesting.
The interpretative case law has been clear in restricting the use of certain types of criteria for the determination of the offer with the best price-quality ratio (and, ultimately, of the most economically advantageous offer)—which, although relevant in general terms, are not tender-specific criteria. In the first place, as already mentioned, criteria of economic and financial standing and of technical capability, and criteria that concern the tenderers’ suitability to perform the contract in general terms do not have the status of award criteria—but must be considered qualitative selection criteria under the rules of the directives. As stressed by the EU judicature, ‘“award criteria” do not include criteria that are not aimed at identifying the tender which is economically the most advantageous, but are instead essentially linked to the evaluation of the tenderers’ ability to perform the contract in question’ [Case C-532/06 Lianakis [2008] ECR I-251 30].
Therefore, ‘a contracting authority is precluded … from taking into account as “award criteria” rather than as “qualitative selection criteria” the tenderers’ experience, manpower and equipment, or their ability to perform the contract by the anticipated deadline’ [ibid, 32; see S Treumer, ‘The Distinction between Selection and Award Criteria in EC Public Procurement Law—A Rule without Exception’ (2009) 18 Public Procurement Law Review 103]. Hence, with no doubts, the case law of the CJEU prior to the entry into effect of the 2014 rules prevents contracting authorities from using the past experience of the tenderer as an award criterion [S Arrowsmith, The Law of Public and Utilities Procurement. Regulation in the EU and the UK, Vol. 1, 3rd edn (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2014) 749-61].
However, it must be stressed that this has been the object of a significant reform in Directive 2014/24, given the specific introduction of a modified experience criterion that, according to article 67(2)(b), allows contraction authorities to determine the BPQR offer partially on the basis of the ‘experience of staff assigned to performing the contract, where the quality of the staff assigned can have a significant impact on the level of performance of the contract’. In that way, Directive 2014/24 decouples the treatment of the general experience of the tenderer as a qualitative selection criterion [art 58(4), where the CJEU case law applies full-force] from the assessment of more limited and specific aspects of experience evaluation clearly linked to the subject-matter of the contract, which allow for the specific experience of staff assigned to performing the contract to be taken into consideration at award stage, ‘where the quality of the staff assigned can have a significant impact on the level of performance of the contract’ [art 67(2)(b) dir 2014/24, which restricts, specifies or modifies the CJEU position].
The justification given by Directive 2014/24 for this change is that
Indeed, it must be stressed that admissible award criteria must in any case be tender-specific, or relate to the tender as such, not to the general qualities of the tenderer that have already (or should have) been analysed by the contracting authority in previous phases of the procedure. The EU judicature has been crystal clear in emphasising this limitation, by stressing that
Wherever the quality of the staff employed is relevant to the level of performance of the contract, contracting authorities should also be allowed to use as an award criterion the organisation, qualification and experience of the staff assigned to performing the contract in question, as this can affect the quality of contract performance and, as a result, the economic value of the tender. This might be the case, for example, in contracts for intellectual services such as consultancy or architectural services. Contracting authorities which make use of this possibility should ensure, by appropriate contractual means, that the staff assigned to contract performance effectively fulfill the specified quality standards and that such staff can only be replaced with the consent of the contracting authority which verifies that the replacement staff affords an equivalent level of quality [rec (94), emphasis added].In my view, all of this indicates that the use of staff (specific) experience at award stage will need to be assessed under strict proportionality terms (particularly as the ‘significance’ of its impact on the level of performance of the contract is concerned), given that exceptions [art 67(2)(b)] to the general rules [art 58(4)] of Directive 2014/24 and the applicable interpretative case law need to be constructed strictly. Moreover, recourse to this sort of award criterion will still need to comply with general requirements and avoid distortions of competition such as first comer advantages for incumbent contractors.
Indeed, it must be stressed that admissible award criteria must in any case be tender-specific, or relate to the tender as such, not to the general qualities of the tenderer that have already (or should have) been analysed by the contracting authority in previous phases of the procedure. The EU judicature has been crystal clear in emphasising this limitation, by stressing that
it is settled case law that the quality of tenders must be evaluated on the basis of the tenders themselves and not on that of the experience acquired by the tenderers with the contracting authority in connection with previous contracts or on the basis of the selection criteria (such as the technical standing of candidates) which were checked at the stage of selecting applications and which cannot be taken into account again for the purpose of comparing the tenders [Case T-148/04 TQ3 Travel Solutions [2005] ECR II-2627 86. See also Case 31/87 Beentjes [1988] ECR 4635 15; and Case T-169/00 Esedra [2002] ECR II-609 158.].Consequently, the award criteria must be relevant from a tender-specific standpoint.
Restrictions Derived from Award Criteria that Result in de facto Exclusion of Tenders or the Advantage of Some Tenders over Others
Even if rules on qualitative selection and non-discrimination requirements are formally complied with in a given tender, the adoption of certain award criteria could generate the same results as an infringement of those rules. That could be the case if the award criteria or their weighting favoured tenders submitted by certain operators on the basis of conditions that could not have been used for the purposes of the qualitative selection of candidates or that automatically exclude de facto a significant number of tenders (or even restrict the number of compliant tenders to one).
For instance, they could do so by requiring the implementation of quality management systems for the purposes of the specific contract that would have proven excessive or irrelevant for the purposes of assessing the general suitability of the tenderer [however, this has been accepted as a proportionate requirement by the GC in Kieffer Omnitec v Commission, T-288/11, EU:T:2013:228; for criticism, see here]; or that exclude certain operators because they focus on requirements whose implementation would be impossible for tenderers that did not comply with these or other requirements beforehand, or whose partial implementation would not be economically viable with regard exclusively to the specific contract.
These sort of requirements are now potentially covered by article 67(2) of Directive 2014/24, given that it allows contracting authorities to include award criteria that do not relate ‘to an intrinsic characteristic of a product, that is to say something which forms part of the material substance thereof’ and, consequently, can focus on factors involved in the specific process of production, provision or trading or a specific process for another stage of their life cycle, ‘even where such factors do not form part of their material substance’ In these instances, it is still important to highlight that the adoption of such award criteria could generate significant distortions or restrictions of competition—without, it must be admitted, generating a substantial potential for discrimination and, currently, with an apparent legal coverage under article 67(2) of Directive 2014/24.
Therefore, in view of the requirements of the principle of competition, such a strategy should be significantly restricted and contracting authorities should guarantee that the award criteria and their weighting ensure equality of opportunity of all tenderers and, consequently, should not focus on or advantage compliance with criteria not restricted to the tender itself—ie, criteria that undertakings would be in a position to comply with or not depending on previous or general conditions unrelated (or not specifically related) to the subject-matter of the contract.
For instance, if certifying compliance with a given quality standard for the product required the previous certification of the general operations of the undertaking as being compliant with a more general quality control system, and the tender documents did not require tenderers to be certified under that standard—then, giving better evaluations to certified than to non-certified products would generate a distortion of competition by de facto excluding or reducing the chances of award to non-certified undertakings (which would not be in a position to get the products certified only for the purposes of the tender). Therefore, by indirectly advantaging or requiring compliance with a condition not imposed at the qualitative selection stage, which refers to more general conditions unrelated to the specific contract, the contracting authority would be distorting competition in a way that should be declared to run contrary to the directives.
Drawing the line between, on the one hand, justified award criteria related to production processes or elements related to other stages in the life cycle of the products or services and, on the other hand, excessive and unjustified requirements that de facto advantage certain competitors over others will be difficult. In my view, it should be conducted on the basis of a strict proportionality requirement aimed at preventing unjustified distortions of competition.
These issues were recently analysed (in general terms) by the CJEU in relation to requirements concerning corporate social responsibility policies and, more specifically, with a focus on requirements of compliance with ‘criteria of sustainability of purchases and socially responsible business’. These are requirements that clearly affect tenderers as a whole and are remotely related to the specific scope of the contract (where contracting authorities can, however, avail themselves from the use of social labels) [Commission v Netherlands, C-368/10, EU:C:2012:284 98-112]. In that regard, and in line with what is here submitted, it is important to stress that the CJEU rejected the possibility to consider such requirements as the establishment of minimum levels of professional or technical ability and emphasised that such type of considerations are incompatible with the rules of the procurement Directives when they are unrelated or go beyond the subject matter of the contract [ibid, 106-108].
Consequently, in order to avoid distortions of competition (and regardless of the creation of discriminatory situations), contracting authorities must refrain from setting such type of requirements as either selection or award criteria that result in de facto exclusion of tenders or the advantage of some tenders over others. In my opinion, the reasoning of the CJEU regarding those requirements at qualitative selection phase are transferable mutatis mutandis to their introduction as award criteria under article 67(2) of Directive 2014/24. Otherwise, the use of this new provision would further erode and damage the distinction between selection and award criteria, which the CJEU has recently emphasised and which, consequently, should be respected in the detailed application of the rules concerning award criteria [Spain v Commission, C-641/13 P, EU:C:2014:2264].